

THE CAMBRIDGE SHORTER HISTORY
OF INDIA

Part III (British India)

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THE
CAMBRIDGE SHORTER HISTORY
OF INDIA

BRITISH INDIA

by

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PREFACE TO THE CAMBRIDGE SHORTER HISTORY OF INDIA

The *Cambridge Shorter History of India* seeks to provide the general reader with a complete account of Indian political history from its beginning down to the year in which the reforms of 1919 were initiated. For many reasons no single person could hope to succeed in such an attempt. No living person possesses, or indeed is likely to possess, an adequate knowledge of the Sanskrit and Pali texts and inscriptions, of the Persian and Marathi chronicles and documents, and of the administrative records of the English Government. A co-operative method is therefore unavoidable. But it was thought that, if the collaboration were limited to three persons, a volume might be produced founded in each of its sections on original materials, and yet possessing, so far as each section went, a unity of conception and treatment unattainable when individual topics are handled by individual specialists.

The general aim of the authors has been to take full advantage of the knowledge and experience embodied in the various volumes of the *Cambridge History of India*, but to reserve to themselves complete liberty of judgment. The present volume is far from being a mere *résumé* of the larger work, and it is hoped that it will provide in a compact form that survey of Indian history as a whole which has long been sorely needed and which no existing volume satisfactorily supplies.

In two respects the present volume departs from the practice of the later volumes of the *Cambridge History*. In order to bring them into line with the *Cambridge History of the British Empire* of which they also form a part, diacritical marks were omitted, and no maps were included. But the considerations which justified those decisions do not apply to the present volume. The general reader cannot be expected to be familiar with the pronunciation of the less common Indian names. The long vowels have therefore been marked in order to provide him with a rough guide. For a similar reason a series of maps has been included. With one exception these maps have been specially drawn. But the editor has gratefully to acknowledge the courtesy of Dr C. C. Davies, in allowing him to illustrate the North-West Frontier with a section of a map which appeared in Dr Davies's work on that subject.



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CHAPTER I

The Coming of European Influence

The epochs of Indian history have been determined by the appearance from time to time of foreign influences. At the dawn of recorded events is the coming of the Aryan, whose intermingling with the peoples of India begot the elaborate social system and the philosophy of life which we know as Hinduism. For a thousand years it followed the normal human cycles of development and decay, and then the Muslims burst upon India, first merely touching an outlying province, but later establishing themselves firmly over the north, founding great states, building mosques to the might of Islam out of the stones of desecrated temples, and cleaving the population into two most sharply defined sections, differing profoundly in outlook, in faith, in philosophy, in politics. Lastly, eight centuries afterwards came European influences, unlike the others for they arrived, not by the Afghan passes, but by the ocean, bringing powers yet more subversive than Aryan metaphysic or the Muslim sword.

The coming of the Portuguese marks the first impact of modern western science upon the Indian world. Earlier relations between East and West had produced little but the exchange of goods. Greek and Roman, Genoese and Venetian had bought in Indian markets, pepper and cloves, gaily-dyed calicoes and rich silks; but their intercourse had been politically sterile. Different as were the ideas of European and Indian, the dominion of both the one and the other over the realm of nature was subject to the same narrow limitations. But with the European renaissance Western man became the master of ocean travel. Of all the agents of political and social change none have been so powerful as the inventions which have increased human powers of movement; and politically the great achievement of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries was neither the revolution in political or religious thought, nor the transformation of the European state-system, but the development of the art of guiding ships to unseen points across the ocean and the building of vessels stout enough to brave the storms of the open sea.

In this great work the Portuguese had led the way. A number of causes co-operated. Fronting on the Atlantic Ocean, the country had bred a race of mariners accustomed to the constant risk of life. The history of the kingdom had been in its earlier stages a long crusade against the Moors, and once these had been expelled it was most natural to pursue the attack on the African shore. In 1415 Ceuta was captured. In this exploit a young prince of barely twenty-one took part. He proved to be a man equally great in character and in intelligence. Prince Henry, whom historians have commonly called "the Navigator", grasped to the full the importance of maritime exploration and of nautical skill. The shape of the world was still a matter of speculation. The configuration of Asia and Africa was still uncertain. The existence of the New World was not even guessed. The African coast down as far as Cape Bojador was vaguely known, but the paths beyond were barred not only by shoals and currents, but by yet more terrifying beliefs borrowed from Arab legend, that all who passed beyond would turn black like the inhabitants, that they would be devoured by dragons, that they would be lost for ever in the Green Sea of Night.

It is not easy to understand what stout hearts and strong leadership were needed by adventurers into these regions of unknown peril. Prince Henry set himself to replace fancy by observed fact. At Sagres, close to Cape St Vincent, he built a naval arsenal and an observatory, and devoted his life to improving the rough instruments by which men directed their course at sea, to sending forth missions of exploration, to studying their reports, and plotting out on maps the information thus secured. By the time of his death in 1463 the African coast had been explored as far as Cape Mesurado, trading factories had been set up, the trade in guns and gold and slaves had been established, and the papal bull *Romanus Pontifex* had bestowed on the king of Portugal exclusive rights on the African coast from Cape Non to Guinea.

The voyages by which these results had been accomplished had been mere coasting voyages. But the Portuguese shipwrights were gradually mastering the art of naval construction. Their problems were not simple. Great ships (as men in those days reckoned greatness) were needed, in part the more easily to ride the great waves that came in from the Atlantic, in part to accommodate large numbers of men and the provisions that they

required for voyages of most uncertain length. Under this pressure the art of shipbuilding rapidly improved. By the middle of the fifteenth century, by the time that the Turks had captured Constantinople, the Portuguese had made great strides towards the objects which Prince Henry had set before his countrymen.

His motive had been principally religious. The stars of his horoscope destined him to spread the faith. Azurara, the Portuguese chronicler, describes him as eager to bring Christianity to "the vast tribes lying under the wrath of God", to find out the real strength of the Moorish enemy, and to join hands with Presbyter John, the fabled Christian prince of the East, so that Islam might be completely and finally overthrown. Closely interwoven with these religious motives were the hopes of national wealth and power, and no doubt in lesser minds mere personal objects were predominant. But for the moment the capture of Constantinople disposed men to set the crusading motive foremost. In easy, tolerant Italy men might jest at the possible replacement of the pope by the sultan, but in Spain and Portugal, where men had fought for the faith, the idea of revived Muslim dominion was an abomination.

King João II, who ruled Portugal from 1481 to 1495, with extraordinary energy and hope, carried on the work that Prince Henry had begun. By his time the African trade had begun to have an importance of its own. In the year of his accession he sent an expedition to found a permanent settlement on the Guinea coast. He built the fortress of St George of the Mine—*São Jorge da Mina*. It soon received the title and privileges of a city, and in its church a daily mass was said for the great prince whose far-sighted efforts had made its building possible. King João at the same time pushed his enquiries by sending expeditions overland. One directed southwards reached Timbuctoo, and another eastwards reached the Malabar coast. In the words of Barros, the king "roared round Africa like a famished lion", in the hope that his vessels would find the southern extremity of the continent, lay open the sea-route to India, and release the Eastern trade from the shackles which Turkish dominion in the Levant had set upon all that passed by the familiar overland ways. The reward of his persistence was that in 1486 Bartholomew Dias was driven by storms far to the southward and discovered what he called the Cape of Storms on his return, the king renaming the dis-

covery the Cape of Good Hope, in allusion to his unfulfilled desire of reaching India.

In 1495 he was succeeded by Manoel, in whom religious zeal burned with extraordinary vigour. The new king even expelled the Jews from his kingdom for the sake of marrying a daughter of Ferdinand and Isabella. But he pursued the same eastern goal as his predecessor. In 1497 he despatched a new expedition, consisting of four ships under Vasco da Gama. Though Vasco's earlier exploits are unknown, he was a born leader of men. His own energy and endurance were extraordinary; his anger terrible, cruel, unforgetting; his courage indomitable. He sailed in the *São Gabriel*, whose figurehead is said still to be preserved in a monastery at Belem, and with him went three smaller vessels. Putting to sea on July 8, he reached the Natal coast at Christmas. He then sailed northwards up the African coast to Melinda, whence information, gathered from traders following the overland route, had assured the Portuguese that they could strike across direct to India. On May 17, 1498, da Gama made his landfall eight miles north of Calicut. The sea-route to the Indies had been made clear by nearly a century of unabating effort.

In four respects the Portuguese were singularly fortunate. Arriving on the Malabar Coast, they found themselves in touch with a multitude of small princes divided by mutual jealousy, so that hostility in one was certain to be accompanied by friendship in another. Furthermore, the country round Cochin and Calicut did not at that time produce enough rice for the needs of the inhabitants, who were supplied by Muslim vessels with grain from the Coromandel Coast; the region was therefore peculiarly sensitive to a blockade by sea. Again, reaching India at the close of the fifteenth century, the Portuguese found no state which could make either great or sustained efforts to prevent their establishment. And lastly the difficulties which they had had to meet and overcome implied that for purposes of war their vessels would be stouter and more formidable than any ships they would meet in Indian waters. This last was of all the most important, for the position which the Portuguese would occupy in the East certainly depended upon naval power. Their nation was too small, in view of the conditions of land warfare, for them to dream of establishing a military empire. They were vowed to the destruction (if they could possibly contrive it) of

Muslim states, and therefore could not contemplate taking up the position of unarmed and helpless traders. Supremacy at sea was the essential condition of success. And the physical circumstances which had fostered the early development of eastern seafaring had not promoted sustained progress. The regular and periodic winds which blow in the Indian seas had permitted men to sail easily and regularly at certain seasons of the year from Aden and Basra to Gujarāt, from Bengal to Malacca, from Malacca to Malabar; but their very strength and regularity had forbidden all attempts to sail against them, while cyclone and typhoon were too awful in their might for primitive sailors to dream of meeting and outliving them. Eastern mariners and vessels were therefore trained and built for voyaging with reliable and favourable winds. Their vessels were frail compared with the ships built to resist Atlantic storms. The consequence was firstly that Portuguese shipping could hold the seas in weather which would send all possible enemies fleeing for the first windward port and secondly that the Portuguese could mount cannon, the recoil of which would have shaken Indian vessels to pieces at the first discharge.

The results were not long in appearing. Da Gama reached Lisbon in August, 1499, with cargoes of spice, which he had obtained at Calicut in spite of the opposition of the Moplah traders. In the following year a new expedition was despatched. This consisted of thirteen vessels, heavily armed and carrying 1200 men, able to meet and destroy any Muslim enemies whom they might find in the Indian seas. Stretching well to the westward, in order to avoid the calms which had prolonged da Gama's voyage, the new expedition made a much more rapid passage, reaching Calicut in only a few days over six months, having touched the Brazilian coast on its way. The leader, Cabral, after long discussions with the Zamōrin of Calicut, probably over the admission of Muslim vessels to trade, broke irrevocably with the Zamōrin and, with only two of his ships laden, sailed to the neighbouring but independent port of Cochin. There he was welcomed, and found cargoes much easier to procure. Only five of the ships found their way back to Portugal, but their lading sufficed to cover the whole cost of the expedition, and from this time Cochin was regarded as the trading headquarters. Its harbour was excellent, its communications with the pepper country good, and its jealousy of Calicut permanent.

Cabral's expedition led to a great development of Portuguese policy. This was marked by the king's assuming the title of "Lord of the Navigation, Conquest, and Trade of Ethiopia, Arabia, Persia and India", and by the despatch of a great expedition—da Gama's second voyage—to assert the claim. The fleet consisted of twenty vessels, five of which were to remain in Indian waters when the rest returned to Europe. A regular trade was to be accompanied by a permanent force. Da Gama sailed in 1502. His conduct was marked by a consistent and even ferocious hostility towards Muslim ships and traders and the ports which protected them. Falling in with a vessel from Jeddah bound for Calicut, he plundered and destroyed it with all on board. At Calicut, being denied the expulsion which he demanded of every Muslim, he seized a great number of small craft, bombarded the town, hanged his prisoners at the yard-arm, and sent their heads and hands ashore.

In the next year, 1503, more ships were sent from Portugal, with orders to build a fort at Cochin to protect it from the attacks which the Zamorin would certainly make upon it. Though the proposal was unwelcome to some at least of the raja's advisers, "yet", as Albuquerque wrote, "to furnish his estate the more safely, and to preserve the friendship of the king of Portugal, and also to keep the great profit which accrued to him from this commerce, he... was pleased to grant a site for the building of the fortress". Temporary defences of wood and earth were at once thrown up; and though the Zamorin, in 1503 and 1504, repeatedly attacked Cochin with all the forces he could assemble, his attacks were beaten off with the aid of a small body of Portuguese under the famous Duarte Pacheco, who clearly established the military value of the Portuguese as allies. Portuguese power at sea became even clearer in 1506, when the Zamorin and the Moplahs, seeking safety in numbers, prepared a flotilla of between two and three hundred craft for the Red Sea. The flotilla was engaged by four Portuguese vessels, which destroyed the greater part of it without a single Portuguese being killed.

Meanwhile the Portuguese court had taken a further step with its eastern policy. In 1504, Albuquerque, who had held high command in the squadron despatched to India in 1503, returned to Portugal and at once urged the importance of preventing the

Moplah traders from renewing their trade or disturbing the friendly rajas of Cochin and Cannanore during the long interval between the departure of one expedition and the arrival of the next. The question was discussed in the council, which at last resolved upon a definite plan of action. It resolved to avoid all occupation of territory, to build forts only where needed to protect trade, but to maintain on the Malabar Coast as large a squadron as possible and to send a permanent governor to remain for three years in India. Francisco de Almeida was therefore appointed with the title of viceroy. He was sent out with a large fleet and 1500 soldiers. On his arrival he built a second fort at Cannanore and rebuilt the earlier one at Cochin in stone. He made Cochin his headquarters, and aimed at the control of the Malabar Coast, considering that the extension of Portuguese influence into either the Red Sea or the Straits of Malacca could lead only to a weakening of the Portuguese position.

In any case the interests of Muslim traders would have led them to resist the establishment of a new route and a new group of merchants threatening their monopoly of Indian trade westwards. But the bitterly hostile attitude which from the first had been displayed by the Portuguese made a desperate struggle certain. Other interests also were involved. The appearance of the Portuguese and the activity of their squadrons dislocated the trade up the Red Sea to Suez and Alexandria. At the close of the fifteenth century the Venetians were, and had long been, the chief distributors of eastern produce in Europe. In 1498 they had not cared to buy all the pepper that had reached Alexandria that season, in 1502 they had not been able fully to load their galleys. They had at once urged upon Kansauh al-Ghauri (the last Mameluke sultan of Egypt) the importance of checking without delay this danger to their own trade and to the Egyptian customs. But the sultan's power was threatened by internal dangers, and he had at first contented himself with idle threats to destroy the Christian Holy Places and drive every Christian out of his dominions. At the end of 1505 he resolved on war. Twelve vessels were built at Suez. Early in 1507 they were at last ready. Fifteen hundred fighting men were put aboard them and they sailed for India, reaching Diu in September. Though they displayed no eagerness to seek out and destroy the Portuguese, they met a squadron under the command of Almeida's son off Chaul

in March, 1508, and destroyed the commander's vessel. The viceroy at once set to work to equip a fleet able to destroy the new enemy. After nine months' delay, and having emptied Cochin and Cannanore of every man that could be spared, he sailed northwards with eighteen vessels and 1200 men. On February 2, 1509, he appeared off Diu where the Egyptian squadron lay. The next day the Muslim vessels were destroyed at anchor, and the Portuguese recovered their threatened supremacy. They were indeed fortunate in having to meet the danger only when they had already accumulated considerable resources in India.

Shortly after this event the great Albuquerque arrived on the Malabar Coast. He had been despatched from Portugal in 1506, with instructions to operate against the Muslims in the Red Sea and to succeed Almeida in the chief command on the expiry of his term of office in 1507. Reaching eastern waters in 1507, he had seized Socotra and built a fort there, in order to block up the Red Sea, and had then attacked Ormuz in order to do the like by the Persian Gulf. After sinking every vessel that he found at Ormuz, he had attacked the place itself, and compelled the rais to become tributary to the king of Portugal and to suffer the Portuguese to build a fort on the island. These exploits signified an inclination greatly to expand the sphere of Portuguese operations. When Albuquerque reached Cannanore, Almeida refused to deliver up the government, and imprisoned his successor, on the score of the dangers involved in this policy of expansion. With the arrival of the new shipping in the autumn of 1509, however, the despatches from Portugal made it impossible for Almeida to continue his opposition. On November 4 he resigned and next day sailed for Europe.

His successor gave to the Portuguese position in India its specific form. Almeida had sought to dominate the Malabar Coast. Albuquerque considered that so limited a power could not easily be maintained. Its revenues would be small, its forces slender, its basis insecure. If, however, the Portuguese boldly seized the strategic points from which the whole traffic of the Indian seas could be controlled, and if, moreover, they set up their headquarters in a city of their own, rich, populous, and strong, their revenue would be great enough to maintain an irresistible power, while continuing to feed the wealth of their

mother-country with eastern exports. His policy was therefore an extension of the principles which Almeida had laid down rather than a departure from them.

In 1507 and 1508 his operations at Socotra and Ormuz had partially secured the control of the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. The next step was the establishment of a Portuguese capital in India. At Cochim authority continued with the raja, who could at any time hinder provisions from coming into the Portuguese fort. But higher up the coast lay an island-town, with an excellent harbour, recently conquered by the Muslim kingdom of Bījāpur from the Hindus. This was Goa. It had lately afforded refuge to a number of Turks who had escaped from the Egyptian fleet when Almeida destroyed it, and these men were reported to be building ships and galleys after the Portuguese style. It was a place of great trade; caravans of merchants came there from the Muslim and Hindu capitals, and the trade in horses from the Persian Gulf was centred there. Early in 1510 Albuquerque assembled twenty-three ships and a force of 1200 Portuguese. His ostensible reason was to attack the Muslim forces in the Red Sea. But off Goa he was joined by a body of Hindu vessels and seamen, and proceeded to attack the place. A fort commanding the entrance to the harbour was stormed, and the town was then abandoned by the Muslims and occupied by Albuquerque. This was quickly resented by the sultan of Bījāpur, and the Portuguese were soon obliged to forsake their new conquest. But before the end of the year Albuquerque attacked it again, stormed it, and exterminated its Muslim inhabitants, in part as vengeance for their having aided the Bījāpur forces, in part "because it was necessary that there should be none but Hindus within it".

Up to this time the Portuguese had troubled little about the eastern division of the Indian trade. But under the influence of the new policy of expansion, of which King Manoel had become as strong a supporter as Albuquerque himself, an expedition was despatched from the Tagus in 1508 to Malacca, the great entrepot of far-eastern commerce with India. The sultan of Malacca regarded the new arrivals with well-grounded distrust, and, after some futile hostilities, the expedition departed. In May, 1511, however, Albuquerque sailed in person with nineteen ships, 800 Europeans, and 600 Indians in the Portuguese service. On the sultan's refusal to give up the Portuguese prisoners whom he

had seized in 1509, the place was attacked and captured after over a week of furious street-fighting. A fortress was at once constructed on the quay-side, at first of timber, then of stone taken from the mosques and the tombs of by-gone rulers. Portuguese power was thus extended into the Malay archipelago.

For the moment this marked the limit of Portuguese expansion. In 1513 Albuquerque failed in an endeavour to secure control of the Red Sea by capturing Aden, and in 1515 he went a second time to Ormuz, where he crushed opposition that had arisen to Portuguese control. He died within sight of Goa on the return voyage, and was buried in the church which he had built there. In many ways he anticipated the qualities which were to mark out the great Englishman, Clive. Both were great military leaders, whose courage and insight rose with danger. Both were men of unshakable constancy, ready to meet any foe however numerous; of a high spirit, which imposed itself on their followers; of a good fortune, which daunted their enemies. Both were capable of acts of treachery; but both resorted to treachery so rarely that they never lost the confidence of other men. Both had the skill to discern essential conditions of success and to ignore all else. Albuquerque seems to have stood alone in his generation in perceiving that "a dominion founded on a navy alone cannot last"¹. He insisted against all opposition from Portugal on the importance of maintaining Goa as the centre of Portuguese power in the east, as a great dockyard in which vessels could always be refitted, remanned, and revictualled, and as a great city whence reserves of troops could always be drawn. In this he was certainly justified. When a century afterwards the Portuguese found themselves involved in a war of life and death, they could not possibly have maintained the struggle for over fifty years but for the resources which had been accumulated at Goa.

On the foundations thus laid by Albuquerque the Portuguese gradually built up a position of extraordinary predominance in eastern waters. The conquest of Malacca led naturally to the conquest of the Moluccas--small islands producing the most precious spices, cloves and nutmeg--to participation in the important trade in silk goods with China, and the establishment of a settlement off the Chinese southern coast at Macao; and to

trading and missionary activities in Japan. This entrance into the far-eastern trade was important financially rather than politically, for it provided the Portuguese with goods readily exchangeable for Indian commodities, and so relieved them of the need of sending from Europe great quantities of the precious metals. Then again they established a control over Ceylon. The island was too large, and its central areas too difficult, ever to be conquered by the Portuguese with the small forces that could be spared. But they built a fort at Colombo in 1518, and then spread round the coast, occupying the points which enabled them to master the trade of the island and to dominate the cinnamon-growing regions, while the frequent wars between rival Singhalese rajas prevented any persistent endeavour to expel them from the country.

In the course of time a small number of settlements grew up on the Coromandel Coast at Negapatam and St Thomé, in Arakan and Bengal at Chittagong and Hughli, in Pegu at Syriam; but these factories in eastern India never became of great importance. The Portuguese position in Ceylon and the Straits carried with it the mastery of the Bay of Bengal and its trade, and so rendered large establishments unnecessary. Consequently the settlements north of Negapatam were mainly formed and occupied by adventurers under hardly any official control and with little official encouragement. It was indeed more important for the Portuguese to strengthen themselves in western rather than in eastern India; in the latter area no attacks were to be feared, but in the former the Muslim states, with whom the Portuguese were generally on ill terms, might at any time receive help from the arch-enemy of Christendom, the Turks.

When in 1517 the Turks had overthrown the Mameluke rule in Egypt, they inherited the feud which had arisen between the Mamelukes and the Portuguese in consequence of the interference of the latter with the Red Sea trade. Commercial interests thus reinforced religious animosity. The Portuguese leaders were keenly conscious of this situation and eager to prepare against its probable results. Co-operation between the Turks and the Deccani sultanates was unlikely, for the southern Muslim states were under Shiah rulers whom the Turks, as Sunnis, regarded with great distaste. So long too as the Hindu kingdom of Vijayanagar continued to hold its own, Hindu-Muslim hostility was a

strong safeguard against attack. But to the northward lay theultanate of Gujarāt. Not only was the ruling family Sunni, but also the Gujarāti ports—Surat, Bassein, Diū—had always driven in active trade with the Red Sea, which the Portuguese were eager to control and limit, in order to complete their growing dominance of the European markets in eastern produce. The Gujarātis were therefore certain to seek Turkish help and certain of receiving Turkish sympathy. The Egyptian fleet which Almeida had destroyed had found a welcome in Gujarāti harbours. A strong position on the Gujarāti coast was therefore the great object of Portuguese policy in the period following the death of Albuquerque. In 1519 and again in 1521 attempts were made to secure Diū, as the point from which communications with the Red Sea could most easily be commanded. Both failed. Ten years later another attempt was made by Nuno da Cunha, but was checked by the arrival of Turkish reinforcements. However, the pressure of Portuguese sea-power compelled the sultan, Bahādur, to abandon Bassein which the Portuguese had seized, and to agree that all the Gujarāti ships should touch at Bassein to take Portuguese permits and pay customs-dues, and that no Turks should in future be allowed to enter his kingdom.

The rise of the Mughal power in India at last gave the Portuguese their real opportunity. In 1535 Bahādur was attacked and defeated by Humāyūn. In great alarm the sultan applied for help to both the Turks and the Portuguese. The Turks for the moment did nothing. Nuno da Cunha, however, went in person to Diū, where in return for promises of help against the Mughals he obtained the grant of a site on which the Portuguese might build a fortress at Diū. The fortress was begun at once and completed in the next year. But to Bahādur the bargain proved most improvident. The military science of Europe, unlike its naval science, was still very far from being able to confer marked superiority in open warfare. The few men—50 horse and 100 matchlock-men—whom the Portuguese could spare for their new ally were of no material help. Events in northern India compelled Humāyūn to withdraw the bulk of his forces, while Bahādur was able by himself to defeat the detachments which remained. He thus found that he had given away the control of his principal port, and the mastery of his merchants' external trade, virtually for nothing. He began to repent his hasty agree-

ment, and, being much given to liquor, was probably unable always to disguise his feelings. The same weakness in an envoy whom he sent to Goa is reported to have revealed to the Portuguese a design to expel them from Diū. In any case the latter resolved to seize Bahādur on the first chance that offered. One such occurred at the close of 1536, when the sultan with a few followers visited the fort; and the captain of the fort who suffered him to depart, was severely rebuked by Nuno da Cunha for his weakness of heart. Early in 1537 da Cunha himself visited Diū; and a visit which Bahādur paid to the governor of India on board ship concluded with a *mêlée* in which the sultan was wounded and drowned.

For this unhappy conclusion the Portuguese were certainly to blame. But it is certain also that the sultan himself was not guiltless. He had appealed to the Turks for help, and had probably been seeking merely to gain time until they should arrive, while the Portuguese had been bent on provoking a crisis before that should happen. When in the following year, 1538, a Turkish fleet reached Diū, it found the Portuguese in a position of considerable strength.

The Turkish expedition, which had been leisurely got together at Suez, consisted of 72 vessels, with 6500 men. It had paused on its way to seize and sack Aden. Its commander, the eunuch Sulaimān, had been ordered to engage and destroy the Portuguese fleet. He preferred, however, to join the Gujarātis who were besieging the Portuguese fort. The Turkish artillery soon effected a breach; but the Turks quarrelled with the Gujarātis, who withdrew from the siege; the Portuguese resistance was most obstinate; and after two months' persistent attack the besiegers retired just when one more desperate effort might have carried the place. On September 4, when the siege began, the defenders had numbered 1400 men; on November 4, after the repulse of the final attack, only 40 remained fit for duty. The stubborn conduct of the garrison stands out the more strongly because the considerable force collected at Goa to relieve Diū hesitated to set sail until the Turks had withdrawn, and only arrived in January, 1539.

This attack on the Portuguese position by the Turks was alarming enough to produce efforts both in Europe and in India to end the danger. In Europe proposals (which, however, came

nothing) were made in 1541 for the delivery of fixed quantities of pepper at Basia to be paid for in wheat, on condition that none of the pepper should be re-exported to Europe and that Portuguese ships should have free entrance into Turkish ports on the Red Sea. In the same year in India a strong expedition under Estevão da Gama was sent into the Red Sea. But although da Gama succeeded in plundering and burning Suakim, Suez proved too difficult, and the Turkish vessels there too numerous, to be attacked. A body of 400 men was landed at Massowah to help the Abyssinians who were being attacked by the Turks, and with them and the king succeeded in recovering his territories. But apart from this the expedition produced no results.

However, from this time the Turkish menace died away, for Turkish ambitions lay rather in the direction of dominating the Mediterranean and extending their power in eastern Europe than in assailing the Portuguese position in the Indian Ocean. Consequently, till the appearance of a European enemy, the Portuguese sea-power remained unassailed, and the only enemies they had to meet were the land forces of the Indian states. In 1546 Diū underwent a prolonged siege, extending over seven months, by the Gujarātī forces under Rūmī Khān. The siege was concluded by a notable victory which Dom João de Castro, the last great governor of Portuguese India, obtained over the besiegers. Another crisis arose in 1570-71, when Goa was unsuccessfully attacked by the combined forces of Bijāpur and Ahmadnagar, and the northern ports, Damān and Bassein, were besieged by the Mughal forces which had under Akbar just conquered the Sultanate of Gujarāt. But these attacks lacked the danger involved in the Turkish struggle. The sea remained open; the Portuguese fleets could carry forces and provisions wherever they were needed; and the position established by Albuquerque remained intact.

That position was essentially a maritime dominion covering a commercial monopoly. It rested on the occupation of points by which sea-borne trade must pass, and the maintenance of a naval power sufficient to meet and overthrow any marine enemy. Territorial dominion was never sought. From this point of view Goa was excellently chosen. It lay on the dividing line of Hindu and Muslim influence and was therefore relatively secure from attack, since each party would view the progress of the other

with great jealousy. It was situated on an island, and was therefore easy of defence. It had a good harbour, and so was well-fitted to be the base of a naval power. It was hedged in to the eastwards by the great wall of the Western Ghats, and so its possession was not calculated to tempt the Portuguese into schemes of inland conquest. Its position was moreover central. Malacca and Ceylon on the east, Mozambique on the west, Ormuz on the north, could communicate with it more readily than they could have done with any other headquarters established in a different region.

From these fixed points the Portuguese fleets could operate, certain of meeting with any trading ships which the state of the monsoons allowed to put to sea. Of all these vessels they took toll. Any ship found in eastern waters without a pass from the recognised Portuguese authorities was liable to seizure. These passes—*cattas*, they were called—were specific in their terms. They named the port to which the vessel was bound, they enumerated the arms and men that might be carried, they specified the commodities, such as pepper, which the Portuguese reserved for their own trade. Any infraction of the terms of a *catta* might involve the forfeiture of the vessel and all that she carried. By these means the royal monopolies of pepper, cloves, nutmeg, mace, silk and lac, both in the trade from India to Europe and in the port-to-port trade of India itself, were secured from external interference, to the impoverishment of Turk and Venetian, and to the enrichment of Portugal.

Save for a brief period after 1571, when three separate governments of Mozambique, Goa and Malacca were constituted, the general control of the Portuguese establishments and trade was vested in the official who bore the title of viceroy or governor of India, according as he came out direct from Portugal with his patent of appointment, or succeeded to the office by the death or unexpected departure of its holder. His position was one of great dignity. He received the honours of royalty. None spoke to him with covered head. None save the archbishop of Goa ate with him at table. He exercised supreme civil and military authority, though in matters of importance he was supposed to consult his council. He held office for three years. The saying ran that in his first year he learnt his duties, in his second he filled his purse, in his third he visited the subordinate governments to

receive presents from the occupants. The term was certainly too brief for efficiency; but it had two advantages which the home authorities thought outweighed its defects. It made the Goa government more closely dependent upon the government of Lisbon than would otherwise have been the case, and it increased the number of nobles who in a given period of time could be enriched and rewarded by holding the office. The official at Goa next in importance was the *vedor da fazenda*. He was in charge of the arsenal, docks and mint. His was a most profitable office, for he had the disposal of all the goods sent out to India on the king's account, and provided the stores needed in the dockyards, making, it was said, cent per cent on what he supplied. The chief judge was the *ouvidor general* till 1544, when he was replaced by a court of several judges. Criminal sentences needed the viceroy's or governor's approval, and civil decisions of sufficient importance might be reopened before the supreme court at Lisbon. But though the judges were technically independent of the executive, they were generally young, poor and desirous of wealth; and justice is described as having been venal, slow, and ruinously expensive. Within the city itself administration was vested in a corporation entitled to the same privileges and powers as the corporation of Lisbon. The aldermen and other officials were in theory elective, but in practice they soon came to be nominated either by the king or by the viceroy. The chief value of the corporation probably lay in its right to address petitions directly to the king, so that it afforded a channel by which the people might complain against the misconduct of the government.

Under the government of Goa were a number of subordinate governments, usually administered by an official with the title of *capitão*. Like the viceroy, he was the head of both the civil and the military establishments; and in practice he was liable to very little interference from above. The chief subordinate governments were those of Mozambique, Ormuz, Colombo and Malacca. The payment of viceroy and *capitão*, and indeed of all officials, was divided into two parts. One was the *mantimento*—maintenance allowance, to cover expenses such as diet and lodging usually drawn regularly; the other was the *ordenado*—the salary attached to the office, payable only by special warrant and normally in arrears. But besides these there quickly sprang up an endless number of perquisites—*percalços*—vastly exceeding the

acknowledged payments. The salary of the *capitan* of Malacca was about £300 a year; his perquisites were reckoned to be £20,000. He was, however, in a singularly favoured position, owing to the large number of vessels which were obliged by the Portuguese regulations to touch there, and which would certainly be seriously delayed in their voyage if the *capitan* were not satisfied.

The organisation of the Portuguese government at Lisbon was ill-designed to exercise an effective control over its remoter possessions. Till 1591 there was neither a council nor a minister whose special duty it was to watch over colonial affairs, to prepare royal orders, or to secure their due observance. It is true that Indian finance was placed under the management of the *vedores da fazenda* at Lisbon. But their duties were limited to enlisting soldiers for service overseas, and to the purchase and sale of outward and inward cargoes. They had no authority over the Indian government. When Portugal passed into the possession of the Spanish crown, a special section of the finance department was devoted to colonial business, and in 1604 the Council of the Indies was set up. But by that time the Portuguese power in India had already begun to wane and the control of affairs had fallen into the confused corruption natural to a distant and unregulated administration.

Portuguese government can hardly be described as other than weak and inefficient. But the Portuguese, in the east as in Brazil, succeeded in a notable degree in passing on their culture to the peoples under their rule. They effected this by a zealous propagation of Christianity, by promoting mixed marriages, and by encouraging with the prospect of distinguished honours Indians who embraced their faith. The extension of the Christian faith had been the prime condition under which the Church of Rome had recognised the exclusive title which the Portuguese had claimed as the right of the discoverer. But the degree in which this duty was accepted had been a matter of growth. At first ecclesiastics had been few, and the conduct of the Portuguese leaders determined largely by secular considerations. But as their settlements grew, the ecclesiastical element increased swiftly. Goa was made the seat of a bishopric in 1534; in 1560 the organisation was developed by the creation of subordinate sees and the elevation of Goa into an archbishopric. In the same period the religious

orders—especially the Franciscans, Dominicans and Jesuits—became more active in Portuguese India. The Jesuits became specially prominent in the work of education as well as conversion. In 1540 had been founded the Confraternity of the Holy Faith. Its house at Goa had been completed on the Feast of the Conversion of St Paul, in whose name it was dedicated in 1543; and after the death of the founders, the House of St Paul had been taken over by the Jesuits; thence they derived the name of Paulists by which they became commonly known in India. By 1552 complaints were already being made that the religious were absorbing an undue share of the royal revenues, but the cost of religious establishments more than tripled in the following fifty years, while in 1623 it was reckoned that at Goa and elsewhere there were twice as many priests as Portuguese laymen. Under this ecclesiastical pressure the religious policy developed rapidly. In 1567 it was ordered, on the recommendation of the first provincial council held at Goa, that no Christians should keep infidel servants, that the public worship of both Hindus and Muslims should cease; that all heathen residents should attend every alternate Sunday to hear a sermon on the benefits of Christianity; and that children left orphans should be brought up in the Christian faith. In 1575, in consequence of orders from Lisbon, the system was amplified. Where a heathen died without sons, his property could be claimed by the nearest Christian relative; converted members of Hindu families could claim immediate partition of the joint property; female converts could claim the same share as they would have been entitled to had they been males; and converts could claim all the legal privileges of Portuguese nationality. Under the pressure of these rules and the unwearied persuasions of the religious, Goa became a city of Christians.

Though this religious policy certainly impaired the trade of Goa, through the reluctance of great Hindu and Muslim merchants to submit themselves to such regulations, it did not provoke any great resentment. The chief complaint which the Muslim chroniclers make is against the cruelty of educating orphans as Christians. In Bijapur the sultans endowed several Portuguese missions some of which survived into the nineteenth century. Perhaps this attitude is to be explained by the degree in which the Portuguese settlers became indianised in all but

religion. From the time of Albuquerque mixed marriages had been encouraged. Portuguese emigrants were almost all male. In 1524 three Portuguese women were publicly whipped at Goa for having come out clandestinely. In the second half of the century a few orphans, dowered by the king, were sent out to Goa, but in nearly every household the wife was either Indian or of mixed blood.

The position of Indian converts was decidedly favourable. They could claim the rights of Portuguese blood. They were eligible for honours and distinctions. One Malabar convert, for example, was entrusted with important commands, was made a Knight of the Order of Christ, and when, in 1571, he was killed in action, his body was brought to Goa and buried there with great ceremony.

But by the close of the sixteenth century the Portuguese dominion was fast falling into decay. The officials were corrupt; the fortresses unrepaired and unarmed, trade was declining. Even more significant was the dissolution of Portuguese union and solidarity. When the raja of Cochim had resolved to accept the Portuguese alliance, he had been moved by admiration for their discipline, which was such that, had a cabin-boy arrived with the king's orders to command them, he would have been obeyed. But when Francisco da Gama was viceroy at Goa from 1597 to 1600, he was subjected to the grossest insults. The statue of his great ancestor Vasco was thrown down and broken; and on the day when he embarked for his homeward voyage, forty men went aboard and hung him in effigy from his own yard-arm. Some of the causes of this decline are evident. Portugal was but a small country; she had undertaken two great enterprises—the occupation of Brazil and the conquest of Indian waters. Both took a heavy toll of her manhood. The mortality on board ship and in tropical climates was extraordinary. Few of the gallant, adventurous men who built up the Portuguese position in the east ever returned to their native country. The breed, robbed of its finest elements, decayed; and their successors were not the equals of the early adventurers. Even by 1538 difficulties were found in securing the necessary number of men. Outlaws were tempted by a general pardon to all, heretics and traitors excepted, who would volunteer for Indian service. Criminals sentenced to death were respited and sent out into

perpetual banishment; and lesser criminals were offered pardon in return for three or more years' service. The Portuguese settlements were being reinforced by men bringing little of civic virtue, who would probably mate and breed with the lowest classes of the Indian population.

At the same time the Portuguese were falling into a condition of mental stagnancy. The astonishing progress which they had made in the allied arts of shipbuilding and navigation ceased. They remained supreme in Indian waters, but were doomed to succumb should they be called on to meet men who should have learnt to build or sail or fight their ships better than the Portuguese had learnt to do by the time of Vasco da Gama and the great Albuquerque. Goa was in fact destined to become the burial-place of reputations.

The circumstances which were to lead to this emerged in the last quarter of the sixteenth century. In 1560 the Netherlands had broken into revolt against the Spanish dominion; in 1580 Portugal passed under the Spanish crown; in the course of the two previous generations the Dutch had replaced the Venetians as the chief distributors in northern and western Europe of the eastern produce which they purchased at Lisbon. The establishment of Spanish authority in Portugal gradually brought this most profitable trade to an end. Dutch ships were seized in Portuguese harbours, and from about 1590 the situation had become so difficult as to demand the exploration of new avenues of trade. Attempts were made by Dutch seamen to open a route to India through the Arctic seas. But the obvious dangers of the way, even before its impossibility was recognised, induced Dutch merchants to invade the route which till then had been a Portuguese monopoly. Companies were formed at Enkhuysen and Amsterdam in 1594 to trade to Guinea and the Far East.

The latter, the *Compagnie van Verre*, based its plans on information furnished to it by Linschoten, who had served the Portuguese and even resided for some time at Goa. The command of the fleet was given to Cornelis van Houtmann, who had studied the spice-trade at Lisbon and had himself made the voyage to India. Houtmann sailed from the Texel in April 1595. He was destined for Bantam. Two reasons determined the choice of his destination. The object of the voyage was the purchase of spices, and therefore he aimed at reaching the Malay archipelago rather

than India itself; further the main strength of the Portuguese lay along the western coast of India, and therefore the archipelago was a region where attack in force was less likely. He returned with three out of his four ships in 1597, and immediately a number of new companies were formed to share in the new trade. In the five years 1598-1602 no less than thirteen fleets were sent out to the archipelago. But all this competition proved disadvantageous. It lowered the rate of profit, and it hindered co-operation against Portuguese attacks. Therefore under the guidance of the Dutch statesman, Oldenbarnevelt, the eight existing companies were amalgamated in 1602 into the United East India Company, to which was confided the monopoly of the Indian trade for a term of twenty-one years.

The constitution of the united company was strongly marked by the circumstances of its origin. Great jealousy existed not only among the various provinces forming the United Netherlands, but also among the merchants of the principal cities. In order therefore to conciliate this local patriotism and to secure the advantages of a centralised control, the company was to be composed of six chambers—one situated at each city where one or more of the amalgamated companies had been established. General control was placed in the hands of seventeen directors representing the various chambers. But the seventeen merely laid down general policy, decreeing the number of ships and men, the amounts of the cargoes, and the persons in whom the superior command should be vested, while the individual chambers conducted the detail of fitting out the ships, purchasing the outward cargoes, and disposing of the goods returned, in proportion to their share in the capital of the company. The body thus established speedily became a very powerful corporation. Although the stock was subscribed by a large number of private persons, the stock-holders had little or no share in the management. Almost from the first the directors of the chambers were the nominees of the magistracy of the city where the chamber sat. The governing body of the chamber was thus identified with the governing body of the city, and popular control over the conduct of the chambers was completely wanting. In like manner the seventeen was virtually free from political interference. The states-general, which formed the supreme authority within the United Provinces, was with the possible exception of the Polish

Diet the weakest sovereign body in Europe. It had no judicial power. Unanimity was required for all important decisions. Its financial resources consisted of the subsidies doled out to it by the individual states. The Dutch East India Company therefore speedily became not merely a commercial association but also a political body charged with an almost independent direction of colonial interests in the east. Its policy was necessarily national, for it was directed by the same groups which determined the political conduct of the states. As in Portuguese India the king was supreme, so also in Dutch India was the commercial oligarchy. In neither was there any external body which could enforce reform if and when reform was needed. At any time the Latin tag might apply -- *Quis custodiat ipsos custodes?*

These new rivals soon displayed that superiority at sea which was to be decisive in the struggle for the trade of the east. The Dutch vessels were as strong and more manageable than the high-built Portuguese shipping; and their navigators were more skilful. The Dutch had begun where the Portuguese had left off in the matter of naval technique; and the monopoly which European science had enabled the Portuguese to set up was to be broken down not by any eastern hostility but by further developments of that science in which the Portuguese had not participated. The Dutch aimed at the entire control of the Moluccas, Amboyna and Banda, a region where the Portuguese were relatively weak, where they had no fortresses of note, and where they could be overcome by the destruction or dispersal of their squadrons. The local chiefs were ready to enter into alliance with anyone who offered to free them from Portuguese control; and Portuguese commanders soon learnt to dread the fighting capacity of the newcomers, preferring whenever possible to secure safety by flight, even when superior in numbers. Amboyna was occupied by the Dutch in 1605, and they easily established a control over the Banda islands. But in this period all their attacks on the Portuguese strongholds failed, and an attempt in 1603 to enter into an alliance with the Singhalese king Wimala Dharma ended in the murder of the Dutch leader and his companions.

The twenty-one-year truce which was negotiated between Spain and the United Netherlands in 1609 conceded to the Dutch the privilege of trading in the Spanish (and Portuguese) de-

pendencies subject to the king's permission. This agreement, which should have come into force in the east in 1610, recognised the gains which the Dutch had actually secured, but would have greatly limited their further expansion. However, the Spanish officials in the east refused to acknowledge it. The result was thus entirely to the advantage of the Dutch company, which was freed from the dangers of war in European waters and from the restrictions of peace in the spice islands. During this period the Dutch busied themselves almost entirely with Java and the archipelago. However, they established themselves on the Coromandel Coast (where the Portuguese were weakest), founding a fortified factory at Pulicat in 1609, for the provision of cotton goods for which a ready market was to be found in the archipelago.

The Dutch still lacked an administrative centre from which their operations, military, naval, and commercial could be controlled. In 1618 this was at last supplied by the genius and vigour of Coen, who determined the future character of the Dutch position much as Albuquerque had that of the Portuguese. Coen held the view that the company should in the first place secure territory large and populous enough to maintain a considerable trade. He sought centres of production. This constitutes the essential difference between his and Albuquerque's policy. The latter aimed at the naval control of commerce by the occupation of strategic posts; the former aimed at the possession of the productive areas themselves. With this end in view, Coen decided to establish his headquarters at Batavia, a site possessing an admirable harbour near the extreme north-west corner of the great island of Java. There he built a small fortified factory, to be garrisoned by about a hundred men. It was excellently fitted for his purpose. It had all the facilities for becoming a great port. It gave the Dutch a foothold in Java and therefore great scope for territorial expansion. It commanded the western entrance into the archipelago and yet occupied a central position from which the archipelago could be dominated. The Dutch were thus seeking to employ sea-power in a manner essentially different from that of the Portuguese. They were preparing, not to monopolise the whole trade of eastern waters, but to concentrate upon securing the exclusive control of a great series of islands where sea-power would enable them to assume not

merely commercial, but also a political and perhaps even a territorial predominance. Into the detail of their progress it is not necessary to enter. But in course of the next eighty years they achieved the supremacy in the archipelago which they had sought. Batavia grew rapidly into a great city, thronged with traders, strongly fortified, centre of a great military and naval power, mistress of great revenues, and the headquarters of a government far stronger in resources of men, shipping and wealth than that of Goa even in its richest days.

The early stages of this expansion had much engrossed the attention of the Dutch authorities, who paid little attention to India itself save in so far as it would enable them to complete their cycle of trade. With this object they established trading factories, the chief of which were at Chinsura in Bengal, at Surat in Gujarāt, and at Bandar 'Abbās in Persia. In 1636 they renewed their attacks upon the Portuguese settlements, seeking to weaken and destroy them by blockading Goa throughout that part of the year when the monsoons permitted ships to ride off the western coast of India. Their immediate object was to secure the monopoly of pepper in Malabar and of cinnamon in Ceylon. But their blockades of Goa were less effective than they had hoped. Encouraged by the offers of alliance made to the chief of Pulicat by the Singhalese king Rāja Singha, they sent expeditions to Ceylon. In 1638 they took Batticaloa, but the king's friendship cooled when he recognised that Dutch success would merely mean the exchange of one master for another. In 1641 the Dutch captured Malacca after a year's siege.

The recovery of Portuguese independence in 1640 brought a change into the political situation, for the wars with the Dutch had been the wars of Spain, not those of Portugal. Negotiations for peace were at once opened, but the Dutch were unwilling to concede more than a ten years' truce. This was concluded in June, 1641, and was to come into force in the east twelve months later. But the Dutch were making great efforts to extend their power in Ceylon. Intentional delays prevented the necessary authorisations from reaching the Dutch leaders in the island till March, 1643, and even then they refused to cease hostilities, alleging that the Portuguese would not surrender lands which the Dutch claimed to have been mortgaged to them by Rāja Singha. By the time that the Dutch commander, Maetsuycker,

and the viceroy of Goa had come to terms, in November, 1644, the Dutch had added Galle and Negombo to their conquests. The truce expired in 1653, and active operations were renewed in 1655. Colombo was taken in the following year. In 1658 the surrender of Jaffnapatam marked the expulsion of the Portuguese from Ceylon. In the same year Portuguese power vanished from the Coromandel Coast with the fall of Negapatam, which some years later the Dutch made their headquarters in southern India. In 1661 the Portuguese forts on the Malabar Coast were attacked. In Europe the Portuguese succeeded at last in making peace with the Dutch on August 6, 1661. But various pretexts were found to evade its promulgation in India until Cochin and Cranganore had fallen into Dutch hands. Thus by force and guile the Dutch wrested from their Portuguese rivals all the posts which commanded the trade they sought. Goa and the more northerly ports, Bassem, Chaul, Damān, Diū, were valueless from the Dutch point of view.

At this moment the Dutch were incomparably more powerful than any other people in the eastern seas. But there was a great difference between the situation in 1663 and that which had existed at the height of the Portuguese dominion. This was exemplified by the regions which the two had selected as the respective centres of their operations. The Portuguese had established themselves on the western coast of India, ready to meet and destroy any rivals. They claimed the monopoly of the entire eastern waters, and European ships other than their own ran the risk of seizure, while any Protestant adventurers might find themselves handed over to the Inquisition at Goa. The Dutch, however, cast their claims less widely. The spice monopoly they were resolved to hold. So their centre lay not in India but in the eastern archipelago. There they might perpetrate extraordinary acts, as the English knew to their cost, but they laid no claim to a complete monopoly of the Indian trade. The Dutch overthrow of the Portuguese signified the opening of the Indian trade to all the nations of the west.

The system of administration which grew up in the Dutch settlements is interesting, for it exemplified the difficulties which a trading corporation had to encounter and the typical manner in which they were met. The greatest of all, that of exercising due control over the management of remote dependencies, was

and remained without solution among the Dutch as among the Portuguese. The Dutch directors gave comparatively little attention to the administration of their settlements, while the absence of any court of justice in the United Netherlands competent to try men accused of misconduct abroad relieved the Dutch company's servants of any fear of criminal prosecution on their return. While then, as we have already seen, there was no effective political control over the company at home, so also in the east the company's government was a law unto itself.

At first the admiral of the fleet had constituted the chief authority over the Dutch; but in 1609 it was decided to set up a permanent organisation. This consisted of a council of seven members (later increased to nine) presided over by an official designated the governor-general. This body was empowered to deal with all matters of trade, administration, war, and justice, in every Dutch settlement and factory established within the scope of the company's exclusive privileges. By the instructions which were issued, the governor-general enjoyed no special powers except that of giving a casting vote when the council was equally divided. Nevertheless, he soon became the virtual master of the Dutch Indies. The chief reason for this unintended development seems to have lain in the fact that he was the special representative of the directors, who until 1680 appointed him personally, while the vacancies in the council were filled by co-option. In case of disputes with the council his views were usually upheld; and he often held office for a considerable term of years. Maetsuycker remained governor-general from 1653 to 1678. A further reason lay in the power bestowed upon the governor-general in 1617 of sending (with the council's assent) members on special missions, so that the councillors came to be influenced by the fear of being sent on profitless, and the hope of being sent on advantageous, services. His ascendancy over the council became so complete that one governor-general Camphuis, at the close of the seventeenth century, overruled a hostile majority on the ground that he was specially responsible to the directors, and even refused to be present at meetings of the council. Only one governor-general was ever punished for misconduct, and only one was ever recalled from his office.

Under this "High Government" at Batavia there came into existence a number of subordinate governments, framed on the

same model, under a chief official—styled governor, director, or commander—assisted by a council. Ceylon was placed under a governor and council, so were the Coromandel factories. The Malabar factories were under a commander and council; those in Bengal under a director and council. These councils not only controlled trade and administration, but also constituted the chief local court of justice, though an appeal lay from their decision to the “High Government” at Batavia, and below them were *land-raden*—country courts—which included representatives of the inhabitants of the territory in question. Their distance from Batavia and the difficulty of communications often made uniform control impossible. At one time a plan had been devised for the regular inspection of the subordinate governments by officials from Batavia. But this scheme was never put into operation and the “High Government” in practice did no more than depute one of its members to look into matters when serious trouble broke out.

Administrative and commercial business was carried on by a body of servants, nominated by the directors of the various chambers. They were organised in grades, rising from writer to assistant, and then to under- and upper-merchants, on salaries ranging from about one to twenty pounds a month. Besides this they were entitled to money allowances for food and fixed quantities of liquor, oil, wood, rice, etc. But their chief advantages lay, not in their salaries and allowances, but in the private trade which they conducted. This was from the first prohibited by the company. Great penalties were imposed; a special official was appointed—the fiscal—to see that the regulations were observed; the servants were kept short of money by being allowed to draw only half their salary until they returned home; and they were required to carry all their savings back to Europe in bills drawn on the company's treasury. But all these precautions proved entirely useless. In Bengal, for instance, a private company was formed by the Dutch officials to conduct the large and profitable trade in opium to Batavia. A special inspector—Van Rhee de tot Drakestein—was sent out from Europe to reform these abuses in 1684. He died in 1691 before he had visited all the Indian factories and without having been able to suggest any remedy. The prohibition of private trade was continued; but the directors resigned themselves to the existence of abuses which they could not prevent.

This policy was short-sighted and disastrous, for it bred in the company's servants a contempt not only for the company's orders regarding private trade, but also for all orders affecting their private interests. As the territorial possessions increased, administrative corruption added to illicit trading profits. Presents on various occasions, bribes paid for the adjudication of tax-farms, fraudulent weighments of produce received as part of the company's revenues, all came into frequent use. Usurious loans were made to the principal natives. The mode of appointing the company's servants offered no guarantee against such abuses, and even afforded convincing reason against attacking the guilty so long as their malversations provoked no public outbreak.

The Dutch military forces were ill-recruited, ill-paid, and ill-organised. Their European troops were got together by crimps who gathered the riff-raff of the cities and made up their complements with boys of thirteen or fourteen. Only half their pay was issued to them in the east, for fear they too should trade, and even that was delivered partly in clothing on which the company took 75 per cent. profit, partly in the over-valued currency of the Dutch Indies, on which it gained 33 per cent. The company always distrusted its military servants, did not admit them to its councils till 1786, and for a long time would not admit its officers to any rank higher than that of major, so that the slowness of promotion afforded small incentive to activity.

At the height of its power the company maintained some 8000 or 9000 European troops in the east. These were supplemented by the enlistment of native troops. Of these some were in regular service, but, while they received a certain amount of drill, they were never efficiently organised or trained. A striking illustration is afforded by the Malay troops who accompanied the expedition to Bengal in 1759. They were armed with the old type of screw-bayonet which fitted into the muzzle of the musket and prevented firing as soon as bayonets had been fixed. These weapons had been disused among all European troops for over fifty years.

The Dutch company's administration was probably never strong or efficient. Its seeming power was due to the military weakness of its enemies; and its establishment was brought about, not by military, but by naval strength. Its concentration to the eastward of India left the great sub-continent open to other European powers. The attention of the "High Government"

directed closely to the aims of the acapulago, missed that critical moment in the affairs of India when it might perhaps have intervened there with prospects of success. Such was the price which the Dutch company was called upon to pay for its initial success in monopolising the spice trade of the east

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CHAPTER II

The East India Company, 1600-1740

The East India Company was incorporated by Elizabeth on December 31, 1600. The great discoveries made by adventurers under the Spanish and Portuguese crowns had excited great interest in England as in other maritime states. But the exclusive rights claimed by the peninsular kingdoms had long deterred English merchants from seeking their share in the new trade-routes which had been opened and the new territories which had been discovered. English and Dutch alike had at first sought other routes to the east, the fancied north-eastern and north-western passages, which might be navigated without invading the Portuguese and Spanish zones. But these attempts were foredoomed to failure by the arctic icefields. Under repeated losses the northern mariners began to turn their attention to the southern seas. The union of Spain and Portugal in 1580 and the state of half-war which existed between Spain and England assisted the process. Drake's great voyage round the world was completed in 1580. Open war with Spain, the defeat of the Armada, the spoils of Portuguese carracks, enlisted the rising national spirit and brought to London samples of the riches of the Indies. In 1591 Lancaster sailed for the east and reached Penang. In 1596 a fleet of vessels under Benjamin Wood sailed eastwards. In these years, too, the Dutch became increasingly active, sending out no less than twenty vessels in 1598. When, therefore, negotiations for a Spanish peace broke down, Elizabeth assented to the proposals of the London merchants, many of whom were already interested in the eastern trade by way of the Levant. The new company received a monopoly of the commerce in the great region stretching from the Cape of Good Hope to the Straits of Magellan, and its privileges were to continue for fifteen years.

At the close of the sixteenth century the idea of the joint-stock company was still in its infancy. The great privileged companies of the past had been "regulated" companies. Under these no one who was not a member could share in the branch of trade reserved for the company, and the company enjoyed the power

of laying down regulations to determine the way in which the trade should be conducted, and of appointing officials to enforce its regulations and collect the dues which it imposed. But within the limits of these regulations individual members were free to trade to as great an extent as they chose. A merchant might become a member of such a company, or, in technical phrase, acquire the freedom of the company in a number of ways—by fine (or payment of a fixed entry-fee), by service, or by inheritance. The early organisation of the East India Company closely resembled that of the regulated companies. But in its financial arrangements it differed wholly from them. Its trade was conducted not by individual members employing their own capital, but by servants of the company employing capital which the members had subscribed. In short, while the company's formal organisation was that of the regulated company, its financial arrangements were those of the joint-stock company. Till then the joint-stock company had been mainly employed as the most convenient method of financing short and hazardous ventures, such as privateering voyages, at the conclusion of which the concern would be wound up, and the capital with any profits be distributed among the share-holders. Similar ideas governed the early financial operations of the East India Company. The members were invited to subscribe capital, at first for a single voyage, and later for more prolonged but definitely terminable operations. Hence the bewildering series of joint-stocks which appear in the early history of the East India Company, and the elaborate arrangements, not merely for the division of profits but also for the return of the capital. Not until the Restoration did the company adopt the modern method of securing a permanent capital and of paying to the stock-holders only such profits as the court of directors resolved to divide. In this respect the English company followed, more slowly and reluctantly, the course followed by the United Dutch Company. When the latter was formed in 1602, the capital was declared to be returnable after ten years; but this provision was in fact ignored, and the capital subscribed speedily became a permanent stock. The comparative slowness of the English development was perhaps brought about by the absence of those political responsibilities which the Dutch company was forced to assume in the first half of the seventeenth century and which

rendered uncertainty regarding capital resources highly embarrassing

The English company's early voyages were directed to Sumatra, Java and the Moluccas, in order to secure a share in the spice trade which formed the predominant element in eastern commerce. In 1608, however, the first attempt was made to establish factories in India itself. For this there were two reasons. Peace had been made with Spain in 1604 without obtaining the desired permission to trade in Spanish and Portuguese possessions, so that political difficulties would follow on further invasions of the Portuguese sphere of control. But probably more powerful than this was the fact that the easiest way of obtaining the spices grown in the archipelago was to load thither not European goods, which were in small demand, but cotton cloths and opium from India. The company therefore sent out William Hawkins, who was familiar with the Levant trade and could speak Turkish. He reached the Mughal court in 1609. Though at first well received, he soon met difficulties created by the Portuguese, who used every effort to prevent the English from being allowed to settle at Surat. The Surat merchants were warned that the admission of the English would mean war with the Portuguese, and their representations led Jahāngīr to refuse Hawkins's petition. He left Āgra in 1611, and at Surat he met three English ships under the command of Sir Henry Middleton. The latter, on being ordered to depart by the Surat authorities, resolved on a measure of retribution. He sailed to the Straits of Bāb-ul-mandab, and compelled the ships of Diū and Surat, not only to exchange their Indian for his British commodities, but also to pay a heavy ransom. This closure of the Red Sea trade greatly alarmed the merchants of Surat. When, in 1612, two English vessels under Thomas Best arrived off the port, they were readily admitted to trade. The Portuguese sent a force against them, but this was smartly repulsed by Best, and early in 1613 Jahāngīr sent down orders permitting the establishment of a permanent English factory. This concession provoked the Portuguese to renewed action. They seized a Surat ship in her return from the Red Sea, although she was provided with the regular Portuguese pass. The Mughal authorities, retaliated by laying siege to Damān, and, when four English vessels reached Surat in October, 1614, under Nicholas Downton, demanded English co-operation

against the common enemy. Downton was much perplexed. The company's interests demanded, while national policy forbade, an attack on the Portuguese. But the viceroy of Goa delivered him from his perplexity. The viceroy sailed in person with a powerful fleet to destroy the English, but, after an action off Swally Hole, was driven off. This second success strengthened the position of the English at Surat, and in the latter part of 1615 the Portuguese made peace with Jahāngīr.

Shortly before this happened a new English fleet reached Surat with an ambassador paid by the company but duly accredited by the king to the court of Āgra. In this the English were following the established practice of the Levant Company, and hoped to secure similar results. The Levant Company maintained at Constantinople an English ambassador nominated by the English crown on the principle that an eastern court would pay more attention to the words of a personal representative of the king of England than to the requests of a body of merchants; and within the Turkish dominions trade was conducted under the "capitulations", a series of treaties granting special privileges in matters of taxation and the administration of justice. By sending an ambassador to Āgra the East India Company hoped to obtain a treaty with Jahāngīr similar to the Turkish capitulations. The person chosen for this task was Sir Thomas Roe, a man of high character, ability and insight, who had acquired some knowledge of oriental courts at Constantinople. From the end of 1615 till late in 1618 Roe resided constantly at Jahāngīr's court and formed relations with the chief people there. His character and breeding did much to raise the Mughal opinion of the English nation; and, although he found that the court would not hear of any treaty on commercial matters, he succeeded in obtaining grants from the viceroy of Gujarāt, Prince Khurrah (Shāhyahān), which secured the position of the English at Surat, and he further brought to punishment local officials who had oppressed English merchants or their agents. In 1618 the organisation of the company's factories was beginning to take shape. The headquarters were settled at Surat, where the company had its president and council, who controlled the up-country factories at Ahmadābād, Broach and Āgra.

About the same time the English were seeking entry into the Persian trade. The Persian kingdom had been much strengthened

and extended by the Safavid rulers, who had carried their conquests down to the shore of the Persian Gulf only to find that the external trade of southern Persia was closely controlled by the Portuguese at Ormuz. This was the more annoying to Shāh 'Abbās, the ruling monarch, because the silk exports of his northern provinces had to pass through the territory and pay the customs-dues of the Turks, his constant enemies. He was therefore predisposed to welcome the English proposals to open a trade with his ports on the Persian Gulf. The Portuguese resented this intrusion as bitterly but as ineffectually as they had resented the establishment of an English factory at Surat. They attempted to keep the English out by force. The first result was a sea-fight off Jask at the end of 1620, in which the Portuguese were worsted. They then attempted to coerce the Persians by attacking their ports. On this Shāh 'Abbās caused an army to be assembled against Ormuz. This was useless without support at sea. So, when in December, 1621, an English fleet arrived in the gulf, the Persian leaders demanded its co-operation against Ormuz under threats of exclusion from the Persian trade if this was refused. The English complied; Ormuz was captured in April, 1622; and the Portuguese thus lost their principal post on the trade-routes to the Mediterranean. In these early years the East India Company had thus been driven into a policy in western India and Persia which corresponded with that which the Dutch were pursuing to the eastward in the archipelago. But this seeming community of purpose in two different areas did not signify any real identity of policy. At first sight one might suppose that the two Protestant nations might have united to overthrow the position of the Roman Catholic and generally hostile power, and in Europe indeed considerable efforts were made to secure this. But the political and European interests of the Dutch were clearly overborne by their economic and Asiatic interests. The great prize of eastern commerce was the spice trade. The Dutch, as has been seen, early established themselves in the spice islands, entering into exclusive agreements with the local princes, and undertaking considerable expenditure on forts, garrisons and fleets, to keep a secure hold on the region from which they had driven their enemies. The English thus found increasing difficulty in procuring spices in the eastern islands and resented their exclusion. The Dutch on their side claimed that

they had borne all the cost and risk of expelling the Portuguese, and were entitled to the whole advantage of their successes. English attempts to trade among the islands led to fierce disputes, and, on occasion, to actual fighting; and, as the Dutch were strong in the archipelago, while the English were weak, the former got the better of their rivals. In 1619, in consequence of political pressure from both governments, the two companies entered into an agreement which was to regulate their conduct in the east. This provided for the maintenance of a joint fleet, consisting of ten Dutch and ten English ships, to keep the Portuguese in check; for the admission of English factors into the Dutch settlements, and for the division of the trade in fixed shares between the two nations. But this agreement was quite contrary to the policy which, under the inspiration of Coen, the Dutch company's agents were pursuing. Coen judged rightly that the complete control of the spice islands was within the reach of the Dutch, and he was resolved on making that project a reality. The English, too, soon proved unable to maintain their agreed squadron to take part in the active operations which the Dutch launched against the Portuguese. Quarrels then arose about the allotment of the military and naval charges, and English factors disliked their subjection to the Dutch law and Dutch tribunals at Batavia. Finally, just after the English president and council at Surat had resolved to withdraw all the English servants from the Dutch factories, the English agents at Amboyna were seized by the Dutch on a charge of conspiring to capture the fort, and these unfortunate men were put to the torture and then executed. This "massacre of Amboyna" was long and bitterly resented, and in fact ended the alliance. Although further negotiations took place in London, and English factors for a while returned to Batavia, they were withdrawn in 1628 and a separate English factory was established at Bantam under a ruler hostile to the Dutch. The English company, however, was too weak effectually to compete with its great rival in the latter's chosen stronghold. The steady and persistent expansion of Dutch power and influence, always seeking the complete exclusion of foreign interests, barred the possibility of developing an active trade in the archipelago. The English maintained a precarious position at Bantam until 1682, when the factory was withdrawn; but thereafter they possessed in this area only a few ill-controlled and often

mismanaged factories on the island of Sumatra which were exchanged in 1824 for the remaining Dutch interests in India itself. This failure of the English to secure a position for themselves beside the Dutch in the archipelago was accompanied by a similar failure to establish themselves on the adjacent mainland of Indo-China and the Malay peninsula, and also led to the abandonment of the early attempts to open up commerce with Japan. For the moment therefore the Dutch were left to dominate the seas of Further Asia, while the English turned to develop the trade between India itself and Europe, and so compensated themselves for their virtual exclusion from the commerce of the archipelago which they had originally sought. In fact, faced with the alternatives of Portuguese hostility in India and of Dutch hostility to the eastward, they elected to meet the first rather than the second. The prize to be gained might be less attractive; but the policy of concentrating upon the Indian trade meant encountering a weaker enemy, and probably gaining the support of far more powerful princes than were to be found among the eastern islands.

The course of events soon proved the wisdom of this choice. The Portuguese, hard pressed by the Dutch, inclined to abate their hostility to the English. Although the Treaty of Madrid, which in 1630 closed the Spanish war, left the position in India unaltered, five years later the viceroy of Goa and William Methwold, president at Surat, signed an agreement establishing friendly relations between the two nations in India. This was confirmed by the Anglo-Portuguese treaty of 1642; and by Cromwell's treaty with the Portuguese of 1654 the admission of the English into all Portuguese harbours except Macao was formally recognised.

The results of the Anglo-Dutch wars in the time of Cromwell and Charles II confirmed this direction of the English company's policy. Cromwell's victories compelled the Dutch not only to promise indemnities for past injuries, but also to cede the island of Pulo Run in the Banda Islands. This island had been placed by its inhabitants under English protection in 1616, and had been recognised by the Dutch as an English possession in 1623. But the company had been too weak to occupy it, and it had passed under Dutch control. Its cession was most unwelcome to the Dutch, for it would have admitted the English to a probable share in the clove trade. They therefore used every pretext for

delay, and only handed the island over in 1665. In the next year, on the renewal of the Dutch war, the island was at once retaken by the Dutch, and the peace of 1667 transferred the island to them. The trend of European politics thus facilitated expansion of trade in India and enforced withdrawal from the archipelago.

In western India the development under the head-factory of Surat has already been mentioned. It consisted in the establishment of factories in Broach and Baroda, in order to buy at first hand the piece-goods woven in those neighbourhoods, and at Agra, for the sale of broad-cloth, to the followers of the imperial court, for the sake of maintaining relations with the court itself, and for the purchase of indigo, the best qualities of which were manufactured at Bayāna. Elsewhere a factory had been established at Masulipatam as early as 1611. This place was at the time the chief port on the Coromandel Coast. It supplied piece-goods, plain and chintz, which could be sold to advantage both at the company's factory at Bantam and in the ports of the Persian Gulf. In 1634 the sultan of Golconda granted the company freedom from customs-dues. But this did not exempt the factory from the frequent demands of local officials. The factors soon learnt that the blue and check cloths which found a ready sale in the archipelago could be bought much cheaper to the southward, in areas to which Muslim rule had not yet extended. Already in 1626 an experiment had been made by opening a factory at Armagon, a few miles north of the Dutch settlement of Pulicat. But the roadstead proved shallow and dangerous. In 1639, therefore, when the Convention of Goa had rendered the Portuguese less dangerous neighbours, the company obtained from the nāyāk of Chandragiri a grant of the town of Madraspatam, close to the decayed Portuguese settlement of San Thomé. The company was permitted to build a fortified factory, and to exercise administrative authority over the town in return for the payment of a small annual quit-rent. At this time the Carnatic was in a state of great disorder. The small Hindu chiefs, who had exercised authority after the fall of Vijayanagar in the previous century, had been fighting among themselves whenever they were not resisting the raids of their northern neighbours, the Muslim sultans of Bijāpur and Golconda. In 1647 the region round Madras fell into the hands of Mīr Jumla, who at this time was serving the sultan of Golconda. Fortunately Mīr Jumla was

himself a great merchant as well as a soldier and administrator. He was already on friendly terms with the English, and agreed to confirm their privileges at Madras on condition that they would pay to the Golconda authorities half the customs-dues received from strangers. This arrangement proved very unsatisfactory to the company, for it opened the way to demands that it should receive Golconda officials into the settlement. In 1658 it was agreed to commute the sultan's share for an annual payment of 380 pagodas. After prolonged disputes this sum was raised in 1672 to 1200 pagodas a year.

The next stage was English expansion into Bengal. An approach had been made by setting up factories first at Hariharpur and then at Balasore. In 1650-1 a factory was established at Hugli, and soon after others were opened at Patna and Kāsim-bāzār. These seem at first to have been established in the interests of the factors' private trade rather than on the company's account; and some time elapsed before the company's trade in Bengal became unquestionably advantageous.

While the East India Company was thus being compelled by political conditions to develop the trade with India and so to establish factories in the principal trading areas, its privileges were meeting with much criticism in England. It was not possible for it to finance its purchases of Indian goods by its sales of broad-cloths and other European commodities, and it was therefore obliged regularly to export considerable amounts of the precious metals. At a time when men believed that the accumulation of gold and silver was the chief method of increasing national wealth, the company's trade was constantly liable to the attacks of pamphleteers, although Mun's famous pamphlet, *England's Treasure by Foreign Trade*, did something to spread sounder economic ideas. More dangerous to the company's position, however, than the attacks of theorists was the uncertain attitude of the first two Stuarts. James I was at one time induced to contemplate the establishment of a Scottish East India Company, and Charles I was persuaded to authorise a specific infraction of the company's privileges. In 1637 he granted to a group of merchants headed by Sir William Courteen letters patent permitting it to trade to places within the company's limits where the company had no factory, and the new traders failed to observe even these limitations.

The company's position, already embarrassed by this rivalry, was worsened by the civil war which soon followed. With the fall of the king, it was no longer able to claim the exclusive rights bestowed upon it by royal charter, and the new government long delayed to restore it to its old position. It also suffered heavy losses in the course of the First Dutch War, and in 1655 was unable to raise new capital.

This, however, proved to be the last of its misfortunes. In 1657 Cromwell granted it a new charter; and, though the Protectorate was then on the point of ending, the Restoration brought with it a vigorous and consistent policy of extending English foreign trade by the agency of chartered companies. The charters of Charles II and James II confirmed the old privileges and enlarged the company's powers. At the same time the establishment of a permanent joint-stock relieved the company of the recurrent difficulties which in the past it had had to encounter. The thirty years following on 1660 were years of expanding trade and great prosperity.

Among the provisions of the charters of this period were grants of authority to build and maintain fortresses, to enlist and discipline armed men, to maintain vessels of war, to coin money, and to administer justice both civil and criminal. At the same time the company became the formally recognised agent of the crown in the first of English territorial acquisitions in India. It was indeed characteristic of the new policy that Charles II should have been willing to accept as part of his Portuguese bride's dowry the remote island of Bombay. After many difficulties had been raised by the Portuguese officials in India, the place was made over to the English in 1665. In 1668, in consequence of the inconvenience and cost of administering a small, isolated settlement, it was transferred to the company, to be held of and administered for the crown at an annual quit-rent of £10 per annum. Thus the company came to exercise sovereign powers in two of its Indian settlements, at Bombay as representative of the king of England, at Madras under grants from Indian rulers, and questions of administration emerged prominently alongside of matters of trade.

The dominant personality in the company's directorate in the time of the later Stuarts was that of Sir Josiah Child, under whose influence broad views of policy began to appear. Though far

from neglecting the commercial interests of the company, and acutely conscious that the company needed the support of English public opinion as well as legal privilege and royal favour, he urged the importance of just government in India and the need of choosing wise governors for the English settlements. In one striking despatch, clearly inspired by his views, the company described the character which its servants should possess to qualify them for offices of political trust. It was not enough, it declared, to have dwelt many years in India, or to be familiar with all the intricacies of trade, or even to be versed in the country languages; these things indeed were needful, but beyond them the servant fitted for the company's highest offices must be a man of parts and education, a statesman as well as a merchant. In this attitude the English company offered a sharp contrast to the contemporary Dutch directors, who fixed all their attention upon matters of trade and left administration to take care of itself. In fiscal matters, however, Child urged that the example of the Dutch should be laid closely to heart. He thought rightly that the company's settlements should establish a regular revenue system, and that the inhabitants should be encouraged not by exemption from taxation but by a fair system equitably administered.

Indeed the latter part of the seventeenth century was a time of considerable growth, both at Madras and at Bombay. Internal wars were beginning again to afflict the country, and the fundamental hostility between Islam and Hinduism was encouraged by the unwise policy of Aurangzib. In western India the Maratha war was throwing the country-side into confusion. The twofold sack of Surat was teaching Indian merchants that even the greatest of Mughal ports was but an insecure place of habitation, while the conduct of Mughal governors led Hindu traders to think of seeking refuge under the foreign rulers of Bombay, especially under the wise and moderate government of Gerald Aungier. At Madras men lived in security while the country round was ravaged by Shivaji's raiders, and while the Golconda government was being overthrown by Mughal armies. These conditions emphasised the wisdom and foresight of Child's demands for increased attention to administrative questions. The purpose of the company (as he viewed it) was "to establish such a polity of civil and military power, and to create and secure such a large

revenue to secure both, . . . as may be the foundation of a large, well-grounded, sure English dominion in India for all time to come.

In fact, however, he judged the future more accurately than the present, and underestimated the effective force of the Mughal empire, misled, perhaps, by the disorganisation of western India and the ease with which Śīvajī had swooped down from his mountains upon Mughal garrisons and cities. The English factories in Bengal had always been harassed by demands for land-customs on goods in transit and for presents for leading officials. In this matter the position of the Bengal trade was peculiar. Elsewhere the goods which formed the staple articles of trade were purchased at no great distance from the coast. Indeed the trend of the company's trade in the second half of the seventeenth century displays a growing inclination to avoid transactions at remote inland factories such as Āgra. But in Bengal the great markets lay far up the water-ways of the province. Silk could only be procured to the best advantage at Kāsimbāzār, salt-petre at Patna, muslins at Dacca. The Bengal trade thus lay at the mercy of a multitude of customs-posts, and could be brought to a complete stand-still at any moment by official orders. In 1656 the governor of the province had exempted the English trade from internal dues on condition of a fixed annual payment. But his successors had refused to recognise his grant. In 1678 a new grant from the governor was at last procured; and in 1680 a *farmān* was obtained from the emperor Aurangzib. But neither the governor's nor the emperor's grant ended the demands which were made. The English factors came therefore to the conclusion that they needed a fortified settlement near the mouth of the Hugli, whither they might withdraw in time of trouble, and from which they might blockade the sea-borne trade of the province in case of need. In 1686 the company attempted to put this plan into operation. It sent out a number of ships with a small force of men to Bengal, and the Mughal ports of western India were also to be blockaded. In the war which followed, though the Mughal attack on the factory at Hugli was repelled, the English soon abandoned it and dropped down the river, first to the village where Calcutta was afterwards to arise, and then to a fever-stricken island at the mouth, whence the cool and experienced English agent, Job Charnock, opened negotiations

which permitted the English in the autumn of 1687 to return to Sūtanūtī. In the next year, however, a fresh naval force arrived from London with orders to attack and occupy Chittagong. Its commander, William Heath, refused to listen to Charnock's arguments for leaving well alone. He insisted on abandoning Sūtanūtī, sailed to Chittagong which he found too strong to be attacked, and then retired to Madras. These irresolute and foolish proceedings were brought to a close by the peace which was made with the Mughals by the president and council of Bombay, which in May, 1687, had replaced Surat as the headquarters of the company in India. The Bombay factors had hesitated for some time to break their peaceful relations with Aurangzāb. In the latter part of 1688, however, they had seized a number of Indian vessels, in revenge for which the factors at Surat had been imprisoned, and Bombay itself had been blockaded. In 1690 it was agreed to pay a large sum in compensation for the seizure of the Indian ships, and to remove the president himself, Sir John Child, from his office. In fact, he died shortly before the discussions were completed.

It was as well that the company was thus speedily relieved from a struggle for which it possessed neither sufficient forces nor adequate organisation. The restoration of peace was soon followed by the return of the English to Bengal. The Mughal governor, moved probably by the complaints of Indian merchants whose trade was suffering, invited Charnock back. The latter refused to stir until an agreement had been reached on the question of customs-dues. In February, 1691, a *farmān* was granted exempting English trade from these payments in return for Rs. 3000 a year. But before this, trusting in the governor's promises, Charnock had already returned, in August, 1690, to Sūtanūtī. Guarded by marshes on the east and by the river itself on the west, the place was well suited for defence. Great ships could ascend the river and anchor close inshore. No great Mughal official dwelt in its neighbourhood. It was therefore much better suited for an English settlement than the city of Hugli higher up the river, while the market which would be created by its establishment would soon attract a considerable population. In 1696, when the local zamindars broke into rebellion, leave was obtained to fortify the factory. In 1698, the company was granted the zamindari of three villages—Sūtanūtī,

Kālighāt, and Govindpur. In 1700 the Bengal factories were placed under the separate control of a president and council, established in this new headquarters called Fort William in Bengal. In one respect at least the settlement thus formed was peculiar. At Bombay the company ruled on behalf of the English crown and no Indian prince could claim jurisdiction there. At Madras it held a position which was more dubious. In fact its agents ruled the city, but some element of Indian supremacy existed, as was shown by the annual quit-rent paid to Golconda and, after the overthrow of that kingdom, to the representative of the Mughal empire in the Carnatic. From time to time claims were put forward by this local authority to jurisdiction over the Indian inhabitants, and, although these claims were in every instance successfully resisted, the independence of the company was incomplete. Its powers at Madras rested upon the acquiescence of Indian rulers, as well as upon its position under its English charters, and the predominance of English authority was in part at least due to the remoteness of its situation and the comparative weakness of Mughal rulers in southern India. In Bengal this dual source of the company's position was much more evident. Over all English subjects its authority was derived from English law and English charters, but over the Indian inhabitants it ruled as zamindar, as the local agent of the *faujdar* of Hugli. To a considerable degree, therefore, the position created later on by the grant of the *diwān* of Bengal merely extended over the whole province an anomaly which had existed at Calcutta for two generations.

The commercial prosperity which the company enjoyed under Charles II and James II provoked great jealousy of its exclusive trading privileges. The average return which its stock-holders received in the thirty years from 1662 to 1691 was 22 per cent. Private traders began to infringe its monopoly, and, when their vessels were seized in accordance with the rights conferred by the company's charters, tested the matter at law. The courts upheld the validity of the charters, and the company remained strong in the king's favour. But the position was abruptly changed by the revolution of 1688. The interlopers, as the private traders were called, having met with nothing but opposition from the king and his Tory supporters, had turned for assistance to the Whigs, who secured power by the overthrow of James II.

The Whigs themselves were hostile to a corporation which had been closely allied with the fallen government. So private interests and political prejudice combined in an attack ostensibly directed against the company's monopoly. After a series of discussions in parliament, the House of Commons voted in 1694 that all English subjects had an equal right to trade to India unless prohibited by statute. The unreality of this decision was displayed in the following year, when the same House of Commons threatened to impeach the Englishmen who had promised financial help to the Scottish project for a great overseas trading company. Two cross-currents were in fact at work. One was formed by the efforts of those politicians who aimed at reducing the powers of the crown in relation to trade; the other by the merchants who desired not to abolish but to share the monopoly of the eastern trade.

The subsequent course of events illustrates these divergent efforts. In 1698 a bill was passed into law creating a new company in return for a loan of £2,000,000 to the state. This body was framed on the lines of a regulated company, in order to avoid the narrower monopoly incidental to a joint-stock company, while provision was also made for its superintendence by the Privy Council. The old company at once became a member of the "General Society", as this new body was called, in order to preserve the right of trading to India. Shortly afterwards the great majority of the other subscribers were incorporated into a second joint-stock company under the name of the "English Company of Merchants". But this body, though it set out with a great show of activity, sending an ambassador, Sir Henry Norris, to the emperor Aurangzib, and obtaining the title of consul for its principal agents, was from the first embarrassed by a lack of trading capital, for its funds had been lent to the state and its available resources consisted only in the interest which it received. Its rival had large funds in hand as well as long-established settlements and privileges conferred by Indian rulers. But as against this the appearance in the east of agents representing the new company raised many difficulties and disputes. The two joint-stock companies, under some pressure from the ministry, resolved therefore on amalgamation, which was agreed upon in 1702 and completed under the arbitration of Godolphin in 1709. Thus the struggle resulted, not in any relaxation of the monopoly,

but in an extension of the circle which enjoyed its advantages. In 1730 proposals for the establishment of a regulated company were feebly revived but in fact the united company's legal monopoly remained untouched till 1793

The further development of the company's position in India during the first forty years of the eighteenth century was quiet, gradual, and lacking in dramatic events. Yet it was none the less important. While confusion spread through India, while the imperial power decayed within the Mughal provinces, while the Marāthas widened their financial claims without undertaking the corresponding responsibilities of public order and administration, the company's settlements remained relatively undisturbed. Trade became more hazardous, but the hazards were compensated by a high rate of profit. Bombay, Madras, and Calcutta all grew rapidly, alike in wealth and population. Sir Josia Child's ideal of a regular and certain revenue to support the costs of government was realised. The revenue system corresponded closely to the established rules of Indian finance, save that the scanty territory under the company's rule did not permit land revenue to be the chief source of income. The customs-dues, as was natural in city-states, provided the bulk of the revenue. Octroi-dues were collected on the imports by land, sea-customs and port-dues on the much more important trade by sea. Besides these, quit-rents were levied on the houses of the settlements, and monopoly revenues, on such articles of common consumption as betel and tobacco, were farmed out to Indian contractors. But despite these imposts, the inhabitants of the English settlements were probably the most lightly taxed subjects in India.

It was of course true that they lived under an authority which united the disparate functions of trade and government. At a later time, when conditions had been completely transformed, Adam Smith had small difficulty in demonstrating the incompatibility of commerce and administration. However, it has to be remembered that not the company only, but also its servants, the governors and councillors of the various settlements, were deeply interested in trade. That privilege had been most reluctantly conceded by the East India Company. In the early seventeenth century, great endeavours had been made to prevent the company's servants from trading at all. In this respect, the English were but following the example of the Dutch, who obstinately

refused to allow men to exercise on their own behalf the talents which they were intended to exercise on behalf of their employers. In the case of the Dutch, the result had been that the regulations prohibiting private trade had been wholly ignored. But the English proved more amenable to experience. From 1679 the company's servants were allowed to trade from port to port in India, provided they did not touch those branches of commerce which the company reserved for itself. Private trade thus ceased to be underhand or illicit, and became the open and recognised method by which the company's servants attained to wealth.

It was at this early period difficult for them to use their administrative authority in oppressive support of their trading privilege. Oppression would have speedily driven away Indian merchants to other European settlements. Authority was indeed too narrowly limited in area, and trade too dependent on the support and co-operation of Indian merchants to render such a course profitable. Probably few vessels save those belonging to the East India Company itself sailed from Bombay, Madras, or Calcutta without large Indian interests aboard. Cargo and vessel would be insured by groups of Indian merchants; capital would be provided by loans locally known as *respondentia* loans, or by the direct subscription of shares. The rapid growth of wealth and population of the three chief towns shows plainly that Indians found the rule of foreign traders milder, juster, safer, or more profitable than the government of neighbouring Indian princes, and, as conditions throughout the country became more disturbed, they sent their wealth and their families into the English settlements for safety, or came themselves to live and trade there.

In the early part of the eighteenth century the English began to run swiftly ahead of their former great rivals, the Dutch. About 1700 Negapatam, the principal Dutch settlement on the Coromandel Coast, was probably as large and wealthy as Madras; on the Hugli, Chinsura vied with Calcutta. But in the course of the next forty years Dutch trade at best remained stationary, while the English trade rapidly expanded.

The chief political event of this period was the great embassy, despatched after long correspondence and preparation, to the Mughal court in 1714. Its object was to secure a general grant of privileges throughout Mughal India together with a number of

villages around Calcutta. It was conducted by John Surman, Bengal servant of the company, assisted by an Armenian merchant who acted as interpreter. After three years *faimāns* were obtained, directing the rulers of the provinces concerned to comply with most of the company's requests. But by this time the imperial authority was rapidly failing. The emperor Farrukhsiyar was himself little more than the puppet of a court clique, and the governor of Bengal flatly refused to make over to the English the additional villages which had been granted to them. The embassy therefore effected little beyond giving the company claims against the empire which the local governors would not satisfy.

At Bombay the most significant development was the foundation of the naval force long known as the Bombay Marine. From early days English trade had been threatened by the attacks of Arab pirates in the Persian Gulf and of small maritime chiefs on the Malabar Coast. In the early part of the eighteenth century the latter were overshadowed by the rise of Kānhoji Angria, who became first the commander of the Marāṭha fleet and then an independent chieftain. He dominated the coast from Goa to Bombay from two strongholds, Gheria (or Vijayadrug) and Suvarndrug, and plundered vessels of every nationality. Under the government of Charles Boone (1715-22) the armed ships of the company were materially increased in order to deal with this menace. Various attacks were made upon the Marāṭha pirates from 1717 onwards, but little permanent success was obtained till almost forty years later. Then in conjunction with the Pēshwā a concerted attack was launched against the Angrias. In 1755 Commodore James captured Suvarndrug; and in 1757 Clive and Watson, sent to Bombay to attack the French at Hyderabad with Marāṭha help, were diverted from their original purpose to attack and capture Gheria.

Meanwhile the company's organisation had changed much from its early form in the seventeenth century. Like the Portuguese and Dutch, the English had begun by attempting to control trade and administration from a single centre. The president and council at Surat had at first been entrusted with the universal management; and this body had later been replaced by the general, or captain-general and council, of Bombay. This centralised control over widely scattered factories carried with it

obvious inconveniences, and from time to time attempts were made to remedy them by investing certain subordinate settlements with powers of local control. For instance, at one time Madras was placed in charge not only of the local factories on the Coromandel Coast, but also of those in Bengal. However, as local jealousies were always obstructing such arrangements, it was decided at the close of the century to vest the government in three equal and co-ordinate bodies, established at Bombay, Madras and Calcutta.

These bodies consisted of a president, who also bore the title of governor, and council. The title of governor goes back to the first charter of Charles II, which empowered the company to administer justice in those settlements where it maintained a governor and council. At Madras, therefore, where the chief official had generally borne the title of agent, he now received the designation of agent and governor. A similar office was created at Bombay when that island passed into the company's hands. The title of governor, however, was not merely connected with the administration of justice. It signified also powers of military command within a fortified town. It marked out the holder as head of the garrison, while the title of president marked him out as head of the civil administration. The president and governor, however, was not in theory more than the senior member and chairman of the council to which alone authority was entrusted. His only recognised privilege was that of giving a casting vote where the council was equally divided. But in practice he exerted a wide though undefined influence over the proceedings of the government. The other members of the council were the heads of the various mercantile offices. One was accountant, another paymaster, a third had charge of the goods sent out on the company's account from Europe. Therefore as soon as the council had dispersed, the powers of individual councillors were limited to making entries in a ledger or issuing a bale of goods or performing some other politically insignificant duty. The president was thus the sole political executive. He translated the decisions of the council into action, and he alone corresponded with the neighbouring princes. That position of itself made him something more than the senior member of council. Then, also, his appointment was usually the direct act of the company at home, and he was thus designated as the man

specially trusted by the supreme authority in England. He also enjoyed certain customary privileges of nomination, while his commercial interests made him both useful as a friend and dangerous as an enemy. A similar development appeared among the Dutch. At Batavia the governor-general occupied precisely the same theoretical position as the English president and governor; but he speedily came completely to dominate his council, and sometimes even refused to attend its meetings. But the English president was subject to a curb from which the Dutch governor-general was free. The English company was ever keenly interested in the administrative as well as the commercial conduct of its servants, and sharply watched to see that no infraction of its established system of council-government was allowed. It repeatedly intervened when it thought its presidents were exceeding their due functions, and thus the presidents never succeeded in establishing a predominance such as long prevailed among the Dutch.

The chief administrative difficulties which emerged in the early English settlements arose from judicial questions. From the first some judicial authority had been indispensably necessary to maintain order among the crews of the company's ships. This had been provided by the grant of power to hold courts martial, and to exercise martial law. The charters of Charles II, as has been mentioned, empowered the company to administer justice where it maintained a governor and council, and, under this authority, a court of law for the trial of European offenders came into being at Madras, consisting of the governor and council. When Bombay was transferred to the company, the island was divided into two precincts, with a bench of justices in each, and the governor and council sat as a court of appeal from their decisions. The charter of 1683 authorised the establishment of a court of judicature designed to hear mercantile and maritime suits; and professional judges, trained in the civil law by which such cases were principally decided, were sent out to Bombay in 1684 and to Madras in 1686. But this practice was not kept up, and the settlements speedily lost the advantage of trained lawyers. In 1687 the company set up, under the sanction of a special charter of 1686, a corporation and mayor's court at Madras. The court was to consist of the mayor and twelve aldermen, who included one Frenchman, two Portuguese, three

Jews, and three Indians, as well as three of the company's servants, to represent the principal trading interests of the place. It was to possess both civil and criminal jurisdiction, with an appeal to the governor and council where the amount at issue exceeded three pagodas (about 24s.) or where an offender was sentenced to lose life or limb. The last important change to be made in the seventeenth century was the issue of letters patent constituting courts of vice-admiralty in the East Indies in accordance with a statute, passed in 1698, for the punishment of offences committed on the high seas.

Such were the arrangements made by the English authorities for administering justice at Bombay and Madras. They proved to be quite insufficient, especially in regard to the trial of criminals. English criminal process was elaborate; any flaw in the proceedings might invalidate the whole process, and so expose the persons acting as judges to heavy penalties in the English courts. The company's servants naturally shrank from exposing themselves to dangers which, in view of their ignorance of legal technicalities, were far from unreal. Moreover, as the attack on the company's privileges began to develop, men questioned the validity of the courts as well as the legality of the trading monopoly; and finally, when the old company surrendered its charters and merged itself in the new, the position became still more uncertain, for the language of the new charter was far less specific than had been the grants of the old ones. The consequence was that the vice-admiralty courts remained the sole criminal tribunals the jurisdiction of which was unquestionable in English law; so that while crime at sea could certainly be punished, crime ashore, when committed by a British-born subject, could only be dealt with by arrest and deportation to England. This most unsatisfactory position was not amended till the issue of a new charter in 1726.

On the Indian side, however, at Madras and Calcutta the company's jurisdiction was on a firmer basis. At both these places it represented autocratic Indian powers as well as the constitutional authority of the English crown. At Madras its servants had maintained the customary court held by the chief executive official, the *adigar*. As other tribunals were established, they inherited the higher jurisdiction of the *adigar*, leaving petty cases to the decision of what was called locally the choultry court

At Calcutta the company as zamindar set up the zamindar's court, which heard and determined according to local custom all causes, criminal and civil, touching the Indian inhabitants, probably reporting capital sentences to the *faujdar* of Hughli for confirmation.

In 1726 the confusion of the early courts was brought to an end by the issue of new grants in England. These directed the establishment at Bombay, Madras and Calcutta, of a mayor's court with full civil jurisdiction, and of a court of quarter sessions to punish all crimes except high treason. Appeals were to lie from the mayor's court to the governor and council, and thence, when the amount at stake exceeded 1000 pagodas, to the Privy Council. The justices of quarter sessions comprised the majority of the council.

The effect of this change was to establish at Bombay and Madras uniform jurisdiction over Indian and European alike; and, while the new courts were directed generally to conform to English procedure and the principles of English law, they were not bound down to observe the technicalities of the first or to ignore the customary law prevalent in India. When an Indian was indicted for a capital offence, his case was heard before a petty jury consisting of six Indians and six Europeans. The jurisdiction of the mayor's court provoked some complaint among the Indian inhabitants, especially in connection with the oaths required of witnesses, and when these courts were modified in 1753 Indians were exempted from the jurisdiction of the mayor's courts save in disputes under a contract which expressly declared that differences should be referred to these courts for decision.

At Calcutta, however, the establishment of the new courts was complicated by the existence of the Mughal jurisdiction. Although, therefore, the courts were set up in accordance with the letters patent, the zamindar's court continued in existence, and in practice dealt with civil suits and criminal charges in which Indians were involved; and this position continued until 1757, when Mughal authority vanished from Calcutta and the English courts began to operate in the same way as at Bombay and Madras.

CHAPTER III

Dupleix and Clive

The French had not taken part in the earlier phases of the European movement to secure a position in the eastern trade. The country was ill-placed to pursue overseas adventures with success. Her long land-frontiers, the continental views and interests of her rulers, and the religious disputes which had convulsed the nation, had made efforts such as those of the Portuguese or the Dutch unattractive and inopportune. Economic causes made in the same direction. The French mercantile classes, in proportion to the wealth and population of the state, were far smaller, poorer and less influential than the corresponding classes of Amsterdam or London, nor was there at Paris or any other French city the like accumulation of liquid funds which might be employed in financing distant and speculative commerce. In the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, therefore, the spirit of adventure carried a few French ships into eastern seas, but no concerted effort, such as the Dutch and English merchants made, could appear among the merchants of France.

Nevertheless leading Frenchmen were alive to the importance of developing an eastern trade; Henry IV attempted to set up an East India Company, and Richelieu, despite his continental preoccupations, believed that the trade should not be neglected. A little later Colbert proceeded to develop a great scheme, by which France was to become a naval and colonising power. He perceived that naval power could only be built up on maritime trade, and that maritime trade demanded overseas settlements. In 1664 therefore he launched a project for establishing a French East India Company to colonise Madagascar, already visited by French ships, and to open up a regular trade with India and Persia. A royal edict was issued creating a company modelled in its constitution on the Dutch company. But from the first, despite the similarity of organisation, there was one profound difference. The Dutch company had been created and financed by merchants. The French company was created and in great part financed by the state. In spite of active official propaganda,

it was impossible to procure the subscription of the fifteen million *livres* announced as the capital of the new company; and it began its operations with only five and a half millions, of which three had been provided by the king. This state interest was soon manifested in another way. In 1670 a strong squadron of royal vessels was dispatched to the east under the command of de la Haye. He was to establish fortified posts, from which the company's trade might be conducted, besides the factories at Surat and Masulipatam which had already been opened. French adventure in the East was evidently going to follow the lines of the Portuguese rather than those of the Dutch and English policy, however much it might appear to be a mercantile concern.

The naval expedition of 1670 was ill-conducted. It attempted in vain to secure possession of Trincomalee. It then seized San Thomé, close to Madras, but the French were speedily besieged there by Golconda troops ashore and a Dutch fleet at sea, and, though de la Haye held out for two years, he was forced at last to capitulate. The one tangible consequence of his expedition was the establishment of the French at Pondichery, a little to the southward of the Golconda frontier. There the French obtained a grant in 1673, and in the next year François Martin took charge of the settlement. A little later he built a small fort for its protection, naming it Fort Louis. Though it could not resist a Dutch attack in 1693, it was restored to the French by the Treaty of Ryswick, and became the headquarters of the French in India.

In this early period the great difficulty which had to be met by Martin and his successors was the feebleness of the company itself. It had needed reconstruction in 1686. Early in the eighteenth century it was reduced to selling permits to merchants of St Malo. It was reorganised by Law and formed a part of his great and over-ambitious scheme in 1719. But with his collapse it fell once more, and emerged in 1721 without liquid funds and under the complete control of the ministry. In the course of the next twenty years it traded on borrowed money, and thanks to the able management of Lenoir and Dumas, who governed Pondichery from 1720 to 1742, its profits rose and its financial position eased. It had, moreover, established factories in Bengal at Chandernagore, and on the Malabar coast at Mahé; while it had also occupied two derelict islands, Bourbon and Mauritius, occupying an important strategic position about half-

way between the Cape of Good Hope and Cape Comorin. In 1742 La Bourdonnais, the governor, was busily seeking to develop the resources of these islands, and especially Port Louis, with its remarkable harbour, on Mauritius, while in that year Dupleix, who had long occupied the position of chief at Chandernagore, was appointed governor of Pondichery.

Meanwhile events in India had been demonstrating how precarious was the political situation. In 1739 northern India had been terrified by the irresistible invasion of Nādir Shāh, by the sack and slaughter which had marked his entrance into Delhi, by the restoration of Persian authority on its ancient boundary of the Indus, and by the impotence of the Mughal empire to defend either its provinces, or its capital, or the remnants of its wealth. In the next year the Carnatic was similarly afflicted, though not by the armies of a foreign sovereign. The Marāthas thought the time ripe to levy plunder in lieu of *chauth*. Fatch Singh and Rāghūji Bhonsla were sent southwards with a host of cavalry. At the entrance to the Carnatic, in the Dāmaleri Pass, they found the nawab Dost 'Alī, seeking to prevent their entrance. Him they overpowered and slew, and then proceeded thoroughly to ravage the province. Many refugees and much treasure passed for safety into the European settlements on the coast, and Dost 'Alī's son, Safdar 'Alī, was obliged to promise the Marāthas a great sum to withdraw. They then moved southwards against Trichinopoly, where Dost 'Alī's son-in-law, Chanda Sāhib, had recently established himself at the expense of a Hindu ruling family. In 1741 they compelled Chanda Sāhib to surrender and carried him off a prisoner to Satāra.


These events shattered public order in the Carnatic. In 1742 Safdar 'Alī was murdered by a cousin; and in 1743 Nizām-ul-mulk, the subahdar of the Deccān, marched in order to re-establish peace. He recovered Trichinopoly from the Marātha garrison, and named an old servant of his own, Anwar-ud-dīn, as nawab of Arcot. But for thirty years the Carnatic had been governed by a single family. Its members had received the command of all the chief fortresses and enjoyed large *jāgīrs*. They viewed the new nawab with jealousy, and he was never strong enough to expel them from their position, while the country was pervaded with rumours that Anwar-ud-dīn would speedily be removed and some member of the old family appointed in his place.

At this time, in 1744, France and Great Britain became involved in the War of the Austrian Succession. That did not necessarily imply war between the two companies in India. During the last war Madras and Pondichery had remained on friendly terms, and the French had received assistance against the blockade which the Dutch had sought to establish, even though vessels of the French navy had captured English vessels in the Bay of Bengal. The troubles which had broken out between the Malabar factories at Tellicherry and Mahé in 1725 had been composed by an arrangement which had stipulated that neither factory should attack the other even if the two nations went to war in Europe. On the Coromandel Coast in 1744 both Madras and Pondichery had small garrisons, but neither had any vessels of war and hostilities therefore appeared unlikely and disadvantageous. Dupleix at once proposed to the English council at Madras to make a neutrality agreement similar to that which had been made in Malabar. But the position had changed considerably. The French company's trade had expanded and become an object of jealousy to the English company. More important than this was the likelihood of French naval action in the east. In the previous war they had sent out a squadron. In 1740, when it seemed likely that France would join in the war which had broken out between Spain and England in 1739, La Bourdonnais had induced the ministry at Paris to dispatch men-of-war. The scare had blown over, the men-of-war had been recalled, but the threat remained. On the instant that war was declared, the English directors approached the ministry with a request for a naval squadron to protect the English and cruise upon French shipping in the east. The request was granted and early in the year Commodore Barnett announced his arrival by capturing the French company's China fleet and a number of richly laden French vessels engaged in private trade.

On this Dupleix appealed to La Bourdonnais at Mauritius to equip a squadron to redress the situation. The latter with rare vigour set to work, and in 1746 appeared off the coast with eight vessels against the English four. The new-comers were not the equals of the English in either speed or weight of guns, but these disadvantages were more than compensated by a superiority of command. Barnett had died and been succeeded by the senior captain, Peyton, who proved an incompetent leader. An

indecisive action was fought on June 25, after which Peyton gave the French ships leisure to refit and increase their armament of guns at Pondichery. He then refused a further action and sailed off to Calcutta, while La Bourdonnais landed the troops he had brought with him before Madras, which capitulated on September 21 after the feeblest of defences. The place surrendered under an informal promise of ransom. But after La Bourdonnais had signed an agreement, and had received a handsome present in acknowledgement of his conduct, but before the convention could receive its full effect, a cyclone struck the coast, shattering the French vessels lying before Madras. This event obliged La Bourdonnais to withdraw, leaving behind him many men whom he could no longer accommodate on his reduced squadron, and charging Dupleix to give effect to the arrangement which the latter had bitterly opposed. As soon as he had secured control, Dupleix denounced the convention, and officers from Pondichery proceeded to pillage Madras from top to bottom, while La Bourdonnais, on his return to France, was imprisoned for some years on the charges which Dupleix hastened to send home against him.

In these events the Mughal nawab at Arcot had vainly sought to intervene. On the outbreak of hostilities Dupleix had endeavoured to screen French trade behind the nawab's flag; but Barnett had refused to be deceived by such a transparent subterfuge. He had seized French-owned vessels regardless of whether they chose to fly the French colours or the white flag edged with green which purported to stand for the authority of Arcot. The French had complained to the nawab, the nawab had demanded an explanation from the governor and council of Madras; and the latter had made answer that they had no authority over the commodore. With this *Anwar-ud-din* had remained content, and, when the French had proceeded to wage hostilities ashore, he had at the English instance demanded French withdrawal. Undeceived by the evasive answer returned to him, he sent a force, too late to relieve Madras but charged to expel the French. His troops attempted to blockade the place, but were so roughly handled in two actions that they withdrew and after a while the nawab made peace with Pondichery. The importance of these events lay in their revealing two things—one the incapacity of the local ruler, the other the military superiority conferred on European arms by recent developments in military technique.



Small units of European foot and artillery could now confront and defy the ill-disciplined and ill-conducted cavalry which still formed the only fighting force of an Indian army.

The remaining events of the war were of small immediate moment. In 1748 a considerable expedition arrived under Boscawen to avenge the capture of Madras. It laid siege fruitlessly to Pondichery; and early in the next year news came that peace had been determined in Europe. By the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle Madras was restored to the English, and this rendition was carried into effect in the autumn of 1749. But before that had been executed, Dupleix had already begun to forge a new and most momentous chain of events.

Ever since Chanda Sāhib had been carried off a prisoner to Satāra by the Marāthas, negotiations had been going forward from time to time for his release. His wife and family had found refuge in Pondichery, carrying with them considerable wealth in jewels. But they were not able to raise the full amount demanded for Chanda Sāhib's ransom, while the Marāthas were not willing to release their prisoner on credit. At last Dupleix, indisposed to Anwar-ud-dīn by his interference at Madras, agreed to take a hand in the business. He seems to have stood as surety for the payment of Chanda Sāhib's ransom, at the same time promising to send a French force to the latter's aid as soon as he should appear in the Carnatic. On July 16, 1749, the troops marched under d'Auteil, Dupleix's brother-in-law. On August 3 the allies met, defeated, and slew Anwar-ud-dīn at Ambūr. Chanda Sāhib in gratitude at once proceeded to Pondichery. He showered gifts on the French officers who had assisted him, and granted to the French company territory cutting off the English factory at Port St David from access to the interior, while he also appointed a disreputable connection of Madame Dupleix to the government of San Thomé, only three miles south of Port St George, Madras.

At that moment the conduct of English affairs lay in feeble hands. The governor, Floyer, was a light, inconsiderate, frivolous man. On the news of Chanda Sāhib's victory he had hastened to write letters of congratulation. But even he could not but perceive the menace to English trade implied in these new grants to the French. A son of Anwar-ud-dīn, Muhammad 'Alī by name, had found refuge in Trichinopoly, and claimed to be

entitled to his father's succession. From him Floyer obtained grants of Bahur and San Thomé, and at once put them in execution, turning out the French agents and replacing them by English forces. He also sought another ally. The great Nizām-ul-mulk had died in 1748. His second son, Nāsir Jang, had succeeded to the rule of his territories. But Chanda Sāhib had been accompanied by a grandson of Nizām-ul-mulk, Muzaffar Jang, who claimed to have been named as heir by his grandfather. Floyer therefore sent agents to Nāsir Jang, urging him in his own interests to march south and extinguish this rebellion before it extended to the region under his direct government.

At the close of 1749 Floyer was replaced as governor by Thomas Saunders. Saunders was in his way a remarkable man. He possessed none of the dazzling talent, the versatility, the inexhaustible resource of Dupleix. He cherished no great designs and contemplated no revolution in policy. But he had a cool, clear brain, strong good sense, a shrewd judgment of men, an inflexible resolution. He harboured no thoughts of empire, but he was fiercely, unalterably resolved that the position of the company he served and of the nation he represented should not suffer through the intrigues of any foreign governor. His firm grasp of realities and his invincible obstinacy of purpose made of him a dangerous enemy, none the less dangerous because his lack of showy gifts might lead to an underestimate of his real quality. He was not a great man. But many great men have been far less effective. It was, after all, who in defiance of all principles of military etiquette chose Clive for independent command, and chose the very point where a tiny force might exert an influence out of all proportion to its numbers.

At the end of 1749 Chanda Sāhib had moved south, accompanied by his French allies, with the object of besieging Trichinopoly and capturing his rival, Mubammad 'Alī. But he paused on his way to lay siege to Tanjore in the hope of extracting from the raja money with which to refill his treasury, exhausted by his gifts to the French. But before his hopes could be realised, the approach of Nāsir Jang with a numerous army induced Chanda Sāhib to march back hastily to Pondichery. Nāsir Jang was joined by an English detachment; the rival forces met near Valudavūr, west of the French settlement, and a battle seemed imminent when the officers with the French troops, either struck with

panic or dissatisfied with the lack of a new donation at this crisis, abandoned their troops and retired into Pondichery. This not only disorganised the French force but also threw Chanda Sāhib's own followers into the utmost confusion. They sought refuge under the guns of the French fortifications; Chanda Sāhib took refuge with Dupleix; Muzaffar Jang gave himself up to his uncle, Nāsir Jang. The latter, reckoning the person of his rival the main object to be secured, then fell back on Arcot, where he spent the hot weather of 1750. This permitted Dupleix to re-organise his troops and open one of those political intrigues at which he excelled. The chiefs who had accompanied Nāsir Jang were discontented with their prolonged absence from the Deccan. One group in particular, the Pathān nawabs of Cuddapah, Kurnool and Savanūr, was known to be wavering. With them Dupleix opened a correspondence, which led to an agreement to join the French against their master. In September a body of French troops under Bussy stormed Jinji, reputed to be impregnable. Later in the year Nāsir Jang again moved south. On the night of December 16 his camp was surprised by the French under the command of La Touche. Nāsir Jang, in the confusion of the onset, was slain by one of the Pathān nawabs. His army at once broke. Muzaffar Jang was freed and conducted to Pondichery. The great treasure which Nāsir Jang had carried with him fell into the hands of the French. This brilliant success, alike in the disparity of numbers, the treachery of Indian leaders to their chief, and the magnitude of the reward, anticipated in important features the victory of Plassey.

Dupleix now believed that success lay in his hand. He at once prepared to send Muzaffar Jang to the Deccan with a French detachment under the command of Bussy in order that the prince might establish himself as the due and regular successor of his dead uncle. By this means Dupleix hoped to be able to control not only the nawab of Arcot, Chanda Sāhib, but also the subahdar of the Deccan, and thus to secure such a legitimacy for his claims as neither the English nor Muhammad 'Alī would dare to dispute. In this he was guilty of a gross miscalculation. The subahdar might no doubt obtain a formal confirmation of his position at Delhi, and might ratify whatever grants Dupleix desired in southern India. But would the English admit the validity of such grants? All men knew that the power of the empire had vanished.

Could its rights be recognised when they were diverted by French policy into the creation of a French empire, supported by French bayonets? To expect English recognition involved an assumption of such folly in an enemy as could not reasonably be anticipated. The expedition to the Deccan was based therefore on a mistaken estimate of English conduct, and it carried with it a great disadvantage. It involved sending far away to the northward a considerable body of troops under the command of the ablest French officer. Whatever might be the political effects of setting up a French nominee at Hyderabad, they were liable to be wholly upset by the military consequences of dividing a weak French force and entrusting the command against the English to incompetent leaders.

Muzaffar Jang marched northward under Bussy's escort on January 15, 1751. A little later in the year an English force marched southwards to prevent the French from overwhelming Muhammad 'Alī at Trichinopoly. There followed a campaign as futile and uninteresting as a children's game of chess. Both leaders were unintelligent and lethargic. Clive, who burned for action, could not be entrusted with the general command over the heads of officers far senior to him. But Saunders sent him off on an independent command to attack Arcot, which had been left poorly defended. He seized the place. Chanda Sāhib hastily detached a force from before Trichinopoly to recover his capital. But Clive held it triumphantly. This was the first real military success that the English had secured in the struggle. It was followed in the next year by a triumph which had far-reaching consequences. Lawrence, who had already served the company in south India, returned from England as the commander of the company's forces. He was no man of genius, but a sound soldier whom his men followed with confidence, and whose military rank and experience—he had served in the king's army—dominated the senior officers' jealousy of Clive. Early in 1752 he marched with reinforcements to Trichinopoly, taking Clive with him. They found the French troops commanded by Jacques Law, a gallant man in himself but a most timid leader. Muhammad 'Alī's cause was at this moment supported by contingents from two Hindu kingdoms, Tanjore and Mysore, both of which feared the success of Chanda Sāhib. Under Lawrence's control, the allies speedily drove Chanda Sāhib and the French into the

island of Srirangam, formed by the Kāveri opposite Trichinopoly. While Lawrence watched them from the south bank of the river, Clive was sent with a detachment to cut them off on the north. Against an enterprising commander such a division of the English forces might have been fatal. Even as it was, Clive was surprised and almost overwhelmed. But events proved that the English had accurately measured the talent of the French leader, who permitted himself to be shut up in the island. In May, Chanda Sāhib, despairing of his position, surrendered. With singular ill-judgment he placed himself in the hands of the Tanjoreans. He had in his day of power repeatedly ravaged their country. "By order of the raja and with the assent of Muhammad 'Alī he was now beheaded. Law had already surrendered to the English, and a considerable body of the French forces thus passed into Muhammad 'Alī's prisons at Trichinopoly.

Nothing so well proves Dupleix's fertility of mind as the fact that even this crushing blow did not bring the war to an end. Bereft for the moment of force, he resorted to intrigue, as he had done in the case of Nāsir Jang. The Mysoreans were easily detached from their alliance with Muhammad 'Alī because he had promised them possession of Trichinopoly, and, when the French had been defeated, refused to make good his promise. Morārī Rāo, the commander of a Marāṭha force of mercenaries, was also induced by large promises to join the French. So that Trichinopoly was soon blockaded again, though now by forces which had formerly been defending it. Dupleix received reinforcements from Europe and sent them down under a variety of leaders to attack the place. But he could not lay his hand upon a man of outstanding military talent. Though Trichinopoly remained beleaguered all through 1753 and a great part of 1754, and though the French made several desperate efforts to destroy the English covering force under Lawrence and to escalate the town, their attempts all failed, and in August, 1754, news arrived that the French authorities had decided to recall Dupleix. This was in a large degree the consequence of the slow development of his plans. His alliance with Chanda Sāhib in 1749 had been inspired by no ideas of dominion. He had hired out a body of French troops in order to secure large personal rewards for himself and a privileged position for the French East India Company in the Carnatic. The destruction of Nāsir Jang had widened his

theatre of action but hardly changed his aims. Not until he perceived the success of Bussy in the Deccan does he seem to have begun to consider the possibility of a disguised or avowed sovereignty. Then in the course of 1752 and 1753 he began to expound to the authorities at Paris wider schemes, the acquisition of a great revenue, and the financing of the company's trade from Indian resources. Moreover he had consistently represented the opposition of the English and Muhammad 'Alī as a trifling obstacle which would be immediately overcome without cost to the company. At first the French directors and ministers had welcomed a policy which they supposed to be beneficial without serious risk. They sent out to India considerable reinforcements, larger in fact than the reinforcements sent out by the English; but they did not enlarge their supplies of finance, since Dupleix had constantly assured them that his operations were paying for themselves. But on this point Dupleix had deceived both himself and his superiors in Europe. He had expected the English opposition to collapse, leaving him free to collect the Carnatic revenues to pay for his military operations. But the English opposition had proved stubborn. The Carnatic revenues had fallen away while the military expenditure had risen. In these circumstances it had not been possible to maintain the Carnatic investment at its usual figure, and the company found its shipments falling away. This was the first hint that the schemes of Dupleix were not as sound as they appeared on paper. Then, at the close of 1752, came disquieting news from London. The English claimed to have secured a notable success. At first Paris discounted these statements as mere English brag. But when it learnt belatedly from Dupleix that Chanda Sāhib had perished, that a large French force had surrendered, but that he was as optimistic as ever, that he was finding new allies, and that the English resistance would be crushed within a year, Paris began to doubt whether the reports received from Pondichery were in any degree reliable. About the same time Paris received from London copies of letters which Dupleix had addressed to the English governor, Thomas Saunders, putting forth claims in which the English declared they never would acquiesce, while the English ambassador was instructed to inform the foreign minister of France that the policy of Dupleix was manifestly injurious to English interests. At the moment France did not desire war with Great Britain, nor did

the trading interests of her East India Company seem to demand a bellicose policy. There was room in the markets of India for the trade of both companies. In these circumstances the French company and ministry agreed upon recalling Dupleix, whose continuance in office was indeed a strong obstacle to the conclusion of a working compromise with the English in India. Negotiations were begun between the companies in London, and a new agent, Godeheu, was dispatched to Pondichery to replace Dupleix and arrange a temporary suspension of hostilities on the spot. In order the more easily to induce the English to desist from war, Godeheu was accompanied by a large body of troops. He reached Pondichery in August, 1754. Dazzled by the brilliance of Dupleix's projects, historians have usually condemned the action of the French authorities. But the problem was not so simple as has usually been represented. France was not prepared to lavish men and money, or to run the risk of instant war with England, in support of schemes which had never been adequately explained. Godeheu was therefore charged to make the best of the position as he found it, and this he proceeded to do. The influence of the troops he carried with him was neutralised by the arrival on the coast of English reinforcements—a small naval squadron under Admiral Watson, and a royal regiment. But the attitude of the English was not aggressive. They were far more anxious to secure their trading position than to continue an expensive war. A truce was made, and then a provisional treaty was signed at the end of 1754. This latter stipulated for a position of equality between the two nations, alike in the Carnatic and in the Deccan. But the treaty was not to come into force until it had been confirmed in Europe. The immediate effect of the arrangement was therefore very beneficial to the French. They were relieved of the burden of war by the truce, while they still retained the territory and revenues actually in their possession in August, 1754, unless and until the authorities at Paris assented to their relinquishment. Godeheu, so far from sacrificing national interests, secured for the moment all the material advantages which had been won, free at last from the mortgage of a war which Dupleix had not been strong enough to win and which he had not been pliant enough to end by a compromise.

His attitude had doubtless been much stiffened by the successes which Bussy had secured in the Deccan. Bussy had marched

northwards in January, 1751, with Muzaffar Jang. But very soon the Pathān nawabs who had conspired against Nāsir Jang conspired against his successor; and although their troops were routed, Muzaffar Jang was killed in action on February 14. Bussy at once halted and awaited confirmation of his recognising Nizām 'Alī, a younger brother of the dead Nāsir Jang. Dupleix, however, annulled this, and directed his lieutenant to install an elder brother, Salābat Jang. This was done. The army moved onwards. Hyderabad was occupied, and Salābat Jang emptied the treasury to reward the successes of the French officers on his behalf. They then moved to Aurangābād, the traditional capital of the province. This success had inspired Dupleix to dream of yet more extensive operations. He proposed to Bussy that the latter should march with Salābat Jang against Alahwānī Khān, nawab of Bengal, and establish the new French *protégé* as ruler of that province too. The project, however, was characteristically founded on hopes rather than possibilities. First came an attack from Bālājī Rāo, the Pēshwā, who thought he saw in recent events chances for an expansion of Marāṭha power. When he made peace on January 17, 1752, Bussy began to find his position threatened by intrigues at the durbar against French influence. The Hindu *dīvān*, Rāmdās Pandit, who had been chosen by Dupleix, was murdered on May 4. Then Salābat Jang's eldest brother, Ghāzī-ud-dīn, came south from Delhi to claim his father's succession. When he had been removed by poison, Salābat Jang's army, deep in arrears of pay, refused to march against Mysore; and Bussy, weary and in bad health, retired to recuperate at Masulipatam. As soon as he had gone, Sayyid Lashkar Khān, the new *dīvān*, put in action a scheme to expel the French altogether from the Deccan. A small body remained as bodyguard of the subahdar, but the rest were broken up into parties and sent to collect arrears of revenue. On this news Bussy hurried back from the coast, assembled the scattered troops, and in November, 1753, moved to Aurangābād. There he demanded that the position of the French should be assured by the grant to him as a personal *jāgīr* of the coastal area known as the Northern Circars, stretching from Masulipatam to the Chilka Lake. It was reckoned that the revenues of these districts would provide for the pay of Bussy's troops and so obviate direct demands on Salābat Jang's treasury. During most of 1754 Bussy

was occupied with administrative affairs in the new *jāgīr*. When he returned to Hyderabad in January, 1755, he found his position more delicate than ever. Shāh Nawāz Khān, the *dhūwān* who had succeeded Sayyid Lashkar Khān, was obstinately hostile, and took advantage of the easy terms which Bussy allowed to Morāī Rāo, the chief of Gooty, to declare that Salābat Jang's interests were being sacrificed. Morāī Rāo had in fact considerable claims on the French, and this was doubtless the reason why Bussy's aid had been demanded for his reduction. On this score Bussy was dismissed, and letters were hurriedly sent to Madras requesting the assistance of an English force to replace the French. Bussy retired to Hyderabad and occupied a defensive position till he could receive reinforcements. The despatch of the English expedition was prevented by news of Sirāj-ud-daula's capture of Calcutta. Shāh Nawāz Khān's blockade of Bussy collapsed, and Bussy resumed his place in the councils of Salābat Jang, and retained it until he was summoned by Lally in 1758 to take part in the attack upon Madras. This brought the French adventure in the Deccan to an end, and the capture of Masulipatam by Colonel Forde with a force from Bengal in April, 1759, marked the end of French dominion in the Northern Circars. The importance of this episode has generally been misunderstood. So far as the French were concerned, it led nowhere. The English refused to be deceived by the shadow of legitimacy which it allowed Dupleix to cast over his projects. Its advantages were private, not public. Bussy and his chief officers, including some of Dupleix's own relations, made large fortunes; but the company received no financial benefit. The Northern Circars did not in fact produce the expected revenues, and Bussy was never able to help the campaigns of Dupleix with either troops or money, while the division of the French forces produced by this northern excursion and the absence from the Carnatic of the one French officer of unquestionably superior talents must be regarded as having materially aided the defeat of the French at Trichinopoly in 1752—the defeat which led directly to the recall of Dupleix himself. An expedition which secured no public advantage and which contributed to the French defeat elsewhere can only be considered a grievous mistake. But Bussy's brilliant though fruitless management of a Muslim durbar provided the English with a notable example of what might be done, and pointed the

way on more than one occasion for Clive in his management of Mir Ja'far in Bengal. Therein lies the real importance of Bussy's short-lived predominance in the Deccan.

The policy of Dupleix indeed lacked the elements of permanent success, and could never have survived a European war. Had he never been recalled, Coote or some other English leader would none the less have besieged, captured, and ruined Pondichery. The indispensable condition of political expansion in the east lay in the eighteenth century, as it had lain in the sixteenth and seventeenth, in predominance at sea. But this condition, as events were to prove, was not possessed by France. Dupleix's success was only obtained under temporary conditions of a most favourable nature. He launched his campaign after the war of the Austrian Succession. The most powerful weapon of the English, their naval power, was for the moment out of action. They could not pursue, intercept, or destroy the vessels which carried out to Pondichery recruits and munitions. Without this advantage it is unlikely that Dupleix would have obtained as high a degree of success as he in fact secured.

As it was, however, the schemes of the great French leader contributed largely to that expansion of English influence which shortly followed. In order to check the plans of the French, the English had been compelled to assemble on the Coromandel Coast a greater military and naval force than they had ever before gathered together in India. There were Admiral Watson and his squadron, a royal regiment, and the company's European troops strengthened not only by the recruits destined for Madras but also by those intended for Bengal. Besides these there was a considerable body of sepoy. The credit of being the first to drill and organise these troops in the European manner has been falsely ascribed by many to Dupleix. But recent research has shown that his English enemies led the way in attaching to them European drill-sergeants and officers, under whose training they became the best body of native infantry in India. In the middle of 1756 a combined force had been destined to march to Hyderabad at Salābat Jang's request, to deliver him from French control. But its march had been prevented by alarming news from Calcutta.

Alahwirdi Khān, who had ruled Bengal in virtual independence after a prolonged struggle with the Marāthas, died in

April, 1756. He was succeeded by his great-nephew, Sirāj-ud-daula, a young man at once inconsiderate and resolute. His predecessor had favoured the Hindus, and had employed a number of them in high office. Sirāj-ud-daula had reversed this policy, and speedily alarmed and disgusted the principal Hindus of the provinces. Attempts have been made in recent times to rehabilitate his character. But contemporary Muslim writers lend no support to this change of view, and the young nawab seems to have deserved no more sympathy or respect than his own generation bestowed upon him. He had been alarmed by the events which had been taking place in southern India, and had been closely watching the Europeans settled on the Hughli, lest they should attempt to repeat in Bengal operations which had involved the overthrow or death of four Muslim rulers in the Carnatic and the Deccan. The English, the French, and the Dutch alike possessed factories which had once been fortified. Of these, the Dutch and the French were much stronger than the English factory, which was a fort only in name, and had been declared by every military officer who had seen it to be untenable against any sustained attack. But rumours of a new war in Europe with the French had led the president and council at Calcutta to build new batteries on the river-side, lest a French squadron should sail up the river to attack their virtually unprotected settlement. Sirāj-ud-daula at once demanded an explanation, and required the removal of the new defences. The president, Roger Drake, replied that they were necessary in view of a possible French attack. The nawab, who was marching against a rival, Shāhkar Jang, in Purnea, at once returned to his capital, Murshidābād. He seized the English factory hard-by at Kāsimbāzār. He then marched against Calcutta. On June 16 he appeared before it; on the 18th the English were driven from their outposts; on the 19th the president and the commandant of the garrison sought refuge aboard ship; and on the 20th Fort William surrendered. The prisoners were shut up for the night in the military prison the Black Hole, in which a number of them were suffocated. This event does not deserve the title of "massacre" by which it has long been known, for there is nothing to show that the fate of the prisoners was in any way designed. But neither does there appear ground for discrediting the evidence of more than one survivor or for supposing that no such incident occurred.

Despite Sirāj-ud-daula's triumph in capturing Calcutta, he had chosen his time most unfortunately. If he had but waited until the French and English were again at war, he would have been certain of French co-operation had he required it, and would have been secure from the reprisals of the other English settlements in India, at all events for a time. As it was, the presidency of Madras had the means, and, under the inspiration of Orme, the historian, the will, immediately to take up the challenge. The troops intended to join Salābat Jang had not marched when the news arrived from Bengal. Ships were collected. A new expedition was prepared. Its command was entrusted to Clive and Watson, who arrived in the Hughli a few days before Christmas. On January 2, 1757, they reoccupied Calcutta without resistance. The nawab at once returned. But a night-attack directed by Clive, though inflicting no great loss, shook Sirāj-ud-daula's nerve, and he at once made peace, agreeing to confirm all English privileges, to make good all the loss caused by the capture of Calcutta, to permit its fortification, and to allow the coinage of rupees there.

Then emerged the question of the French. At the end of 1756 it was known that war had broken out in Europe. The French at Chandernagore at once made proposals for a neutrality. The subject was repeatedly discussed, but came to nothing, because the chief of Chandernagore could bind only himself and his council and could not limit the action either of Pondichery or of any officers who might come from Europe. Chandernagore was thus exposed to attack as soon as the nawab permitted such a step. The two nations were represented at Murshidābād by William Watts and Jean Law, who used their utmost efforts to induce the nawab to give, or to withhold, his assent. On the whole the durbar favoured the English. Then, too, came an alarm that Ahīnad Shāh Durāni meant to advance against Bengal, and Sirāj-ud-daula offered the English a lakh a month for aid against the Afghans. At the same moment came a strong complaint from Calcutta that the treaty had not been carried into effect; and on March 10, the nawab's secretary wrote a letter, which received the nawab's seal, permitting the English to attack Chandernagore. Almost at once Sirāj-ud-daula changed his mind. He ordered a force to march to protect the place; then, on hearing from Nandakumār, his *saujdar* at Hughli, that the

French were certain to be beaten, he cancelled this order, but he also wrote imploring Bussy to march into Bengal and deliver him from the English. Meanwhile Clive and Watson, on receiving the nawab's letter, had moved at once, and the French surrendered after one day's fighting.

The result was that the nawab was deprived of his natural allies against the English, at the very time when he had betrayed his hostility to the latter by summoning Bussy to his aid. His simultaneous abandonment of Chandernagore and invitation to Bussy was the conduct of one who could neither perceive the sound course of action nor persevere in any. It is likely too that the nawab was the victim of treacherous advice received from his own durbar. The Seths hated him. Rāi Durlabh, who had held a great position, had been placed under the orders of a favourite named Mohan Lāl. Mīr Ja'far, the *bakhshī*, had been dismissed with insult. Already at the end of 1756 Omichand, one of the chief merchants of Calcutta, had sounded the English about a plan to replace Sirāj-ud-daula by a new and better nawab. In April, 1757, they were again approached by discontented Hindus and Muslims. The Frenchman, Law, believed, probably with justice, that these projects would have come to nothing without the backing of the Seths. But it was also clear that nothing would be done unless the English acted as the spear-head of the movement. In these circumstances an agreement was framed between the English and Mīr Ja'far. On June 11 the document was delivered at Calcutta, and immediately afterwards Clive set out on the march destined to lead to English dominion in Bengal. His force consisted of 800 Europeans and 2200 sepoys. He had with him no cavalry, and a zamindar who had been invited to join him with a body of horse preferred to wait until he saw how matters went. So did Mīr Ja'far himself. He was to have joined the English on the march. In fact he only gave them promises of help. When Clive reached the point at which he would have to cross the river in order to make contact with the enemy, he hesitated and sought the counsel of his officers. They advised a halt. But reflection quickly restored Clive's confidence, and on the eve of June 23 he encamped at Plassey Grove, close to Sirāj-ud-daula's camp. Many knew or had made a shrewd guess at what was going forward. Omichand, the Calcutta merchant who had taken a share in the early projects,

had demanded a great reward—a quarter of the jewels and a twentieth of the treasure—as the price of his acquiescence. He had been half-silenced by the trick of a forged treaty in which his claims were allowed but which was not to receive effect. Nevertheless, the nawab had had ample notice of the English intentions, and had assembled his forces. But he was as ever hampered by his own indecision and the sinister advice which he received from his officials. He himself was no soldier. He ordered an attack on the English camp. It was feebly led and easily repulsed. Mīr Ja'far, who commanded a division of the nawab's army, drew aside and took no part. Then Clive advanced. Sirāj-ud-daula fled. His troops disbanded. Mīr Ja'far entered the English camp. On the 28th he was formally installed as nawab at Murshidābād, and on July 2 Sirāj-ud-daula, betrayed by a fakir whose ears he had cut off, was brought in a prisoner by Mīr Ja'far's son and at once put to death. These events precisely paralleled the events in the south. Once more an incoherent Indian army had been scattered, and the ruler of a province overthrown, by little more than the resolute advance of a small but well-organised force and its firm front on the battlefield. The people acquiesced in this decree of fate. The new nawab was accepted in Bengal with the same indifference with which Chanda Sāhib had been accepted in the Carnatic and Salābar Jang in the Deccan. Muslim rule was being destroyed as easily as in the day of its power it had established its ascendancy. The people at large remained utterly unmoved.

The new nawab was more humane but hardly more competent than the man he had displaced. He was indeed strong in the strength of his English allies, but he was burdened with the rewards which (like Dupleix's puppets) he had promised in return for assistance. All who had taken part in the revolution had stipulated for ample consideration. Like Salābar Jang, therefore, Mīr Ja'far succeeded to a treasury which was heavily mortgaged. Instead of reorganising and improving his administration, he projected despoiling the Hindu officials who had survived Sirāj-ud-daula's government. The chief of these were Rāi Durlabh, who had been and still was the *āmīn*, and Rāmna-rāyan the deputy of Bihar. The latter had had no part in the late revolution; the former had done his utmost to favour it though he had cautiously abstained from any but verbal engagements.

Within six months Mīr Ja'far was accusing him of plotting to set up another nawab. Watts made strong representations on his behalf and for the moment the matter was smoothed over. But a little later the nawab's son, Mīrān, made a strong attack on him, and he was compelled to take refuge in Calcutta. Rāmnaṛāyan's case was different. He had at first been suspected of favouring Sirāj-ud-daula, and immediately after Plassey Eyre Coote, then a captain of the king's troops, had been sent up to Patna to effect his removal. Coote had been dissuaded from this by Mīr Kāsim, Mīr Ja'far's son-in-law, who seems to have sought a freer opportunity of despoiling the deputy. Later in the year Clive himself, having received assurances of Rāmnaṛāyan's fidelity to the new nawab, changed his attitude and accompanied Mīr Ja'far up to Patna to take part in the Bihar settlement. Rāmnaṛāyan refused to place himself in the nawab's power without a guarantee from the English. This was given, and under Clive's influence the nawab reluctantly agreed to confirm the deputy in his post for 9 lakhs of rupees; and Rāmnaṛāyan was promised by Clive that so long as he did not intrigue with foreign powers and paid the revenues regularly he should not be disturbed. Clive was already therefore checking the nawab in his policy towards his chief Hindu servants.

The recovery of Calcutta had been followed by the resumption of authority by the old governor, Roger Drake, and council. But Clive remained the dominating influence among his countrymen. When in July, 1758, a despatch was received from the company ordering the establishment of four governors to rule each for a month at a time, the council decided that so foolish a plan could not be put into operation, and invited Clive to act as governor till the company should send out orders on the news of the revolution of 1757. Later in the year a despatch arrived formally appointing Clive to the position which he was occupying.

In 1759 Prince 'Alī Gauhar—afterwards Shāh 'Alam II—appeared on the borders of Bihar. He had fled to Oudh from the confusion reigning at Delhi, and hoped to establish himself in the eastern provinces. But Rāmnaṛāyan refused to give up Patna, and, when English reinforcements arrived, the prince retired to Oudh. His advance had much alarmed Mīr Ja'far, who feared that he would either succeed in his invasion or be joined by the

English. On his withdrawal the nawab bestowed on Clive the quit-rent which he had reserved when he had granted the 24-Parganas to the company in 1757. But he was already weary of the control under which he lay, and had begun to intrigue with the Dutch. The latter had viewed the establishment of English influence in Bengal with the same apprehension as the English had felt regarding the projects of Dupleix. They had lost the saltpetre monopoly which they had formerly enjoyed, and were eager for change. They therefore approached Mirān with offers to set him up in his father's place. A little later they opened communications with Mir Ja'far himself, proposing to bring a force from Batavia to reduce the English. An understanding was reached. In 1759 the Dutch governor-general sent to India 300 Europeans and 600 Malay troops to carry out the plan. These were directed to proceed first to Negapatam, where they waited a month doing nothing. Moreover, a captain of the Dutch squadron, in hopes of commercial gain, had sailed direct to the Hughli. Clive was thus forewarned. He coolly made his preparations, and, when in October the Dutch troops reached the Hughli, Mir Ja'far was at Calcutta under Clive's eye. He agreed to forbid his new allies to enter the river. They hesitated for a month. At last they resolved to force their way up. They began by seizing some small English vessels, thus providing Clive with an unanswerable case for hostilities. Their land-forces were scattered and broken by an action at Biderra. Their ships were defeated and captured the same day. Mirān suddenly appeared with a body of horse with which he had hoped to chase the broken English, but which he now set to blockade Chinsura. The Dutch made peace hurriedly. They admitted they had begun the fighting, they agreed to limit their forces, they promised to pay ten lakhs indemnity. Thus once more Clive had made certain that Bengal should not be the scene of a prolonged European war as had happened in the Carnatic.

Immediately after this success, in January, 1760, he resigned and sailed for England. His three years in Bengal had given to the English the position which Dupleix had established for a moment in the south. He had shown a tenacity and political skill equal to that of the great Frenchman; he had shown a vigour and promptitude of action which has seldom if ever been exceeded; he had shown a power of personal influence, a domina-

tion over other men, a gift of leadership, of extraordinary quality. He lacked the foresight of Dupleix; the charm of Hastings, but in the circumstances of the time his gifts had the fullest scope, and neither Dupleix nor Hastings could have accomplished all that he accomplished between 1756 and 1759.

The period of these great changes in Bengal had been marked in the south by the collapse of the French effort inaugurated by Dupleix. The outbreak of the Seven Years' War in 1756 had at first made small difference to either Madras or Pondichery. The former had sent all spare troops with Clive to Bengal, the latter to Bussy at Hyderabad. The uneasy truce arranged in 1754 was thus succeeded by a year of eventless war. In the autumn of 1757, however, a French royal regiment arrived, and in April, 1758, this was followed by an expedition comprising a squadron of nine ships under d'Aché, another royal regiment, and Lally as commandant-general of the French settlements in India. The English squadron, now commanded by Admiral Pocock and consisting of seven ships, had already appeared on the coast, but the position in Bengal was judged too uncertain for Clive to return the military forces sent up in 1756. The two squadrons engaged on April 28. The action was indecisive, but the French lost almost four times as many men as the English.

Ashore, however, the English could do little to oppose Lally's operations. They had concentrated their troops, and held only Madras, Fort St David, Chingleput and Trichinopoly. As soon as Lally had landed he hurried on to attack Fort St David, which fell on June 2. Lally then proposed to attack Madras by both land and sea. But in this d'Aché refused to co-operate, and Lally therefore deferred his project till later in the year when the north-east monsoon should have driven Pocock off the coast. Meanwhile he marched against Tanjore, in the hope of compelling the raja to pay the seventy lakhs he had promised to Chanda Sâhib in 1749. His preparations were hasty and incomplete. His men lacked supplies and ammunition. He opened the siege of Tanjore, but had not been able seriously to press the place when on August 8 he learnt that d'Aché had been defeated by Pocock off Kârikâl. He then retired to the coast with great loss of reputation.

The naval action of which he had heard had been fought on August 3. D'Aché in an hour's fighting lost 500 men. He returned to the Pondichery roadstead under the shelter of the

batteries ashore, but was resolved to remain no longer. Councils of the chief military and naval officers were held. The former declared loudly and bitterly that d'Aché would ruin the prospects of the campaign if he left the coast. The latter with one accord declared that they could not again encounter the English. On September 3 d'Aché therefore sailed for Mauritius, and did not reappear till a year later, and Lally was thus left without the assistance of a squadron. He resolved nevertheless to attack Madras. On December 14 he appeared before it and formed the siege. Great preparations had been made for the defence. Provisions and ammunition had been collected in plenty. The works had been skilfully reconstructed. The governor, George Pigot, the commandant, Stringer Lawrence, the engineer, John Call, were resolute and talented, and although the garrison lacked protection from the shells that Lally constantly threw into the place, it never lost heart. The besiegers, too, were harassed by a force drawn from Trichinopoly and Chingleput. In the middle of February, when the defences had been severely battered, a squadron of ships hove in sight. It proved to be English. Lally did not venture to attempt a storm, but abandoned his trenches and retired.

This was the turning-point of the war on land. In the following April Colonel Forde, who had been dispatched by Clive from Bengal to attack the French in the Northern Circars, captured Masulipatam. Later in the year Lieutenant-Colonel Eyre Coote arrived from England with reinforcements which enabled the English to meet the French in the field. On January 23, 1760, Coote defeated Lally severely at Wandiwash. In a third action at sea Pocock had already defeated d'Aché, inflicting on him a crushing loss of men who could not be replaced. D'Aché had thus again been driven off the coast, this time never to return. These naval and military successes enabled the English to blockade Pondichery by sea and land. On January 16, 1761, it was compelled to surrender. The French effort to hold the gains of Dupleix had been completely broken.

The main cause of the English success lay in the supremacy which the English squadron established at sea, permitting them to receive men, money and provisions from Bengal and England, enabling them to transport, and cover the operations of, their forces, and depriving the French of their supplies. This placed

Lally at a grievous disadvantage, and the elusive authority which Dupleix had seized vanished at the first touch of that naval power which had not been applicable when he was projecting his schemes. Then, too, while Bussy's exploits had not contributed a man or a rupee to French aid, the English in Bengal were able at a critical time to send down both troops and money. Lastly Lally himself was hampered by personal defects and confronted by an impossible task. As a leader he was hasty, inconsiderate, violent. He expected others to attend to the detail of supplies, and never reflected on the hindrances which might be caused by the councillors whom he abused. Moreover, no man could at once conduct a war against the English and reform the Pondichery methods of administration. The knowledge that he was charged with the latter duty made every servant of the company desire to see him return to Europe discredited by defeat.

The fall of Pondichery left the English without serious European rivals in India for the moment, and thus enabled them to consolidate their position in Bengal. When Clive had sailed for England in January, 1760, he was succeeded by Holwell. This change increased the immediate difficulties of the situation. The new governor was merely a stop-gap, who had succeeded to the chair by accident and would speedily be replaced by a man with more influential interest. The nawab, whom even Clive had not persuaded to reduce his expenditure, was unwilling to listen to the advice of a new and transient authority. Affairs were further complicated by the reappearance of the prince whom Clive had driven away in 1759. On this occasion he slipped round the forces sent against him and raided Bengal itself, exciting great disturbance and alarm. It was moreover believed that he had been encouraged by the nawab himself. Though he was speedily expelled by the exertions of Colonel Caillaud, relations between Calcutta and Murshidābād were severely strained, and a crisis was precipitated by the death of the nawab's son, Mirān, which raised the question of the succession to Mir Ja'far.

Holwell, after long discussions, came to the conclusion that the only sound course of action was for the company to assume the direct government of the province. He saw clearly that this was in the long run inevitable, and rightly believed that no good would come of either tolerating Mir Ja'far's mismanagement or replacing him by another. At the same time, in view of his

approaching retirement he could take no immediate action. Matters were left over, therefore, until the new governor, Henry Vansittart, should arrive.

Vansittart assumed the government in August, 1760. He was a Madras servant of some standing, who had secured the friendship of Clive and who enjoyed a good reputation for character and ability. But he lacked personality, and was much better fitted to carry out the orders of others than to frame and pursue a policy of his own. His appointment was most unwelcome in Bengal. All the members of council regarded it as an unfair supersession and were not likely willingly to co-operate with him in any policy which they disliked. The first question to be decided was that of the nawab's succession. In the interval between Mirān's death and Vansittart's arrival the claims of the nawab's son-in-law, Mīr Kāsim, had been skilfully put forward. The aspirant offered a strong contrast to Mīr Ja'far. He was careful where the other was extravagant, and resolute where the other was timid. He was moreover skilled in playing on the interests of others. This man was bent on securing the support of the Calcutta council. He won over Holwell, promising him a large present if he were named successor to Mīr Ja'far. Holwell, forgetting the policy which he had advocated earlier in the year, espoused his cause, and a number of conferences were held at Calcutta between him and Mīr Kāsim. The latter was willing to promise whatever was demanded of him. On condition of his nomination as heir to Mīr Ja'far, he agreed to cede new territory to the company, to provide immediate payment of the arrears due from the nawab to the company, and to reduce the military forces of the nawab to a specified number. These offers won over the council and it was resolved that Vansittart should proceed to Murshidābād at once to announce the decision to the nawab and obtain his assent. In fact, however, Mīr Kāsim had lured the council into an impossible position. He had returned at once to Murshidābād, and, when Vansittart arrived there, he found the nawab unalterably opposed to the new plan. His life, he declared, would not be worth a day's purchase once Mīr Kāsim had been recognised, and he would rather retire to Calcutta than continue to occupy the carpet of state—the masnad—on such terms. Vansittart, faced with this refusal, decided to install Mīr Kāsim at once as nawab, on condition that he would pay to his

predecessor such an allowance as would permit him to live in comfort at Calcutta. This was done, and Mīr Ja'far was escorted down the river to the English settlement.

This revolution was a great triumph for the new nawab. He must have expected, if he had not inspired, Mīr Ja'far's opposition to his nomination. The issue was a tribute to his own insight and to the blindness of the new governor who had been unable to see through the outer semblance of the proposals laid before him. He signalled his gratitude by promising large gifts to the governor and council, and by carrying into immediate effect the agreements into which he had entered at Calcutta. He made over to the English the three districts of Bardwān, Midnapur, and Chittagong—outlying and disturbed districts of which he was not sorry to be relieved, and he made the payments of arrears which in fact permitted the siege of Pondichery to be carried to its successful conclusion. But the change carried with it the certainty of a new struggle. The old nawab had been replaced by a far better one. The government of the province would be improved. The payments to the company would be made with regularity. But the abler the nawab, the more certain he would be to seek to recover his independence, and the more strongly he would resent the position of superiority which the English occupied. Vansittart's policy was in fact inconsistent with itself. He sought to give Bengal a good ruler, but he was not willing to set his nation back in the position which it had occupied before the battle of Plassey.

From the first therefore subjects of dispute arose. The prince 'Alī Gauhar was threatening Patna once more. Rāmārāyan defended the place with resolution until an English force arrived, and on January 15, 1761, Major Carnar defeated the prince on the river Sōn. The latter, being now refused refuge in Oudh, came into the English camp and for a while abode in Patna. He was anxious to procure English help to establish himself as emperor at Delhi, and at this time assumed the title of Shāh 'Ālam II. Vansittart was inclined to comply with his desires, but Mīr Kāsim viewed the discussions with jealousy and fear. He thought the English might be over-persuaded to accept from this needy monarch territorial rights over Bengal and Bihar. Though these suspicions were entirely baseless, his opposition brought the discussions to an end. He had succeeded in imposing his views on the governor and council of Calcutta.

His success in this matter was followed later in the year by one far more remarkable. Mīr Kāsim desired to get rid of Rāmārāyan, the deputy governor of Bihar. He had for this two powerful reasons. One was that the deputy was believed to have accumulated great sums of money during the course of his rule and Mīr Kāsim hoped by plundering him to make good the sums he had disbursed to the English. The second was that Rāmārāyan had been preserved in his office by English protection in accordance with Clive's policy of watching over the interests of the leading Hindus of the province. His destruction would therefore be a sign to the province at large that English favour was no longer any guard against the nawab's power. For a while Vansittart refused to abandon the policy of Clive, but he gradually weakened before Mīr Kāsim's persistence, and in September, 1761, gave a reluctant assent to the removal of the deputy. Rāmārāyan was at once removed from office, imprisoned, plundered, and subsequently put to death.

At the same time the nawab was busy reorganising his power. He removed his capital from Muṣṣadābād, dangerously near to Calcutta, to Monghyr, on the borders of Bengal and Bihar. He reorganised his troops, and placed them under the command of two Armenian leaders. He set up factories for the manufacture of arms. He ignored the complaints of Vansittart that he was not complying with his promises to reduce his military forces. At last when all was ready, at the end of 1761, he began to stop the trade of the company's servants in salt and betel. If they submitted, they would be reduced to the position which they had occupied before the victories of Clive and the nawab might regard his independence as achieved.

Participation in the internal trade of the province had long been a vexed question. The imperial *farmāns*, under which the trade alike of the company and of its servants had been conducted, had made no difference between goods of internal consumption and goods for export. But the nawabs had always limited the English trade to the latter class, and this had always been resented by the company's servants as a tyrannous exercise of power, exerted not on behalf of the interests of the province, but in the interest of the favourites to whom the nawab gave the monopolies of salt and betel, the chief articles concerned. In 1757 Clive had been instructed by the council to get the matter put right.

In consequence Mīr Ja'far had issued *parwana*s to his servants phrased in universal terms "Whatever goods the company's *guniastas* [agents] may bring or carry to or from their factories... you shall neither ask for nor receive any sum however trifling." These orders covered all kinds of goods, and applied equally to the trade of the company and of its servants. Moreover, the nawab deprived himself of jurisdiction over any disputes that might arise out of this trade. "Whoever acts contrary to these orders," the *parwana*s continued, "the English have power to punish them." These orders had been duly acted upon. The company's servants had traded in salt and betel duty-free; and, when the internal customs-men had attempted to interfere, they had been punished by the authorities of the nearest English factory.

Though Mīr Ja'far had repented of the extraordinary concession which he had thus made, and had even applied to Holwell for its abolition, the system was certainly in full force in 1760 when Mīr Kāsim accepted the government from Vansittart, nor had he objected to it before his elevation to power. Indeed, it is clear that if he had done so, neither Holwell nor any one else would have dreamt of supporting his candidature. A year later, however, he began to describe the practice as a new and grievous innovation. In principle he was unquestionably right. The privilege which had been extorted from the weakness of Mīr Ja'far was not one which should ever have been demanded. But Mīr Kāsim had unquestionably condoned it. His demands that it should now cease were resented by the council as an attack upon the English. At the same time the latent jealousy of Vansittart was stirred up by the nawab's allowing his private trade to pass untouched, while he stopped the trade of everyone else. After long discussions, Vansittart visited the nawab at the end of 1762 and arranged a compromise with him. This provided for the payment of a small duty on salt and the abandonment of the privilege of punishing the nawab's officials. The change was at once rejected by the council, which sent up two of its members to the nawab to arrange less unfavourable terms. Anger ran high. The hot-tempered chief of the Patna factory, Ellis, alarmed by the increase of the Patna garrison and by the walling-up of the gate close to the English factory, made an unsuccessful attempt to seize the town. At the same time the two councillors who had

been deputed to the nawab were murdered by the nawab's troops on their return down the river. War at once followed.

The campaign was short and completely successful. Major Adams, who commanded the troops which were sent from Calcutta, stormed position after position which the nawab had entrenched in the hope of checking an advance which he had long foreseen. When his capital, Monghyr, fell into English hands, Mīr Kāsim came to fancy that he had been betrayed. He put to death his Armenian commanders. He put to death the Seths. He ordered his unfortunate European prisoners, fifty-six in number, to be slain. Then he fled into Oudh with all the treasure which he had been able to carry away with him. The nawab wazir of Oudh resolved to assist him. In the next year, 1764, a long campaign followed around Patna, chequered by mutinies of the English troops, first of the Europeans and then of the sepoys, due in part to the great numbers of foreign deserters and in part to promises of reward which had been rashly made to the men. But when these difficulties had been dealt with by Major Hector Munro, who succeeded to Major Adams, the battle of Buxar on October 23 brought the matter to a decisive conclusion. The Oudh forces were broken. The conquest of Oudh itself followed. The nawab wazir fled into the Rohilla country. The control of affairs had passed more fully than ever into the hands of the government of Calcutta.

On the outbreak of the war Mīr Ja'far had been sent back once more to Murshidābād as nawab, on terms which had been dictated to him. English-owned salt was to pay no more than $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. The nawab's forces were to be limited. He was to receive a permanent resident. He was to make good all the losses which might be involved in the war with Mīr Kāsim. But he was still left free to choose his ministers. He selected the Brāhman, Nandakumār. The new government gave little satisfaction to the English authorities. It failed to supply the troops with provisions during the war with Mīr Kāsim and Oudh. It was believed to have entered into relations with the nawab wazir. On February 5, 1765, the old nawab died. He left a son, Najm-ud-daula. A deputation of the council proceeded from Calcutta to the capital. It was empowered to offer to recognise Najm-ud-daula's succession on condition that the English were to be allowed to select the principal ministers of the nawab. Inspired by Nandakumār,

the prince made every effort to avoid this demand. But in vain. He was obliged to assent, and Muhammad Riza Khān was appointed deputy to act on behalf of the nawab in all matters. The nawab was installed on March 3, but in fact the council of Calcutta had assumed the supreme authority in the provinces. The nawab was a mere figure-head, able to act only through a minister nominated by and responsible to others.

Meanwhile, on news of the revolution of 1763, which was strongly disapproved at London, Clive had been appointed once more governor of Fort William in Bengal. He arrived in May, 1765, to find a situation open to any political settlement which he might think fit to impose. Fearful of extending too widely the dominions of the company, he resolved to hand back to the nawab wazir the country of Oudh, on condition of his paying an indemnity of thirty lakhs. Shāh 'Ālam was denied the military assistance which he had persistently demanded; nor was he even given the territory of Oudh which it had been in contemplation to bestow upon him. Instead he received the districts of Kora and Allāhābād, with an agreement to pay him twenty-six lakhs a year out of the revenues of Bengal, in return for which he issued a grant to the East India Company of the *ḍivāni* of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. The decision to restore the nawab wazir to his former dominions was unquestionably wise. It set up a friendly prince on the western borders of Bihar and thus covered the English interests from direct attack. The settlement with Shāh 'Ālam was less satisfactory. It introduced a new element of make-believe into the position of the company in Bengal. The Calcutta government was already exercising supreme control over the nawab, and the grant of the *ḍivāni* weakened rather than confirmed its position besides laying it under the obligation of paying a large annual sum for nothing save the dubious advantage of having the nominal and powerless emperor reside under the company's protection. In this matter Clive's action seems to have been inspired by considerations of English rather than Indian conditions. Although in 1757 he had desired to see the English ministry take over the political duties of the company, he had changed his view after he had become the dominant influence in the company itself, and his great aim in 1765 was to make ministerial interference as difficult as possible. That object was well secured by the grant of the *ḍivāni*. The ministry might have insisted on assuming the government of territories

which the company had acquired or the protection of princes ruling under the company's control. But it could not assume on behalf of the king of Great Britain the privilege of collecting the revenues of Bengal under the authority of the emperor of Delhi. In fact the consequences of Clive's action at this time are clearly to be seen in the difficulties with which the ministry was confronted when in 1773 it attempted to legislate for the government of Bengal. From both points of view the results of his action were unfortunate, and it would have been better had he been content to leave untouched the supremacy over the nawab of Bengal which he found existing on his arrival.

The remainder of Clive's second period of government was occupied with administrative reforms. The sudden transformation of the East India Company from a commercial into a political body had resulted in a multitude of abuses. The company's servants were infected with the idea of using political methods of acquiring swift riches. In this Clive himself had led the way. He had taken great presents after Plassey and a *jāgīr* after the expulsion of Prince 'Alī Gauhar. In 1760 revolution had again been followed by great gifts to the chief movers. In 1763 Mir Jafar had been expected to pay for the privilege of being restored to his former government. In 1765 his son had been required to pay for succeeding to his father's position, and his chief minister had been made to pay for his selection. All this was entirely in accordance with the custom of the country, but the custom was noxious, and was producing the belief that the policy of the council was inspired solely by greed of gain. The presents of 1765 were peculiarly evil because the company had already sent out to India orders forbidding such conduct. These orders had been ignored because it was already known that Clive had been nominated to the government and the council thought it impossible that he would enforce orders of such a nature in view of his own past conduct. But in this it was entirely mistaken. Clive rightly believed that the presents which he had accepted were of a nature quite different from those which had been extorted in 1765. In spite of the strong discontent which the measure excited, he insisted that all the company's servants should sign bonds obliging themselves under penalty to accept no presents whatever. Declaring that none of the Bengal servants were senior enough or of character good enough to deserve exemption, even the council he filled up with the same

from Madras, and by stern discipline did his utmost to restore obedience. He recognised, however, that most of the evils had arisen from the practice of paying the company's servants small salaries and expecting them to make money by other means. He therefore devoted the salt monopoly to provide a fund for the increase of the salaries of the senior servants, both civil and military. Thus he did under the guise of forming a salt company to be managed by a committee of the company's servants: and, since this appeared to conflict with the company's orders prohibiting privileges in trade, his measure was reversed by the home authorities, although additional allowances of less amount were granted from the territorial revenues.

The question of army pay also offered him great difficulties. In 1763 the company had ordered a reduction of the field allowances paid to the officers under the denomination of *batta*. These were almost twice as high as the corresponding allowances at Madras, but the Calcutta council had shrunk from attempting to enforce the reduction. Clive proceeded to cut down the amounts, permitting the old rates only to be paid when officers were on service outside Bengal and Bihar. Stimulated by the discontent of the civil servants, the officers resolved to lay down their commissions simultaneously, so as to compel the governor to revoke his proposals. But the resignations were accepted; non-commissioned officers were promoted, officers were hurriedly brought up from Madras; the ringleaders were sent down to Calcutta; a few were tried by court martial for mutiny. The net result was that a number of officers were sent to England, and that the remainder submitted and entered into new agreements which for the first time placed the company's officers under military law.

Early in 1767 Clive sailed back to Europe, worn out by the efforts of his second government. He had shown himself to be as direct, as resolute and forceful as ever. He had met and triumphed over each situation as it arose. But the circumstances of the time had offered less scope to his special talents than had been the case ten years earlier. He was at his greatest in times demanding instant and decisive action. But he was a man of insight rather than one of foresight. His administrative settlement bequeathed a crop of difficulties to his successors and soon had to be remodelled.

CHAPTER IV

Warren Hastings and the Regulating Act

The return of Clive to England in 1767 was followed by extraordinary activity at the India House. The news of his acquisition of the *diwāni* was hailed with ignorant enthusiasm. Everyone believed that he had made the fortune of the company, that it would pay huge dividends, that its stock would rise to prodigious heights. Such famous men as Henry Fox and Edmund Burke gambled in the stock, while others like Henry Vansittart and Laurence Sullivan sought to repair their crippled fortunes by buying for control in the hopes of procuring for themselves and their friends lucrative appointments. These activities drew political attention to the affairs of the company. In 1766 Chatham had already informed the directors that Indian affairs must be laid before parliament. But Chatham's health did not allow him personally to deal with the matter, and at last Charles Townshend, as chancellor of the exchequer, compounded with the company for an annual payment of £400,000. In 1769, when the intrigues of Vansittart and Sullivan had borne fruit, the court of directors resolved to send out a commission of reform, to be headed by Vansittart. The ministry, in which Lord Weymouth was then predominant, decided to intervene. It had already been requested to send a naval squadron to the east. When the company refused to join the commander of the squadron in its commission of reform, Weymouth resolved to give the commodore a secret mission. He was to enquire into the treatment of the princes of India by the company's servants. This attempt to secure control over the Indian administration failed before the obstinate opposition which the company's government offered to the commodore's interposition in matters which did not touch naval affairs. Then in 1772 parliament appointed select and secret committees to enquire into the company's political and financial conduct. Though Clive defended himself with success, the select committee elicited much discreditable evidence regarding the actions of many of the company's servants, and finally in 1773 the Regulating Act was passed. In many points it was inspired

by the advice of Clive himself. For the government of Bengal it set up a new council which was named in the act. The council chosen consisted of three members sent out from London, and two company's servants. One of the latter, Warren Hastings, who had been governor of Fort William since 1772, was named governor-general, mainly, it would seem, in order to conduct affairs till the senior councillor should have learnt enough to assume the control himself. To the new council was entrusted the charge of superintending the political conduct of the other presidencies. A special court was to be established by royal authority at Calcutta and empowered to try cases in which the natives of Bengal suffered under the oppression of the government. In future only one sixth of the directors were to be elected each year, instead of the whole body being chosen annually. It would be difficult to exaggerate either the benevolent intentions with which the act was passed or the maleficent consequences by which it was followed.

Meanwhile, in Bengal Clive had been succeeded first by two nonentities and then by a man of genius. Under Verelst and Cartier, who were governors from 1767 till 1772, one at least of Clive's political arrangements had begun to crumble. The emperor at Allāhābād soon wearied of English protection. General Richard Smith, who commanded the troops there, and who was afterwards to take part in the attack on Hastings, was an unaccommodating man who would not allow his morning's rest to be disturbed by the beating of the imperial kettle-drums. The Marāthas, who were beginning to recover from their disastrous overthrow at Pānīpat, and were seeking once more the lordship of northern India, re-occupied Delhi, threatened Oudh, and sent flattering messages to Shāh 'Ālam offering to establish him in the palace of his ancestors. The English tried to dissuade him from accepting. But he, refusing to listen, marched off and joined his new friends. About the same time, the Marāthas, in order more easily to attack Oudh, made overtures to the Rohilla chiefs, and then attempted to coerce them into compliance. The Rohillas in alarm made an agreement with the nawab wazir.

At the outset of his government in 1772 Hastings was thus confronted by two main political problems. The emperor, now under Marātha protection, was loudly demanding the payment of his twenty-six lakhs a year. The famine which had afflicted

the provinces in 1769 had necessitated its suspension; and Hastings resolved to make that an excuse for ceasing altogether to pay out a large sum of money which would have fallen into the hands of the Marāthas and assisted them in their designs on northern India. He took the view that the cession of the *dhawāni* had been merely a solemn farce, that the company had in fact conquered Bengal, and that the emperor could not give what it was not in his power to bestow. Hastings had on his accession to office been required to undertake the direct administration of the provincial finances. He had soon perceived that it was not practicable to limit the scope of the company's government to half the administration only. He had therefore deliberately sought to make Calcutta the capital, transferring thither the treasury and centralising there the administration of justice. He aimed at establishing English sovereignty; and his refusal to continue Clive's arrangement with the emperor was in fact but another step in the same direction.

The second problem was that offered by Oudh. Its maintenance as a buffer-state was clearly most desirable; but if it was duly to fulfil its function of sheltering the company's territories, it had to be strong enough to protect itself. Hastings made over to the nawab wazir the two districts which the emperor had abandoned. They lay at a distance from the company's territories, and their retention would have been inconvenient. This was arranged at conferences which Hastings held with the nawab wazir in 1773. At the same time the latter complained that the Rohillas were not keeping the agreement into which they had entered with him, and proposed that the company's forces should assist him in reducing them and adding their country to his own. Strategically the project was desirable, for the Rohilkhand afforded the best route for an invasion of Oudh from the west, and its possession would materially strengthen the nawab. But at the moment no decision was taken. Later in the year the nawab repeated his demands, and the matter was laid before the council at Calcutta. It was persuaded by the arguments of the governor to agree. A force was marched westwards to co-operate in the conquest of the Rohilkhand, which speedily followed. Hastings found it necessary in more than one instance to protect the nawab from the demands which the commander, Colonel Champion, made upon him.

While the English force was still in the Rohilkhand, the new councillors and the new judges reached Calcutta. The first included General Clavering, selected by the personal favour of the king, whose aide-de-camp he had been; Colonel Monson, who had served in south India, and proved himself to be an honest but irascible man of limited judgment, and Philip Francis, who, wearied of his subordinate position in the office of the secretary at war, had been seeking employment outside England. His father was a client of the Grenvilles; he himself was known to them, and probably through that channel he had made the acquaintance of Clive. Whether Clive recommended him to Lord North does not appear, but immediately after his nomination, he visited Clive, and was speedily indoctrinated with Clive's ideas on Indian administration. The fact is important. It meant that the one man of intelligence sent out from England in 1774 carried with him conceptions the exact opposite of those which Warren Hastings had been seeking to put into practice and that the dead hand of Clive would be laid upon the government with all the weight of the majority of the council.

The councillors reached Calcutta on October 19, and within a week had declared war on the governor-general. Their moves have been hotly debated. But there is no doubt that they reached India in a hostile temper, that they complained bitterly of such a trifle as a lack of punctiliousness in their reception, and that before they stepped ashore they had been in communication with men whose interests had been hurt by Warren Hastings's reforms. The responsibility for their action probably lay with Francis. The voyage had afforded him time to judge the capacity of his fellow-councillors and to establish over them the ascendancy of his talents. It rested with him to determine whether they should for a while rest inactive spectators of what was going forward or enter at once upon the fray. His own interests as a mere junior member of council demanded the latter course. In Clive's principles he possessed a whole armoury of weapons for attack. He resolved therefore to drive Warren Hastings from office at the first possible moment, in order to bring nearer the realisation of a dream in which he was already beginning to indulge, that of himself succeeding to the office of governor-general.

The Rohilla War afforded the pretext for their action. Francis denounced it as "the conquest of all the little states about us,

who were our friends, who were our barriers" Champion, whose perquisites had been cut down by Hastings, was ready to denounce the policy which had led to so bloodless a campaign. A legend of atrocities was developed, leading men to fancy that peaceful cultivators with their wives and children had been massacred wholesale, whereas Champion himself admitted that not a person had been slain except on the battlefield. The Rohilla chief, Hāfiz Rahmat, had perished in battle, his family for a while had suffered privations, but by the end of the year two of his sons had accepted Shujā'-ud-daula's service, and the narrative afterwards compiled by a member of his family makes no mention of atrocities. The current Indian view is expressed by the author of the *Siyyar-ul-Mutakherin*. Doubtless it was high time, he says, that the Rohillas should undergo the treatment which they had long been meting out to others. But despite all that could be said about a policy which was of course calculated in the interests of the East India Company rather than in compliance with humanitarian ideas, the majority, led by Francis, prepared despatches warning the company that their interests and prospects in India had been jeopardised by the conduct of the governor-general.

Their next step was aimed more directly at the personal conduct of Hastings. Joseph Fowke, a *protégé* of Clavering and a company's servant of dubious character, together with Nandakumār, who was presented to Clavering by Fowke, brought forward accusations of bribery. Nandakumār had a strong grudge against the governor-general. He had hoped that when the company's Indian deputy, Muhammad Riza Khān, was removed from office, he would be chosen as his successor. Instead, under the orders of the company, Hastings had assumed the direct administration of affairs. Nandakumār now accused the latter of having accepted a large bribe from Munni Begum, one of the late Mīr Ja'far's wives, and, without delay, the majority resolved that "there is no species of speculation from which the Honourable the Governor-General has thought it right to abstain". Hastings promptly brought forward a charge of conspiracy against Nandakumār and Fowke, but, while this charge was still pending, a further charge of forgery was brought against Nandakumār. It has generally been surmised that the charge was brought at the suggestion of Hastings himself. This seems unlikely. The

charge of forgery was a revival of a suit which had lapsed owing to the institution of the new court of justice at Calcutta under the Regulating Act, and the accuser is known to have been seeking legal help for his suit before Nandakumār had opened his mouth against Hastings. Nandakumār was committed to prison on May 6. He was tried in the second week of June under an act which made forgery a capital offence, he was found guilty by the petty jury, and he was executed by warrant of the Supreme Court on August 5.

The commentary on these events supplied by Burke and afterwards by Macaulay is well known. Briefly it accuses Hastings of having sought deliberately to put Nandakumār out of the way, and the chief justice, Elijah Impey, of having been misled by his school-time friendship with Hastings into straining justice against the prisoner and wrongfully putting him to death. This explanation seems false, for it ignores a great number of facts. The court by which the accused was tried consisted of all four judges, of whom, if Impey was a friend of the governor-general, another, Chambers, was a close friend of Francis. This friend of Francis declared that he considered the verdict of guilty justified by the evidence. The jury, which returned the verdict, had been empannelled by the brother-in-law of Francis. The applicability of the act under which Nandakumār was tried seemed established by the fact that in 1765 an Indian had been tried under it and sentenced to death by the Court of Quarter Sessions. No reason appears for supposing that the trial was unfair or that any of the judges, including Chambers, doubted the correctness of the sentence. But at that point the court ought to have stopped. It was clearly undesirable to execute the principal witness against the governor-general while the latter's cause was still undecided. The court should therefore have exercised its powers of respite, and kept the accused alive at least until his evidence was no longer required. This step was proposed by Chambers, but rejected by the other three judges. One reason given was that no grounds appeared upon the face of the trial for the exercise of mercy. But their chief motive was afforded by the conduct of the majority of the council. The latter had strongly taken the side of the accused. They had visited him in prison. Reports had spread through the city that if he were condemned they would use force to release him. Worst of all, on the morning on which the trial opened,

the majority had addressed a threatening letter to two of the judges, warning them that they had better be careful what they did. To men brought up in the traditions of the English bar this letter was bound to recall Stuart rule and the vanished supremacy of the executive over the judicature. They knew well that the Supreme Court had been deliberately constituted so as to be completely independent of the government of Fort William. This attempt to intimidate them was certain to incline them to administer the strictest justice to the accused lest they should be themselves accused of truckling to the wishes of the councillors. The majority, having thus indisposed the court against the prisoner, waited patiently for the trial to take its course. On the eve of the day fixed for the execution, Clavering received a letter from Nandakumār. It could have had but one object—to pray the majority to request the court for a respite of sentence. Clavering did not open the letter till after the execution, and did not lay it before the council till the 14th, when on the motion of Francis the majority resolved to burn the letter as a libel on the court and to expunge it from the records of the council. In other words the majority deliberately abstained from asking the court to defer the execution of the chief witness against the governor-general—a request which the court could hardly have refused. It has been asserted that Hastings should have foreseen the consequences of the execution and urged his friend Impey to keep Nandakumār alive. But that duty lay no less clearly upon the majority, whose conduct before, during, and after the trial can scarcely be explained unless they desired to see him safely hanged. After all, the evidence of Nandakumār against Hastings, like the evidence which he had formerly given against his enemy Muhammad Riza Khān, had little corroboration. The case was not likely to be proved. But Nandakumār's death would restore all the venom to his charges against the governor-general.

While these events had been taking place, the majority had given a singular expression to their views of foreign policy. Early in 1775 the nawab wazir, Shujā'-ud-daula, had died, lamented by his subjects. He was succeeded by his son, Āsaf-ud-daula. The majority at once declared that treaties were binding only during the lifetime of the parties, and denounced Hastings's agreements with the late nawab. Āsaf-ud-daula needed the company's assistance and was obliged to accept hard terms. His pay-

ments for military assistance were increased and he was obliged to cede Benares to the company. Thus his charges were raised while his resources were reduced, and the agent whom the majority had employed was voted a reward of a lakh of rupees. This new treaty, signed on May 21, 1775, marks the beginning of the ruin of Oudh. Āsaf-ud-daula was a weak prince, who at once set up in office his own favourites in place of his father's experienced ministers. His treasury was exhausted; his troops unpaid and mutinous. But the late nawab's wives had possessed themselves of the large resources in specie which the nawab had left behind. With the aid of the agent, Bristow, fifty-six lakhs were extracted from these ladies in the five months following on the treaty, under promises that no more should be demanded of them. But disputes between the nawab and the begums, and between the nawab and his ministers, continued unabated. The result of the majority's policy was disastrous. The state which Hastings had tried to strengthen was weakened by the excessive demands which were made upon it, by the promise of protection which Bristow was at last allowed to give to the begums, by the failure to restore discipline in the military forces of the state, and by the consequent spirit of disorder which developed among the great landholders, who refused to pay the revenue till coerced by actual force. This also was the period in which the administration of the Rohilla country fell into confusion, so that what Macaulay represents as due to the conduct of Hastings was rather due to the policy of the majority who wrested power from his hands and reversed his measures.

Whatever may have been the purpose of the conduct pursued by Francis and his associates, Hastings was driven to contemplate the resignation of his office. At first he had resolved to wait and see what the directors and ministry thought of the behaviour of the majority. Early in 1775 he sent to England as his agent an officer named Maclean, to represent his difficulties and try to secure support for him. In a moment of temporary and most unusual hesitation, he even empowered Maclean to tender his resignation if support could not be had. But a few weeks later he retracted this decision and wrote informing Maclean of his change of mind. In London Lord North was fully disposed to back his nominees; the ministerial agent, John Robinson, won over a majority of the directors by promises of patronage and

rewards, so that the ministry and the company seemed to be united in opposition to Hastings. In May, 1776, the directors agreed to move the crown to dismiss Hastings from office. But Hastings's friends hurriedly called a special meeting of the proprietors, who resolved that this proposal should not receive effect. Thus the ministry was itself defeated owing to the provisions of its own act, which, while limiting the number of directors to be elected year by year, had done nothing to meet the case of differences arising between the directors and proprietors. On this check, the ministry decided to modify the act so as to disable Hastings's friends among the proprietors from hindering his removal. Macleane, daunted by the hostility which he found in London, then proposed an accommodation. Hastings was to resign on condition of being well received on his return. Since this would have made way for Clavering's advance to the chair, the sole point in which North was really interested, the suggestion was accepted. The Order of the Bath was conferred upon Clavering as a mark of ministerial favour, and it seemed as though North had reached the object which he had been seeking by his usual devious means.

Events in India, however, moved quite contrary to his expectations. Monson had died in 1776, thus transferring the actual control of government into the hands of the governor-general, who had been consistently supported by Barwell (the other company's servant on the council) and whose casting vote now gave him a majority whenever he desired. He had not used his recovered power to introduce any great changes, conscious that his tenure of office was most uncertain; but he had recalled the majority agent, Bristow, from Oudh. In June, 1777, news reached Calcutta of the results of Macleane's negotiations. Clavering, who thought the game in his own hands, at once began to act as though he were governor-general. He summoned the council to meet, and prepared orders announcing the change of government to the garrison of Fort William. Hastings hesitated. On the one hand his friends had written informing him that they considered the bestowal of the Bath on Clavering with no corresponding honour for himself to be a breach of Macleane's agreement with the ministry and advising him not to resign. Having retracted his authority to Macleane, he certainly lay under no obligation to retire. He was most unwilling to deliver over the

charge of the company's affairs to a man who (he felt sure) would ruin them. But on the other hand he had to recognise the implacable hostility which appeared to have possessed the minds of the authorities in England. In these circumstances the precipitation of Clavering's conduct seems to have determined him to retain his office. He had not resigned, he had not been dismissed; yet the general was assuming the powers of his office. Hastings therefore defied him, and claimed that in acting as governor-general Clavering had tacitly vacated his office of commander-in-chief. On Hastings's suggestion the matter was referred to the judges for their opinion. They held that Hastings was still governor-general and Clavering still commander-in-chief. The latter reluctantly gave way, but could not overcome the chagrin which the turn of events had caused him. Elderly, high-living men almost always found the Indian climate fatal. For some months Clavering had fallen into poor health. He was covered with boils which exasperated a temper naturally violent. In August he was attacked with dysentery, and died on the 30th.

The news of these events reached London in the course of 1778. Since two of the three ministerial nominees had died, the third, Francis, hoped that his chance had come at last. He wrote to all his friends demanding their utmost activity in his favour, and he seems even to have received some sort of promise from North that he should be considered as a possible successor to Hastings's place as soon as the latter should have been removed. But Clavering's death had taken away North's main object in trying to get rid of Hastings. Moreover, public affairs were becoming difficult. To the American rebellion had just been added a war with France. North was unwilling to endanger the British position in India by removing a man of admitted capacity to make way for one who had never held high office and who was supported by no great parliamentary interests. Consequently the enmity against Hastings evaporated, and in 1779 the ministry even entered into an alliance with the friends of the governor-general on condition of receiving their aid in parliament. This arrangement led to the disappearance of Francis from Calcutta. He soon wearied of his fruitless opposition on ground where Hastings had clearly triumphed. He had secured the main purpose with which he had sailed to India, for he had made a large fortune at the whist table, mainly at the expense of Barwell.

But he was not to depart without one more dramatic incident. In 1780 Hastings had come to an ill-defined agreement with Francis in order to permit of Batwell's return to England. In the latter part of 1780, in consequence of differences over the conduct of the war which had broken out, Hastings recorded a minute in which he charged his enemy with an habitual breach of faith, public and private alike. Francis was obliged to respond to this by a challenge. In the duel which followed, Francis fired first, and missed. Hastings, with characteristic deliberation, waited till his aim had steadied, and Francis fell with a wound in the side. As soon as he recovered, he took a passage for England, to continue the struggle on ground with which he was more familiar and where his peculiar talents for intrigue would find freer scope. But for the moment the enemies sent out against the governor-general in 1773 had "sickened, died, and fled".

Nevertheless, it must be remembered that for seven years the chief efforts of Warren Hastings had been diverted by the consequences of the Regulating Act to defending his own position against a hostile element within his own council and against the hostility of the ministry in England, with small leisure to develop and continue the policy of reform which had marked the two years of his uncontested power. Nor was this the only handicap which the act laid upon him. In the field of foreign policy also he found his government invested with responsibility without power. The act was intended to give to the governor-general and council authority over the conduct of relations with the other rulers of India. But their legal rights were limited to the sanction of declarations of war and the conclusion of peace. The subordinate presidencies of Bombay and Madras could legally defy the intervention of the presidency of Bengal in all intermediate relations. They could so conduct their external affairs as to render war inevitable, and so mismanage a war as to render peace on any terms beneficial, while the evil tradition of the political functions of the commanding officer of the naval squadron still permitted the intervention of his authority however unexpected and inexpedient that might be. These difficulties first emerged in connection with the relations of Bombay with the Marāthas. In 1761 the great Pēshwā Bāji Rāo had died heart-broken at the defeat of Pānīpat. He had been succeeded by his son, Malhu Rāo, aged only seventeen, and naturally under guardianship. The

regent was his uncle, Rāghunāth Rāo, a man of unquestioned personal bravery but of a weak, vacillating character. In the next year, however, the young Pēshwā insisted on assuming the authority of his office. Wars followed with the Nizām and with Hyder 'Alī of Mysore, leading to projects of alliance on the part of the English with one or other of the contending parties. Internal difficulties also arose, and Rāghunāth, who had intrigued with other Marāṭha chiefs, was attacked and made prisoner. But Madhu Rāo's health soon began to fail. He was attacked by consumption, and died on November 18, 1772. He was succeeded by his brother Narāyan Rāo, and Rāghunāth Rāo enjoyed once more the regency of affairs. At the capital, Poona, however, he was opposed by the ablest of all the Marāṭha officials, Bālājī Janardhan, better known as Nāna Phadnavis, who had been brought forward by the late Madhu Rāo. At the same time affairs were complicated by the hostility which raged between Gopika Bai, the Pēshwā's mother, and Ānanda Bai, Rāghunāth Rāo's wife. As a result of their quarrels Rāghunāth Rāo was imprisoned in the palace. Further intrigues followed. The army was discontented. Rāghunāth sought to take advantage of this to secure his own release, while his wife sought vengeance against the Pēshwā and his mother. On August 30, 1773, a mutiny broke out. A party of infantry forced its way into the palace, and, although Rāghunāth Rāo interceded for his nephew, Narāyan Rāo was murdered, and Rāghunāth Rāo recognised as Pēshwā.

His success was short-lived. At Poona a strong party, headed by Nāna Phadnavis, counteracted his measures, and, when in the following year the late Pēshwā's wife was delivered of a son, the infant was formally recognised and a council of regency formed to conduct the administration. Rāghunāth Rāo, who had been campaigning against Hyder 'Alī, had hastened back to Poona on receiving the news of the probable birth of the child and had defeated a force sent to oppose him. But he had failed to follow up his victory, and so missed his opportunity of turning out the council of regency. Finding that Nāna Phadnavis was too strong for him, he then appealed for English help. Here, as in the Carnatic and elsewhere in India, European intervention was produced not by the aggressive ambitions of the European, but by the decay of the Indian states themselves and the desire of Indian princes for European support.

Bombay at this time was the weakest of the three presidencies. It comprised only a tiny island, facing the mainland where the strongest power in India held control. Under Bālājī Rāo the Marāthas had conquered from the Portuguese the fort of Bassein and the island of Salsette, thus rendering their control of the surrounding territory complete. Good relations with Poona were thus essential to Bombay, and in 1772 the company had wisely ordered the council to maintain a regular envoy with the Pēshwā, in the hope of securing privileges for the company's trade and if possible the cession of Bassein and Salsette, which would make the position of Bombay much more secure. Rāghunāth's overtures seemed to provide the opportunity of obtaining those places. But he, hoping to enlist Sindhia and Holkar in his cause, refused the English terms. Learning that the Portuguese at Goa had lately received large reinforcements and that they were about to use them in recovering Salsette and Bassein, the Bombay council resolved on instant action. One reason was that if the places passed again into the hands of the ancient ally of Great Britain their acquisition would become virtually impossible, the other that the Portuguese possession of Salsette would place all English trade with the interior under their control. Thāna, the chief post in Salsette, was attacked and captured on December 31, 1774. A little later, Rāghunāth, having failed to procure Marātha help from northern India, reopened discussions with the English, and, on March 7, 1775, the Treaty of Surat was signed. By this the English agreed to support Rāghunāth with a force of 2500 men, provided he bore the cost, in return he agreed to refrain from alliance with any enemy of the company, to make over Bassein and Salsette, and to deposit six lakhs as a security. A force under Colonel Keating had already reached Surat on February 27. On May 18 the allies met the Poona troops at Adas and completely defeated them after a prolonged contest. At the same time Commodore John Moore destroyed the Marātha fleet, and, encouraged by these victories, Fateh Singh Gawkar, a claimant to Gujarāt, allied himself with the Bombay government. At Poona the supporters of Nāna Phadnavis began to desert him, and a resolute advance would probably have established Rāghunāth Rāo as Pēshwā, at all events for the time being.

This war had been begun and the Treaty of Surat had been signed without reference to the governor-general and council.


For this the Bombay council was not without excuse. Events had come to a crisis just before the new government at Calcutta had announced its assumption of office, and therefore before the Regulating Act need be considered in force. The signature of the treaty and the commencement of Keating's campaign were defended on the score of the company's positive orders and the pressing need of immediate action. On the receipt of the news the Bengal government unanimously condemned the conduct of its supposed subordinate. But it was more difficult to decide what course ought to be pursued. Hastings considered that any sudden reversal of policy was likely to cause more evil than good. The abandonment of Rāghunāth would make every Indian prince dubious of English faith. It was undeniable that the company had laid great stress on the acquisition of Salsette and Bassem. He therefore desired to limit and control the future action of Bombay rather than abruptly to denounce the treaty into which it had entered. The majority, however, was resolved to enforce its own views. On May 31 a despatch was addressed to the Bombay council requiring it at once to recall the company's forces "unless their safety may be endangered by an instant retreat." Later in the year it sent Colonel Upton to negotiate a peace with the Poona regency in its own name. Upton was ill-fitted for the duty. Neither he nor his secretary knew a word of Marāṭhi, and were in fact dependent on the interpreters supplied to them by the Marāṭhas themselves. Moreover, the Calcutta authorities had shown themselves manifestly eager for peace, and were so misguided as to fancy that they might get Salsette and Bassem in return for their pacific sentiments. Nāna Phadnavis of course sought to take advantage of this attitude. He refused to consider the possibility of any cessions of territory and demanded the surrender of Rāghunāth Rāo. This was more than Upton's instructions permitted, and, when he reported the deadlock, in February, 1776, the council suddenly became bellicose and threatened to resume hostilities. On March 1 the wisdom of this change of front was exhibited by the signature of the Treaty of Poandhar. It annulled the Treaty of Surat; it admitted the retention of Salsette and the cession of the Broach revenues; it agreed to the payment of twelve lakhs of rupees by Poona to cover the costs of the English campaign. Rāghunāth Rāo was to live in retirement in Gujarāt on a pension of three lakhs a year.

But the treaty never took effect. Rāghunāth Rāo, having received some encouragement from Sindhua, refused to accept the terms offered to him. The Bombay government, despite the protests of Upton, gave him shelter at Surat. The Poona regency never made any payments, and in the next year received a French adventurer with distinguished honours and agreed to grant the French a port in western India. Further complications arose from the conduct of the East India Company. Towards the close of 1776 a despatch from England approved the Treaty of Surat, on which the Bombay authorities at once invited Rāghunāth Rāo to take up his residence at Bombay. In the following year a further despatch arrived, regretting the Treaty of Purandhar and authorising the government of Bombay to make a new alliance with Rāghunāth if the Poona government attempted to evade its stipulations. The governor and council at once did so.

By this time the majority had fallen from power at Calcutta, leaving Hastings to meet the difficulties caused both by their own conduct and by the provisions of the act which had placed them in power. In 1778 Hastings learnt from Bombay that dissensions had at last broken out at Poona. The regency had long been divided between Sakharām Bāpu, a wavering and unreliable man, and Nāna Phadnavis, able but unscrupulous. Holkar promised Sakharām his help, and Maroba Phadnavis, a cousin of Nāna, joined him. This new group opened negotiations with Rāghunāth at Bombay, and the government of the presidency promised its support. This corresponded too closely with the orders of the company to be opposed by Hastings. He therefore decided to send a force from Bengal to march overland and join the Bombay troops. But almost at once the party with which the English hoped to co-operate began to dissolve. Nāna, who had for the moment been forced to flee from Poona, bought over Holkar with nine lakhs of rupees, induced his cousin to rejoin him and then shut him up in prison, and thus recovered the headship of affairs. Governor Hornby from Bombay at once called upon him to declare whether he was willing to give full effect to the Treaty of Purandhar and dismiss the French adventurer with whom he was still negotiating. When he refused to give an explicit answer, the council resolved to plunge at once into war. It proposed to establish Rāghunāth Rāo as regent on behalf of the young Peshwā Madhu Rāo Narāyan. In November, 1778, the

Bombay forces took the field. They consisted of 600 Europeans and 3300 sepoys. The military command was placed in the hands of Colonel Egerton, an officer of indifferent health and no Indian experience, but the control really lay with a committee of three, consisting of the commander and two members of the council. It does not seem to have occurred to the Bombay government that if it could not trust its commander it had better not go to war. Rāghunāth accompanied the expedition. It carried with it an enormous baggage-train of 19,000 bullocks, and could march barely two miles an hour. In January, 1779, Egerton resigned his command and was succeeded by Colonel Cockburn. On the 5th at Talegāon at the top of the Ghats a large Marāṭha army was encountered. Cockburn considered that he could force his way to Poona twenty miles off if he abandoned his baggage. But the committee, despite Rāghunāth's entreaties, resolved to retire. The stores were burnt; the guns thrown into a tank, and on the 12th the army marched three miles to Wadgāon, harassed by perpetual attacks. Further retreat being deemed impossible, the committee entered into negotiations, Rāghunāth took refuge with Sindhiā, and the Convention of Wadgāon was signed. It promised the surrender of all territory acquired since 1773, the withdrawal of the force advancing from Bengal, the transfer of the Broach revenues to Sindhiā, and the giving of hostages as a security for the due performance of the terms. Although Hornby and his council had not authorised and promptly disavowed these disgraceful terms, they cannot be acquitted of having brought about the failure of their enterprise, both by the unwise arrangements made for the control of the expedition, and by the haste with which they had embarked on their action without awaiting the promised support from Bengal.

On January 30 the Bengal detachment marched into Burhānpur, and on February 26 reached Surat. Hastings had rightly calculated that neither Sindhiā nor Holkar would care to oppose its movements, since by so doing they would endanger the safety of their own territories. Colonel Leslie, the officer under whose command the detachment had at first been placed, had proved to be slack and unenterprising. But he had died in October, 1778, and the command had then been given to Colonel Goddard, who had thus carried to a successful end the project from which Francis had anticipated nothing but failure. Goddard remained under



the orders of the governor-general and council, but on his arrival he was invested with the command of the local troops and given a seat on the local council by the Bombay government. By this means the operations of the Bombay presidency were at last placed under the effective control of the Bengal government. Circumstances had proved too strong at Bombay, as they were to prove at Madras, for the Regulating Act to receive its full legal effect touching the relations between the Bengal government and those of the subordinate presidencies.

Goddard had been empowered by Hastings to seek an accommodation with the Poona government. But Nāna Phadnās would accept nothing less than the surrender of Salsette and the handing over of Rāghunāth, who had escaped from Sindhia's custody and taken refuge with Goddard. Towards the end of the rains, however, Goddard heard of a rumoured agreement between the Marāthas, the Nizām, and Hyder 'Alī for a concerted attack upon the English. He then entered into discussions with Fateh Singh Gackwal. Having crossed the Taprī on January 1, 1780, he induced that chief to sign a treaty on the 26th, by which the English were to receive the revenues of certain districts as soon as they had put Fateh Singh in possession of Ahmadābād and other territory of the Pēshwā, and meanwhile to be joined at once by Fateh Singh with 3000 horse. Ahmadābād was captured on February 15, and a campaign followed in Gujarāt, where the Marāthas succeeded in keeping the field. But Hastings, mindful of the need of breaking the confederacy, entered into alliance with the rāna of Gohad, a long-standing enemy of Sindhia, and sent more troops to threaten Sindhia's northern territories. On August 3, Popham captured Gwalior by escalade. The place had always been regarded as impregnable. Sindhia at once abandoned Gujarāt and retired to cover his own revenues. This permitted Goddard to move to attack Bassein, which he took on December 11. He then attempted to threaten Poona itself. But seeking to retire in the face of a superior force he underwent the one serious reverse of his career. The effects of this defeat were, however, more than compensated by the defeat which Carnac inflicted on Sindhia's troops at Siprī on February 16, 1781. Sindhia now came to the conclusion that his interests lay in an alliance with the English. He had long been aiming at the control of the Marātha Confederacy. His own defeats and the success which

Holkar had just secured meant a set-back in his plans. He therefore opened negotiations, and on October 13 agreed to a cessation of hostilities and undertook to effect a treaty between the English and the Poona government. This led to the Treaty of Sālhbāi, signed on May 17, 1782, though not ratified by Nāna Phadnavis till February 26, 1783. At first sight the clauses of the treaty do not seem specially important. All English conquests made since the Treaty of Purandhar were to be restored. Rāghunāth was to receive no more help from the English. Hyder 'Alī, who was not a party to the treaty, was to give up the territories which he had seized from the nawab of Arcot. It thus stipulated for the mere *status quo ante bellum*. But it nevertheless marks a turning-point in the history both of the Marāthas and of the English company. Mahādaji Sindhia, through whose agency the treaty was made, was the greatest Indian prince of his day. He was looking forward to the establishment of a powerful state in northern India, centring round Delhi, fortified with the prestige of the imperial name, and gathering round itself as satellites the other Marāthā states, so as to renew the old confederacy under fresh leadership and on fresh terms. His alliance with the English meant that so long as he did not attack their interests he would be free to pursue his plans. On the English side it marked a great triumph for Hastings's skill and tenacity. The year 1780 had formed a tremendous crisis. No man could tell if some powerful French expedition might not arrive in Indian waters, just at the moment when the company was menaced by the two chief leaders of India. The revenues of Bengal were visibly weakening under the strain of maintaining war in several theatres at once. Most of Hastings's advisers and colleagues were clamouring for peace with Poona on any terms. But he, with the same constancy with which he had faced the pistol of Francis, drove on his course until he had wrested from circumstance a favourable conclusion. "If you would employ effectual means for obtaining peace", he had written, "you must seek them in the terroirs of a continued war. . . . If you expect to obtain it by concession and entreaty, . . . you will be disappointed." The Treaty of Sālhbāi was the vindication of his words.

But if the conduct of the Bombay council had involved Hastings in a policy which he himself had never chosen and which reduced him to the need of making the best of a bad business,

the conduct of Madras affairs involved him in worse difficulties still, for it brought on new disasters at a most critical moment. The fall of Pondichery in 1761 had established in the south a position not unlike that in Bengal following on the battle of Plassey. The nawab, Muhammad 'Alī, was wholly dependent on the English for the maintenance of his position. On his western borders had arisen a new state. A Muslim adventurer of great capacity both in war and in administration, Hyder 'Alī, had overthrown the old Hindu dynasty and set up his own rule. He had on the whole been disposed to cultivate friendship with the English, who were his neighbours on both sides of India. But that design had proved impossible. Hyder, like all newly established and ambitious princes, coveted the lands on his borders. He was always at war with the Marāṭhas; he was always threatening the Carnatic. But whereas his hostility to the Marāṭhas might easily have made him an acceptable ally of Bombay, his hostility to Muhammad 'Alī made him an inevitable enemy of Madras. In 1767, by a course of policy the causes of which remain obscure, war had broken out between him and the nawab. The Carnatic had been severely ravaged; and, though Hyder had been defeated in pitched battles at Changama and Timmalai, he had much the best of the war, which was ended in 1769 by a treaty concluded at Madras. Muhammad 'Alī's finances, which remained under his own incompetent management, had been thrown into complete confusion. The French war had left him with a large debt to the company. In the next few years he had seemed to be paying off this debt, but in fact he was only doing so by borrowing from the company's servants and other persons at Madras at a much higher rate of interest than was due to the company. As soon as the directors learned of this, they prohibited their servants from participating in such loans in future and ordered the rate of interest to be reduced. But the private debt remained the dominant political interest at Madras. Paul Bensfield, an engineer in the company's service, who in modern times would have made a great name as a financier, became a most active agent in the matter. At one time he was said to have in his hands the fortunes of everyone in Madras, allowing them 2 per cent. a month, while he was principal manager of the nawab's finances as well. The importance of increasing the nawab's revenues came thus to out-

weigh every other consideration. It furnished the motive for two expeditions against the raja of Tanjore in 1771 and 1773, the second of which ended in the annexation of the state by the nawab. On learning of this, the directors at once ordered the restoration of the raja to his territories, and appointed governor of Madras Lord Pigot, who had formerly held the same office during the crisis of the Seven Years' War. Vigorous rather than tactful, Pigot encountered the bitterest opposition. This was headed by the commander-in-chief, Sir Robert Fletcher. He had already distinguished himself by playing a more than dubious part in the opposition to Clive in Bengal in 1766. He and Benfield's friends succeeded in securing a majority on the council against the governor, and, though they did not dare to refuse compliance with the company's orders, they placed the governor under arrest in 1776, and kept him in confinement till he died a year later. In 1778 this state of internal confusion was ended by the appointment of Sir Thomas Rumbold as governor.

But Rumbold proved neither more honest nor more capable than his predecessors. Madras was poverty-stricken; the nawab's loans had fallen to a great discount, but policy still hinged upon the debt and the possibility of wringing gifts from the nawab. As an example it may be mentioned that Rumbold invited the nawab to act as godfather to a son who was born to him at Madras and who was therefore baptized after his godfather by the name of Anwari. This and other acts of complaisance are said to have cost the nawab over fifteen lakhs of rupees. These gifts, however, meant that the nawab was not to be pressed more than could be avoided for the payments on which the maintenance of the company's military forces depended. The expedient which occurred to Rumbold to relieve the financial situation was to get rid of the tribute annually payable to the Nizām for the Northern Circars. Those districts had been granted by Shāh 'Ālam to the company at the same time as the *divāni* of Bengal. But when the Madras government had attempted to act upon this grant, it had found that the *fannān* was valueless without the assent of Nizām 'Alī who actually possessed the Circars. By a treaty with the latter, three out of the four were transferred to the company on condition of an annual payment of five lakhs of rupees. This was already two years in arrears when Rumbold proposed to the Nizām that it should cease altogether. Another

subject of difference had also occurred. It had been agreed that the Circar of Gunttoor should be held by Basālat Jang, the Nizām's brother, for life and should afterwards revert to the company. Basālat Jang had agitated the Madras government by taking a body of French troops into his pay. At first attempts had been made to secure their removal. Then in January, 1779, when Basālat Jang was being threatened by Hyder 'Alī, a treaty was made with him by which he ceded the circar to the company. The circar was at once leased out to Muhammad 'Alī and an English force was sent to protect the district from Hyder. These measures completely indisposed the Nizām and Hyder 'Alī against the company. The Nizām contented himself with stirring up discontent. But Hyder, with his usual decision of character, resolved upon war, for which the contest between the English and the Marāthas provided him with a most favourable opportunity. At the same time he hoped to receive the co-operation of the French, who had lately declared war on Great Britain. He steadily prepared himself but for the moment withheld his attack. In the spring of 1780 Rumbold decided to return to England, confident that, since the presidency had lately received a royal regiment from England, Hyder would not dare to risk a war. In July Hyder suddenly invaded the Carnatic, which was wholly unprepared to resist. Hector Munro, the former victor of Buxar, was commander-in-chief. He marched out in full confidence of driving the invaders out of the Carnatic. But a party of English troops moving to join him was severely defeated at Pollilūr. He retired hastily on Madras. The council, at its wits' end, informed Bengal that all was lost unless assistance in men and money could be instantly sent.

In the development of these events the governor-general and council had hardly been consulted. Rumbold indeed held the view that the Regulating Act was to be understood literally and that so long as he neither went to war nor signed a treaty Bengal had no control over his actions. Nor had Bengal interfered until it seemed likely that the Nizām would be driven into the arms of the Marāthas, when it assumed the conduct of political relations with him, and succeeded in smoothing down his ruffled sensibilities. Nevertheless, Hastings found himself in 1780 committed to a new war with which he had had nothing to do. He must either send help from Bengal or allow Hyder to besiege

Madras In these circumstances he resolved to send Sir Eyre Coote, the commander-in-chief, with as large a body of men as could be spared and a considerable sum of money. But these resources were not to be wasted by the incompetent council. Coote was to procure the resignation of Whitchill, who had succeeded to the chair on Rumbold's departure, assume the whole conduct of the war, and keep the funds under his own management. He was intended to do at Madras what Goddard had succeeded in doing at Bombay—establish the control of the governor-general and council.

These measures secured a partial success. Coote, who enjoyed a deservedly high reputation as a soldier, soon restored the confidence of the Madras army, defeated Hyder at Porto Novo, Pollilūr and Sholingarh, but, like the commander in the former Mysore war, failed altogether to expel Hyder from the Carnatic. The chief cause of this lay in the superior mobility of Hyder's troops. He was strong, Coote was excessively weak, in cavalry. Coote was moreover burdened with an immense transport train. He had to carry with him a disproportionate amount of artillery in order to keep Hyder's horse at a respectful distance; the number of his camp-followers was enormous, and he was not willing to incur unpopularity by insisting on their reduction. The consequence was that his demands on the Madras council for cattle and grain were greater than could be supplied from an area already wasted by war. For this he fiercely blamed the civil authorities, and his vituperations have usually been repeated. The fault, however, lay elsewhere. The plan of the campaign was wrong. The easiest way by which Hyder could have been compelled to withdraw from the Carnatic was not to march after him at the rate of two miles an hour but, as Hastings had done in the case of Sindhu, to carry the war into his territories. He had conquered the districts lying along the Malabar Coast from a number of small Hindu chiefs, and they resented the Muslim domination. Coote should have been content to protect Madras itself and despatch the strongest force he could spare to attack Hyder on the west coast, where the enemy would have been compelled either to lay waste his own territories and destroy his own revenues or meet the invaders in the field. But Coote was probably too eager to multiply his laurels by defeating Hyder in the Carnatic to adopt a plan which would either have removed

himself from the Carnatic or have diminished the forces under his immediate command. He therefore remained in the Carnatic till the autumn of 1782, failing to achieve the purpose of his campaign and seeking to throw all the blame on the civil authorities.

It was not to be expected that this should be borne meekly. In the middle of 1781 a new governor, Lord Macartney, had arrived from England. He was a man of character, with both administrative and diplomatic experience, and had been chosen in order to free the Madras government from its subservience to the corrupt influences of the nawab's debt. The war with Hyder had not been heard of when he had left England, and the position which he found on his arrival was a grievous disappointment to him. The first step which he decided to take was to induce the nawab to make over to the English for the period of the war the administration of the Carnatic revenues. This he succeeded in doing. But the nawab then refused to appoint the agents whom Macartney recommended. The effect of this would have been to nullify the transfer of the management; Macartney therefore insisted on appointing them himself. This action revived the combination which had overthrown Pigot in 1776. The nawab, Paul Benfield, and others did their utmost to cancel the assignment of the revenues. They appealed to Warren Hastings. They sought to lure Coote into the business by offering him an illusory assignment of the revenues in his own name. This quarrel was complicated by disputes which had arisen between Madras and Bengal regarding the conduct of the war. Just before Macartney's arrival Hastings had urged the Madras council to leave the whole management of the war to Coote. The council, overawed, had complied, and Macartney had acquiesced in the situation which he found in being. When Coote reiterated his complaints, Hastings urged Macartney to humour the commander-in-chief. Macartney agreed provided that the responsibility also was to rest on Coote's shoulders. But that was a burden which Coote was not willing to bear. Coote kept his plans entirely to himself, limited his communications to demands for money, cattle, and supplies, and at the same time threatened Macartney with accusations of ruining the campaign. Hastings's position was one of great embarrassment. He did not wish to disoblige Coote, lest he should in a huff return to Calcutta and vote against the measures of the governor-general. He did

not wish to disoblige Benfield, whose friends had greatly assisted in the accommodation between himself and Lord North. He thus found himself obliged to support the nawab's cause and Coote's cause against the governor of Madras. This led to an open breach between the two governments. Bengal ordered Madras to resign the assignment of the Carnatic revenues, Madras refused.

Early in 1783 Coote, who had passed the cold weather at Calcutta, was about to return to the south. He demanded powers to overrule the local council and if necessary to displace Macartney. Hastings favoured compliance with his demands; but in this he was not supported by the other members of his council, and Coote finally sailed without the authority he had desired. On his way down his vessel was chased by a French frigate. The agitation caused by fear of capture brought on a stroke of apoplexy. The old general was carried ashore at Madras speechless, and died almost at once. It was perhaps fortunate. Macartney had determined to resist by every means in his power what he believed to be unwarranted demands which would ruin the British cause in the south. The command of the Madras troops passed into the hands of Major-General James Stuart, as quarrelsome as Coote, but a far less formidable opponent of the civil government. Early in the year a great expedition had at last arrived from France under the command of Bussy, now old and worn out. Bussy had landed and occupied Cuddalore. Stuart was ordered to march southwards and attack him. Resenting orders of any sort, Stuart languidly pursued his march, spending six weeks over the hundred miles separating Madras from Cuddalore. He then attacked the French position, and two stubborn actions followed in which both sides lost heavily. But events at sea had placed the English in a desperate position.

Throughout the war an English squadron had been maintained on the coast, at first under the command of Vernon and afterwards under that of Sir Edward Hughes. In 1782 a French squadron had arrived under the greatest admiral whom the French ever produced. This was the *Bailli de Suffren*. He was filled with an indomitable energy; and his one thought was not the safety of his ships but the destruction of the enemy. He was moreover a fighter of great intelligence, and was ever thinking out plans for modifying the stereotyped methods of naval manœuvre. A series of engagements followed his arrival.

Hughes at first succeeded in holding his own, though with difficulty. More than once Suffren succeeded in concentrating a superior force of ships against a part of Hughes's line of battle. But the decisive victory which Suffren was seeking evaded his grasp. His subordinate officers were of inferior quality and failed to understand the instructions which they received, and in every circumstance he was encountered by a most obstinate resistance. Nevertheless, he was wearing down the enemy. Finally in June, 1783, he attacked the English off Cuddalore, where they were covering the operations of Stuart, and inflicted on them so much damage that they were obliged to retire to Madras to refit. That event left Stuart helpless. He could receive no further supplies of food, and must have been reduced either to ignominious surrender or to disastrous retreat but for the last piece of good fortune which had befallen the English in the course of the war. This was the arrival of the news of the conclusion of peace in Europe. A suspension of arms followed, and the fruit of Suffren's vigour and skill was lost.

Macartney had been most dissatisfied with Stuart's military conduct. The general was therefore recalled, as soon as news of peace was received. The order was reluctantly obeyed, and, as soon as Stuart reached Madras, he began a series of intrigues, which looked the more threatening since he had been the officer selected in 1776 to arrest Lord Pigot. The real point at issue was whether the military forces should or should not be under the command of the governor and council. Macartney was resolved that his authority should be obeyed, and decided to arrest Stuart and send him off to England. This was accordingly done. But even then his difficulties were not at an end. The officer next in seniority was Sir John Burgoyne, a king's officer. He was offered the command provided he was willing to execute whatever orders he should receive from the civil government. On his refusal, a company's officer was named commander-in-chief. This was a dangerous measure which almost led to a conflict between the king's and company's troops. Burgoyne, however, though unwise, had nothing of Stuart's malignity of character, and the matter was smoothed over, although a mutiny actually broke out among the king's regiments as the result of the unsettlement which these events had produced.

Meanwhile the war had been pursued against Mysore with

better success than had at first attended the British plans. Hyder 'Alī had died at the end of 1782, and had been succeeded by his son Tipu Sultān. Hastings had long been urging on both Madras and Bombay the need of an expedition to attack the Malabar possessions of Mysore. At last in 1783 a force was sent from Bombay under a company's officer named Matthews, who landed at Mangalore and occupied the capital of the province of Bednor. This at once compelled Tipu to recall his forces from the Carnatic, and he himself hastily marched to expel the intruders. Matthews had imprudently scattered his force, and was besides much embarrassed by the jealousy exhibited by the king's officers who had been placed under his orders. He was besieged in Bednor and compelled to surrender. Tipu then marched to recover Mangalore, which was held by a king's officer, Colonel Campbell. The latter defended the place gallantly, but at last agreed to an armistice on very unfavourable terms, under which he was precluded from receiving supplies by sea, the only way by which they could possibly be sent. The consequence was that when supplies arrived by sea and the English insisted on their being admitted into the place, Tipu considered himself free again to carry on his siege-works.

As soon as he had removed Stuart from the command of the army, Macartney had sent a force to attack Tipu's southern possessions. Dindigul had been taken early in 1783. In June Dharapuram was taken, and the English were preparing to advance when they were ordered to halt and await the issue of proposals which had been made to Tipu for peace. One of the terms of the agreement made by Sindhia's means at Sālbaī had been that Tipu should be compelled to make peace with the English. But the Marāthas had been so long without making any move in that direction that Macartney had come to disbelieve in their sincerity. Since the preliminaries of peace declared that the allies of both combatants should be invited to accede, he thought it best to make direct proposals to Mysore, and sent commissioners to confer with Tipu, who was still before Mangalore. In December, on reports that hostilities had again broken out there, Macleod on the Malabar Coast seized Cannanore, while the English in the south captured Palghat and Coimbatore, before their movements could be countermanded by the commissioners. On January 29 Mangalore was sur-

rendered by Campbell, owing to the sickness which prevailed in the garrison. Shortly afterwards the commissioners reached Tipu's camp. They then negotiated the Treaty of Mangalore, by which each side restored all conquests and agreed to release all prisoners. Military officers, indignant at peace at the moment when success seemed possible, spread numerous stories about the conclusion of this treaty. But there is no reason to suppose that the commissioners were treated with worse than the contemptuous pride which was to have been expected. Tipu believed himself to have won the war and behaved accordingly. A large number of English prisoners were then released. But those who had been coerced into adopting Islam during their captivity were retained. The treatment of the prisoners had been severe, but no ground exists for believing the stories which were told of many having been deliberately put to death. The treaty was strongly disapproved by Hastings, mainly on the ground that it made no reference to the Treaty of Sālbaī. He actually moved that Macartney should be suspended from his office of governor on the ground of his having disobeyed the orders of the Bengal government. But this proposal was not accepted by his councillors, probably for no better reason than that Macartney had influential friends in England.

Amid this confusion of authorities, of quarrels between the civil and military powers at Madras, between the king's and company's officers, between the councils of Madras and Bengal, it had been completely impossible for Hastings to direct the conduct of affairs. They had passed out of his control, but, as in Bombay, he was left to pay the bill. The Marātha and Mysore wars had burdened the Bengal finances to such a point that the company's investment had to be provided by private subscription. Hastings was driven by this state of things to extraordinary expedients which were afterwards made the subject of accusation against him, without sufficient consideration of the difficulties under which he had laboured, and without memory of the anarchical conditions created by the Regulating Act. The two famous incidents which occurred in this connection were the affair of Chait Singh and the affair of the Begums of Oudh. Chait Singh was the zamindar of Benares. As soon as the French war broke out, Hastings proposed that he should be called upon for an extra contribution to help meet the costs of the war. In this he was

justified by the well-established practice of India, where the ruler's demands were limited only by his will and sense of the expedient. Later on new demands were made and in 1780 Hastings resolved to visit Benares personally in order to overcome Chait Singh's delays. Chait Singh does not seem to have intended opposition. He met Hastings at Buxar, and submitted to the arrest in which Hastings placed him. On reaching Benares, a tumult broke out, a company of sepoy's was destroyed, and Hastings had to flee for his life to Chunar. There he gathered together forces, reoccupied Benares, declared the fugitive Chait Singh dispossessed of the zamindari, regranting it to a nephew of the dispossessed chief, and increased the tribute from two and a quarter to four lakhs of rupees a year. Hastings's enemies attempted to prove that Chait Singh was not a mere zamindar, and that the company had no right to claim more from him than the fixed tribute. The first point seems untenable. Benares was handed over to the company by the ruler of Oudh, whose authority was henceforth exercised by the government of Calcutta, Chait Singh certainly never possessed sovereignty. The custom of India again strongly favoured the contention of Hastings that the tribute payable was unlimited. Hastings acted therefore within the rights which any other ruler of India would not have hesitated to use. At the same time it is clear that Chait Singh was treated with severity, and that Hastings's conduct at Benares in 1780 was precipitate. The fact doubtless was that Hastings was feeling the results of a long period of strife and disappointment, that his judgment was less clear and calm than usual, and that he was urged on by the spur of need. It is likely also that Hastings had never forgiven Chait Singh for having sent a messenger to Clavering in the crisis of 1777, and was not sorry to exhibit to the Indian world the consequences of incurring his displeasure.

Perhaps, however, the chief criticism which should be passed on his conduct towards Chait Singh is that it failed of its immediate object. He was in need of money at once; and the outbreak at Benares disappointed him of the sum which he had hoped to obtain, although his settlement augmented the future resources of the company. He thus found himself obliged to seek out some new source of finance. Asaf-ud-daula, the nawab of Oudh, owed the company at this time some fifteen lakhs

of rupees. In 1781 in consequence of Hastings's urgent demands, he proposed to resume the *jāgīrs* and seize the treasure of which his late father's wives had improperly possessed themselves. This matter had long been a subject of dispute between the two parties, and at an earlier time the begums had been compelled to disgorge part of their spoils under a promise made by Bristow, the resident appointed by the majority, that no more should be demanded of them. Āsaf-ud-daula, who was a man of feeble character, possibly hoped that the former promise might serve as an obstacle to the acceptance of his proposal, while his offer might relieve him from immediate pressure for money. But since Hastings's need of money was great and growing, the nawab was urged to carry his suggestion into effect. The begums were therefore placed under restraint, and their chief agents were imprisoned for almost a year. In December, 1782, they agreed to pay over a large sum of money and were duly released. The defence put forward for withdrawing the promise of protection from the begums was that they had promoted rebellion in the Benares country. But for this little evidence appears. Like Chait Singh, the begums were treated with severity, although the degree of their ill-treatment was greatly exaggerated by Hastings's enemies, and in their case the matter was darkened by something like a breach of faith.

In February, 1785, Hastings sailed for England, being convinced by the terms of Pitt's India Act that he was not likely to remain undisturbed in the office which he had held for so long. Indeed, for years Francis had been busily employing his matchless talents for slander against the governor-general. He sedulously inflamed the enthusiasm of Edmund Burke against what he declared to be a system of torture and corruption. When Shelburne went out of office and the Coalition Ministry of Fox and North was formed, official hostility reappeared, stronger than ever it had been before. All the Whigs were united against Hastings, while the Tories were languid in his defence. The fall of the coalition and the accession of Pitt to power did nothing to change this state of things. Early in 1786, shortly after Hastings's return to England, Burke brought forward charges on which the impeachment of Hastings was subsequently founded. Then arose the situation which Burke himself had foreseen in an earlier day. "God defend me", he had once exclaimed in the House of

Commons, "from the justice of this house when supported by neither the faction of one side nor the venality of the other." An informed survey of the career of Hastings revealed errors, revealed occasional acts which cannot well be defended, but revealed also a high and noble constancy of purpose, a mind of extraordinary qualities, as hard, as flexible, and as resistant as the finest-tempered steel. Justice would have demanded condemnation of his errors, but recognition of his great and unequalled services. Probably not another man of his generation could have carried the company's government through the period during which the Regulating Act remained in force without incurring great, perhaps irremediable, disaster. In every other part of the outer realms of George III rebellion, defeat, humiliation had been the national portion. In India alone national interests remained unharmed. And the reward prepared by Francis and Burke was a series of accusations, vague and general, such as no court of law would ever have entertained, accusations supported by an unending stream of eloquence, designed to make the worse appear the better reason.

After long debates the impeachment was resolved on twenty-two articles in May, 1787. The charges involved the violation of treaties with Oudh, the unrighteous sale of Kora and Allāhābād, the oppression of Chait Singh and the Begums of Oudh, the arbitrary settlement of the land revenues of Bengal, and fraud and corruption in general administration. On April 23, 1795, Hastings was acquitted on all the charges which were pressed to a conclusion. The redeeming feature of the trial was the care with which the lords reviewed the evidence submitted to them, and the view which evidently inspired them at the conclusion that Hastings had suffered far more than any mistakes and misconduct of which he had been guilty could possibly demand. It was but just that Burke never recovered from this decisive condemnation of his conduct in the matter. Throughout the trial he had been the leading spirit, and after it he was a broken man. Hastings on the other hand showed his true spirit. He bore his seven years' ordeal as he had withstood the majority in the council-room of Fort William. He believed with reason that he had saved English interests in India, that he had governed the territories committed to his charge with justice, that the inhabitants of Bengal had heard of his departure with sorrow, and that the princes of India would

have welcomed his return to direct the affairs of the East India Company. Indeed, it is hardly less than tragic to think that the one supremely great man whom England sent to rule India was checked in every action either by opposition in his own council, or by hostility of the home government, or by the provisions of the worst piece of legislation which ever passed the British parliament regarding India. If Burke had wished to impeach any one, he would have done well to choose his old enemy Lord North, the author of the Regulating Act, rather than Warren Hastings, its unhappy victim.

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CHAPTER V

The Establishment of the East India Company as the Supreme Power in India, 1784-1818

The resignation of Warren Hastings marks the end of one and the beginning of a new period in the history of the East India Company. The disastrous experiment of the Regulating Act was brought to a close by Pitt's India Act. As will be shown in the following chapter, an effective system of government was at last established. The political conduct of the East India Company was placed in due subordination to the policy of the national government; and the governor-general and council of Bengal received power sufficient to permit their control of British policy in India. In the previous generation Clive and Hastings had led the way in a great experiment. With imperfect powers and insignificant resources they had established the company as a vital force in Indian politics. Clive had seized a lucky opportunity; and Hastings had maintained the company's position in defiance of difficulties created principally by the folly and ignorance of London. His successors were now to enjoy advantages which he had never known—consistent support, freedom from interference, untrammelled authority.

Hastings had been ignorantly supposed to pursue a policy of aggression. Such conduct was specially disliked at London. The directors feared that it might endanger the advantages which had been obtained; the ministry feared that the resources of the nation might be involved in some great struggle. Therefore the India Act sought to prevent the future representatives of the company from following Hastings's supposed example. It specifically declared that wars of aggression were contrary to the wishes, the interests, and the policy of the nation. But this attempt to regulate the conduct of external policy by moral maxims was foredoomed to fail. Wars of aggression are probably the most exceptional events in history. One state attacks another because its rights have been injured, because its interests are threatened, because it fears that unless it attacks it will itself be attacked at a disadvantage. Almost

all wars, in the eyes of both parties, are wars of defence. The period ushered in by this pacific declaration was therefore as nilitant as that which had preceded it.

Some have put forward the view that this was due to the brutal and ferocious policy of the governors-general. But this facile explanation takes no account of the state of India. The country remained in the state of flux to which it had been reduced by the collapse of the Mughal empire. A number of new states had emerged, but none of them recognised any natural boundaries, and every prince was eager to extend his territories. But their position varied greatly. The Rājput states, the Carnatic, Oudh, Hyderabad, feared their neighbours, and were prepared to take any measures and to welcome any allies promising even a temporary relief from their immediate dangers. Two of these, Oudh and the Carnatic, had already accepted the alliance of the East India Company, and in fact depended for their continued existence on the military support of their ally. Hyderabad was at constant war with its Marāṭha neighbours at Poona, and was usually worsted. The Rājput princes feared the advance of the Marāṭha chiefs who had established themselves in northern India and who threatened to reduce them to tributary subordinates. On the other side there were two states which clearly aspired to greater power than at the moment they possessed. One of these was Mysore under the rule of Hyder 'Alī's son, Tipu Sultān. Tipu lacked his father's capacity for government, but inherited all his ambition. He had declared himself king in his own right, thus expressly disclaiming any dependence on the Mughal empire, still recognised by every other prince and ruler of India with the exception of the Marāṭha Holkar. He was extremely orthodox, and afflicted his Hindu subjects, especially on the Malabar Coast, where they were newly conquered and unsubmissive, with forced conversion and the destruction of temples, like another Aurangzib. Like the Nizām of Hyderabad, he was constantly at war with the Marāṭhas on his northern frontier: but, unlike the Nizām, he was able to meet them on equal terms. He also yearned to redeem the Carnatic from its subservience to the infidel authority of the English, whom his father had reduced to such straits in 1780. Beside him was the group of states known as the Marāṭha Confederacy. This formed by far the most powerful political unit in India. The confederacy was composed of that part of the Deccan under the direct rule of

the Pēshwā from Poona, of Baroda under the Gackwar, of Nāgpur under the Bhonslas, of two groups of territory round Ahmādābād and round Gwalior under Mahādaji Sindhia, and of Indore under Holkar. Of all these the Pēshwā was the nominal head. But his effective authority had already begun to break. Princes who had willingly obeyed Bālājī Rāo or Bājī Rāo at an earlier time, when the Pēshwā's power was great and their own small, had adopted more independent views when the power of the Pēshwā had been reduced by the struggles centring round Rāghunāth Rāo and when their own power and dominions had increased. Now Mahādaji Sindhia aspired to succeed to the headship of the Marāthas. He had widely extended his dominions in northern India, he had occupied Delhi and taken the emperor under his protection. From his protégé he had required the appointment of the Pēshwā as the chief lieutenant of the empire, with himself as the Pēshwā's deputy. As has been seen in the previous chapter, he had intervened in the war between the Pēshwā and the English, and had agreed with the latter to bring it to a conclusion. But his ambitions were viewed with great jealousy. Holkar was always ready to support the ministers at Poona if Sindhia attacked them. Great as the confederacy still was, it was seamed with divisions, no longer capable of common action, and ready to break asunder under the pressure of conflicting interests.


After a short interval during which John Macpherson acted as governor-general, Cornwallis arrived as his successor. He reached Calcutta on September 12, 1786, bent on giving the fullest effect to the acts of parliament and on abstaining from all interference in the politics of India. So far as northern India was concerned he succeeded. The only event of note in which he was involved in that area occurred when Sindhia, having become the emperor's deputy chief-lieutenant, thought of claiming the annual twenty-six lakhs of rupees which Clive had agreed to pay for the *diwāni* of Bengal. Cornwallis promptly and firmly warned Sindhia that any attempt to promote that claim would be treated as an unfriendly act. The warning was sufficient. Sindhia, who was only testing the attitude of the new governor-general, dropped the matter immediately. But affairs in the south were less easy to manage. Tipu's attitude was definitely hostile. The Treaty of Mangalore had named the raja of Travancore as one of

the allies of the company whom Tipu agreed not to threaten or attack. The raja had lately purchased from the Dutch certain factories and forts which, in the decaying state of their trade, they no longer wished to retain. Tipu claimed that these places were dependencies of chiefs who had recognised his own supremacy, and demanded that they should be handed over to him. On learning of this, Cornwallis at once ordered John Holland, the governor of Madras, to inform Tipu that any attack on Travancore would be deemed an attack on the East India Company. The governor, however, was not willing to carry out the order. He belonged to the old, bad generation which had been deeply interested in the nawab's debts. He feared that a war with Tipu would mean the ravaging of the Carnatic as in the time of Hyder 'Ali, and that the nawab would be unable to pay his private creditors. Tipu therefore was not warned as early or as firmly as Cornwallis had intended. He attacked Travancore, commanding in person the troops who were employed; and this action led at once to the Third Mysore War. But the circumstances of the moment were very different from those in which Hyder had attacked the English in 1780. Tipu had cherished hopes of overthrowing first the Nizām, then the Marāthas, and finally the English. He had sent embassies to Paris, and, although the French government was not prepared actively to assist his plans, it was not at all unwilling to see its old European enemy opposed and thwarted in the east. Tipu received encouragement which he was unlucky and unwise enough to take at its face-value. In 1785-87 he was engaged in war with Poona and Hyderabad, leading to an inconclusive peace. Cornwallis, judging from Tipu's embassy to Paris, concluded that war with France would mean immediate war with Tipu, and that the company's safety demanded an alliance with Tipu's late enemies. The India Act precluded him from entering into treaties with them at once, for it forbade any alliance in preparation for war. But he took care to cultivate a good understanding with Nāna Phadnavis, who still controlled affairs at Poona, and, when he arranged with the Nizām a settlement of the Guntur question, he gave him an informal promise of support provided he refrained from attacking any ally of the English. A list of the English allies given to the Nizām did not include the name of Tipu Sultān. This was certainly a violation of the spirit of the India Act. That so honest and moderate a man as

Cornwallis should have deemed such a course necessary displays the impossibility of conducting foreign policy in accordance with general maxims. But when war broke out, Cornwallis had already provided himself with allies who threatened the long line of Tipu's northern frontier. The war began in May, 1790, and treaties for common action by the English, the Nizām, and the Marāthas, were signed in June and July following. The position of 1780 was exactly reversed. The Carnatic lay untouched, while the English and their allies invaded the Mysore territories.

• Their initial operations were not marked by success. In 1791, therefore, Cornwallis came south to take the command in person. He succeeded in taking Bangalore, but although he advanced towards Tipu's capital of Seringapatam he was prevented by a shortage of supplies from laying siege to it. In the next year, however, he advanced again, besieged the place, and compelled Tipu to accept severe terms. Tipu was to cede to the allies most of the conquests which his father and himself had made, and he was to pay a great indemnity. As security for the due execution of these terms, he gave two of his sons into English keeping. By this settlement Cornwallis hoped that he had established peace on a firm basis in the south. He considered that he had cut down the power of Tipu to the point at which he would not dare again to attack the English, and that the cessions made to the English allies would enable them to meet any attack which Tipu might launch against them. In short he attempted to apply the principle of the balance of power, strengthening the weak and reducing the strong.

Such calculations, however, took no account of the ever-shifting character of Indian alliances. Cornwallis's departure in 1793 was soon followed by a war between his late allies, the Nizām and the Marāthas. Shortly, the new governor-general, refused to take part in the struggle, which ended in the defeat of the Nizām, in the battle of Khairāda. The Nizām, who already had a considerable force in his service under the command of the famous Frenchman, Raymond, then proceeded to increase this branch of his troops. French influence thus threatened to become predominant not only at Seringapatam but at Hyderabad as well. In 1793 war had broken out again between Great Britain and the revolutionary French government. The possibility of French interference in Indian affairs had thus again become a question of importance. When in



April, 1798, Richard Wellesley, Lord Mornington, arrived as governor-general, he found the balance which Cornwallis had tried to set up already overtuned. In the middle of October, when he learnt of the French invasion of Egypt, he resolved that Tipu must either renounce the French alliance or be destroyed.

Tipu had in fact welcomed the Anglo-French war as promising him his revenge for the defeat of 1792. He had opened negotiations for help from France both with the governor of the French island of Mauritius and with the Paris authorities. Shortly after Mornington's arrival, the latter had heard of a bombastic proclamation in which Malaitie, at Mauritius, had called for volunteers to aid Tipu to destroy the English power, and of the arrival at Mangalore of a small party of Frenchmen who had in consequence joined Tipu's service. The conduct of the sultan in thus seeking the aid of the French was singularly unwise, and betrayed a deplorable lack of information. It was not in Malaitie's power to give Mysore any material help. Tipu's mission to Mauritius and the landing of the small body of men whom he obtained warned Mornington of his intentions without strengthening himself. Tipu did his utmost to counteract the effects of his own conduct. But the governor-general interpreted his smooth letters as designed to allay English fears until arrangements for effective French support should have been completed.

In Mornington's eyes the first step to be taken was to root out French influence from Hyderabad. In this he soon succeeded. The Nizām accepted his offers to maintain a force of company's troops at Hyderabad on condition of the Nizām's providing for their pay and of conducting his foreign policy in accordance with English wishes. The French force which Raymond had formed was thus broken up. The officers were carried off to Calcutta as prisoners of war and sent back to Europe, while the sepoys for the most part took service with the English. This danger removed, the affair with Tipu was brought to an issue. Mornington calculated that no French force could arrive from the Red Sea until the middle of 1799. At the close of 1798 therefore he moved south to Madras, and required from Tipu categorical answers to his demands which he had made. Tipu played for time. But Mornington would not wait till circumstances should favour the sultan. On February 22 he ordered the invasion of Tipu's territories by the army which had been assembled. The campaign

was marked by unbroken success. Tipu was defeated in the field at Sedasere and Mallavelly. In April, Seringapatam was again besieged. On May 4 it was stormed and Tipu perished in the defence. The generation of conflict between the Muslim rulers of Mysore and the company had come to a close. Mornington's services were recognised by the bestowal of an Irish marquissate, and he was thenceforth known as the Marquis Wellesley.

His settlement was characteristic. On this occasion the Marāthas had refused to co-operate with the company in the war, and even massed troops as though preparing to assist Tipu. Wellesley therefore needed to consider no other interests than those of the company and of the Nizām. He decided to reduce Mysore to its old boundaries, within which a representative of the Hindu ruling house was to be set up. Most of the territories thus cut off were to be divided between the Nizām and the company, and shortly afterwards the Nizām handed over his share to the company in return for the abolition of his annual payments for the maintenance of the subsidiary force. Certain districts were set aside to be offered to the Peshwā, Bāji Rāo II (son of the old English ally Rāghunāth Rāo), whom Nāna Phadnavis, after a period of bitter conflict with Sindhu, had established at Poona. These districts were to be the price of the acceptance by the Marāthas of an English alliance similar to that which had been made with the Nizām. With the new Hindu prince a treaty, till then without parallel, was signed. Wellesley was resolved that, if it could be avoided, the company's alliance should not be disgraced by the evil consequences which had followed in the Carnatic and in Oudh. The prince was given his principality, not only on condition of military and political subordination to the government of Calcutta, but also on condition of following such advice on administrative and financial matters as the governor-general might offer him. A neglect of these conditions might be followed by the English resumption of the raja's territories.

The effect of these arrangements was to establish the company as the unquestioned arbiter of affairs in the south. Wellesley himself cherished the hope of securing a similar position for the company in the north as well. This depended upon inducing the Marāthas to accept a subsidiary alliance. Nāna Phadnavis had rejected Wellesley's offer of part of the conquests made from Tipu. But he had died in 1800, and there followed a struggle for


supremacy at Poona, between Holkar and Daulat Rāo, who had succeeded Mahādaji Rāo Sindhia. The Pēshwā found himself helpless between the two rivals. He was himself a man possessed of neither wisdom nor good faith. He made an alliance with Sindhia in order to wreak vengeance on the friends of the late Nāna who had held him in tutelage. Jaswant Rāo Holkar marched south, defeated Sindhia's army, captured Poona, and plundered it from top to bottom. Bāji Rāo fled to Bassem. He begged for English help. Wellesley agreed to give it provided he would accept English mediation in his disputes with other Indian princes, and provided he would accept a subsidiary force such as the Nizām had received. Bāji Rāo consented to these terms, and on December 31, 1802, signed the Treaty of Bassem.

The effect of this treaty was to establish English influence at the very heart of the Marāṭha Confederacy. This was not likely to be accepted by the Marāṭha chiefs with calm. In London this seemed a reason for disliking the policy which had brought it about, because it would involve the company in "the endless and complicated distractions of the turbulent Mahrattah empire." To Wellesley, however, the continuance of the wars in which the Marāṭha princes had been constantly engaged appeared a far greater danger. It would accelerate the growing poverty of the country; it might lead to the formation of a single Marāṭha state under an ambitious leader with whom the company would have to fight for its existence; above all, the existence of strong states unconnected with the company meant the existence of openings into which French influence might intrude. Like the Nizām, Sindhia had employed French officers to organise and train his army. First de Boigne and then Perron had commanded large bodies of his troops, and had received *jāgirs* from the revenues of which the sepoy were paid, so that the commander was, or at any time might become, independent of his employer and free to promote his national rather than his employer's interests. From all these points of view Wellesley judged the establishment of English influence among the Marāṭha states a matter of the first importance. He did not believe that the Marāṭha princes could unite against any enemy. English control at Poona would deprive them of their common rallying point. The treaty, he supposed, might perhaps lead to war with individual chiefs, but not to war with the Marāṭhas as a whole. The event was to prove the accuracy of his judgement.

It soon became evident that small reliance could be placed on the fidelity of the new English ally. Bājī Rāo desired only to be freed from the domination of Holkar, and at once sought to free himself from the new bonds which he had so lightly accepted. He tried to form a combination of all the chiefs. But Holkar was too disgusted with Bājī Rāo to co-operate. Complaining that the Marāṭha power had been sold to the English, he withdrew sullenly to his possessions in Mālhwā. The Gaekwar, too, refused to participate in any scheme against his ally the company, whom he feared much less than he feared the Peshwā. Daulat Rāo Sindhia and the raja of Nāgpur alone assembled their troops and crossed the Nerbudda. Wellesley desired them to separate and withdraw their forces. On their refusal, war was declared in August, 1803. Arthur Wellesley was placed by his brother in political and military control of the operations in the Deccan; Lord Lake received the like authority in Upper India. Arthur Wellesley defeated the combined armies of Sindhia and the Bhonsla at Assaye; Sindhia then agreed to a truce, during which the Nāgpur forces were beaten at Argāon. Nāgpur then made peace at Deogāon, agreeing to cede to the company the district of Cuttack, thus completing the company's command of the eastern sea-board of India, besides making other cessions to the Nizām. Meanwhile, Lake had captured Algarh, on which Perron had resigned Sindhia's service and taken refuge in British territory, being no longer able to command the obedience of his French subordinates. Delhi had then been taken, the emperor had passed from Marāṭha to British custody, and in November Sindhia's remaining forces had been scattered at Laswar. Sindhia then made peace, surrendering much territory and transferring his political rights in Upper India to the company. The war thus appeared to have ended as triumphantly as the war with Tipu. But Holkar, who had looked on contemptuously while his rival Sindhia was being beaten, resolved to teach the English what a Marāṭha war was like. He rejected the proposals which Lake made to him at the end of 1803, and invaded the territory of the raja of Jaipur, an ally of the company. A new war therefore broke out in April, 1804. The English hoped to help him in western India, but their plans miscarried, and one of their detachments was overwhelmed and beat a disorderly retreat to Agra. Holkar, however, could not repeat this success. He was repulsed in an attack on

Delhi. Later in the year his troops were defeated at Dig and again at Farrukhābād, and Holkar himself was chased by Lake across the Sutlej into the dominions of the rising Sikh chief, Ranjit Singh. While these events had been in progress, Sindhia had shown signs of wishing to renew the struggle, but had thought better of it. So in 1805 the company retained the position of supremacy which had been claimed by the Treaty of Bassem and asserted by the campaigns against Sindhia and the Bhonsla raja.

But at the moment when Wellesley seemed about to reap the harvest of his policy, he learnt that he had been recalled and Cornwallis reappointed governor-general. The directors at London were on principle opposed to a policy of expansion. When Henry Dundas had left the Board of Control in 1801, he had been succeeded first by Lord Lewisham and then by Castlereagh, and his departure had been marked by a diminution of the support which the governor-general had till then received from the cabinet. Castlereagh thought with the directors that Wellesley's policy had been unduly adventurous. Like them he had been alarmed by the outbreak of war with Holkar into thinking that the struggle with the Marāthas would never be brought to a successful conclusion. Cornwallis, though sixty-seven and infirm, was therefore induced to return to India to make peace with the Marāthas. He arrived on July 30, and died at Ghāzīpur on October 5 following, before he had carried his instructions into effect. The senior member of council, Sir George Barlow, took his place. This man had earned a great reputation as a covenanted servant. Under Cornwallis he had been employed to draft that ill-omened code by which it had been hoped to bestow justice on Bengal. To Wellesley, just before the latter sailed for India, Cornwallis had recommended Barlow as a man to whom to turn for advice in a difficulty. Barlow had supported Wellesley's policy consistently. But now, seeing into what trouble with London it had brought the late governor-general, he hastily made peace with Holkar and concessions to Sindhia, convincing the Pāshwā, Sindhia and Holkar alike, that war with the English carried with it small hazard, since such irresolute enemies were sure to resign the fruits of victory. Holkar recovered his territories. Sindhia received back Gohad and Gwalior. Barlow further declared that the company had no interests in the region west of the Chambal. This policy was not only foolish but also



unjust. It abandoned the Rājput states which had entered into alliance with Wellesley and the Sikh princes east of the Sutlej to whom Wellesley had given the company's protection. It renounced the responsibility for the well-being and public peace of India which Wellesley had been first among the governors-general deliberately to undertake.

Indeed, Wellesley was the first English ruler to foresee and accept the full consequences of the unstable conduct of Indian princes and of the military superiority of the company. Just as in the administration of Bengal he insisted on the company's servants being trained and educated not as merchants but as statesmen, creating the College of Fort William not merely to teach them the languages of the country but also to provide them with the liberal education which many of them lacked; just as in his external policy he sought to bring the principal Indian states into alliance with the company in order to check the constant flux of power and end a whole century of ceaseless war, so also in his relations with the allies of the company he was most averse from the system of blind, irresponsible support to which he found himself committed both in the Carnatic and in Oudh. In both cases the ruler was a client of the company; in both cases the company declined responsibility for its client's conduct. In the Carnatic several attempts had been made to bring order into the nawab's administration. The enquiries which had been made in Macartney's time had revealed an extraordinary wastage of the public revenues. At Trichinopoly, for instance, the disbursements amounted to a lakh of rupees more than the revenues of the district, owing chiefly to a multitude of pensions charged upon them. Then, too, the practice of assigning whole districts to the management of creditors meant that the revenues would be managed in the worst possible way by men who had no interests beyond the early realisation of their advances. In 1787 the nawab had agreed to pay nine lakhs of pagodas to the company and twelve to his creditors. But this arrangement fell at once into arrears. In 1792 Cornwallis attempted a new settlement. It was based on the optimistic view that if the nawab's obligations were reduced, he would be able to restore order in his administration. Under the scheme the nawab was to pay nine lakhs as before to the company but only six to his creditors. If his payments fell into arrears, certain specified districts, over which he promised no

longer to grant assignments, were to be taken over by the company. If he were involved in war, the whole administration of the Carnatic was at once to be assumed by the company for the duration of the war. But even this treaty was not kept. Assignments were in fact granted on the districts specified. In 1795 the governor of Madras, Lord Hobart, desired to take advantage of the old nawab's death, which occurred in that year, to impose new terms on his son and successor, 'Umdat-ul-'umara. Hobart proposed to bring the treaty into action by taking over the direct administration of the "mortgaged" districts. But the governor-general, Shore, disclaimed in the most emphatic terms the least responsibility for the state of the nawab's territories. Hobart then resigned, and was succeeded by Lord Clive, son of the victor of Plassey. The new governor was a man of less energy of character than Hobart, but at almost the same time Shore was displaced by Wellesley. The British authorities then attempted once more to induce the nawab to modify the method of his government. But 'Umdat obstinately refused all concessions. The war with Tipu strengthened his opposition, for either the company would be beaten and he would be relieved for the moment from further pressure, or Tipu would be overthrown and the danger of war, and the risk of the Carnatic administration being assumed, would disappear. Unluckily for the nawab, the victors found at Seringapatam papers which rendered the traditional fidelity of Muhammad 'Ali to the company at least suspect. These papers proved that the nawab and both his sons had been in correspondence with Hyder 'Ali and Tipu, that arrangements had been made for a secret cypher, and that the nawab had expressed himself bitterly on the subject of his English allies. Probably this exchange of letters and passing of messengers signified no more than the customary instability of Indian rulers at this time. But it was fatal to the old nawab's character as the company's unalterable friend. The company had repeatedly refused to allow pressure to be put upon him on the score that his loyalty was unimpeachable. That defence could no longer be made, and all reason for continuing past policy disappeared. Wellesley referred the question to England. He received authority to settle the Carnatic. About the same time 'Umdat-ul-'umara died. Wellesley offered to recognise the succession of his son if in return for one-sixth of the net revenues of the Carnatic he would make over the entire

government of the province to the English. The son refused. The same offer was then made to a nephew of the late nawab. The nephew accepted. So in 1801 the company "assumed" the administration of the Carnatic, and the disastrous plan of separating military control and civil administration was brought to an end. Here, as in Mysore, Wellesley carried into effect his deliberate policy of undertaking the responsibility for the government in regions which had been placed by political developments under the company's power. In Mysore he set up a prince who was to rule in accordance with English advice. In the Carnatic he would have been content with an arrangement of the like nature. But being defeated in this by the refusal of the nawab, annexation remained the only method by which responsibility could be assumed.

In Oudh events followed a course not at all dissimilar to that just described. English policy followed the same development; but the nawab in Oudh proved more flexible than the southern ruler had been. The result therefore lay midway between the settlement in Mysore and the settlement in the Carnatic. In Oudh there emerged under the feeble conduct of Āsaf-ud-daula the same financial disorder, the same public debt to the company and private debt to individuals, the same disorder in the government, the same refusal to pay the revenues except under compulsion. The nawab of Oudh, like the nawab of Arcot, could not have maintained his position for a year without the armed help of the company. He was threatened by the insubordination of his unpaid troops, by the disobedience of his turbulent land-holders, and by the ambition of his Marāṭha neighbours. The English defended him against these enemies, but did nothing to re-establish order in his dominions. On Cornwallis's arrival, an attempt was made to apply the same fallacious remedy as was applied in the Carnatic. He reduced the company's demands on the nawab by fifty per cent. But affairs continued in their old course. At last in 1797 Āsaf-ud-daula died. He was at first succeeded by his reputed son Wazīr 'Alī. But after a short period of hesitation Shore, departing from his usual policy of non-intervention, declared the new nawab spurious, declared all Āsaf-ud-daula's other reputed sons spurious likewise, and installed Sa'ādat 'Alī, the late nawab's brother, in Wazīr 'Alī's stead. In return for this Sa'ādat 'Alī agreed to increase the annual payments to a trifle more than the

amount payable before Cornwallis's reduction, to reduce the number of his own undisciplined troops, and to receive a larger garrison of the company's forces as a measure of protection against the anticipated invasion of northern India by Zamān Shāh, the ruler of Afghanistan. Such was the position on Wellesley's arrival as governor-general. The nawab, however, demanded an increase of the English forces as a protection against his own people. Wellesley increased it to 20,000 men and for this required an increased subsidy of fifty lakhs of rupees. Sa'adat 'Alī, too, proved to be the most inconsistent of rulers. He would not reduce his troops though he needed protection against them. Under pressure, he demanded to be allowed to resign. When Wellesley agreed, he withdrew his offer. Wellesley sent to Lucknow first Colonel Scott, and then his own brother, Henry Wellesley, destined to make a reputation in Europe as a diplomatist. A treaty was to be made which would settle the Oudh question definitively. Wellesley desired in the first place no longer to be dependent on the nawab for the payments due to the company, since his financial management was entirely unreliable. In the second place, since the defence of Oudh depended on the company, he desired the cession of a tract of country which would prevent any enemy from attacking Oudh without coming into direct conflict with its protector. In the third place he felt that the company was disgraced by maintaining so disreputable a government, and that the nawab should be made to listen to the advice of the governor-general. In November, 1801, a treaty embodying these points was forced upon Sa'adat 'Alī. The first two objects were secured by the cession of lands forming "a barrier between the dominions of the wazir and any foreign enemy". Thus Oudh ceased to be the buffer state, which it had formed in the days of Clive and Warren Hastings. The change marks clearly and emphatically the alteration which had occurred in the political situation of India. Under the guidance of its representatives at Calcutta, and very much against the wishes of the directors at London, the company was standing forth as the leader of the Indian political world. The third point was covered by the nawab's promise to set up in his country such a government as should conduce to the happiness and prosperity of his people. This clause did not in fact secure the purpose with which it was drafted. But that was not the fault of the treaty or of the policy

which had inspired it. It was brought about by the fact that Wellesley's successors cherished a more confined conception of the company's duties in the regions under its influence but outside the sphere of its immediate authority. Here, quite as much as in the exact foresight displayed in his military and political arrangements, Wellesley showed himself possessed of great qualities. He approached the problems of the company's position in India in the same spirit as that displayed by Lord Grenville in his speech in 1813 in the House of Lords. Wellesley, like Grenville, was convinced that the interests of India and Great Britain were interlocked, and that by establishing peace in India and by promoting good administration, not only in the British provinces but also in the provinces ruled by the company's allies, he was securing the welfare of a multitude of men. The courage with which he faced the responsibilities of the task marks him out as a great leader. If Clive created the British-Indian empire, and Hastings maintained it through a period of extraordinary difficulties, Wellesley may claim to have been the first to recognise its moral and political significance.

Unfortunately other men were unwilling to shoulder so great a load as responsibility for the entire sub-continent. Wellesley's supersession in 1805 has already been mentioned, together with the reversal of the policy which he had followed. The set-back, however, was not long continued. In 1807 the first Lord Minto succeeded Barlow. As Sir Gilbert Elliot he had taken a prominent part in the impeachment of Hastings and the attempted impeachment of Impey. In 1805 he had been appointed president of the Board of Control, though without a seat in the cabinet, and then was chosen to replace Barlow, whose administration had provoked great discontent in India, culminating in the mutiny of a large number of military officers at Madras. Minto devoted himself in the first place to the task of excluding French influence from the east. On the outbreak of the Revolutionary War, Pondichery and Chandernagore had at once been occupied, and Wellesley had evaded their restoration to the French during the short truce opened by the Peace of Amiens. But the French still held the islands of Mauritius and Bourbon. The first of these formed a centre from which numerous privateers preyed upon English shipping, inflicting very serious losses upon private merchants and the company itself. Moreover, the establishment of

French influence in Holland threatened to extend French power into the Dutch colonies, especially the Cape, Java, and Ceylon. During Shore's government Ceylon had been captured by a force from India, and the Cape by an expedition sent from Europe. About the same time certain islands in the archipelago, Amboyna and the chief spice islands, had also been seized by the English. But the government of Java passed under French control, so that British enemies were entrenched in positions east and west of India. This position meant the possibility of French intrigue with discontented Indian chiefs and of the sudden appearance of a French force on the coasts of India. In 1807, too, the French threatened to approach India by way of Persia. In that year Russia was at war with both Persia and France. In order to alarm Russia, Napoleon entered into a treaty with the shah, and sent a French general to Teherān with instructions to collect all possible information about the routes through Persia to India. Minto did not credit the stories of a French advance in force. But the appearance of even a small body on the Indian borders would certainly excite much alarm and trouble in the country. He therefore sent embassies to Persia, to Afghanistan, and to Lahore. They were to obtain promises of co-operation against the French if any advance overland should be attempted. For the moment the mission to Persia, conducted by Malcolm, failed. But the Persians soon found that Napoleon had been concerned solely with his own political interests. The French embassy was dismissed, and after long delay, due largely to squabbles between representatives of the government of Bengal and of the ministry at home, a treaty was signed between Great Britain and the shah. At Peshāwar, whither Elphinstone, the future historian, was sent, the ruling prince was Shāh Shujā', who had displaced Zaman Shāh, who a few years earlier had been a serious danger to the peace of northern India. But Asiatic kingships decay with extraordinary rapidity. The Afghan kingship was falling into the ruin of family feuds, and, though Shujā' was willing to make a treaty, he was too distracted by rebellions to make an effective ally. At Lahore, however, Minto's envoy, Metcalfe, found a ruler of a different stamp. Ranjit Singh, head of one of the chief *misls*, or groups, into which the Sikhs were divided, had gradually extended his authority over the Panjab, and had organised a strong military state. In 1807 he was busily seeking to establish his power over

the Sikh chiefs on the east bank of the Sutlej. In the days of Mahādajī Sindhia they had been reduced to recognising his suzerainty. Wellesley's treaty of 1803 had transferred Sindhia's political rights in that region to the company, and Minto was determined not to allow Ranjit to substitute himself for the company as the overlord of the Cis-Sutlej states. Metcalfe's mission thus was difficult. He was required to obtain Ranjit's promise of co-operation against the French if they made any attempts against India, and at the same time to induce Ranjit to desist from a project on which he had set his heart. His negotiations were prolonged and delicate. At one moment he even had to inform the prince that any movement of his troops across the Sutlej would be resisted by the company's forces, and Ranjit hesitated between peace and war with the English. At last he decided to ally himself with the strongest power in India. He signed a treaty of friendship, agreeing to recognise the Cis-Sutlej states as under the protection of the company and to regard the friends and enemies of the company as his own friends and his own enemies. Minto was thus relieved from fears for the security of the English position on the north-west.

His next step was to attack the French islands in order to end the activity of their privateers and to deprive them of a possible naval base from which an attack on India might be launched. The islands were first blockaded. Then in 1810 an expedition from India captured Bourbon and Mauritius, so that a French squadron reaching eastern waters would find itself deprived of any place where it could revictual or refit after its long voyage. Finally in 1811 an attack was made upon Java, where a French regiment had been landed. For two centuries Dutch influence had been supreme in the archipelago. The Dutch company had made a great number of treaties with the local chiefs, binding the latter not to admit foreign vessels to their harbours. On the strength of these agreements the Dutch had claimed the right to exclude foreign, and especially English vessels, from the free navigation of the neighbouring waters. They had reluctantly abandoned these exclusive claims by the treaty ending the war of the American Revolution, but nevertheless they had continued to punish the chiefs who dared to admit the English to trade. The commerce of the archipelago, however, was far too valuable an adjunct to the trade of India, affording a profitable outlet for the sale of opium

and cotton goods, for the English company easily to acquiesce in this position. It retained a few small factories in Sumatra, formed mainly for the supply of pepper. In the time of Cornwallis English interests had been extended by the acquisition of the island of Penang in the Straits of Malacca. It had been hoped that the island would form a naval base as well as give the English access to the trade of the archipelago. But these hopes had hardly been realised. The eastern settlements remained unimportant. They were peculiarly unhealthy, and were avoided as much as possible by the company's servants. By accident a man of great ability, Stamford Raffles, was included in the Sumatra establishment. He was known for his familiarity with the languages and peoples of the archipelago, and, when Minto proposed to turn the French out of Java, he was summoned to Calcutta to advise the governor-general. The expedition, which sailed in 1811, met with speedy success. The French were ill-led and unpopular even with the Dutch. Their defeat was followed at once by the surrender of the island, which was entrusted to the management of Raffles as lieutenant-governor. For the moment English naval influence was supreme from the Cape of Good Hope eastwards as far as Canton.

The settlement which followed the end of the Napoleonic wars in 1814 and 1815 somewhat reduced this position of monopoly. The French were readmitted to their old settlements on the Indian mainland. They recovered the island of Bourbon, which from its lack of a harbour could not be made into a naval base. The Dutch recovered their eastern possessions. But Great Britain retained the Cape of Good Hope. Her sovereignty over the possessions of the East India Company was for the first time recognised by both the Dutch and the French. Though Java was restored to Holland, Raffles's activity and foresight speedily secured for the English, by his occupation of Singapore in 1819, a stronghold in the very centre of the archipelago, thus effectively breaking the monopoly of control which till 1811 the Dutch had enjoyed. Moreover, although the French were readmitted to India, they returned under the obligation of limiting their military forces to the needs of their settlements for internal police, so that they were no more to form a political danger. Finally, in 1824, the Dutch exchanged their remaining Indian factories for the factories which the English company still held on the island of

Sumatra, while in 1845 the Danes sold to the English the settlements of Tranquebar and Serampore. These subsequent changes thus emphasised the predominance of English interests over those of all other European nations established by the treaties of 1814 and 1815. Politically neither the French at Pondichery nor the Portuguese at Goa could attempt to rival the position of the East India Company or to undermine its authority. This consequence resulted, not from the successes which Cornwallis, Wellesley, and Minto had obtained in the east, but on the overwhelming supremacy which the British navy had established on the oceans of the world. The triumphs culminating in the victory of Trafalgar and the blockade which the English fleets had thereafter applied to the coasts of France, alone had prevented the appearance in the east of French forces which would have set all India ablaze. As supremacy at sea had transferred the dominion of Indian waters from the Portuguese to the Dutch, and produced the downfall of the Portuguese power and the establishment of the Dutch empire in the archipelago, so now supremacy at sea had determined the prolonged struggle between the French and the English for predominance on the Indian mainland. The validity of victories in India depended on the issue of the naval war. Had Nelson failed, neither the fall of Seringapatam, nor the victories of Assaye and Laswari, could have produced more than the most transient results. But his success permitted the company to consolidate its power.

As has been seen, Wellesley had sought to establish a position of supremacy in anticipation of these events, but had been frustrated by the narrow views and reluctance to accept responsibility displayed by the home authorities. His work was now to be completed. In 1813, the year in which the British parliament first asserted the sovereignty of the crown over the company's territories, Lord Moira was appointed governor-general in succession to Minto. Moira was by profession a soldier and received like Cornwallis the combined offices of governor-general and commander-in-chief. He speedily found himself involved in troubles with the Gurkhas. In the course of the eighteenth century these hardy hillmen had conquered a wide stretch of the Himālayān tract. In 1768 they had conquered the Nepāl valley and gradually expanded until they ruled from the Sutlej as far eastwards as Sikkim. They touched English territories for over

700 miles, and the border districts constantly suffered from their incursions. Barlow offered concessions. Minto remonstrated. Moira decided to garrison the disputed districts. The Gurkhas slew the garrisons. In November, 1814, Moira declared war upon them. The British officers in India had at that time small experience of hill-fighting or of the organisation of hill-transport. Against the fine fighting qualities of the Gurkhas they met at first with numerous reverses. Moira, who had personally planned the campaign, was much disconcerted by the tactical failures which occurred. But his military talent soon discerned that his subordinates were not making proper use of their advantages. He insisted that mortars, which till then had been little used except in siege-operations, were as effective against an enemy who sheltered himself from direct fire behind a hill as against one who sheltered himself behind walls. The instructions which he issued, coupled with the appearance of a new and most competent commander, Colonel Ochterlony, led to a rapid reversal of the position. The Gurkhas were defeated in the field. Kumāon was captured in April, 1815, their stronghold of Malāon was taken in the next month. In consequence the Gurkhas sued for peace. By the Treaty of Sagauli, concluded in 1816, after unsuccessful negotiations and a brief renewal of the war, the Gurkhas ceded Garhwāl and Kumāon together with a large part of the Tarai; they withdrew from Sikkim; and they agreed to receive a permanent British resident at their capital of Kāchmāndu. This settlement proved definitive, and the alliance between them and the English has never since been broken.

The Gurkha War, however, was but in the nature of an interlude. The far more serious question of the Marāthas had still to be determined. Barlow's conduct after the death of Cornwallis had convinced them that the British were as stupid in negotiation as they were formidable in the field. But they lacked leaders. No Marātha prince appeared capable of giving them guidance. The Pēshwā, Bāji Rāo II, was one whom no man could wisely trust. He endeavoured to crush his own feudal nobility, the *jigirdars*, in order to increase his own revenues: with the result that he was hated throughout the territories under his immediate control. At Indore the peaceful rule of Ahalya Bai, who had governed from her husband's death in 1766 till her own death in 1795, had been followed by confusion and chaos. Jaswant Rāo, the rival of

Daulat Rāo Sindhya, had died mad in 1811. He had been succeeded by Malhar Rāo, under whom the state had been torn to pieces between two factions, the Marāṭha under his mother Tulsi Bai, and the Pathan under Amīr Khān, a leader of mercenaries. Revenue was gathered at the point of the sword, and appropriated by the gatherer. Sindhya's dominions were hardly better off. Daulat Rāo had been greatly weakened by his war with the English. His lands had been overrun by Holkar's troops in search of plunder. His own army was unpaid. Independent bodies of troops, well known under the name of Pindāris, established themselves under him with his half-willing consent, on the understanding that they would serve him in case of need in return for finding with him a place of shelter. The Gaekwar was distracted by differences with the Pēshwā over claims which the latter had upon him. Nāgpur was barely able to maintain a settled administration.

From the point of view of Calcutta the most pressing problem was offered by the activities of the Pindāris. These freebooters, composed of both Muslim and Hindu bands under rival commanders, formed a growing menace to the whole of India. They would gather at the festival of the *Dasara* in the autumn when the rains were over, and march whithersoever they chose, plundering as they went. Central India and the domains of the Nizām were repeatedly pillaged, and in 1812 they began to attack the company's possessions. In that year they harried Mīrzāpur and the southern districts of Bihar. In 1816 they invaded the Northern Circars. In one village which they approached, the inhabitants preferred to burn themselves with their wives and children rather than fall into the hands of these savage enemies. Those who shrank from so extreme a measure had small cause to congratulate themselves on their wisdom. These outrages in the latter part of 1816 at last compelled the company to peremptory government in India to take measures to bring them to an end. Out of this sprang the Pindāri War, which extended to all the Marāṭha states except Baroda and concluded with their complete overthrow and the final consolidation of the East India Company's power in India.

For some time the position at Poona had been most uncertain. Political relations had been conducted by two very able servants of the company, first by Barty Close, and then by Mountstuart

Elphinstone. Neither had been able to induce Bājī Rāo to forsake his perpetual intrigue. The Pēshwā hoped once more to head a confederacy against the English and was constantly seeking to incite the chief Marāṭha princes to attack them, but he was unwilling to commit any overt act of hostility till he should be assured of a general support. His intrigues were betrayed, and he was therefore closely watched, but matters did not come to a head till 1814. In the hope of settling the disputes between the Pēshwā and the Gaekwar, the latter was induced to send his principal minister, Gangadhar Sāstri, to Poona under the Pēshwā's safe-conduct. The Sāstri was a strong adherent of the English alliance. He even borrowed English ways, walking fast, speaking broken English, given to calling the Pēshwā and his people "dam' fools". He was consequently much disliked in Marāṭha circles. He accompanied the Pēshwā to Nasik, to take part in a religious festival. He was murdered there, apparently by agents of the Pēshwā's favourite, Trimbakji Dangle, and probably with the Pēshwā's connivance. In punishment for this breach of faith, the Pēshwā was compelled by Elphinstone to surrender Trimbakji after prolonged delay. But in 1816 he escaped, it was believed with the assistance of the Pēshwā. Matters were then looking most threatening. Bājī Rāo was certainly seeking to stir up the other Marāṭha chiefs, and the Pindāri inroads proved that the chiefs were making no attempts to restrain the actions of their dependents.

The governor-general, now relieved of the Gurkha war, prepared to meet this combination of dangers. His first measure related to Nāgpur. The late ruler, Rāghūji Rāo, had been succeeded by an imbecile, Parsaji. Parsaji had a capable but unscrupulous cousin, Appa Sāhib, who aspired to the government and desired as a preparatory measure to be invested with the regency. In 1816 he was recognised by the company in return for the signature of a subsidiary alliance. This meant the establishment of a strong force of company's troops at Nāgpur. Moira's immediate object was to check any possible movements of the Pindāris or other Marāṭha troops to the south-eastwards, and to detach Nāgpur from any possible league of the Marāṭha states. The next measure related to the Pēshwā. In 1817 Bājī Rāo was compelled reluctantly to sign a new treaty by which he renounced the headship of the Marāṭha confederacy, acknowledged the

independence of the Gaekwar, and ceded to the English the Konkan and other districts. Later in the same year, having assembled an overwhelming force on Sindhia's frontiers, Moira compelled him to sign the Treaty of Gwalior. This bound him to co-operate in measures against the Pindāris and released the company from the obligation, into which Barlow had so lightly entered, of abstaining from political activity beyond the Chambal. This permitted the conclusion of a number of treaties with the Rājput states, which had been threatened with extinction by the attacks of their Marāṭha neighbours. Having blocked Pindāri movements into the Nāgpur territories and westwards into Rājputāna, Moira then began to attack the Pindāris themselves. For this purpose he had assembled a force of over 100,000 men and 300 guns. Had the Marāṭha chiefs been content to watch the destruction of the Pindāris, and sink without another effort into dependence upon the company's government, no general war need have followed. Had they been wise enough to combine their forces and act together, they might have fallen gallantly. But once more, as after the Treaty of Bassein, they were to fight one by one. Perhaps nothing illustrates more forcibly the political imbecility into which India had fallen than that the one Hindu power which had arisen after the fall of the Mughal empire should have proved to be utterly incapable of uniting in the face of a foreign power. In fact the eighteenth century, marked by the establishment of European predominance, merely repeats the history of those earlier centuries in which the pre-Āryan states fell before the Āryans, and in which the Hindu princes submitted to the Muslims. While Holkar's durbar was still undecided and while Sindhia was signing the Treaty of Gwalior, the Pēshwā and Appa Sāhib resolved to attack the company.

The Pēshwā attacked and burnt the residency at Poona, and then with 27,000 men attacked 2800 under Colonel Burr at Khurki. Even his enormous preponderance of men did not save him from a heavy defeat. Two more battles followed, at Koregāon and Ashti. In the second the Pēshwā's general, Bāpu Gokhala, was killed, and in both the Marāṭhas were defeated. In the middle of 1818 Bāji Rāo, tired of being hunted all over his territories, surrendered to Sir John Malcolm, under promise of personal safety and of a pension of eight lakhs of rupees a year. His dominions were annexed and placed under the administration

of the presidency of Bombay. Meanwhile in Nāgpur Appa Sāhub had attacked the resident, had been defeated like Bājī Rāo, and had fled to the Panjab. A boy belonging to the ruling family was established as raja of Nāgpur, and the districts north of the Nerbudda were annexed to the company's territories. Holkar's durbai had refused all offers of peace, but, unable to give help to, or to receive any from, the other Marāṭha rulers, it had been completely defeated at the battle of Mahidpur by Hislop, who commanded the southern portion of the company's army, and compelled in January, 1818, to sign the Treaty of Mandasor, by which it surrendered all districts south of the Nerbudda, abandoned all claims on the Rājput chiefs, recognised one of its mercenary commanders as nawab of Tānk, and accepted a permanent resident at Indore. Sindhia, who had proved unable to assist the English against the Pindāris, agreed to a fresh treaty ceding Ajmir to the company and making a certain readjustment of boundaries. The Marāṭhas had vanished as a political power.

‡ The settlement of 1818 marks the beginning of the paramountcy of the East India Company. No state remained which could challenge its supremacy. No state remained which could reject its alliance. The project of Wellesley had been realised. All the principal states of India had been brought into agreement with the company, and had placed in its hands the conduct of political relations. Many had accepted a subsidiary force, which implied a position of dependency. The peace of India had been assured. The wars which for a century and a half had desolated India had been brought to an end. But if the political project of Wellesley had been completed, one aspect at least had been neglected. The treaties into which Moira had entered had not been treaties such as Wellesley would have ratified, for they all omitted those stipulations on which he would have set a high importance. Moira's treaties all included some clause intended to avoid all possibility of interference on the part of the company's government in matters of internal administration. Unlike Wellesley, Moira limited his views to the regions under the direct control of the East India Company, while Wellesley had envisaged the good of India as a whole. Consequently the company found itself committed to a number of alliances by which it was bound to support the reigning prince without much regard for the quality of his administration. The relations which

SKETCH MAP
ILLUSTRATING
INDIA
in 1818
Protected territories
shaded.



had characterised the alliance with the nawab of Arcot or with the nawab of Oudh were perpetuated over a wide field. The governor-general, to whom it was given to establish the paramountcy of the company, did not choose with it to recognise the responsibility of the company for the general well-being of India. While, therefore, Moira's conduct of relations with the Marāṭha princes was marked by an exact and vigorous estimate of political forces, he shrank from the more extended responsibility which Wellesley sought, and which, if Wellesley had been left for another year in power, he would probably have assumed. In short, the settlement of 1818 imposed upon the company all those ambiguities and uncertainties which were afterwards to mark its relations with the native states.

CHAPTER VI

The Growth of the Company's System of Government

In a previous chapter some reference has already been made to the results of the Regulating Act on the position of Warren Hastings. The matter must now be considered from a more general point of view, and some attempt made to sketch the growth of the company's government, alike in its higher organisation and in the subordinate branches which brought it into direct contact with the peasantry of the country. It will be most convenient to deal first with the home government, then with the governments of Bengal and of the subordinate presidencies, and lastly with the district administrations which grew up in Bengal and Madras, Bombay being reserved for later consideration, since that presidency in its territorial form was scarcely constituted till 1818.

Down to 1773 the home government had consisted solely of the directors and proprietors of the East India Company. The former had been annually elected by the latter, and the two had constituted the only body authorised to issue orders to the governments in India. No prolonged conflict between the two parts of the body had been possible, because the policy desired by the proprietors was necessarily reflected every year in the choice of the directors. The Regulating Act laid down that of the twenty-four directors only six should be chosen in each year. The power of the proprietors to overrule decisions of the directors was left unchanged. Thus it might come to pass that the proprietors desired one thing and the majority of the directors another, for an indefinite period, and in that case the directors could be prevented from carrying out the policy of their choice by resolution of the lower body. The act thus gave an opening, in the home as in the Indian governments, for prolonged and bitter strife, as actually came to pass. The directors, under the corrupt influence of the ministry, desired to remove Hastings from office, while the proprietors resolved that he should not be removed. Nor did the

act gave to the ministry power of interfering in the company's transactions. Despatches relating to the political and administrative affairs of India were to be sent to one of the secretaries of state, but no power of control was taken. North evidently looked to managing the directors as he managed the House of Commons.

Ten years later in 1783 Fox introduced his famous bills which proposed the complete supersession of the company. Seven commissioners were named in the bill to administer Indian affairs, holding office for a fixed term of seven years. This proposal was strongly attacked on constitutional grounds. The commissioners would have exercised all patronage, they were nominees of Fox, and Pitt described the bill as bestowing the patronage of India on Charles Fox whether in or out of office. This criticism has usually been ignored as dictated solely by party purposes. But a great jealousy of the executive was felt at that time. It was expressed by Dunning's famous motion, "That the power of the crown has increased, is increasing, and ought to be diminished". If to the ordinary patronage of the crown were added the patronage of India, would not the Coalition fix its power in parliament for at least a generation? And was it desirable to increase the ministerial powers of corrupting members of parliament? These doubts were widely and deeply felt, and materially contributed to the decisive overthrow of the Coalition at the general election of 1784. That election placed Pitt firmly in office, and in the same year he introduced and carried his famous India Act, which settled the main lines of the home and Indian governments for over seventy years.

This act set up a Board of Control, which was at first meant to be a cabinet committee. This was to receive copies of all despatches received from India and drafts of all orders proposed to be sent out. No orders could be sent without its approval, and, in matters of secrecy or urgency, the board could draft orders which had to be forwarded at once to India by a committee of the directors known as the Committee of Secrecy. The new body differed from Fox's commissioners in two important respects. It represented the government of the nation and was variable by ordinary constitutional methods. Save in a limited class of matters, which in practice was confined to questions of external policy, it had no powers of initiation. It had no powers of patronage. Pitt himself described his object as "to give to the

crown, the power of guiding the politics of India, with as little means of corrupt influence as possible." In this he had clearly succeeded. At the same time the possibility of the company's action being hindered by internal conflict was avoided by a clause which declared that the proprietors could not veto a proposal made by the directors and approved by the Board of Control, while the creation of the board itself prevented the recurrence of the position which had developed under Lord North, when the ministry had been unable to carry into effect its policy on Indian subjects.

At the same time the company retained far more than nominal power. Its right of initiating despatches on ordinary subjects meant that while it might be restrained from acting, it could hardly be compelled to act against its will. It would be entirely wrong to suppose that the government of the company's territories was transferred by Pitt's India Act to the ministry. A system of control was established, by which for the first time the East India Company was brought into organic connection with the sovereign power of Great Britain. The board, however, evolved in a manner somewhat different from that which had been anticipated. Pitt had expected that the Indian business would not be more than ministers could consider in the leisure which their other offices afforded them. But it soon proved to be far too voluminous and far too complicated for a secretary of state or a chancellor of the exchequer to be able to master in the spare time at his disposal. Consequently Dundas, who had devoted more study to Indian affairs than any other member of the cabinet, first took the lead, then became president of the board, and at last monopolised its business.

The structure of the government of Bengal was reformed by Pitt and Dundas with equal thoroughness. But here the changes introduced by the India Act were more tentative. All that was done at first was to reduce the size of the council from five to four inclusive of the governor-general. By the exercise of his casting vote the latter could always secure the adoption of his policy provided he could obtain the support of a single member. But the governor-general remained merely the head of the council with no special powers. Hastings had repeatedly urged the importance of investing his office with superior authority. Macartney, to whom the office had been offered on Hastings's

resignation, refused it unless he should receive specific powers of over-ruling his council. Cornwallis, to whom the government was then offered, made the same demand, and added to it the requirement that he should be appointed commander-in-chief as well. The cabinet desired his acceptance too much to refuse his terms. The directors appointed him governor-general, and the cabinet brought in an amending bill to permit the union of offices and the bestowal of the powers demanded. The choice of Cornwallis and the changes connected with his appointment constituted a reform of the utmost importance. In the first place the governor-general would no longer find himself in the position of impotence to which Warren Hastings had been reduced. In the second place the conflict between the civil and military authorities was ended when the head of the state became the head of the army too. It is true that after Cornwallis's government some recrudescence of military insubordination did occur; but by then the civil government had been reorganised and strengthened, so that the position was far less dangerous than before. In the third place the selection of the head of the government from London, while the remainder of the council was formed from the company's civil servants, showed that Pitt and Dundas had learnt at least one of the lessons provided by the Regulating Act. To nominate a majority designed to supervise and if necessary check the action of the governor-general was to establish faction in the heart of government. If Hastings deserved the office to which North had named him, he should have been trusted not to abuse his powers. Pitt's method was wholly different. He united power and responsibility in the same hands, while giving Cornwallis the advisers who could make good his ignorance of the technicalities of Indian administration. Moreover, once the custom of naming English noblemen to the office of governor-general had been established, another great source of weakness vanished. The company's servant who had spent all his life in India could never rely on finding support on either side of the House of Commons. That was the reason why Hastings's position from first to last had been so extraordinarily precarious. But the new practice meant that, so long as the governor-general behaved like a gentleman, he was sure of the support of his party in London. He was able therefore to approach his work with that confidence in the future which Hastings had never possessed.

In another point also the India Act introduced a much-needed change. In the recent past the power of superintendence vested in the Bengal government had done as much harm as good. No effective central power had been created, and the subordinate presidencies had been able to defy all attempts to co-ordinate British policy. But the India Act gave to the Bengal government power of control "over all transactions with the country powers" and over the entire conduct of any war that might break out. Nor could the subordinate presidencies excuse themselves from obedience on the plea that the orders of Bengal exceeded their legal powers. That point was to be determined by the Bengal government itself and by the home authorities. The sole case in which obedience might be delayed was when contrary orders which had reached Madras or Bombay from England were still unknown in Bengal.

Before Cornwallis had left India, a final change was made in the governor-general's position. This was designed to meet difficulties caused by the great distance and slow communications of India. Cornwallis had thought fit to assume the command of the war which broke out with Tipu Sultān. His council passed a resolution enabling him to act separately from it with as much authority as if he were acting in council. This was held in England to exceed the powers legally granted, and a special act was passed in 1791 to validate whatever he had done under those defective powers. In 1793, when the privileges of the company were extended for twenty years, provision was made to enable the governor-general to visit any part of the company's dominions, to act with the local council with as much authority as he possessed when acting with the council of Bengal, and to issue orders to any of the company's servants without consulting the local council at all.

By these various measures an effective central government was at last built up in British India. The changes made in the subordinate governments were less important, but were still considerable. In them also the councils were reduced by the India Act to four members, inclusive of the governor. In 1793 the governors received powers of over-ruling their councils. From the appointment of Macartney as governor of Madras in 1780 the custom of selecting provincial governors from the political world of London instead of from among the company's servants came into force, although it was never so

rigid as in the case of the governor-general, and occasional exceptions were made for the benefit of specially eminent members of the administrative services, such as Malcolm, Munro, and Elphinstone. The chief defect in this organisation certainly lay in the provision made for the administration of the province of Bengal, and the dual task imposed upon the government of managing local detail and controlling general policy. The consequence was likely to be that whatever system of administration was adopted for Bengal would tend to be thrust upon the other provinces, because the central government would be slow to admit the existence of fundamental differences between the province with which it was familiar and the provinces with which it was not.

From the beginning the administration of Bengal offered peculiar difficulties. The system of government had fallen into great confusion. A powerful class, known locally as *zamindars*, had sprung up between the government and the cultivators. These zamindars were derived from two distinct sources. Some of them, such as the zamindars of Bardwān or Rājshāhi, represented old Hindu families which had formerly borne sway in the country and had submitted to the Muslim conquerors on condition of retaining a position of dignity and paying annual tribute. Others were descended from farmers of the land revenue and other officials who had acquired hereditary status. These persons claimed to represent the government within the areas committed to their charge. They collected the land revenue and other dues, as well as a number of unauthorised cesses; they administered justice; they represented the only police and magisterial authority. Under the Mughal government nobody had troubled to define their rights over the soil. As was usual in India, such matters had been left to the determination of custom. But the amount of revenue which they should hand over to the treasury had been a cause of unceasing dispute. In order to keep a check over their payments, officials called *kanungos*, or declarers of custom, had been instituted. These were supposed to keep exact registers of each zamindari, showing the amounts of revenue which ought to be collected. But the kanungos had gradually slipped from the control of the government and had become the servants of the zamindars themselves. The official organisation had thus broken down before the company was in any way

interested in the administration. Then too the province had fallen as a whole into English hands. In 1765 the company suddenly became master of the revenues, with great responsibilities for the maintenance of the government and the payment of forces large enough to protect Bengal from external invasion and internal rebellion. Its servants had indeed attempted to administer certain limited districts, which had already been granted to the English, but they had hardly learnt more than that the task was complex and difficult. The prime need, before which all else fell into insignificance, was to secure the regular payment of sums sufficient to maintain the military forces. Clive had therefore made no attempt to modify the mode of administration, but had handed over the company's duties to the charge of Muhammad Riza Khān, who, he hoped, would be able to keep matters on at least their old footing.

This plan, like the similar attempt of Duplex to collect the Carnatic revenues through Pāpayya Pillai, proved a failure. Muhammad Riza Khān received a huge salary, but his administration was lax, while the decisions in the courts of justice were asserted by Verelst, a well-informed and honest if not vigorous man, to be corrupt bargains with the highest bidders. Since the resident at Murshidābād could not exercise sufficient supervision over the conduct of the company's deputy, supervisors were appointed in 1769, with orders to investigate the revenue position and above all to ascertain the amounts which the zamindars collected from the cultivators. But such attempts were frustrated by the passive opposition of the zamindars and their servants the kanungos. In 1772 Hastings was ordered by the company to remove the deputy and undertake the direct administration of the company's duties as *diwān*. With these orders the English administration of Bengal begins.

It was determined to reappoint the supervisors, under the new title of collectors, to each district, to give them the assistance of Indian officials called *diwāns*, to farm out the revenues for a term of five years, and to create a Committee of Circuit to tour the province and suggest a suitable organisation for adoption by the council. On the proposal of the Committee it was resolved to set up two courts of justice in each district. The civil court consisted of the collector with a number of Indian officials, and was called the *mofassal diwāni 'adālat*. The criminal court, the *faujdāni*

'*adālat*, consisted of Muslim law officers, whose decisions were to be revised by the collectors, and submitted for the approval of an Indian official stationed at Calcutta and appointed by the nawab on the nomination of the governor. This official was known as the superintendent of the court—*daroga-i 'adālat*.

The five-year settlement of 1772 proved to be much higher than could be realised. Speculators desirous of the dignity of association with the land, and zamindars fearful of being dispossessed of their old position, bid up the farms recklessly. The collectors reported their opinion that the settlement could not be maintained. But the governor and council resolved that every effort should be made to prevent arrears. One reason was that they fancied that the farmers were deceiving the collectors, the second, that if the terms were rigorously enforced, it would be possible at the end of the settlement to make a good guess at the revenues which could normally be obtained. In 1773, on the private advice of Hastings, the company decided to withdraw the collectors from the districts, and a new system was introduced, by which the collectors were grouped into a number of provincial councils, charged with administering civil justice and with supervising the *dhavāns*, who were left in executive control of the various districts. But a new influence was destined to throw the system into confusion. In the next year the councillors and judges appointed under the Regulating Act reached Calcutta. Francis brought with him the administrative ideas of Clive, and the judges the legal ideas of England. Francis was convinced that every attempt to manage directly the administration of Bengal was doomed to failure, and was eager to see Muhammad Rīza Khān restored to his old position or one as like it as possible. He also soon developed the theory, borrowed from some of the company's servants who had been employed in district administration, that the land revenue ought to be settled permanently and never varied. These ideas led to great controversy whenever the council proceeded to the discussion of revenue business; but Francis had not developed his theories in time to make use of the majority opposing Hastings before its disappearance with the death of Monson in 1776, and consequently the discussions led to no practical results. The interference of the Supreme Court, however, was a different matter. The judges held the view that every person concerned with the collection of the revenues must

be deemed to be in the service of the company, and, therefore, under the Regulating Act, subject to the jurisdiction of the court, that it had been constituted in Bengal in order to check oppression, that persons wrongfully imprisoned were entitled to appeal to the court for interference by seeking a writ of *habeas corpus*, and that such writs should be granted on the filing of an affidavit such as would authorise the issue of the writ in question in England. The result was that many renters, imprisoned by order of the provincial councils for non-payment of revenues, and ryots imprisoned at the suit of renters for the same reason, applied to the court for redress; the court issued writs accordingly; and the imprisoned persons were in fact released. Thus interference threatened to bring the revenue collections to a standstill. Similar action on the part of the Supreme Court dealt an equally severe blow to the operations of the provincial courts of justice which Hastings had set up. In what was called the Patna Case, for instance, the Muslim law officers of the Patna Provincial Council were cast in heavy damages in consequence of a sentence given by the council. In 1780, in order to bring the deadlock thus created to an end, Hastings invited the chief justice, Sir Elijah Impey, to accept the presidency of the appeal court at Calcutta, the *sadr dīwāni adālat*. This arrangement permitted the Supreme Court, now feeling sure that improper sentences delivered by the district courts would receive due correction by a trained and expert judge, to abstain from further interference. The arrangement was, however, disallowed by the company, and Hastings's enemies made of it a charge against Impey. They represented the affair as a bribe to the chief justice for ceasing to inconvenience the administration, and as a violation of the Regulating Act, which forbade the acceptance of salaried office by persons appointed under the act. They attempted to impeach Impey on this and other grounds. But their efforts broke down completely before the defence which Impey made before the House of Commons. Indeed, the partisan nature of the accusation was clear from the fact that they sought to impeach Impey, Hastings's friend, for accepting a paid office, while they said nothing of Mr Justice Chambers, the friend of Francis, who had likewise accepted the paid office of judge at Chinsura.

In 1776, when the five-year settlement was drawing to an end, Hastings proposed the formation of a new commission intended

to tour through Bengal and collect information on which a new settlement could be based. This was appointed accordingly, in spite of the strong opposition of Clavering and Francis. It became known as the *Amini* Commission, and its report is justly described as the most important document relating to the revenues of Bengal at this period. It bears striking evidence of the alienation of lands and of the oppression of the ryots under the influence of the settlement of 1772. In 1781 it was followed by a re-organisation of the revenue machinery. The collectors were to be re-established in the districts, acting under a central Committee of Revenue set up at Calcutta: but they were not invested with effective power. This involved a greater concentration of authority than the plan adopted in 1773. The settlements were made by the Committee of Revenue, not by the collectors, who were not allowed to interfere with such matters. The farmers were thus left without any local control, and did not hesitate to flog ryots presumptuous enough to complain of oppression or extortion.

Shortly after Hastings's departure from Bengal, a new scheme was introduced by his successor, John Macpherson. The provinces were to be divided into thirty-five districts (reduced in the next year to twenty-three). The collector in each district now became the authority by whom the settlement was to be made, and his conduct was supervised by the central committee, now called the Board of Revenue. On Cornwallis's arrival, the collectors once more received the office of head of the *ḍivāni* 'adālat, with an Indian assistant to hear the smaller cases. Thus, the system of 1772 was for a while restored. But great changes were made in the mode of paying the collectors. In 1772 they had possessed the privilege of private trade, which had provided the chief reason for Hastings's dislike of their employment in the districts. They were now to receive 1500 rupees a month, besides a commission on the revenue which they collected, and this was expected to afford them an addition of about as much as their fixed pay. They were also given two covenanted servants as assistants. Criminal justice remained under the management of Muhammad Rīza Khān, who had been restored by the majority in Hastings's government to his former office of *naib nāẓim*, deputy for the nawab in that branch of government not covered by the *ḍivāni*.

Cornwallis's first measures were only temporary expedients, which had been chiefly dictated by the company's desire for

economy in the administration. An entirely new system was introduced between 1790 and 1793. The basis of this was a new settlement of the land revenue. When Cornwallis arrived, he found two schools of opinion on revenue matters. One was headed by James Grant, who had explored a quantity of ancient revenue accounts. These led him to the view that the zamindars had long succeeded in secreting a vast proportion of the revenues of the country, and that the actual collections fell far below the amount that ought to be realised. The second was headed by John Shore, who was probably the most experienced revenue servant in the presidency, and who believed that Grant's researches bore no relation to the actual facts of the time. Matters were further complicated by the ascendancy which the ideas of Francis had obtained in England for the time being, and that Cornwallis's instructions required him to effect a permanent settlement as soon as possible. In 1787 the Board of Revenue was ordered to prepare to settle the revenue for a long term of years. Two years later, when the necessary reports had been received from the collectors, Cornwallis came to the conclusion that nothing would be gained by a longer delay, and that, if the home authorities approved, the long-term settlement ought to be made permanent. In 1790 the long-term settlement came into force; and in 1793, with the approval of the company, it was declared unalterable. Even Shore, Cornwallis's most trusted adviser, was opposed to this measure. But the governor-general was convinced of its necessity, not from the revenue point of view but from that of general administration. So long as settlements were made annually, so long the zamindars would have the strongest possible incentive to corrupt the revenue officials. The stake was large, and the bribes offered would be great. But if the revenue demand were settled once and for all, this source of corruption would vanish. The permanent zamindari settlement thus came into being.

This change made way for the transformation of the system of district administration. On principle Cornwallis had disliked the concentration of revenue and judicial powers in the hands of the collectors. He considered that it gave too much authority to individuals, whose character would form the sole security for the due exercise of their functions. Moreover, the traditional Indian system of government, in which the executive official played so large a part, was wholly unfamiliar to him. He was accustomed

to a mode of government under which the law was administered by a series of courts, and the duties of executive officials were reduced to a minimum. This was in his eyes the best method, and the one which he resolved to set up. Since it was in every point utterly different from that which he found in use, he thought that the conduct of the new system must be confined entirely to the English servants of the company. Hence that exclusion of Indians from responsible employment which marked the Cornwallis method of administration.

Henceforward the collectors were to be only fiscal agents, required to collect the fixed revenues from the zamindars. They would need for their duties only a small number of subordinates, who would be employed in the collectors' offices at the district headquarters; and they would have no possible reason for travelling about the area entrusted to their fiscal charge. It would not matter whether they knew much or little about the condition of the people, about the extent of cultivation, or the economic resources of the country. It was not their business to redress any wrongs. It was not their function to rule. In future the head of the district and the real representative of government was to be the district judge. To him, or to those acting under him, complaints for redress were to be preferred. Should a ryot be wronged by a zamindar, the ryot was to sue the zamindar in one of the courts of justice which were to be set up, in accordance with a new code of laws which was to be enacted. The judge was moreover to be head of the police and magistrate, responsible not only for the administration of civil justice, but also for the maintenance of public peace and the prevention or punishment of crime.

For the administration of justice a complete chain of courts was established. The district, or *zillah* judge, as he was called, was entrusted with the determination of all civil suits of importance and revenue suits, with the help of a registrar who was empowered to try cases referred to him by the judge. Suits for small amounts might be heard by Indian judges, *munisiffs* and *sadr amins*, who were to be paid by fees in order that they should seek to attract suitors to their courts by the impartiality of their decisions. In his magisterial capacity, the *zillah* judge could commit persons accused of crime for trial by one of the four courts of circuit which were established for the punishment of crime. These courts of circuit were also to serve as courts of

appeal from the civil decisions of the zillah judge, and consisted of three English judges. In civil cases a further appeal lay to the governor-general in council, who formed the *sadr dīwānī* 'adālat.

As regards the police, the districts were to be divided into several areas, each in charge of an Indian official called the *daroga*, who had under his command a body of salaried police, and who could also require the assistance of the village-watchmen. The darogas were responsible to the zillah judge in his capacity as magistrate.

In order to complete the system a series of regulations was passed in 1793, drafted mainly by the chief secretary, Barlow. These enacted a measure declaring the land revenue settlement permanent and unchangeable, laid down a form of procedure for the courts of justice, defined the qualifications of the law officers, Hindu and Muslim, who were attached to the courts, and dealt with a considerable variety of other matters.

This system was evidently inspired by a spirit of true philanthropy. It set up a great ideal, the supremacy of the law and the authority of the courts of justice. But in a large number of respects it was most unsuited to the needs of the province, and, like the revenue settlement which formed an integral part of the system, was full of unexpected evils. In its benevolent intentions and its unfortunate results it bears a marked affinity to the Regulating Act, and for the same reason. Both were founded upon ignorance. Ignorance was indeed the chief feature of the revenue settlement. No collector knew the resources, the rights, or even the limits of the zamindars which he was required to settle for ever. The grants which were issued to the zamindars showed the names of the villages included in their estates, but the boundaries were undefined and unknown. Great areas of uncultivated waste were thus signed away without the government's possessing any idea of the magnitude of the gift it was making. That affected merely the rights of government. But the rights of the villagers were affected also. No attempt was made to define the rights of the customary tenants, who were entitled to cultivate their holdings at fixed rents. It was expected that such matters would be cleared up by the gradual operation of the courts. This proved to be an entire miscalculation, and the general effect was to bestow on the zamindars the fee simple of large areas in which a multitude of peasants had enjoyed extensive rights. And, based

as it was on ignorance, the system made no provision for the future acquisition of knowledge. The collector, tied to his office at headquarters, had neither authority nor opportunity to learn the condition of the people. The judge, in like manner, could learn nothing but the affairs of the suitors who appeared before him. Yet the administration was, and was intended to be, a foreign administration. Cornwallis would have no Indians in high office. But if there is one thing above all which a foreign administration needs it is knowledge of the economic and social condition of the people over whom it rules. That was removed from all possibility by the revenue and administrative methods established in Bengal.

Nor were the endeavours made to provide the people with justice marked by success. New laws were made, but no means existed by which they could be brought to the knowledge of the people at large. They were framed in English, of which only a few Indians living in Calcutta itself could read a word. They were translated into Bengali and posted at the district headquarters; but how many peasants would tramp thither to read them? How many could read them if they tramped thither? Above all, how many could understand their elaborate verbiage when they had done so? The consequence was that the legislation benefited the few persons who could become aware of its contents, a group of sharp-witted Calcutta *banyans* and *sarkārs*—agents and head-servants—who studied them closely and made great advantage of their knowledge. Nor was real justice to be expected from the courts themselves. Their procedure was imitated from the complex and interminable procedure of the English courts. Witnesses were examined on oath. But the taking of oaths was a thing which the respectable Hindu had never been able to stomach. The consequence was that even a good case had to be supported by false witness. Men had to be hired to declare they had seen what they had not seen. The fact, says John Shore's son after long judicial experience, that a Hindu gave evidence in a British court was presumptive evidence against the respectability of his character. Then, too, law was costly. Pleaders had to be employed, because the procedure was elaborate. The great liberty of appeal permitted the man with funds to wear out the man without. The advantage lay altogether with the rich against the poor. Nor were the courts numerous enough to cope with the cases which were

brought Aicars increased to enormous proportions. It came to be a saying that with luck a decision might be reached in the life-time of the grandson of an original suitor. In fact Cornwallis had confounded law and law-courts with justice.

Nor must the police be omitted from this tale of woes. The darogas, under the supervision of a sedentary judge who could be trusted never to pay them a sudden visit and who in any case was much too busy to attend to them, enjoyed a most enviable position. They were empowered to arrest on suspicion. All they had to do therefore was to inform a well-to-do person that they proposed to lay him under the social stigma of arrest, unless he dissuaded them with gifts, to obtain whatever they liked to ask in reason. The office of daroga of police became the most sought-after of all the places open to Indians under British authority.

Cornwallis's successors sought to remedy some of the evils which began to emerge from this unsuitable mode of conducting the business of government. The permanent settlement was heavy, and at first the zamindars had great difficulty in meeting their obligations. Shore therefore increased their power of coercing the ryots, and Wellesley increased those powers and permitted the zamindars to seize the lands of defaulting ryots. These measures, designed to facilitate the collection of the revenues, emphasised the position of dependence in which Cornwallis had in effect placed the cultivator. To meet the evil of delay, the number of judges was increased, the duties of the governor-general and council as the supreme appeal court were transferred to three judges who in future formed the *sadr dīwāni 'adālat*, freedom of appeal was limited, and the payment of fees was required before a suitor could file a suit. But all these changes only palliated the evils of a system fundamentally unsuited to the circumstances of the time.

Until 1808 the home authorities had approved without any hesitation the system established by Cornwallis. But in that year Thomas Munro went to England on leave. He had acquired a great knowledge of district administration, not indeed in Bengal but in Madras, and was a strong critic of the Bengal methods, above all of the ignorance of the Bengal collectors and of the complete supremacy of the zillah judges. He was called upon to give evidence before a select committee of the House of Commons, and made a deep impression upon all who heard him. His energy,

knowledge and character carried conviction. The directors began to wonder why the system which Munro had employed in Madras had never been adopted in Bengal, and how it was that their collectors there knew so little of the condition and occupations of the people placed under their charge. They noticed too that when a collector was called upon to manage a zamindari during the minority of the zamindar or on its resumption by government for the non-payment of rent, he found insuperable difficulties in executing duties which Munro and others discharged with ease in the south. They therefore ceased to desire the extension of the Bengal system to the other provinces under their rule. This was fortunate. The Bengal government was still convinced that its methods were the only sound methods of managing the land revenues and was bent upon establishing them in every region under its authority. But for the conversion of the directors, the influence of the Cornwallis system would have been much more extensive and injurious than was actually the case.

In Madras early revenue management had followed much the same methods as in Bengal. The company's servants knew little of the languages of the people or of their customs. Farming the revenues had appeared the easiest and best course to follow. In the Northern Circars, for instance, where the company had exercised control since 1767, the councils at Masulipatam and Vizagapatam had let out the farms, sometimes to local chiefs, sometimes to prominent Indian merchants, as ignorantly as had been done in Bengal. A committee of council had been appointed, as under Warren Hastings, to gather information; but, though it succeeded in its task far better than its Bengal counterpart, its reports had led to no change of management. Nor had any steps been taken to set up an adequate system of justice. That function had been confided to the renters and zamindars of the region. Even in the area surrounding Madras itself, which had been bestowed on the company as a *jāgīr* by the nawab Muhammad 'Alī, the revenues had been rented out either to the nawab himself or to one of his nominees.

In southern India as a whole conditions varied greatly. In some regions, such as the hilly portions of the Northern Circars, the southern hills of Tinnevely and Madura, or the hilly region lying due west of Madras, hereditary chiefs existed who had been wont to pay such tribute as the nawab's power permitted him to exact

from them. Elsewhere no hereditary middlemen intervened between the government and the cultivators. The nawab appointed *faujdar*s, or commandants, and *tahsildar*s or collectors, to manage the affairs of the state. The first were military officers intended to support the authority of the tahsildars and compel a reluctant people to pay what was demanded of them. The lands were classified as wet and dry, according as they had or had not a perennial supply of water from one of the numerous tanks which constituted the main source of irrigation. The wet lands, which grew rice, were assessed at a proportion of the crop; and the officials insisted on selling the state-share in the markets before the ryots were allowed to dispose of any of their own grain. The dry lands, and garden lands where betel or tobacco was grown, were assessed at a money-rate, which was based on the amount which could be extracted from the ryot in a good year. Here, as in other parts of India, the authority of the state had fallen so low as no longer to command the voluntary payment of the taxes. The realisation of the revenues was always a matter of violence. The ryots of a group of villages would be gathered together, they would declare their complete inability to pay what was demanded of them: they would then be beaten, or stood in the burning sun with a heavy stone weighing down their heads, until they reluctantly produced the coins which they had brought with them. It was a point of honour never to pay on demand, and he was reckoned a leader among them who endured longer than his fellows. In most of the villages there was a headman, nominated by the government from among the members of a particular family, who was held responsible for the maintenance of cultivation and public order in his village. In some districts, however, especially in Tanjore and the Arcot country, there was a superior class known by the Persian term *mirās*dars, claiming exclusive rights over the waste-lands of the village and often entitled to a share of the produce of the lands occupied by others than themselves. In most parts of the country, however, individual families owned specific plots of land, over which no other possessed rights apart from the demands of the state and the customary shares of the crops due to the village temple and the village craftsmen.

Towards the close of the century the financial distress of the nawab introduced great confusion into a country already disorganised. Numberless pensions were granted to individuals as

the reward of their services; these pensions took the form of an assignment of the land revenues of a certain area. Creditors were given assignments of the revenues over large districts as security for their debts; and where this was done, the whole administration of the district passed into their hands. Village officials and persons in favour with the higher officers of government saw to it that their own lands were lightly assessed, and that the deficit was made up by imposing heavier burdens on the lands of less fortunate men. Under the name of *motufa* a great variety of impositions was established, of ever varying amount, levied on artisans and other persons believed able to pay even the smallest sums. In these ways the task confronting the company's servants was more difficult than in Bengal, because the old system had fallen into a state of greater confusion. But as against this must be set the fact that no established class of middle-men had come into being, except in certain limited areas, and that, as soon as the company's servants began to assume the responsibilities corresponding with their power, they would find no concerted opposition to their enquiries and no great difficulty in reaching direct contact with the cultivators themselves. This difference, fundamentally a difference between the landed tenures of south India and those of Bengal, implied different methods and a different attitude of administration.

In 1786, under instructions which the company issued after Pitt had passed his India Act, a board of revenue was established at Madras. It consisted of three company's servants under the presidency of a member of the council. Much needed reforms were introduced by this new authority. In 1794 the old chiefs and councils in the Northern Circars and elsewhere were abolished and their administrative duties were given to collectors. But at this time the centre of interest lies outside the old possessions of the company. In 1793 Tipu Sultan had been compelled to cede to the English the districts known as the Bārāmahal, which now form the districts of Salem and Coimbatore. Cornwallis had taken a close personal interest in forming the administration of the new acquisitions. He had himself chosen the men to whom the charge was to be confided. Deeming that familiarity with the languages of the people formed an indispensable qualification, he had ruled out all the covenanted servants of sufficient standing not otherwise employed: and at last he had selected Alexander Read,

a lieutenant-colonel of the Madras army, to serve as the head of the administration. Read was a man of great talent. He was entirely honest. He had no skill in expressing his ideas upon paper, but his ideas themselves were clear, vigorous, and sound. He was convinced that knowledge formed the foundation of all good administration, and set to work, with his assistants, to acquire it. Among the latter was another officer of the Madras army, Thomas Munro, equally honest and hard-working, but possessed of an imagination and the gift of clear and forcible expression which Read lacked. These two men laid the foundations of the Madras revenue system in accordance with the custom of the country. They resolved to get rid of the traditional English method of employing renters of the revenue and to manage it directly. That meant the formation of a multitude of assessments on small patches of land, and therefore a revenue survey was the first condition. This step, the lack of which had vitiated all the revenue work in Bengal, was undertaken and carried out. It was found that much cultivation had been concealed by fraudulent exclusion from the revenue accounts. Adopting the rate of assessment current under Tipu's government, half the gross produce, they succeeded in drawing from the districts about the same amount as had been drawn in Tipu's time to cover both the demand of the state and the defalcations of individuals. This demand was, however, heavier than could be paid in any but a good season. Like other early settlements, Read's in the Bāiāmahāl was heavier than the country could bear. But Read's method of careful and persistent enquiry carried with it the seeds of improvement. Munro in particular came to form a theory of the system which would be appropriate to the country in general. He thought that the revenue should be permanently fixed on each holding, that the ryot should be left free to cultivate his customary fields as he chose, and even to take more if any fell vacant, and that the traditional practices of compelling the ryot to cultivate a certain area and of making additional assessments to cover failure on the part of any cultivators should be abandoned. Later experience in Canara and the Deccan confirmed him in his opinions.

The governor-general and council, however, had long been pressing Madras to introduce the system which had already been introduced into Bengal. In 1798 formal orders were sent down to do this without further delay. A permanent zamindari settlement

was therefore begun. This was easy in those parts of the country where a zamindari class existed. The zamindars of the Northern Circars and the poligars, as they were called in the other districts, were invested with the same rights as had been bestowed in Bengal. In many cases the settlement was based, not on any calculation of what the estates could reasonably pay, but on a commutation of the zamindars' obligation of maintaining military forces to keep the public peace. But where no zamindars existed, they had to be created. Villages were grouped together, and the right of collecting the revenues was put up for sale. At the same time attempts were made to introduce the Bengal system of justice. Zillah judges were appointed, invested with the control of the police, and the collectors were for the moment reduced to the same position as they occupied in Bengal. Since in 1802 the territories of the nawab of the Carnatic were annexed, the area over which these revolutionary changes were enforced was very extensive.

Save where zamindars existed already, the Madras permanent settlement did not last long. The *mutahdars*, as the new zamindars were called, soon found their position untenable and the revenue demands higher than could be met. They abandoned their rights, and a new plan had to be devised. In 1808-9 an experiment was made of leasing out villages either to the *mirās-dars* or to the village headmen. These at first were to be made for a term of three years and, when that had expired, a further term of ten years was ordered. These village leases, however, also failed. The revenue demand was too high, the village officials abused their position, the collectors and their staffs lost touch with village conditions. In 1812 the Madras government was required by the company, under Munro's influence, to abandon the Bengal system, to re-introduce the ryotwari settlement, as the assessment of small individual holdings was called, and to reduce the authority of the zillah judges. Munro himself was sent back to Madras as a special commissioner to carry these orders into effect.

In 1816 a series of regulations was passed into law establishing these changes. The collector became a magistrate and recovered the control of the district police. A considerable number of subordinate Indian judges, under the title of district *munisiffs*, was appointed, and the village headmen were empowered to try petty suits, and, at the request of the parties, to constitute boards

of arbitrators, known as *panchayats*, to determine causes of whatever amount. This attempt to revive the traditional mode of settling differences failed completely, mainly, it would seem, because of the popularity enjoyed by the district *munisiffs*. In 1818 the Board of Revenue ordered the introduction of the *ryotwari* system.

Thus the attempt to extend the Cornwallis system to Madras failed completely. In fact what was destined to become the characteristic mode of district administration developed, not in Bengal, but in Madras. There the collector emerges for the first time invested with a detailed control of the land revenue, possessed of an extensive revenue staff, spending much of his time touring through the villages of his district investigating conditions and hearing complaints, responsible for the public peace, but leaving to the district judge the determination of civil disputes and the punishment of serious crime. He was neither the unquestioned autocrat nor the unimportant tax-gatherer who had alternately appeared in Bengal. But he was the local representative of the government, it was his business to know all that could be known about his district; on his annual settlement of the land revenue depended the well-being of every village; on his activity depended the execution of the wishes of government. Many of the men who filled this position in such a manner that their names are still remembered in their districts, would have cut but a poor figure in a competitive examination. They knew the vernacular in no scholarly way. But they could converse familiarly with the *ryot* about the matters which most nearly touched his interests and did not live in the isolation of a Bengal *cutchery*. The courts did not rank so high as in Bengal. It was characteristic that the designation of the Madras collector was "collector and magistrate" whereas, even when Bentinck had to some extent brought the Bengal system into line with the practice of the subordinate presidency, the Bengal collector was a "magistrate and collector". In short, under the influence of Munro the English at Madras wisely abandoned the attempt to subordinate the position of the executive official to that of the judge. The Madras system was in fact a middle way between the old Indian plan of making the executive official the sole agent of government, and the English plan of subordinating all to law and law-court.

CHAPTER VII

The North-Western Approaches to India

From the beginning of the sixteenth to the end of the eighteenth century, the nations of Europe had sought to approach India from the south-west, by way of the Cape of Good Hope. The conclusion of the Napoleonic wars had left Great Britain in firm occupation of that route. Rivals began therefore to seek out some alternative way of reaching the great dependency which had been built up under the protection of the British navy. Indications of the coming change had already been given. Napoleon's invasion of Egypt, and still more the plans which had been formed both by him and by Russia for military expeditions after the manner of Alexander the Great, showed how European policy was moving. Accordingly the nineteenth century was marked by the development of new approaches by the north-west, and the intermediate regions, Persia, Irak, Egypt, and the tangle of mountains on the frontier of India itself, acquired a new and dominant influence on the foreign policy of the Anglo-Indian government. These regions included three possibly vital areas. The farthest away was Egypt, commanding the neck of land which parted the Mediterranean from the Red Sea, then came Irak, through which, if the upper reaches of the Euphrates could be attained, an enemy could drop down the river to the head of the Persian Gulf; and nearest of all was Afghanistan, the age-long key to India, from which an enemy, neglecting Suez and Basra, could attack the Panjab and thence spread over the valley of the Ganges. These possibilities complicated the problem of Indian defence, and destroyed the all-sufficiency of maritime power, although through the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf the water-ways bit so deeply into the land.

With those water-ways the vessels of the Presidency of Bombay had been long familiar. It had been obliged, for the protection of its local trade from Marātha pirates, to build a fleet organised for police and war under the name of the Bombay Marine. Its shipping was mostly built at Bombay itself, and when, in 1759, Surat was taken by the forces of the company, the latter became admiral of the Mughal empire and undertook the duty of con-

roying Indian vessels plying to the ports of the Red Sea and Persian Gulf. For the next seventy years the officer appointed to act as deputy for the company flew the company's colours at the peak but the Mughal flag at the main. The duties of convoy brought this force into conflict with the pirate tribes of the Persian Gulf and Red Sea, and a number of officers were employed in surveying and charting the coasts. The alarm created by the French occupation of Egypt suggested the expediency of blocking up the Red Sea. An attempt had been made to occupy Perim, and, when that was defeated by lack of water, the English had been welcomed at Aden by the sultan, with whom the naval commander made a treaty in 1802. In the early years of the nineteenth century various expeditions were directed into the Persian Gulf. Alliances were made with some of the chiefs, notably the *imām* of Maskat, and in 1819, after the pirate stronghold of Rās-ul-khāima had been captured, the principal maritime tribes had been compelled to enter into a league with the company, renouncing both piracy and the slave-trade. For the second time in history, fleets directed from India were controlling Arabian waters.

In both cases the motives were the same. The Portuguese and the English alike were interested in maintaining peace and order on the great trade-routes, both were concerned to guard their position against possible attack by Mediterranean powers. The developments of the nineteenth century were to render these regions more critical than ever. Two causes in particular contributed to this result. One was the rising power of Muhammad 'Alī in Egypt, the expansion of his authority, first into Arabia and then into Syria, and the likelihood of his establishing his rule over all the coasts of the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. The other was the invention of the marine steam-engine, which made the navigation of the Red Sea possible at all seasons of the year instead of being narrowly limited by periodic winds as in the past. The ocean-sailing ship had brought India into effective contact with Europe, the development of the fire-arm had subjected India to European domination; the development of steam-power, abolishing the slow travel of the past, and destined ultimately to unify India, at the moment was to transfer the control of India from Calcutta to London and interlock the external policy of India and England.

The first effect of these changes was to revive projects for

opening a trade-route to Europe by way of Suez. Earlier attempts had been frustrated by the confusion which had reigned in Egypt in the eighteenth century. But now that it was clear that letters, if not goods, could be conveyed much more safely and rapidly by Suez than by the Cape of Good Hope, merchants set actively to work. Committees were formed at the presidency towns and in London. Bombay took the lead in a matter in which it was vitally interested, and the government of Bombay, under Elphinstone and Malcolm, proved by experiment that the route from Bombay to Suez could be used at all seasons of the year, even by the feeble steam-ships of the period. Muhammad 'Ali was eager to co-operate in a movement which promised him wealth and influence. Under the pressure of public opinion, the English government and the East India Company organised a system of monthly steamers between England and Alexandria on the western section of the route, and between Suez and Bombay on the eastern section. In 1837 the sultan of Aden was unwise enough to seize and plunder the cargo of a Madras-owned vessel which was wrecked off that port. The steam-ships of those days could not carry coal enough for prolonged voyages, and Aden was by nature marked out as the ideal coaling-station on the eastern run, apart from its strategic value as commanding the entrance to the Red Sea. The company's government demanded reparation; the sultan promised and then retracted; in January, 1839, therefore, Aden was captured by the Bombay marine and military forces. The treaties with the tribes of the Persian Gulf together with the occupation of Aden gave the company's government control of the two avenues of approach towards India from the north-west by way of the sea.

Similar, if less successful, activity had been displayed along the continental approach to India. The alliance of Persia had been sought and obtained. But it was still important to learn the geographical conditions, the routes, their passibility for wheeled traffic, the supplies of water and provisions, the things which would hinder or facilitate military movements through this north-west zone. In 1809 and 1810 three officers, Grant, Pottinger, and Christie, explored the ways through the Makrān and Balūchistan into Persia, and Christie was the first Englishman to visit Herat and call attention to its military importance. Only a little later Moorcroft crossed the Himālāyas and visited Ladākḥ. Thence he

penetrated to Bukhāra, and was seeking to return by Herat when he died of disease. In 1830 Arthur Conolly, setting out from Tabriz, attempted to reach the khanate of Khiva in the hopes of learning its military strength. He was captured and held to ransom. He then passed back into India by way of Kandahār, where for a while he had to lie in hiding, amusing himself by hunting hyenas with the boys of the village where he found refuge. In 1832 Alexander Burnes, with the approval of the governor-general and the financial support of the government, set out in the reverse direction, from India to Kābul and Bukhāra. His purpose was two-fold, to survey the possible routes of an advance towards India and to test possible friendships which the British might form in that region. He concluded that Herat, being covered on the north by extensive deserts, was not likely to be attacked save from the side of Persia, but that any movement on India would be likely to follow more than one road, and to the eastwards he indicated the possibility of an advance by way of Chitral and Kashmīr. He hoped that the states on the Oxus might be brought into political and commercial relations with British India and that an alliance might be formed with Dost Muhammad, the ruler of Kābul. In 1836 he was sent back to Kābul as commercial agent.

To some extent adventure had been the motive of these explorations. But adventure had been reinforced by political aims. The projects of Napoleon and Paul had directed attention to Central Asia, and the development of Russian policy in Persia had invested the matter with a more pressing interest. The decay of Turkish power in the eighteenth century had laid Persia open to Russian aggression, and, as soon as Russian power was well established in the Caucasus, Russian forces began to press southwards. The Persians had attempted to persuade the French to come to their help. In 1807 Napoleon by the Treaty of Finkenstein had guaranteed the integrity of Persia and had sent a military mission to Teherān. But immediately afterwards he had made peace with Russia and refused even to act as a mediator on behalf of the shah. The Persians had then hoped to get help from England. After long negotiations the Treaty of Teherān was signed, by which protection was promised in case Persia were attacked by any external power. In accordance with this arrangement a body of officers of the company's armies was lent to

re-organise the military forces of Persia. This treaty had been negotiated by a representative not of the company but of the crown, so that it was clear that the policy of Wellesley and Minto of covering the routes to India by an alliance with Persia was supported by London as well as by Calcutta. It seems, however, that the policy had been adopted without counting the cost. The only power likely to attack Persia was Russia. Was England prepared to go to war with Russia for the protection of the shah? Was she prepared to send into Persia such a force as would enable Persia to meet her invaders on equal terms? These questions either had never been considered or must have been answered in the negative. It is true that the Treaty of Tcherān gave a loop-hole by which actual war might be avoided. In the first place the obligation did not arise except in the case of foreign aggression. It would not be difficult to jockey the shah into military movements constituting Persian aggression. And even if the aggression came unquestionably from the other side, England still had the choice of giving military or mere financial assistance. For some years nothing happened. But in 1826 the Russians and Persians went to war again. The shah, Fath 'Alī, began the attack on the sound principle that aggression is the best form of defence. But Canning, who was at the time secretary of state for foreign affairs, and much engrossed with questions arising out of the Greek war, was not prepared to sacrifice the success of his policy in Europe by supporting the shah in circumstances in which no formal treaty obligation had arisen. He therefore compounded with the shah by giving him a moderate subsidy. The Persians were defeated. In 1828 they were reduced to making more territorial cessions by the Treaty of Turkomanchai, and concluded that their interests would best be served by cultivating the friendship of the Russian emperor.

The establishment of Russian influence at Tcherān was followed by disquieting events. The Russians encouraged the Persians to seek expansion eastwards. The advice jumped with the shah's inclinations, while it promised to Russia the extension of her own influence through that of her client. In 1831 an expedition against Khiva was planned. In 1832 Khūfāsān was overrun. Next year an expedition against Herat was only interrupted by the death of the shah's heir. In 1834 the shah himself died and was succeeded by his grandson, Muhammad, who leant heavily on his Russian

advisers. He projected not only the renewal of the expedition against Herat but also the capture of Kandahār. In 1837, in spite of strong representations made by the British envoy at Teherān, the shah laid siege to Herat. Persia under Russian control was seeking to recover the provinces which had formed the empire of Nādir Shāh and from which he had sallied out to conquer Delhi.

While Persia was pushing out towards long-lost frontiers, not in her own strength, which was small, but in reliance on Russian power, which was great, the position in Afghanistan was most uncertain. After the murder of Nādir Shāh in 1747, Ahmad Shāh Durāni had built up a strong power stretching northwards to the Oxus, westwards to Persia, eastwards to the Sutlej and the Indus. Under his son Tīmū Shāh, who reigned from 1773 to 1793, the state began to decay. Ten years later it fell into the hands of Shāh Shujā', a thoroughly incapable prince, who was driven out in 1809, and, after some years' wandering, found refuge under British authority at Ludhiāna. In Afghanistan itself prolonged civil wars followed, first between princes of the reigning Sadozai family, then between them and a new family, the Barakzais, and then among the Barakzais themselves. The upshot of these conflicts was that the Sadozais, represented in 1830 by a prince named Kāmran, retained Herat; while the triumphant Barakzai, Dost Muhammad, established himself as amir of Kābul. The Indian provinces had been completely lost. Sind, never very closely attached to the Durāni empire, had become virtually independent under the amir of the Tālpurī family. In the Panjab had arisen the power of Ranjit Singh and his Sikhs, who had taken advantage of the civil wars in Afghanistan not only to establish their own independence but also to conquer from the Afghans Kashmir and Peshāwar. In these circumstances, Dost Muhammad was uncertain which way to turn. In 1834 Shāh Shujā', with the countenance of both Ranjit Singh and of the English, had made an unsuccessful attempt to recover his vanished kingdom. In the hope of obtaining aid from one quarter or another, Dost Muhammad made overtures to the Persians, to Russia, and to the English.

In 1835 Lord Auckland had been appointed governor-general in succession to Lord William Bentinck, and assumed his office on March 4, 1836. The views of the British cabinet, in which Palmerston had charge of foreign affairs, were inspired by the desire of checking the progress which Russia had made in the

regions bordering on India. In 1836 Palmerston appointed McNeill, a prominent Russophobe, minister to the shah; in the same year instructions were addressed to Auckland, pointing out the need of securing the north-west frontier and of counteracting "the progress of Russian influence in a quarter, which, from its proximity to our Indian possessions, could not fail, if it were once established, to act injuriously on the system of our Indian alliances, and possibly to interfere even with the tranquillity of our own territory." He was given entire discretion to select his mode of action, as soon as he should be convinced "that the time has arrived at which it would be right for you to interfere decidedly in the affairs of Afghanistan."

Auckland's position was most embarrassing. He was separated from the area in which he was to act by the interposition of independent though allied states, and the treaties did not contemplate the use of the territories of Sind or of the Panjab either as a base for war or even for the passage of armies. Worse than this was the irreconcilable hostility of Sikh and Afghan. They were divided by religion, by a long course of merciless war, by an obstinate determination on the one side to retain, and on the other to recover, the spoils of conquest, especially Peshāwar and its dependencies. Burnes, at Kābul as commercial agent, soon found himself involved in political discussions. Dost Muhammad leant towards a British alliance. He had written to St Petersburg, and, in December, 1837, Vitkevitch, a Russian agent, was sent in answer. But the amir still would have chosen the British side could he but have obtained from them the terms on which he had set his heart. One was not a matter over which Auckland would have hesitated for a moment. It was a promise of protection from any attacks by Persia. But the other was the transfer of Peshāwar to Afghanistan. This would have involved the abandonment of the long-standing alliance with Ranjit Singh. That prince was already stricken in years and could not be expected much longer to rule at Lahore. It was not unlikely that on his death much confusion would arise, for it was clear that he had no son, genuine or supposed, able to carry on his work. War with the Sikhs in that contingency was not improbable, and then the alliance of Dost Muhammad would be most valuable. But, as things stood, nothing could more contribute to such a war than a formal alliance with the ruler of Kābul; and, were the surrender of

Peshāwar to be one of the terms of the alliance, nothing could be more certain to bring that war about. Auckland had therefore to choose between alienating the Sikhs or the Afghans, between abandoning an old, sensible, and honest ally of the company, and throwing Dost Muhammad into the arms of Russia. The first would mean war on the Sutlej, the second would mean either the tolerance of Russian influence at Kābul or the removal by force of arms of a ruler with whom the English had no quarrel save that he would not ally himself with them on their own terms.

Auckland judged that the arrival of the Russian envoy at Kābul had created the situation in which interference in Afghanistan had become necessary; and that a vigorous attempt to remove Dost Muhammad from his throne was a lesser evil than to antagonise Ranjit Singh. He still acted with great deliberation. In May, 1838, he sent his foreign secretary, Macnaghten, to frame an arrangement with Ranjit Singh. The outcome of this was the Tripartite Treaty which was signed on June 26. This treaty seems to have gone farther than Auckland had intended. He had meant to revive the projects of 1834 for the re-establishment of Shāh Shujā' at Kābul without doing more than making a military demonstration, or alternatively to promote hostilities between Ranjit Singh and Dost Muhammad. Ranjit, however, was not willing to attack Afghanistan without much more than the passive support of the English. Finally a joint attack was decided on in the name of the old shah. Then, when detailed arrangements for the actual operations began to be made, it became clear that if anything effectual was to be done the English would have to take the lead. Orders were issued for the assemblage of a great army to invade Afghanistan by way of the Bolān Pass and to establish Shāh Shujā' as ruler of Kābul and Kandahār. Thus Auckland had gradually drifted into a far more extensive action than he had contemplated. His excuse was that the establishment of a friendly prince at Kābul, the assurance of peace with the Panjab, and the creation of a controlling influence in Sind were worth the risks which he knew he was running.

In October, 1838, it became known that the Persians had given up the siege of Herat. By some Auckland has been criticised for not having then abandoned his projected attack on Dost Muhammad. But that criticism seems to overlook the fact that Auckland and Dost Muhammad had been unable to agree on terms of

alliance and that the Afghan ruler was thought to have committed himself to friendship with Russia. Auckland therefore made no change in his plans beyond reducing the force with which he proposed to invade Afghanistan. The Army of the Indus, as it was called, was to march through Sind, the Bombay and Bengal detachments assembling at Bukkar, where the river was to be crossed. The amirs of Sind had in the first instance to be coerced into permitting the passage of the company's troops through their territory. When that had been done, the army moved onward, and, after a march of great hardship, it entered Kandahār in April, 1839. Shāh Shujā' was at once proclaimed. A move was then made against Kābul. On the way Ghaznī was stormed by a brilliant feat of arms. On August 2 Dost Muhammad, who had marched out to defend his capital, finding his army unwilling to fight, was compelled to flee. He took refuge first in Bāmīān and later in Bukhāra, where the amir shut him up in prison. Shāh Shujā' made a triumphant entry into Kābul, and was installed once more in the Bālā Hissār, the "high fortress", overlooking the city. At this moment it looked as if Auckland's policy had completely succeeded. In reward he was made an earl, the commander, Sir John Keane, was made a baron, and Macnaghten, who was in political control, was made a baronet and a little later named governor of Bombay, an office which he did not live to hold.

The success, however, was entirely superficial. Shāh Shujā' was as incompetent as ever. His own troops were worthless. His ministers were untrustworthy. It was soon clear that he would only remain at Kābul as long as the English kept him there. On Macnaghten devolved the task of settling the administration of the country. He was a good Persian scholar, and a man of quick wit, but he was incurably optimistic, of uncertain judgment and small administrative knowledge. The first need was to provide the shah with a regular revenue. This provoked the liveliest opposition. The tribes did not greatly care who called himself amir of Kābul so long as he did not attempt to levy taxes on them. Sporadic troubles occurred all over the country, and a number of chiefs were only kept quiet by receiving monthly allowances which for the time being had to be paid by the Government of India. Before long Auckland* found the establishment of Shāh Shujā' was going to cost much more than he had reckoned

Moreover external troubles multiplied. News came that the Russians had sent out a great expedition to attack Khiva. The expedition failed, but the alarm which the news caused spread far and wide. Worse than this, Ranjit Singh died, and no reliance could be placed on Nau Nihāl Singh, who had succeeded him. Then Dost Muhammad escaped from his prison at Bukhāra, and appeared in Afghan territory at the head of numerous followers, including troops who had been raised in the name of Shāh Shujā'. The ex-amir was indeed defeated in September, 1840, and in the following November surrendered himself to Macnaghten. But this success was followed within a year by overwhelming disaster.

In 1841 the company, shocked at the cost of occupying Afghanistan, ordered economies to be introduced. The military force was therefore lessened, and the stipends which had been paid to some of the chiefs were cut off. Local discontent spread as acquiescence became less profitable and the means of punishing disturbances weakened. In the latter part of the year few districts remained quiet. At Kābul itself was a brigade consisting of one queen's regiment of foot, three of sepoy, with a proportion of cavalry and artillery, in all 4500 combatants and 12,000 camp-followers. It was commanded by a queen's officer, Elphinstone, of undoubted personal bravery, but old, inactive, and sick. The brigade was quartered in cantonments outside the city, while the stores were in the city itself and the cantonments were untenable against any serious attack. On November 2 a riot broke out in the city. Alexander Burnes, who had been nominated to succeed Macnaghten as soon as the latter should go down to take up his government at Bombay, was murdered, with his brother Charles and another English officer, in the house which they occupied. The shah's treasury, which was in the city instead of in the Bālā Hissār, was plundered. Shāh Shujā' sent one of his regiments to suppress the tumult, but it did nothing, and Macnaghten and Elphinstone did nothing either. At first they seem to have thought the matter a mere riot of no importance. The next day a feeble attempt was made to suppress the movement, but failed. The city at once passed altogether out of control, and the tribesmen rapidly gathered. Dost Muhammad's son, Muhammad Akbar Khān, soon arrived to take the lead.

Elphinstone's position had been difficult. He had had to choose

between suppressing the riot with severity, in which case partisan historians would doubtless have held him up to execration, and leaving the shah to deal with his tumultuous subjects. In view of the disturbed state of the country, and the indefensible nature of the cantonments, he ought certainly to have chosen the method of severity. But the responsibility does not rest with him alone. Throughout the expedition control had sedulously been kept in the hands of the civil authorities and exercised through the political officers with Macnaghten at their head. This arrangement recalled the unfortunate campaign against Hyder 'Ali in 1767, or that still worse campaign against the Marāthas in 1779, when the councils of Madras and Bombay had so distrusted the conduct of their military officers that they had saddled them with a committee. In Afghanistan the political department had enjoyed exclusive control. Its local representatives had decided when, and where, and how many troops should be employed. Generals had been placed under the orders of lieutenants invested with superiority by employment in the foreign department. This measure had been taken under colour of maintaining the supremacy of the civil government. But Auckland and Macnaghten had forgotten that their supremacy should not be pressed too far in matters of war, that the position in Afghanistan remained fundamentally a military position, and that the first need was to maintain the military control of the occupied country. Difficulties had perpetually arisen in consequence of the interference of the political officers in the disposition and conduct of troops. The military officer commanding at Kābul would have been, not merely a strong man, but an insubordinate one, had he insisted that the military measures necessary for the safety of his troops should be taken in defiance of the opinion of Macnaghten.

A fortnight elapsed, while Macnaghten gave money to some and promised it to others, in the vain hope of buying back the security which had been established only by force of arms. The cantonments were surrounded and attacked, and the measures taken in their defence were feeble and never more than partly successful. A proposal was made that the brigade should retire into the Bālā Hissār, which could at least have been defended against any Afghan attack; but Macnaghten, supported by the second-in-command, rejected the proposal. When the troops, disheartened by the evident incompetence of their leaders, showed

themselves reluctant to go into action, it was resolved to negotiate. Akbar Khān, who had assumed the leadership on behalf of his father, a prisoner in India, was not unwilling to come to terms, and on December 11 he and Macnaghten agreed that the English were to evacuate the country, that Shāh Shujā' might go with them or remain as he chose, and that, as soon as the English reached Peshāwar, Dost Muhammad was to be permitted to return. At this time the roads were still clear, and, if the English were going to march, they should have done so at once before the snow began to fall. But Macnaghten still delayed. He seems to have hoped by bribery to divide the chiefs and re-establish the English position. Renewed conferences were held. On the 23rd with one of his companions was murdered by Akbar Khān and the remainder of the party became prisoners.

On this event the demands of the Afghans redoubled. The treasure, the guns, the ammunition, of the brigade were to be handed over. Elphinstone was ready to agree to almost anything. On January 1, 1842, a fresh capitulation was made. The troops were to march down to Peshāwar under the escort of a body of Afghans. On the 6th, finding that the escort did not appear, the soldiers, completely demoralised by the incapacity of their leaders, insisted on setting out. The cold was intense. The Afghans hung upon their flanks, and followed up their rear. After a while the enemy began to fire down upon them from the hills. Frozen, starved, and hopeless, the brigade soon lost every vestige of military order. In the first two days' march it covered only ten miles. The attacks became closer and more persistent. In the long Khurd-Kābul Pass, running for five miles between high hills, 3000 men are said to have been killed with scarce an effort at resistance. The wives of the officers were given up to Akbar Khān as the sole means of saving their lives. Elphinstone concluded his active service by surrendering himself. At Jagdallak a barrier lay across the road. Of the few who passed it some reached Gandammak. Six arrived living at Fathābād. One man alone, the surgeon Dr Brydon, escaped to Jalālābād. This needless massacre of brave men with weapons in their hands was the greatest catastrophe that ever befell the forces of the East India Company. A whole European regiment was destroyed. But what was far worse, the Sepoys and the camp-followers whose lives were thrown away bequeathed to their brothers-in-arms a distrust of the leadership

which till then had been marked by conspicuous and almost unbroken success. The Sikh soldiers at Lahore began to say that if the Afghans could slaughter English armies like a flock of sheep, the time was coming when the army of the Khalsa might march down to Delhi and sack it as Nādir Shāh had done. Elphinstone's military incapacity, Macnaghten's political blindness, Auckland's foolish deference to London opinion and inability to choose able men to execute his policy, had contributed much to bring nearer the Sikh wars and the incomparable disaster of the Indian Mutiny.

The destruction of the Kābul brigade had not exterminated the British forces in Afghanistan. At the time of the Kābul outbreak Sale had been engaged in withdrawing from Afghanistan a brigade which Auckland had supposed to be no longer needed there. Sale, thinking himself unable with any prospects of success to attempt to march back to Kābul, had thrown himself into Jalālābād, and had prepared to hold that place until reinforcements should arrive from India. In January a message was received from Kābul ordering Sale to evacuate it. Sale refused. On the 13th the solitary survivor of the massacre arrived. For some eight weeks the town was besieged by Afghan tribesmen. For a moment, in February, its abandonment was considered. But this idea was put aside mainly owing to the determination of Havlock. On the 19th the walls were severely shaken by earthquake: but they were repaired, and on March 11 a sortie drove the Afghans away. Besides Sale's force, a small garrison had held Ghazni, while Nott with a brigade was at Kandahār. The Ghazni detachment surrendered and was massacred. Nott was strong enough and resolute enough to hold his ground. But the future evidently depended on the policy of the governor-general.

Auckland belonged to that large class of men who are easily elated by success and pass swiftly from confidence to despair with the first change of fortune. The terrible news from Kābul inspired him with a frantic desire to get out of Afghanistan at the earliest possible moment. He issued a spirited proclamation; but neither courage nor decision lay behind his brave words. Half-hearted attempts, inspired principally by Clerk, the political agent at Peshāwar, and other local officials, were made to rescue the beleaguered garrisons. One force attempted to move by way of the Khaibar, but for lack of transport had to fall back on Jamrud;

another attempted to reach Kandahār by the Bolān Pass, but fell back with much loss of reputation on Quetta. On February 28 Auckland was at last relieved of a task far exceeding his capacity by the arrival of a new governor-general.

Towards the close of 1841 a change of government had taken place. The Whigs' long tenure of office came to an end and Sir Robert Peel became prime minister. Lord Ellenborough, who had already served at the Board of Control, at first was re-appointed to that office; but shortly afterwards he had been offered the government of India. His virtues and failings were almost the exact opposite of Auckland's. Auckland was always ready to carry out his party's policy; Ellenborough insisted on determining his own. Auckland was a man of sober mind, never rising above mediocrity, Ellenborough was capable of deep insight and puerile extravagance. Auckland was slow, timid, irresolute; Ellenborough was hasty, rash, and obstinate. Auckland's charming manners made official business with him pleasant; Ellenborough was overbearing and lacked the art of managing men. Only two of Auckland's predecessors would ever have brought the national interests in the east to such a pass; Ellenborough was the very man for a situation demanding instant decision and resolute action. The change produced by his determined control of affairs soon became apparent. Preparations for the relief of the British garrisons in Afghanistan were pushed on with vigour. Pollock, with adequate transport and artillery, forced the Khaibar and marched on Jalālābād; and a concerted movement of the forces at Kandahār and at Quetta enabled the latter to march through the Khojak Pass. These successes induced Ellenborough to modify the views which at first he had entertained. On his arrival he had decided that the first necessity was to withdraw the troops from Afghanistan. In this he was overruling the advice of the foreign department, which was pressing for the re-occupation of the country. But he had from the first seen that a considerable latitude must be left to the local commanders in the execution of his orders. He was very much afraid that he might suddenly find himself on the verge of war with the Sikhs, and therefore was resolved against any prolonged operations in Afghanistan. But he also felt that anything which would make the Sikhs think twice before attacking the company would be of great political advantage. If such a defeat could be inflicted on the

Afghans as would make the withdrawal from their country appear a voluntary action, the Sikhs would probably feel less bellicose. Ellenborough therefore issued to Nott and Pollock discretionary instructions, permitting them, if they thought it expedient, to join hands at Kābul and return together by way of the Khaibar.

This decision has been grossly misrepresented. Kaye, the leading historian of the First Afghan War, describes the instructions to Nott as calculated to throw the responsibility for any misfortunes that might occur on him instead of on the governor-general. But Ellenborough was never guilty of shirking responsibility, and Wellington, than whom no man alive was more competent to judge, considered the orders wise, appropriate, and proper. Another point of Ellenborough's instructions was for political reasons made the butt of unending ridicule. He authorised Nott, if he should march by Ghazni, to carry away with him the club hanging over the tomb of the great Mahmūd and the gates which were traditionally believed to have been stolen from the Temple of Somnāth. In this Ellenborough desired to strike the imagination of the people of India. House of Commons speakers made great fun of this idea. But though Ellenborough's language was pompous and on the whole ridiculous, the idea was not nearly so incongruous as Whig speakers pretended. The plan did not originate in the hot brain of the governor-general. It had first appeared in discussions of the terms on which Ranjit Singh had been willing to help Shāh Shujā' to recover Afghanistan. Ranjit is said to have demanded that the shah should pledge himself to deliver those very gates, and the shah is said to have refused on the ground that the Afghans would never forgive him for doing so. Ranjit was no sentimentalist; Shāh Shujā' was not likely to quarrel with a possible ally over a trifle. What Ranjit thought worth asking, and what Shāh Shujā' thought he could not grant, would form an undeniable trophy of success. For other reasons the project came to nothing. The club had been looted by some former conqueror; and the gates proved to be the work of mere local craftsmen, made to replace Mahmūd's mouldering spoils.

Apart from this, however, the Afghan War was concluded in accordance with Ellenborough's plans. Pollock and Nott advanced on Kābul from Jalālābād and Kandahār respectively.

Pollock met with considerable opposition, but at Tezin, near the Khurd-Kābul Pass, he drove Akbar Khān before him in headlong flight and on September 15 he entered Kābul. Two days later Nott arrived, having destroyed the fortifications of Ghazni on the way. A relief party was sent out to rescue the prisoners who had fallen into Akbar's hands during Elphinstone's fatal march. The news of the reappearance of the English had filled the Afghan chiefs with dismay. The prisoners had already recovered their liberty, and met the rescue party on the day on which Nott appeared before Kābul. Troops sent out under McCaskill to disperse a hostile concentration in Kohistan found the enemy at Istalif and inflicted on them a severe defeat. In revenge for the rising at Kābul and the massacre which had followed, the Grand Bazaar was blown up, and on October 12 the English forces marched away, no one daring to hinder their going. They left as purely nominal ruler of Afghanistan one of Shāh Shujā's sons. Shāh Shujā himself had been murdered after the collapse of the English authority at Kābul.

The armies then withdrew through the Khaibar, destroying the fortifications of Jalālābād and 'Alī Masjid as they passed. In December they were met and welcomed at Fīūzpūr, in British territory, by the governor-general and the army of reserve which he had prudently collected in case the Sikhs should attempt to take advantage of British embarrassments. The Afghan prisoners in India, including Dost Muhammad, were released, and Ellenborough declared himself ready to recognise any government accepted by the Afghans themselves and ready to live at peace with its neighbours. The result was the restoration of Dost Muhammad, probably the only man capable at the time of imposing himself on the Afghan tribes. In all his operations Ellenborough's chief object had been to re-establish the prestige of the company's arms, and to concentrate its forces once more before any Indian enemy could be tempted into an attack. Nothing more could wisely have been attempted, and Ellenborough certainly secured these purposes as far as was possible. But this foolish adventure into Afghanistan had weakened the company's position and lowered its reputation, both with other states and with its own sepoys. It was perhaps fortunate that the development of affairs in Europe and some experience of the difficulties of operations in Central Asia indisposed the Russians to continue the provocative policy

which had lured Palmerston and Auckland into their Afghan adventure. In 1844, in the course of a visit which the emperor Nicholas paid to Queen Victoria, an informal agreement was reached relieving the English from anxiety regarding the immediate future of Central Asia. Afghanistan on the south bank of the Oxus, and the khanates on the north of the river, became in effect a neutral zone in which neither the English nor the Russians were to undertake political operations. This understanding was maintained until the Near East once more provided the two empires with a subject of quarrel, and the Crimean War brought the informal agreement to an end. Then once more the Russians sought to influence British policy in Europe by threatening the security of British interests in Asia.

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CHAPTER VIII

The Company's Last Conquests

From the death of Ranjit Singh in 1839 Indian politics had been dominated by the problem of the Sikhs. Until the early years of the nineteenth century the Sikhs had possessed no leader whom they were prepared to follow as a body since the time of Banda. They were ranged in groups called *misls*, under the hereditary leadership of certain families. From time to time these leaders had met together to concert a common policy, but their efforts at united action had seldom met with great success. They had submitted reluctantly to the supremacy of the Durāni empire, and the Panjab continued to be at least in name a province of the Afghan government. The Sikhs themselves were a formidable military body, but they disdained every kind of service except the cavalry. In 1791 Ranjit Singh had succeeded to the headship of the Sukarchakia *misl*, and in 1797 he had accepted the governorship of Lahore from Zamān Shāh. He had employed this position to extend his authority over the whole of the Panjab, and in 1806 he was seeking to bring the Cis-Sutlej Sikhs under his authority also. This project brought him, as has already been noted, into conflict with English policy, and the outcome was the Treaty of Friendship of 1809, by which he agreed to limit the troops maintained by him on the east bank of the river to the number required for the maintenance of internal peace, and not to encroach upon the territories of the Sikh chiefs established there. He then turned his restless arms in other directions. In 1809-11 he was at war with the Gurkhas, taking from them the district of Kāngra. He then engaged in a constant war with his Afghan neighbours. At first he did not meet with great success. He failed to take Multān; he failed to occupy Kashmīr. But the domestic troubles of the Sadozais at last gave him his opportunity. In 1818 he captured Multān. In 1819 he conquered Kashmīr. In 1823 he annexed Peshāwar, which he had taken in 1818, though then he had not thought it wise to retain it in his own hands. These military successes were the fruit of the vigorous military policy which he pursued. The Sikh customs had been devised in order to make the

Sikhs good soldiers and to avoid the disadvantages imposed on Hindu troops by caste and other religious observances. Ranjit possessed therefore admirable material. But until his time Sikh fighters had been notably impatient of discipline and disdainful of all but their customary mode of fighting. They had despised the infantry and artillery, and had always refused to serve in them. But under the pressure which their ruler now placed upon them, and their trust in his ability, they came to enlist freely in all three arms. Ranjit Singh's army thus was homogeneous in a degree peculiar in Indian armies. Not that it was exclusively composed of Sikhs, for it included many Muslims and Hindus, but that in all three arms the Sikhs were predominant and gave the tone. Other Indian armies were far less united. In Sindhia's, for instance, the cavalry was Marāṭha, the infantry was mixed, the artillery was mainly Goanese. Nor was it only in composition that the Sikh army differed from the others. Ranjit Singh, like other Indian princes, was convinced of the superiority of European military methods. Like other Indian princes he employed Europeans to train his men. But unlike his fellows, he kept his European officers in strict subordination to his own authority. Under him no officers were to be found in the semi-independent position enjoyed by Raymond under the Nizām or by Perron under Sindhia. The Sikh army thus remained unbroken by sectional interests or by divided command. It was a national army in the sense in which the Marāṭha army under the early Pēshwās had been; and while the Marāṭha army had been positively weakened by the introduction of European instructors and methods of war, the Sikh army was strengthened.

Ranjit Singh had thus forged a weapon of great strength. But it was the only institution which he endowed with vigour enough to survive him. His government was a purely personal rule. His political advisers were his personal servants, whose wealth and position depended on his good will. No member of his durbar had any rights as against the mahāiāja. The administration was conducted by his personal agents, in accordance with his personal instructions, and though they enjoyed much discretionary authority, and were allowed a large measure of perquisites, they were inspired at best by personal devotion to their master, and at worst by personal ambition for themselves. The maintenance of such personal rule depends on the chance that one great man will be

followed by another. Ranjit was succeeded by his son, Kharak Singh, an imbecile, with a reputed brother, Shīr Singh, who hoped to displace him, and a son, Nau Nihāl Singh, bold and vicious, who wished to succeed him. At the durbar the wazīr, Dhīān Singh, and his brother, Gulāb Singh, known as the Jammū rajas, hated Kharak Singh because he preferred his favourite, Chet Singh, to them, and hated Nau Nihāl Singh because he was seeking to displace them. The two heads of the Sindhuanwala family, Arar and Ajīt Singh, were the chief rivals of the Jammū brothers. None of these men seems to have been inspired by any higher motive than that of getting as much wealth and power for himself as he could. The inevitable consequence was a series of personal intrigues carried to murderous lengths. Chet Singh was killed a few months after Ranjit's death. In the next year Kharak Singh died. His son, returning from the funeral rites, was killed by the fall of a gateway through which he had to pass. No one knows whether this was accidental; but few Sikhs believed that it was. The Jammū brothers had too much to gain by his removal. For the moment Kharak Singh's widow became regent, with Shīr Singh as her deputy and Dhīān Singh as wazīr. But in January, 1841, Shīr Singh seized Lahore, and was proclaimed mahārāja. This left the Jammū brothers still in power, and the Sindhuanwalas took to flight. In 1843, however, the Jammū brothers and their enemies came to an agreement, with the result that in September Ajīt Singh murdered Shīr Singh and his son, and then, turning on his new allies, murdered also Dhīān Singh. Dhīān's son, Hīra Singh, then came forward, overthrew the Sindhuanwalas, slew two of them, and proclaimed Dalīp Singh mahārāja. Dalīp was a supposed son of Ranjit by Rānī Jindan.

Amid this confusion of change and murder, while every aspirant looked to the army for assistance, the soldiery found itself the real repository of power. The discipline of the army vanished. *Panchayats* were formed in every unit, and nothing could be done without their assent. Repeated demands were made by the troops that their numbers should be raised and their pay increased. These demands could not be resisted, although the resources of the state were rapidly declining. The army fell into heavy arrears of pay. It became ever more insubordinate. Sooner or later some desperate politician as his last gamble with fate, or some group of more sober men perceiving that order could not be restored till the army had been destroyed, would throw it upon the English.

In 1842, while these events were still developing but when their probable outcome was already clear, Ellenborough was deeply concerned at the political position which he had inherited. He had succeeded in withdrawing the troops from Afghanistan without a breach with the Panjab. But it was necessary to bear in mind the probability of a future war with the Sikhs, and the need of placing the company in the strongest possible position to meet such a contingency. From that point of view, it would be advantageous if the company were enabled to attack the Sikhs, not merely along the line of the Sutlej but also on another front. The occupation of Sind became therefore a desirable object. Moreover, various difficulties had arisen with the amirs of that country. When the development of commercial relations with Central Asia had been in the forefront, Lord William Bentinck had made a treaty with the amirs, designed to liberate the Indus as a channel of trade from the numerous tolls which were imposed on boats passing up and down the river. The amirs had agreed to set up a fixed tariff on condition that no military stores should be allowed to pass. In 1836, when Ranjit Singh had been preparing to attack Sind, Auckland had intervened to prevent this expansion of Sikh power and at the same time had made a new treaty with the amirs by which the latter agreed to accept a permanent British resident. When, in connection with the invasion of Afghanistan, Auckland decided to make use of the Sind route, he had demanded that the amirs should show themselves friends of the British by co-operating with them in the war. They were required to allow the Bombay troops to pass up the river, and to make over the island of Bukkar as a depot on the British line of communications. The amirs were most reluctant to concede these points. But they were forced to consent, and in 1839 Karāchī was occupied. When the Afghan disasters became known, they thought that the time had come for their revenge. They began to intrigue with the Afghans and with Persia. Their intrigue did not amount to much more than declarations of hostility against the infidel and of desire to see his power destroyed. They would have done better to keep these natural but imprudent views to themselves. They had not adhered to the fixed tariff which had been set up on the Indus, and their administration was such as to shock any European observer. Ellenborough came to the conclusion that the position in Sind must be cleared up, and that the British forces there should not be

withdrawn until the amirs had accepted the company's suzerainty in the clearest terms


He appointed Sir Charles Napier to command the forces in Sind, and at the same time empowered him to conduct the political negotiations with the amirs. At this time the amirs formed two groups, governing Upper Sind from Khairpur and Lower Sind from Hyderabad. Both groups agreed verbally to accept a treaty which Napier proposed to them, but both proceeded to collect troops, with the intention of resisting. At the end of 1842 a number of the Khairpur amirs fled to Imāmgarh, a desert fortress about halfway between Khairpur and Hyderabad. It was difficult of access and enjoyed the local reputation of being impregnable. Taking this as a defiance, Napier marched against the place in January, 1843, and on his appearance it surrendered and was promptly blown up. More discussions followed. Outram, the resident, believed that he could settle everything if Napier would allow him to go down to Hyderabad. There he got the signatures to the treaty of all but one of the amirs. But when he seemed to be on the verge of a peaceful settlement, he was beset in the streets and then attacked in the residency. Napier, with 2800 men, was moving down towards Hyderabad. The amirs had assembled a force of over 20,000 at Miani. They certainly thought they could overwhelm the English. Napier attacked. A fierce battle followed in which the Balūchis were completely defeated. Six of the amirs at once surrendered, and Hyderabad was occupied. A second battle followed a month afterwards at Dabo, six miles from that city. The Balūchis were again beaten, and Napier hastened to occupy the chief places in the province. These events led to the annexation of Sind.

In this Ellenborough's policy has almost universally been condemned. The directors of the company made it a pretext for an embittered attack on a man who had offended them in other ways: and the Whigs naturally were glad to attack the man who had not hesitated to expose Auckland's misconduct. Napier's phrase, "a good, honest, useful piece of rascality", represents the common judgment. But the notion that the amirs were attacked and their country annexed simply because they were weak is scarcely tenable. The main culpability lies with Auckland. Ellenborough's responsibility is limited to his treatment of the situation which he inherited. He found the rulers of this frontier state

engaged in intrigues which were hostile though certainly not in themselves dangerous. He was clearly entitled to decide whether or not to exact the penalty. That was a question not of political morals but of political expediency. The size of the state, the immediate danger of its intrigues, are not relevant matters. Viewed broadly, the annexation of Sind seems comparable with the assumption of the Carnatic. In both cases advantage was taken of foolish and hostile conduct to secure a considerable political advantage. Ellenborough, like Wellesley, was more concerned to consolidate and strengthen the position of the East India Company than to make benevolent gestures in the idle hope that others would follow so futile an example.

The annexation of Sind was followed by the establishment of a simple and direct administration closely modelled on that which it displaced. Napier remained in civil charge of the province which he had conquered, and for some years the management of Sind was conducted, not by the Government of India and the dual government in England, but by the governor-general in correspondence with the secret committee of the court of directors, that is, with the president of the Board of Control. Sind therefore escaped the elaborate administration, with its long chain of courts of justice and careful division of functions, which had grown up in the older provinces. In each district Napier appointed an officer, more often chosen from the army than from the company's civil service, to exercise revenue, police and judicial authority. This system was naturally and strongly disapproved by those who had been brought up in the system of Bengal. But Henry Lawrence, who had at first condemned Napier's administration, on learning more of it confessed that he had been mistaken. The simple system worked well and effectively. When the Indian Mutiny broke out, Bartle Frere, who was in charge of the province, was able to denude it of troops in order to assist the Panjab on the one hand and Bombay on the other, without in any way endangering the peace and security of the country. The people apparently did not desire the restoration of their fallen rulers.

As has already been pointed out, relations with the Sikhs at this time were most uncertain. They could only be viewed, as Ellenborough wrote, "in the light of an armed truce." Nau Nihāl Singh had been violently anti-British. Dhillān Singh had hated the resident, Wade, almost as much as he had hated his



rivals at the durbar Hira Singh had secured the support of the army by telling it that the Sindhuanwalas had relied on English help. The failure of the civil government added to the difficulties. Although the Sutlej had roughly defined the limits of political influence, it had never formed a true political boundary. In 1809 Ranjit Singh had possessed districts on its eastern bank, and in them his sovereignty was unquestionable, although he had agreed to maintain in them only such a number of troops as was required for the preservation of order. Some of the minor Cis-Sutlej chiefs were feudatories of Lahore as well as being under the company's protection since they held lands on both sides of the river. In other cases it was uncertain under whose political authority they rightly fell. This interlacing of rights had in the past led to numerous discussions which had been settled with small regard for consistency but rather in that spirit of compromise which had ever marked the relations of the company with Ranjit Singh. But now both Lahore and Calcutta were inclined to stand upon their respective rights. Moreover there was the question of what number of troops might be kept by the Sikhs on the eastern bank of the river. The British frontier authorities were afraid of being caught napping. Every movement of troops near the Sutlej was regarded with great jealousy; and when the Sikh army was paying little obedience to the orders of the durbar, the general position was full of danger.

Until 1838 the troops maintained by the company on the Sikh borders had been few. In order to facilitate his Afghan campaign Auckland had increased them to some 8000, mainly at Ludhiana and the new station which he created at Firūzpur. Ellenborough, in view of the threatening situation, had placed troops in reserve behind the frontier posts, raising the force to 14,000 men and 48 guns. In 1844 he was recalled by the company and replaced by Lord Hardinge, who followed the same policy, and within a twelvemonth the concentration which would be available at once in the event of war had been increased to 40,000 men and 94 guns. These troops were massed, however, behind rather than on the frontier.

While such threatening relations existed between the Sikh government and the English, the Sikh government itself had fallen into a condition of extraordinary confusion. Hira Singh had been unable long to retain power. Rāni Jindan, under the

influence of her brother, Jawāhūr Singh, and her lover, Lāl Singh, won over the army Hira Singh, finding his position undermined, fled from Lahore, but was pursued and slain at the end of 1844. The rānī then attempted to attack Hira Singh's uncle, Gulāb Singh, in Jammū. Gulāb, finding himself too weak to resist by open force, bribed the troops sent against him, and submitted so far as to proceed to Lahore and promise to pay a fine of nearly seven lakhs, besides surrendering certain districts. Jawāhūr Singh was then, in May, 1845, formally installed as wazīr. For the moment the rānī's party seemed supreme. But it was divided. Lāl Singh, the favoured lover, aspired to the post of wazīr himself. The army, too, had never trusted Jawāhūr Singh. Before he had succeeded to the semblance of power, he had only been restrained by force from fleeing to the English with the young mahārāja. As soon as he had become wazīr, he had punished the commander who had made him a prisoner by cutting off his ears and nose. In the middle of 1845 Peshāwara Singh, a son of Ranjit living in his *jāgīr* of Sialkot, and encouraged by Gulāb Singh and other enemies of the wazīr, surprised Attock and proclaimed himself mahārāja. The rebellion was immediately crushed. Peshāwara Singh submitted and was at once put to death. This finally disgusted the army, which still nourished a strong respect for the blood of their late master. The *panchayats* of the regiments gathered together and resolved that the wazīr should be put to death. This decision was carried out on September 21. For several weeks no new wazīr was appointed. Then in November Lāl Singh was installed, and Tej Singh named commander-in-chief. But their real authority was small. Many leading Sikhs had long felt that the reduction of the army was the first need of the state. But that could not be accomplished by any internal means. It might be secured by directing it against the English. The Sikhs had watched the increase of military forces beyond the Sutlej with suspicion, and feared that it precluded an invasion of the Panjab. The army and the durbar came therefore to the same conclusion, and the army took the offensive by crossing the Sutlej on December 11, 1845.

The English forces were commanded by Sir Hugh Gough. The first encounter took place at Mūdkī, where the Sikhs were defeated with the loss of seventeen guns. This was followed by the great battle of Fīrūzshāh on December 21-22. After a fierce and

most obstinate fight the Sikh camp was taken, seventy-three guns were captured, and several thousand Sikhs slain. But Gough had lost one man out of every seven, and the spirit of his army, and especially the spirit of his sepoy troops, was shaken. After this came a pause while the English gathered reinforcements. Then, on January 28, one Sikh force was driven across the Sutlej at Aliwāl, and on February 10 their main body after another fierce and bloody battle at Sobiāon was driven, not across but into the Sutlej with enormous loss. Gough and Hardinge hastened to cross the river and march on Lahore before the Sikhs had recovered from the effects of this crushing blow. On February 20 the capital was occupied.

Hardinge had neither sought nor desired the conquest of the Panjab. He did desire a well ordered and friendly state upon his north-western frontier. This evidently excluded all idea of annexation. In Hardinge's view it also excluded the traditional policy of a subsidiary alliance, which would have made the company in fact if not in name responsible for the good government of the territory. By the treaty which was signed on March 9, 1846, Dalip Singh was formally recognised as mahārāja; the Sikhs were to surrender all lands and claims to the southward of the Sutlej, they were to pay an indemnity of a crore and a half of rupees, but of this only the half crore was to be paid in cash, the balance being liquidated by the cession of the Jalandhar doāb and the province of Kashmīr, the army was to be reduced and reorganised, and the arrears due to the soldiers who should be discharged were to be paid in full. By supplementary articles signed two days later Hardinge agreed to leave at Lahore till the end of 1846 troops sufficient to protect the person of the mahārāja and to maintain public order, but the governor-general was at liberty to withdraw the troops if the durbar did not proceed at once to the reorganisation of the army. By a separate treaty with Gulāb Singh Kashmīr was assigned to him for a payment of seventy-five lakhs of rupees. Both Gulāb and the durbar agreed to refer to the governor-general any disputes which might arise between them.

Hardinge's purpose in making these arrangements was to give the Sikh government a breathing space in which it might set its affairs in order, and Henry Lawrence was appointed British agent at Lahore. But effective reform was virtually impossible. The

darbar itself, under Lāl Singh as wazir, was composed of men who cared for nothing but their personal interests. The army could not be paid off and reorganised because there was no money. There was no money because great tracts of country had been assigned as *jāgīr* to various chiefs, who would not submit to any reduction of their privileges. Great difficulties arose in connection with this fundamental matter, and in fact Lawrence was allowed to advance money from the company's treasury for the payment of arrears to permit the disbandment of a number of men. Nor was the transfer of Kashmīr to Gulāb Singh carried out without much trouble. Although the darbar had agreed to recognise his independence, this went sorely against the grain with men who had always been his rivals and enemies. Long delays occurred. Then an insurrection broke out. It had to be suppressed by force of arms, and, when it appeared that Lāl Singh had been at the bottom of the movement, the resident demanded and the darbar agreed to his removal from the office of wazir. By this time the year was drawing to its close, and little had been done in the way of reformation. The darbar, certain that it could not maintain its position when the English had withdrawn, demanded that the English forces should be left at Lahore for a further term.

At a darbar which Hardinge had held on the day on which the Treaty of Lahore had been signed, he had declared to the assembled chiefs that success or failure was in their own hands; that he would co-operate with them; but that, if they lost their present opportunity, no aid from external friends could save the state. He had soon perceived that the Sikh government was not in the least likely to profit by the respite which he had given it, and had begun to consider what course of action he should pursue when the expected crisis should arise. By September he had begun to entertain the idea of undertaking the administration in Dalip Singh's name during his minority. Some eight years would elapse before the mahārāja could exercise power in person, and meanwhile the government might be carried on by a British minister assisted by a Sikh council. "By British interposition", he wrote, "justice and moderation are secured by an administration through native executive agency in accordance with the customs, feelings, and prejudices of the people." At the request of the darbar for the continuance of the British garrison, Hardinge revisited Lahore. He was ready, he said, to withdraw the garrison

in accordance with the treaty, but if it was to be continued, conditions must be accepted. The durbar was in no position to bargain. Hardinge's terms were accepted, and a new treaty was signed on December 16. This was signed by thirteen chiefs "acting with the unanimous consent and concurrence of the chiefs and sardars of the state assembled at Lahore". It provided that "a British officer with an efficient establishment of assistants shall be appointed by the governor-general to remain at Lahore, which officer shall have full authority to direct and control all matters in every department of the state". The administration was to be conducted by local officials appointed and superintended by a council of regency of eight members named in the treaty and not subject to change without the consent of the resident and the orders of the governor-general. This council was to act "in consultation with the British resident, who shall have full authority to direct and control the duties of every department". The arrangement was to continue till Dalip Singh came of age on September 4, 1854, and the durbar was to pay twenty-two lakhs a year for the maintenance of the army of occupation, while the governor-general was to be free to garrison any fortresses he chose within Sikh territory.

This second treaty in effect recognised that the first had failed of its purpose. Left to itself with a minimum of interference and even a certain measure of financial help, the durbar had reformed nothing, and the wazir had even sought to counteract the treaty under which he had been continued in office. Hardinge's new plan was to place the Sikh government under British superintendence. Thus, he hoped, would provide a driving power towards reform which had been lacking under the former régime. If this too failed, annexation was still held in reserve as a last resort. Hardinge desired above all that his policy should be free from all taint of haste or aggressiveness.

Lāl Singh had been deprived of his office as wazir and removed into British territory as a preliminary condition of the treaty of December 16. His removal was intended to exclude Rāni Jindan from farther participation in the management of affairs. Vexed by the exile of her lover, and humiliated by the reduction of her importance, she strove to avoid her political extinction. The result was that she was removed from Lahore to Benares. Henry Lawrence, who was continued as resident, was nevertheless faced

with a task of extraordinary difficulty. He enjoyed the assistance of the ablest men Hardinge could find for him, and it is noteworthy that the leaders of that remarkable group which Dalhousie afterwards employed to govern the Panjab had already been employed in the province by Hardinge and Lawrence. They included Henry's brother, George Lawrence, Herbert Edwardes, John Nicholson, Lumsden of the Guides—men of great energy and talent. A deliberate part of the new plan had been to maintain the native character of the administration, to act only through the customary channels, and to veil as completely as possible the reality of the resident's predominance. The task was therefore not that merely of reforming the government, but the much more delicate one of reforming as well the practices of men bred in the traditional methods of squeeze and graft. Lawrence was called on to effect the political education of the governing class, and through them to introduce into the country that regularity, honesty, and justice which formed the ideal of the company's administration. His strong sympathy with the Sikh aristocracy, his knowledge of the people, the union of gentleness and force which marked his character, gave him unrivalled qualifications for such a business. Yet he failed completely. As soon as one of the resident's assistants was sent into a district to investigate complaints and advise reforms, he was besieged by men demanding his direct interposition in their affairs. In the frontier districts especially, distracted by the century-long feuds between Muslim and Sikh, something very like direct British authority was established. It was impossible to conceal British control. The durbai's agents were ignored, the resident's assistants were sought after and obeyed. This experience under Lawrence in the Panjab is perhaps the best answer to the critics who enquire why reformer after reformer in British India refused to employ Indian agency in the superior offices of government.

This position enjoyed by the resident and his officers did not pass unresented. The chiefs who were not members of the council of regency and whose influence and profits were curtailed by reforms which Lawrence tried to introduce, were urged to opposition by both pride and interest. The Sikh soldiery, too, were full of desire to try conclusions once more with the men whom they had almost overthrown at Firūzshāh. Some event or other was sure to set fire to the people of the *Khālsa*, as the Sikhs

called themselves. The spark actually came from Multān. The governor, Mūlāj, had succeeded his father, who had been murdered in 1844, and regarded himself as something more than a mere agent of the durbar. The new régime was more exact than the old in the matter of accounts, and demands were made on the governor for large arrears. Mūlāj offered to resign his office. A new governor was appointed, and two of the resident's assistants were sent to install him. On their entry into the city they were beset by an excited crowd and murdered. Mūlāj promptly prepared for a siege, gathering troops and strengthening the fortifications of Multān.

This murder occurred on April 20, 1848. Early in the year Lawrence had gone to England on leave with Hardinge, who had been succeeded by Lord Dalhousie as governor-general. Sir Frederic Currie, who had become resident at Lahore, reported the untoward development to the Government of India, requesting immediate help to suppress the rebellion of Mūlāj. Dalhousie and Gough, who was still commander-in-chief, agreed that the hasty despatch of small bodies of troops would be a mistake. The hot weather was just approaching, and would make military movements difficult and costly of life. That, however, was not the principal consideration. It had long been apparent that the Sikhs were discontented with the control which was being exercised over their administration. If, as Dalhousie believed, the rebellion of Mūlāj was only the prelude to a general revolt, a small force sent against Multān might be destroyed, while the despatch of a large force might prevent the Sikhs from breaking out without in any way improving the general situation. It was therefore decided to take no immediate steps, but to prepare a strong force which should be ready to operate against any enemy who should appear when the hot weather was over, when the rains had fallen, and when military operations would be feasible. This decision was certainly wise. If the Sikhs wanted a renewal of the war, it had better be such a war as they would not wish to repeat, a war which would convince them of the military strength of the company.

The situation developed in accordance with Dalhousie's expectations. Herbert Edwards under Currie's orders got together a small force which marched on Multān and attempted vainly to besiege it. Meantime excitement among the Sikhs rose high.

Troubles broke out on the Afghan frontier. A Sikh chief obtained a promise of help from Dost Muhammad in return for the agreement to give back to him the city of Peshāwar. Sikh troops gathered. The siege of Multān had to be abandoned. By the middle of October Dalhousie informed the resident at Lahore that he considered the Sikh government to be virtually at war with the company. On November 9 Gough, with the army which had been assembled, crossed the Sutlej into Sikh territory, on the 13th he reached Lahore, and on the 22nd forced the Sikh army, under the command of Shīr Singh, across the Jhelum. In December the siege of Multān was reformed, and on January 22 the place was captured. But before this, on January 13, Gough had fought another of those bloody and expensive battles for which he is remembered. After a four hours' march, he had come upon the Sikh army at Chilianwāla, had attacked it, had driven it from its ground with heavy loss, but had himself lost many men, four guns, and the colours of three regiments. Like Hardinge after the battle of Firūzshāh, Dalhousie concluded that Gough was too wasteful of his men to be left in charge of the campaign. He applied to London for his recall, and Gough was accordingly superseded by Sir Charles Napier. But before Napier could arrive, Gough as in the former war redeemed his reputation as a general by the complete triumph of Gujrat. The Sikhs were scattered and could never form again. Within three weeks of this victory they had surrendered, the Afghans had withdrawn hurriedly from the Panjab, and Peshāwar had been occupied by British forces. The Second Sikh War was over.

Dalhousie now put into force the policy towards which Hardinge had reluctantly drifted. He annexed the province. Dalip Singh was deposed, given a pension, and required to reside outside the Panjab. Attempts were made to represent him as ill-used. He had had nothing to do with the second war. But neither could he hold out the faintest probability of his being able to control the Sikhs and transform them into the friendly neighbours of whom Hardinge had dreamed. The policy of friendship had been tried; the policy of guidance had been tried; and at last remained only the policy of annexation. Thus the company took control of one more of the provinces of the Mughal empire. Military superiority was once more consolidating the fragments into which the country had broken up in the eighteenth century

The whole country from Peshāwar to Cape Comorin now lay under the control, in one form or another, of the East India Company. Either the direct government of the company had been set up or the rule was in the hands of princes who were bound both by treaty and self-interest to comply with the demands which the company might make upon them.

Kābul was the one province which had not been recovered. But in other directions the company had exceeded the boundaries of the Mughals. Owing to its combination of predominance ashore and afloat, it had found no difficulty in bestriding the barrier which the Vindhya and Sārpura hills cast across the peninsula. The Mughal empire had broken down under the strain of holding both northern and southern India, the Marāthas had lost their union of purpose in the effort to expand northwards, but the company, with its alternative routes, its power of landing troops at any point of the Indian sea-board, its communications unthreatened by an enemy save at two brief moments, had found no difficulty in establishing its authority over India as a whole. Thus same union of military and naval power facilitated its expansion into a region into which the Mughals had never penetrated. From the first appearance of the Europeans in the east they had attempted without much success to trade with the kingdoms established on the east coast of the Bay of Bengal. Portuguese, Dutch, and French had each in turn opened factories and abandoned them when they found that foreign trade was looked on as a royal monopoly and foreign settlers as an increase in the king's people. The English from Masulipatam and Madras on the other side of the Bay had been more persistent but hardly more successful than their rivals. Addison, the essayist, had hoped to inherit a great fortune from the trade to Syria of his brother, a company's servant at Madras, but had been grievously disappointed. In 1753 a factory was opened on Negrais Island, but six years later the inhabitants were massacred by the Burmese. What trade there was consisted only of private ventures, and the company took no interest in a commerce which promised neither profit nor advantage commensurate with its risks. A few vagrant Englishmen were to be found at Rangoon, but they were men of neither wealth nor influence. Under a vigorous king, Alaungpaya, the Burmese in the middle of the eighteenth century overcame the Talangs in the Irawadi delta and Tenasserim. Under his successor,

Bodawpaya, they expanded northwards, conquering Arakan in 1785, Manipur in 1813, and Assam in 1816. In 1818, remembering that some centuries earlier Arakan had received tribute from the Ganges delta, they demanded that the British should surrender to them Chittagong, Dacca, and Murshidābād. For years, owing to the Burmese operations, the regions lying on the borderlands had been most unsettled. Fugitives from the conquered lands had taken refuge in British territory. Fifty thousand Arakanese had fled to Chittagong, and some under a spirited leader, Nga Chin Pyan, had made raids upon the Burmese. The British had seized a number of his chief followers, but had refused to hand them over to the Burmese to be tortured to death. The Burmese conquest of Assam had been followed by great massacres, while 30,000 had been driven in slave-gangs down to the conqueror's capital at Ava. The more fortunate found shelter in Bengal, and attempted reprisals. Every endeavour was made to prevent hostile excursions from leaving British territory, but the British were not willing to give the Burmese the only satisfaction with which they would have been content, the unconditional surrender of men whose only crime was that of seeking to recover their country.

Several attempts had been made to establish regular political relations with the Burmese court at Ava. Symes was sent in 1795, Cox in 1797, Symes again in 1802, and Canning thrice between 1803 and 1811. They were received with contempt, after the Chinese manner. They were made to live on an island in the river reserved for scavengers. They were told that they represented no one more important than a servant and that no envoy could be received unless he came direct from the king of England. In 1823-4 the Burmese, confident in their power, invaded the company's territories in force. Their orders were to capture Calcutta. Amherst, who was then governor-general, contented himself with checking their advance on the land frontier, but at the same time he sent an expedition, drawn mainly from Madras, under the command of Sir Archibald Campbell and Captain Marryat, the novelist. They occupied Rangoon on May 11, 1824. It had been expected that the Taluings would rise in their favour: but the Taluings had been deported, and the country round was left deserted. A long and ill-conducted campaign followed. The English had poor information, bad medical arrangements, ineffective supply. Whenever the Burmese attacked, they were


routed. But the fighting was for the most part jungle fighting, in which regular troops lost much of their technical advantage. However, after making prodigious efforts to destroy the invaders, the Burmese were compelled to make peace in February, 1826. The king agreed to give up Tenasserim in the south, and Aikan, Assam, Cachar, Jaintia, and Manipul, in the north. He was also to pay an indemnity of ten lakhs of rupees, and receive a British resident at Ava as well as maintaining one at Calcutta.

This agreement, known as the Treaty of Yandabo, brought peace but no permanent settlement. The Burmese king, Bagyidaw, would not maintain a resident at Calcutta; and on his death in 1837, the new king, Tharawaddy, refused to admit that the treaty was binding on him at all. "The English beat my brother, not me", he declared. In 1840 consequently the residency was withdrawn. From this time onwards the position of the few English inhabitants of Rangoon was extremely precarious. But the company's government generally refused to consider their complaints, on the ground that anyone choosing to live under Burmese government did so at his own risk. But in 1850 matters came to a head. In that year was appointed a governor of Rangoon who when drunk used to threaten to torture and behead the whole population of the town. A British barque ran aground near Rangoon. The pilot jumped overboard and swam ashore. The governor accused the captain of throwing the pilot overboard, detained him and his crew for eight days, and fined him 1005 rupees. In another case a lascar died on board a British vessel on the day she anchored off Rangoon. The governor accused the captain of murder, threatened to behead him, detained him for three weeks, and at last fined him 700 rupees. Dalhousie sent a King's ship, the *Fox*, frigate, under Commodore Lambert, to request the removal of this unjust governor and compensation for the two English captains who had suffered from his exactions. King Pagān, who was then ruling, was willing to accommodate matters, appointing a new governor with authority to settle the dispute. But the officers sent by Lambert to welcome the new governor were not admitted to his presence, the new governor had come down accompanied by a large force of men; and Lambert, mistaking these portents, declared a blockade of Rangoon and seized one of the king's ships. On this the land batteries opened fire on the *Fox*. This event led to the Second Burmese War.

This new war was in every way except its termination a complete contrast to the first. Under Dalhousie's superintendence careful arrangements were made to supply the men with food and the hospitals with medicines. The Talangs in the delta rose in favour of the English. The Shāns refused to send levies to help the Burmese king. Rangoon and Mārtabān were occupied at once; then Bassein was taken, followed by Prome and the Pegu country. The campaign ended by Dalhousie's refusing to allow his commanders to advance farther and annexing Pegu by proclamation on December 20, 1852. He left it to the king to accept a treaty or not as he chose, but warned him that, if again he provoked hostilities, they would end in the complete subjection of the Burmese power.

The Second Burmese War thus ended in giving the company the complete control of the shores of the Bay of Bengal, together with the port of Rangoon, while the Burmese monarchy was driven back into the interior whence it had emerged in the middle of the eighteenth century.

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CHAPTER IX

The Growth of British Sovereignty and the Company's Relations with the Indian States

When the company set out on its career of expansion in the years following the battle of Plassey, various circumstances combined to conceal the political significance of its action. The company itself, fearing lest the national government should seize its acquisitions on behalf of the crown, disliked the idea of territorial gains, which could only be made in the name of King George III. The result was the establishment of the system of dual government, by which everything was to be done in the name of some powerless and dependent prince by the servants and for the benefit of the East India Company. Despite the efforts of Warren Hastings to get rid of this legacy imposed upon him by Clive, the position in Bengal long remained most anomalous. In theory the company was only the *dhavān*; in practice it exercised full authority. But that authority was asserted only by the refusal to continue the payment to the emperor Shāh 'Ālam of the annual tribute promised by Clive and by the transfer of the districts of Kora and Allāhābād from the emperor to the nawab wazir of Oudh. In other formal respects the company's government continued to recognise the authority of the emperor. The seal of the governor-general purported to be that of a servant of the Mughal. The coinage was still struck in Shāh 'Ālam's name. In international discussions the English did not claim sovereignty except in Calcutta and the surrounding region, posing elsewhere as the influential adviser of the nawab who reigned, but did not rule, at Murshidābād. The French and the Dutch could thus avoid all public recognition of the supreme position which the company occupied throughout the province.

It has been thought that this obscure position was designed to conciliate Indian sentiment and to conceal foreign dominion. But for that view small justification exists. The leading men of the province knew well who exercised authority; the people neither knew nor cared who governed so long as they were not

taxed beyond customary limits. Wars and revolutions were affairs in which they took no interest, in which they had no concern. No one had raised a finger to aid Shāh-ud-daula after his defeat; no one had sought to bring back Mīr Kāsim after his expulsion, no conspiracies were formed against the English company. Had popular feeling been the sole factor to be taken into consideration, the vicious system adopted by Clive need never have been set up and would never have been perpetuated. It was directed not to deceive the Indian inhabitants of the province, but to prevent probable encroachments of the ministry at London and probable complaint from the capitals of Europe.

This extraordinary position continued for a long period of time. Neither the Regulating Act of 1773, nor the India Act of 1784, nor the act extending the company's privileges in 1793, made the least attempt to assert English sovereignty over the company's possessions. They legislated for them, altering the form of the company's administration, setting up a Supreme Court of Judicature, defining the powers which the company's government might exercise, but nowhere asserting that the inhabitants of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa were the subjects of King George. In fact the position in India was to be wholly transformed before the great revolution was recognised in English law. Cornwallis was the first governor-general to object to the empty formulas in which the company's government was accustomed to protest obedience in its letters to the emperor. Wellesley, who indeed projected the establishment of British predominance in India, carried matters much further. By Lord Lake's victory at Delhi, the person of the emperor passed into the custody of the East India Company. By the arrangements which Wellesley then made, the administration of Delhi was to be conducted in the imperial name, but the only spot in which the imperial orders were really effective was the palace and its precincts. Following on this, the act of 1813, while renewing the company's privileges for another twenty years, declared that its authority was "without prejudice to the undoubted sovereignty of the crown of the United Kingdom". The conclusion of the Napoleonic wars in 1815 led to the recognition of the new position by the states chiefly interested in the Indian situation. The treaties of 1814 and 1815 expressly recognised British sovereignty within the Indian possessions of the East India Company. These

legislative and diplomatic facts gave an added impulse to the movement in India. Lord Moira, who arrived as governor-general in 1813, brought out with him a fixed determination to make an end of "the fiction of the Mogul government." The phrase denoting the imperial supremacy was removed from his seal. No more ceremonial gifts were offered to the emperor in the governor-general's name. He refused to meet the emperor, Akbar II, Shāh 'Ālam's son, unless he waived all authority over the company's possessions. This suggestion was refused. But in 1827 the emperor consented to meet Moira's successor, Amherst, on equal terms. The meeting took place in the *Diivān-i khās* at Delhi. The two entered from opposite sides at the same instant. They sat down, the emperor on his throne, the governor-general on a chair placed on the right, simultaneously. No gift was offered by the latter. From this time onwards, though all letters from the governor-general to the emperor were addressed as to a superior, they avoided all those terms which would have implied vassalage on the part of the company's government. In 1835 the coinage of Bengal ceased to be struck in the name of the dead emperor, Shāh 'Ālam, whose titles had continued to appear on the company's rupees till that year. Then it was resolved to induce the imperial family to remove from the old palace at Delhi to a new residence which was to be built for it near the Kutb Minār, and at last Canning decided no longer to recognise the imperial title after the demise of the existing emperor, Bahādur Shāh. Immediately after this the Mutiny broke out. After the fall of Delhi, the emperor was placed on his trial for complicity in the murders which had taken place at Delhi and, more doubtfully, for rebellion against the East India Company. He was declared deposed; he passed the rest of his days as a state-prisoner at Rangoon, and the British government became both in form and in substance supreme as well as sovereign in India.

This development had a considerable reaction upon the relations of the East India Company with its Indian allies. From the time of Clive onwards, those relations had been very different from those of equals. The nawab wazir of Oudh and the nawab of the Carnatic had speedily become dependent on the military support of the company and had therefore tended to fall into the class of political clients. For their protection, alike from foreign enemies and from their own subjects, detachments of the company's troops

were stationed in their territories, but, although these subsidiary forces were paid for by the prince in question, they remained under the orders of the company's government. From the company's point of view such subsidiary alliances had great advantages. They rendered the princes who accepted them allies who could never afford to break their alliance; and they provided the means for an increase of military force without casting any burden on the resources of the company's territories. Wellesley, who first formulated the idea of uniting all India in a league under the general direction of the company, naturally developed into a formal policy what had begun as a casual expedient. He made subsidiary alliances with three of the major states of India—with Hyderabad, with Poona, and with Mysore. In the first two cases the princes who accepted a subsidiary alliance did so as a defence against external dangers in no way caused by the company: the Nizām accepted a subsidiary force as a protection against his over-powerful Marāṭha neighbours, and the Pēshwā accepted one as a protection against the attacks of his nominal subordinate, Holkar. At Mysore the treaty was part of Wellesley's scheme for the reorganisation of the state after the overthrow of Tipu Sultān. In two respects these treaties contained new features. They all bound the princes to settle foreign disputes in consultation with the governor-general; and they all bound them not to admit to their service any foreign Europeans without the governor-general's consent. But from Wellesley's stand-point this did not go far enough, for it offered no guarantee for a good administration within the territories of the company's allies. The condition of Oudh and of the Carnatic afforded striking examples of the evils which might arise out of the protection of the company. Wellesley was therefore eager to engraft on the subsidiary policy further provisions which would obviate this evil. He desired that the company should become guide as well as protector, and that the allied princes should be bound to accept such advice as might be offered to them by the governor-general. Naturally, though unwisely, the princes shrank from admitting this right of interference in their internal affairs. In two cases only was Wellesley able to give effect to his desires. In Mysore he was able to dictate the terms on which he was willing to restore the Hindu royal family to the throne from which it had been expelled by Hyder 'Alī. In Mysore therefore the governor-general's right to give

advice to the prince, and, in case of need, to re-enter on the Mysore territory, was fully admitted. In Oudh too the position of the nawab wazir was so precarious, and the need of casting the protecting arm of the company around his dominions so undeniable, that Wellesley was able to insist on a promise that an improved system of administration should be adopted and attention paid to British advice. Elsewhere this policy was not practicable; and the most that the governor-general could do towards freeing the company from responsibility for corrupt and inefficient administration was to procure grants of territory to be placed under the company's administration instead of the periodical payments due for the support of the subsidiary forces.

Unhappily neither Wellesley's successors nor the directors of the East India Company were disposed to accept the responsibility which he alone among the company's governors-general was prepared to recognise as incumbent upon the predominance towards which the company was evidently moving. In this respect the treaties which Lord Moira concluded at the end of the Marāṭha War in 1818 offer a remarkable contrast to those which Wellesley arranged. In 1818 Moira had a great opportunity. His victory was complete, and no prince was prepared to question the power of the company's government. The predominance which Wellesley had foreseen had come to pass. In such circumstances Wellesley would almost certainly have made the privilege of the company's alliance depend upon the princes' willingness to accept political guidance, not only in matters of external policy, but also in those of internal administration. But Moira, like the directors, shrank from assuming so great a responsibility, and his treaties followed the usual lines of the subsidiary system, with the formal addition that neither the company nor its officials should interfere in the internal government of its allies. Thus a principle was laid down that the company was in no wise responsible for the administration of the Indian states, so long as their mismanagement did not lead to disorders within the company's own possessions, and that all interference in the internal affairs of the states was as far as possible to be avoided.

This position was, however, extraordinarily difficult to maintain. The company's government controlled by far the largest group of territories in India, and it was in military power the equal of all the other states combined. These facts alone made it

something different from the equal ally of the treaties. Its wishes carried all the influence of power and the prestige of victory. The very constitution of its government, confined as that was to a single class of men from a distant country, was, in the ideas of the time, likely to invest it with the respect due to a caste specially given to war and statecraft. This strange, efficiently organised and closely united power was unique in India, and offered the greatest possible contrast to the position of the other Indian states. They were not merely disunited among themselves, but their governments were cleft by a thousand internal differences. No prince could rely upon the whole-hearted support of all his subjects, on the unhesitating allegiance of all his troops, or on the confidence of the bankers of his state. Moreover the establishment of the company as the common ally of them all, with the consequent disappearance of war, created an artificial situation, in which political vices ceased to exercise their normal effects. Each prince was secure on his throne, notwithstanding the discontent of his people or the jealous eyes with which he was regarded by his abler neighbours. He lacked that most powerful motive, self-interest, which in other circumstances would have compelled him to keep his government sound under pain of destruction if he failed. While, then, the company's government, under pressure of English opinion, was all the time seeking to improve its administrative system, the Indian princes were sinking into a swift decay, and the same causes which had secured the political predominance of the company rapidly gathered weight and momentum.

The material superiority of the company thus grew swiftly in the forty years which followed on the victories of Lord Moira, and constantly tended to pass into political control. In regions such as Kāthiāwār and Central India, divided among a great number of petty chiefs, close control proved to be a political necessity. It was needed to prevent ceaseless squabbles among neighbours or the encroachments of the overlord. In Kāthiāwār, under the management of Colonel Walker, famous for his campaign against female infanticide, an active supervision was established over the conduct of the lesser chiefs. In Central India, which was placed under the management of Sir John Malcolm, the British government not only guaranteed the settlement of the tributes due to Sindhia but also recognised a carefully graduated scale of powers which might be exercised by the tributories. Nor

was the tendency confined to the smaller states. At Baroda, for instance, where difficulties arose over the debts due from the Gackwar to the bankers of his state, it was found necessary to guarantee a settlement of their claims, leading in fact to much supervision of the internal management of the prince. In Hyderabad revenue maladministration produced interference. The vicious practice of farming out the revenues was carried there to extraordinary lengths. It was currently said that a newly appointed revenue-farmer, setting out from the capital to take up his charge, always rode facing his horse's tail in order to watch whether he was followed by some rival who had displaced him either by superior favour or by larger bribes. Metcalfe, when resident with the Nizām, made a strong attempt to introduce reforms into this branch of the Nizām's administration, although this policy was not persisted in. In the same state difficulties arose over the Arab mercenaries who formed a considerable part of the forces of the state. These men always insisted, as part of the terms of their enlistment, that they should not be subject to the law of the state but only to their own tribal law, enforced by their own tribal courts. They followed the frugal custom of saving a great part of their pay and entrusting it to their officers who used it to buy revenue farms in the districts in which they were quartered. The consequence was that in certain areas of the state the authority of the Nizām counted for nothing, and that the Arab troops lived in virtual independence. The assistance of British troops was required to reduce the Arabs to obedience. Here too the finance of the contingent which the British government required the Nizām to maintain, was a constant source of trouble, and led to the accumulation of heavy claims for arrears which were at last only liquidated by the lease of the Berars to the British government in 1853. In Mysore the financial mismanagement of the raja provoked a rebellion in the state in 1830. Here the treaty of Wellesley had provided the company with ample authority to interfere in case of need. But the prevalent views of policy had led to a neglect of the duties imposed by the treaty. The raja had been suffered to persist in his system of government long after he should have been called to an exact account. The rebellion brought matters to a head, and Lord William Bentinck, who was then governor-general, decided to relieve the raja altogether of his powers and appointed Mark Cubbon to administer the state. At

Gwalior during a minority the parties at the durbar quarrelled bitterly among themselves and the army of the state, some 40,000 strong, passed out of control. Ellenborough decided to intervene, and moved with a strong body of troops across the Chambal. The state army resisted and was defeated at the battle of Mahārājpur in 1843, when new terms were imposed on the state, including the limitation of the military forces maintained by it. Thus in a large number of cases the declared policy of non-intervention broke down and was replaced by active interference. As Elphinstone observed in 1832 "This has arisen from the weakness and bad reputation of the native governments. They have often been obliged to request our support against insubordinate chiefs or other subjects and they have also been obliged to solicit our guarantee to pecuniary arrangements and other settlements where the other contracting party could not depend on their faith".

It had at first been hoped that the practice of having a large voice in the selection of the chief ministers of the major states would obviate the need of further interference. From 1810, for example, the governor-general had insisted that the chief minister at Hyderabad should be a person enjoying his confidence as well as that of his master, the Nizām. Chandu Lāl, who held office for over thirty years, owed his prolonged tenure of office entirely to the support of the resident. From a narrowly political point of view the plan was successful. The minister who rested upon British support was not likely to countenance intrigue hostile to the British government, and his overthrow would be a clear signal of political danger ahead. Ellenborough's campaign at Gwalior was brought about by the violent overthrow of the minister in office. Nevertheless, the system had many disadvantages. The most that can be said for it is that it was imposed on the British government in consequence of its declared policy of non-intervention. Metcalfe, recalling the sound doctrine of the school of Wellesley in which he himself had been brought up, wrote with profound truth, "If possible, I would leave all native states to their own government without interference. But we are always dragged in somehow, and then it is difficult to say what should be done. The worst plan of all, I think, is to keep in a minister against the will of the prince, and to support the man without regard to his measures. Yet this is the mode we have generally slidden into; and as it has been adopted by wiser heads

than mine, it is probably right or unavoidable. I would prefer leaving the minister to the choice of the prince, and interfering only as to measures."

In any case, the general effect of the policy of avoiding interference was contrary to the interests of the princes themselves. If the authority which Wellesley had taken in Mysore and Oudh had been exercised with ordinary wisdom the administration of the first need not have been assumed for forty years, and the territories of the second need not have been annexed at all. But from about 1832 a new spirit seems to have entered into the policy of the East India Company. Till then every accession of territory had been regarded as a matter of the most dubious advantage. Indeed, until a workable system of administration had been devised, the transfer of an area from Indian to British control was no very obvious advantage to its inhabitants. But with the formation of a regular system of government, with the improvements which the needs and circumstances of the other British provinces introduced into the system devised by Cornwallis for Bengal, with the growing knowledge of the customs and life of the people which the company's servants were acquiring everywhere outside that unfortunate province, with the increasing activity of missionary effort, and with the formation of an educational policy, large and influential classes in England, which till then had rejected with horror every suggestion of an increase in the company's power, began to hold that India would benefit by every extension of British authority. Therefore, the dislike with which all annexations had been regarded did not indeed vanish but unquestionably began to abate. The future continuance of the Indian states thus became uncertain. Men began to argue, with Elphinstone, that the Indian governments, like every despotism, were essentially ephemeral, and that any stable government founded in their midst must sooner or later swallow them all up.

This change of view was exemplified in two ways. In the first place the company formally declared that in future no just and honourable opportunity of acquiring territory was to be rejected. In the second place, and in consequence of this declaration, it began to take an active interest in the question of successions. At first this matter had been considered to lie outside the scope of the company's interests. So late as 1829 it had taken Metcalfe severely to task for having ventured in a minute to assert a claim to deter-

nune the succession in Bhartpur That attitude was now abandoned All successions were examined, and the new position was adopted that no succession was valid until it had been recognised by the company's government The claim was not unreasonable, though unsupported by the letter of the treaties In the event of a demise, the successor inherited the treaty obligations of the late ruler, so that it was a subject of the company's concern that the power of the state should not pass to one unlikely to observe them. Moreover the Indian rules of succession were extraordinarily lax in European eyes. Among Muslim ruling families the will of the late ruler was usually the only criterion by which one son was preferred to another. Among Hindu chiefs, the rule was that where there was no son, the throne passed to an adopted son, who might be adopted either by the chief himself or after his death by his widow. In both classes therefore the lack of clear and definite rules was likely to produce much intrigue leading possibly to open war The decision of some external authority was on general grounds most expedient. Nor was the exercise of such authority in any way alien to Indian custom

The chief difficulty emerged in the matter of adoptions The company developed the view that its approval was necessary for an adoption to carry with it the political consequence of succession to government The Indian practice in regard to subordinate chiefs, as for instance in Central India under the Marāṭha states, was to demand that permission should be sought before the adoption took place, and that otherwise it was invalid. The company was thus assuming that it occupied towards the Indian states the same position that Sindhua held as regards a Rājput feudatory. However, it did not precisely follow Indian precedent. Indian rulers seldom refused permission to adopt, but they almost invariably imposed terms, such as a reduction of territory or a special payment known as *nazarāna* The company never demanded such concessions, but on some occasions it refused permission altogether, and where it refused permission it annexed the state.

An analysis of the cases which occurred before the time of Dalhousie does not disclose any principles on which permission was given or refused. But Dalhousie endeavoured to introduce consistency into this practice of escheat. In a series of minutes he discussed the position of the various classes of states. These he considered were three in number In the first class were those

which were in every respect independent when they entered into alliance with the company. Such were the old Rājput states of Jodhpur or Jaipur. In the second were those which were dependent on some other prince before they fell within the company's orbit. Such were the Cis-Sutlej chiefs who had been dependent on Sindhia, or the Bundelkhand chiefs who had been dependent on the Pēshwā. In the third were those which had been created by the company's government. Such were Mysore, Satāia, or Nāgpur. He considered that the chiefs of the first class should receive permission to adopt in every case in which they applied for it, that the chiefs of the second class should receive permission if on any ground it appeared expedient to give it, but that chiefs of the third class normally should not receive such permission. This was what became known as "the doctrine of lapse". It will be noticed that comparatively few states, and very few major states, were threatened with extinction by the principles thus defined. They affected no Muslim ruling family and no major state except Mysore and Nāgpur. On these grounds he recommended the annexation of a small group of states. They included Satāra, Nāgpur, and Jhānsi.

More generally dangerous to the preservation of the states was the doctrine that a persistent course of maladministration might lead to their annexation. This doctrine was the correlative of the principle of non-intervention. That policy had a pleasing air of leaving the Indian princes free to do as they liked, but it carried with it the disagreeable risk of leaving them to run into such confusion as would threaten the peace of their great neighbour or at least demand a choice between interference and the disorder which would follow the withdrawal of the company's protection. When Dalhousie went out to India, the condition of two of the great states was regarded with considerable apprehension. In both Hyderabad and Oudh the government was extremely bad, the land revenue systems in disorder, the taxes collected only by military force, and the amounts due from the states to the company running into great sums. In both cases Dalhousie was authorised to annex the state if he thought that the proper course to take. His conduct shows how far he was from pursuing such a policy of general annexation as is usually ascribed to him. Instead of annexing Hyderabad he came to an agreement with the Nizām's government by which, as has already been indicated, the difficulties

were smoothed over by the assignment of Bēiar to the company on lease. In Oudh previous governors-general, instead of acting on the treaty which Wellesley had made, had contented themselves with warning the king, as he had styled himself since the time of Moura, that if he did not reform his government they would have to interfere. In 1837 Auckland had made a new treaty empowering the company if necessary to assume the administration, but this treaty had not been confirmed by the company. It was not therefore valid. But that did not affect the position that the king was obliged by the earlier treaty to reform his administration. In 1847 Hardinge warned him that he must introduce reforms, a demand amply justified by the later reports of Colonel Sleeman, who was charged by Dalhousie with the task of investigating the condition of the country. After careful consideration Dalhousie concluded that it would be improper to require the king to abdicate, partly because he and his predecessors had been consistent supporters of the company's government, partly because a share in the responsibility for the condition of the kingdom must be laid at the company's door for its earlier failure to enforce reform. But since reform was now imperative, the administration should be taken over by the British government with the king's assent. The council desired to see stronger measures taken than Dalhousie had proposed, and the court of directors took the same view, ordering the province to be annexed to the British possessions. The execution of these orders was among the last duties of Dalhousie, who can in no degree be held responsible for the course adopted. Indeed, although he added extensive territories to the company's dominions, to annexation for its own sake he was strongly opposed. It has already been pointed out how carefully he defined and limited the claims of the company to acquire territory by escheat. At Hyderabad he had refrained from taking advantage of the discretion with which he had been invested. In Oudh he was opposed to annexation. It is clear that he sought accessions of territory only where they were to be desired for specific reasons, where, as in Nāgpur, acquisition would consolidate the company's possessions and facilitate communications between the various provinces, or as in the Panjab, where the establishment of British rule would strengthen the strategic position.

Meanwhile every accession of territory had increased the

general influence which the company's government exercised over the governments of the Indian princes. The equal alliances which the treaties appeared to establish were obviously purely fictitious. The claim which the company had set up to regulate the matter of successions formed a long step towards the assumption of superior powers and a superiority of status. The fact that in important states such as Hyderabad no minister had for fifty years held office without the approval of the resident weighed down the scales on the same side, for what so large a state as Hyderabad had submitted to could hardly be refused with prudence by any lesser state. Thus had come into being a series of powers exercised by the company for the preservation of the general peace, and reluctantly acquiesced in by the princes. These powers constituted the paramountcy of the East India Company in India. They rested on no documentary basis. They could be justified only on consideration of the general well-being of the country. Who was sovereign in India? Or was sovereignty split up among a great number of rulers? The powers which the company claimed were clearly infringements of the sovereign powers of the princes. But since conquest and treaties had not only established the company as the direct ruler of two-thirds of the country but had also made it the arbiter of foreign relations throughout the whole land, it may be argued that the political unit which it had brought into being extended beyond its own borders, that it constituted the supreme power in India, and that the question of the authority which it should exercise was a constitutional, not a diplomatic question. From that point of view the development which has here been sketched is to be compared not to the assumption of authority by one equal state over another, but to the struggle between the English king and the English parliament for ultimate control of the administration. The weakness of the company's position lay not so much in the defect of treaty power as in the reluctance of the company, and of almost all its governors-general, to undertake that general responsibility for the well-being of India which would have placed its claims over the Indian states on a constitutional basis.

CHAPTER X

The Company's Administrative System and Policy, 1818-1858

The early period of the East India Company's dominion in India was above all a time of experiment. The parliament and the court of directors in England, Clive, Warren Hastings and Cornwallis in India, had been feeling their way amid great uncertainty towards a system of administration which would work. British sovereignty had been asserted: the last great external enemy had been overthrown, a district administration had been outlined, land revenue enquiries had begun in earnest. But none could pretend that the political structure was in any way complete, and the following period was one of great development. It will be most convenient to deal first with the changes in the home government and in the superior governments in India, then with the growth of the district administration, and lastly with the changes in general policy, both social and administrative.

I

The outstanding anomaly in the character of the company in 1818 was its continued union of commercial and administrative duties. The statute of 1813 had abolished its monopoly of the trade between India and Great Britain. But it still continued to monopolise the trade with China and to maintain large commercial establishments in India. The situation was already becoming complicated by the progress of the industrial revolution. The application of steam power to the spinning and weaving of cotton, and improvements in the process of stamping them with designs, was making the import of Indian piece-goods a profitless business. In 1818 the directors were already seeking some more beneficial employment for their commercial funds. In the next year they had lying unsold in their warehouses Coromandel piece-goods which had cost them over a million pounds sterling. In 1822 the commercial establishment was cut down. In 1828 the directors were hesitating whether to carry on the trade at a great

and increasing loss or to abandon it altogether. On the other hand the growing consumption of tea was rendering the Chinese monopoly a valuable commercial asset. But this latter fact rendered the monopoly the more distasteful to dealers in eastern produce, for they desired a direct share in the profits of the trade. The combination of commercial opposition with the political dislike of the company's united functions produced in 1833 the complete abolition of its commercial privileges. It was required as soon as possible after April 12, 1834, to close down its commercial business and to pension or otherwise provide for its commercial servants. In consequence of this act the company became a purely administrative body.

The act of 1833 continued with small change the existing dual organisation of the home government. A number of critics like Lord Ellenborough were eager to place India at once under the immediate government of the crown. But the Whigs who were at this time in office were still inspired with their old jealousy of the executive Authority. Macaulay declared in the House of Commons, ought not to be vested in the crown alone, for in such matters parliament could not provide the necessary criticism and control. "What we want", he said, "is a body independent of the government and no more than independent—not a tool of the treasury, not a tool of the opposition. The company is such a body." Its administrative functions were therefore continued for another twenty years.

To some extent it lost ground in this period to the Board of Control representing the ministry of the day. As Sir Charles Wood stated in the debates of 1853, the responsibility for foreign policy lay exclusively with the president of the board, and through him with the cabinet. But in fact this was the branch of policy in which home control was least effective. Macaulay's phrase—"India is and must be governed in India"—was particularly true of foreign affairs. So that the province of government in which the authority of the board was supreme was also that in which home authority could be least exercised. And even here the company could exert considerable influence in extreme cases by its unrestrained power of recalling the governor-general. In 1825 the ministry had had much ado to persuade the directors not to recall Lord Amherst; in 1844 the cabinet had been unable to prevent the recall of Lord Ellenborough. With such a weapon in

their armoury the directors could always exercise considerable influence even where they had no direct power. In the sphere of general administration their position was stronger, for here they possessed the power of initiating proposals, and it was difficult for the board to carry through a measure from which the directors were really averse.

However, although in 1853 the company's powers were continued, this time without the customary limitation of twenty years, the statute passed in that year marked a growing disposition to strengthen the position of the ministry as against the directors. The new act provided for a reduction of the directors from twenty-four to eighteen, and for the immediate appointment of three (rising gradually to six) by the crown. Since at the same time the quorum for business was lowered from thirteen to ten, it would be possible, when the scheme was in full operation, for the crown nominees to constitute a majority. The intention (as was stated in the debates) was to prepare for the time when the directors might be reduced to a mere consultative council advising a minister of the crown.

The changes made in the Indian governments were more considerable. The original bill introduced in 1833 proposed to vest "the whole civil and military government in a governor-general and counsellors." This would in effect have annihilated the presidency governments. It was argued that the central government would be overwhelmed with unnecessary detail, and the clause was therefore modified so as to substitute "the superintendence, direction and control" for "the whole government." However, this alteration probably made small difference, for the government had ample authority to enforce its will upon refractory subordinates. More important was the abandonment of another proposal. It had been intended to add another covenanted servant to the governor-general's council, and to divide the Bengal presidency into two. This (it seems) was meant to permit the appointment of a covenanted servant from each of the four contemplated presidencies. It seems a pity that this proposal was dropped. It would have given the governor-general councillors personally acquainted with the whole of British India; whereas the continuance of the former practice of selecting the governor-general's councillors entirely from Bengal meant that his advisers would continue to know nothing about

any other province, and, it must be added, not too much about their own. The only practical result was the formation of the Āgra (or North-Western) Provinces as a separate government under a covenanted servant as lieutenant-governor, instead of the creation of a new presidency with a governor and council. Although, too, the central government received the new designation of "the governor-general and council of India", the governor-general still remained directly responsible for the administration of Bengal. This most serious defect in the governmental machine persisted till the act of 1853, which authorised the appointment of a lieutenant-governor of Bengal.

But in the matter of legislation the act of 1833 introduced sweeping changes. Till then the governor-general and council had legislated for the Bengal presidency, and the provincial governments for the others. Thus three series of regulations (as their enactments were called) had come into existence. These were frequently ill-drawn, having been drafted by inexperienced men; frequently conflicting, in some cases as the result of varying conditions, in others merely by accident, and in all cases enforceable only by the company's courts of law and outside the limits of the presidency towns. Besides these regulations existed uncertain and ill-defined bodies of Hindu and Muslim law and custom. Lastly the English statute and common law and equity were within certain limitations applied by the Supreme Courts in the presidency towns themselves. These diverse systems of law were enforceable by two different and often hostile judicatures—the king's or Supreme Courts and the company's courts—with ill-defined jurisdictions. The legal position was thus not only full of defects in a theoretical sense but also about to become a matter of great practical importance. The abolition of the company's trade was to be accompanied by the withdrawal of the right to license British-born subjects proceeding to India and summarily to remove them if they had no licence or if the provincial government pleased to cancel it. Large numbers of merchants and traders were expected to settle in India. It would be most inexpedient to permit such of these as chose to reside outside the presidency towns to be perpetually appealing to the Supreme Courts from the jurisdiction or the decisions of the company's tribunals. For these reasons it was resolved to extend and to concentrate the legislative authority in India. Law was in future to be made solely by the

governor-general and council, and the need of special laws to suit local peculiarities was met by empowering the presidency governments to submit draft laws for enactment by the central authority. The powers of legislation granted to the Government of India were much wider than any till then entrusted to an Indian legislature. It could repeal or alter any laws or regulations then in force; it could make laws for all persons, British, foreign or Indian; it could regulate the jurisdiction of all courts, whether set up by the crown or otherwise, it could not modify the new act, the Mutiny Act, any future act of parliament relating to India, or the sovereignty of the crown, but apart from this its acts should possess "the same force and effect" as an act of parliament and be enforced by all courts of justice, king's or company's. Till then the king's courts had lain under no obligation to enforce the enactments of Indian legislatures; and still less had the latter possessed power in any way to touch the jurisdiction of the king's courts.

In connection with these changes in the legislature two further innovations deserve mention. One was the inclusion of an additional member in the Council of India. The definition of his qualifications was purely negative. He was not to be a member of the company's civil or military service. It was also laid down that he was entitled to speak and vote only at meetings held for the consideration of legislative business. The office thus obscurely defined speedily became known as that of law member. He was intended to devote himself particularly to the consideration of legislative proposals and to the drafting of acts, and to provide the council with that qualified technical criticism, lack of which had marred many of the earlier regulations. Macaulay was the first to hold this new office; and though he was far from being an eminent jurist, his appointment was undoubtedly a great success. The creation of the law member is further noteworthy since it represents the first step taken to differentiate the council in its executive from the council in its legislative capacity. The governor-general in council was further directed to appoint "Indian law commissioners" to consider and report on the changes desirable in the jurisdictions of the various courts and above all the codification of the disparate bodies of law recognised by the various Indian tribunals. The body, largely under the inspiration of Macaulay, did much preliminary work facilitating the preparation of the

codes which became law soon after the assumption of direct government by the crown

The act of 1853 revised and considerably improved the legislative organ created by the act of 1833. For one thing the governor-general, who had enjoyed merely a casting vote in legislative business under the earlier act, was given a specific power of veto, which till then had been lodged in the home government alone. For another the law member became an ordinary member of council, entitled to speak and vote at all its meetings. For a third the differentiation of the legislative body was carried a long step onwards. Certain additional persons were to be added under the statutory title of "legislative councillors". These were to consist of a covenanted servant nominated by each governor or lieutenant-governor, together with the chief justice of the Supreme Court of Calcutta, one of the puisne judges of the court, and two other covenanted servants. These changes increased the legal element and introduced a new and much needed provincial element. But they also produced a very unexpected consequence—the relaxation of executive control over the legislature. The judges were obviously independent members, and the provincial members, though covenanted servants, were always men of considerable seniority who regarded their legislative councillorships as the last office they would hold in India and who did not look to the Government of India for promotion of any sort. The result was that the enlarged council of 1853 proved to be an independent and very troublesome body, far from what the president of the board, Sir Charles Wood, had intended to establish.

At the same time the structure of the Government of India was materially altered—not for the better. Until 1853 membership of the Council of India had been the highest office within the reach of covenanted servants. But by the new act the salaries of councillors were reduced to 80,000 rupees a year while those of lieutenant-governors were raised to 100,000. In effect the latter office was elevated above the former. The governor-general was thus deprived, or relieved, of that independent, disinterested advice which might be expected so long as his council did not look to him for further promotion and dignity. But now the councillors were provided with a motive for acquiescing whenever possible in the governor-general's views, and the supreme

council lost the supreme position commensurate with its dignity and duties

The acts of 1833 and 1853 introduced one other most important administrative change. The covenanted servants, who by the act of 1793 could alone be named to any civil office in the regulation provinces carrying a salary of over £800 a year, had always been nominated by the court of directors, and consequently had always been chosen from among their relations and friends. In 1813 Lord Grenville had suggested that it would be better if the service were recruited according to the results of a competitive examination. In 1833 an attempt was made to introduce a modification of this idea. The act of that year directed that the directors should annually nominate three times as many candidates as there were places to be filled, and that one-third of their nominees should be selected by competition. This plan if enforced might have combined the merits of nomination with those of competition. The candidates, as before, would have sprung from families connected with India, would have carried out with them family traditions, and would have been welcomed in India by family friends, Indian and European. At the same time competition would have weeded out the bad bargains. But the directors were too tenacious of their patronage easily to give way. In the next year they induced the easy-going president of the board to introduce an amending bill permitting the introduction of the new measure to be deferred. It was in consequence never brought into operation. But in 1853 Macaulay, who had been the prime mover in the earlier proposal, delivered a most eloquent defence of competition as a means of selecting public servants. The plan was adopted, and the directors' patronage thus vanished altogether. Here as elsewhere it is difficult not to regret Macaulay's success, however much the motives underlying his policy merit sympathy. The system certainly secured for India the services of a greater number of brilliant men than could have been obtained in any other way. But it may be doubted whether it provided her with as many devoted and understanding servants. And it carried with it another disadvantage. The act of 1833 had declared that high employment in India should not be a matter of race or creed or colour. But the establishment of competition involved in practice the exclusion of Indians from high office for many years. Lord Stanley was in the right when he opposed the proposal in 1853.

It was, he declared, a step back, not a step forward, for "while the old system could not have been permanent, the present plan would not be felt as an abuse in this country, whatever it might be in India, and it would therefore be allowed to continue without improvement" Lord Stanley's forecast was fulfilled to the letter. But here, as in other points relating to the structure of the Indian government, the main outlines were fixed in the period 1818-58 in the form in which they were to continue for another half-century.

II

In the sphere of district administration the forty years following 1818 were strongly formative. The earlier years had been experimental. But with experience certain methods of district organisation developed as most suitable and effective, and mark a considerable change of conception from that underlying the district system originally established in Bengal. That had been founded on the permanent zamindari settlement of the land revenue. It had been hoped that, as the settlement would reduce the labour of collecting the land revenue to a minimum, it would therefore enable the foreign administrators to devote themselves to the more important aspects of government, to the suppression of crime and to the hearing of civil suits. But it was found to involve one most grievous disadvantage. The collector had no need to know more of his district than that certain zamindars were annually liable for certain sums of money. The judge could merely hear such suits as were brought before him. Neither had any need, and neither was in fact permitted, to tour his district except in very special circumstances. Neither learned to know the people entrusted to his control. No general survey was attempted, although Lord Hastings in 1822 had dwelt upon the importance of surveying Bengal and Bihar and placing on record the various rights of individuals to the soil. Thus the permanent settlement was not only the fruit of ignorance, but the perpetuator of ignorance.

By good fortune the land tenures and therefore the land revenue settlements in the other provinces were of a wholly different nature. In most of Madras, in Bombay, in Agra, in the Panjab, the land-holders were generally peasant-proprietors, either owning their fields individually, or forming communities of

collective owners. In either case a revenue settlement could not be accomplished without going into great detail. So from the first the company's servants were forced into learning all they could about the economic condition, the social organisation, the customs and languages, of the people. Again the amount of detail involved in the revenue collections made a large revenue staff necessary. Whereas in Bengal a collector for long had no assistants beyond the clerks at his headquarters, elsewhere in each *taluk* or *tahsil* (as the sub-divisions of a district were variously called) the collector had a *tahsildar* (in Madras or Agra) or a *māmlatdar* (in Bombay), and under them a host of village headmen, all of whom could be required to furnish him with information. The consequent difference was remarkable. In 1824 the court of directors was already calling pointed attention to the fact that in Madras a competent collector could manage the revenue detail of a whole district, but if in Bengal a small tract or two had to be managed directly instead of through a *zamundar*, it was "almost always managed ill".

It should not, however, be supposed that the provincial settlements outside Bengal were from the first satisfactory. They were not. But constantly accumulating information permitted and even promoted their improvement, while the only change for the better in Bengal lay in a growing, uneasy sense of the ignorance amid which the administrator worked. In Madras, for instance, the period begins with the restoration of a *ryotwari* system instead of the village leases by which the former had been for a while displaced. But the assessments under this "middle *ryotwari*", as it is technically called, remained heavy and unequal. They were heavy, because they were largely based on old assessments framed in Mughal days when the ideal was a maximum rate—the "perfect assessment"—which could indeed seldom be realised but towards which the *amilah* were expected to strive. They were unequal, because the village accounts had generally been manipulated to favour some at the expense of others, and because no complete and professional survey had been attempted. Neither was there as yet any standard method by which assessments were made. A field might be measured; or its crop roughly estimated; or a lump sum might be imposed on a village and then roughly divided among the cultivators. But even so a number of reforms were gradually made. The ancient custom of compelling the other

inhabitants of a village to make good the arrears of one of their number was abandoned. So was another ancient practice—that of compelling ryots to cultivate a larger area than they wished. So also was the long-established use of levying increased rates on the more valuable crops which were grown if the owner sank a well to irrigate his land. Finally in 1855 a professional field-to-field survey was determined on; and in the same year began a prolonged discussion of the principles on which the revenue ought to be assessed, leading at last in 1864 to the adoption of the principles which characterise “new ryotwari”—that not more than half the net produce should be taken and that the assessment should remain unchanged for thirty years.

The history of ryotwari in Bombay is not dissimilar. There the company's government inherited from the Marāthas a *kāmil* or perfect assessment which could hardly ever be realised. After some years of a desultory farming of the land revenue, and a projected introduction of village settlements suggested by the existence of joint villages in Gujarāt and traces of a joint village system in the Deccan, a ryotwari survey and settlement were attempted, but proved worse even than the previous mode of collection. The survey was rough and inaccurate. The classification of the soils was over-elaborate. The assessment was impossibly onerous, and could never be realised. But this proved to be no worse than a bad beginning. In 1835 a revision was begun, and by 1847 the well-known *Joint Report* laid down the principles of modern assessment for the presidency. Whatever may be said of its initial stages, the ryotwari system proved to be singularly capable of improvement and reform.

In Āgra the land tenures demanded a different treatment. Wellesley had wished to apply the Bengal system there, just as he had attempted to do in the Madras presidency. But the unsuitability of that system was so evident that the commission appointed to introduce a permanent settlement reported that it was impracticable. A similar view was taken by the Court of Directors, who had been considerably impressed by the evidence of Munro on the subject of land revenue management. Āgra therefore escaped a permanent settlement, although the earlier assessments were often nothing better than the acceptance of the bids of revenue farmers. In 1822, however, the foundation of a better system was laid. Holt Mackenzie, a distinguished cove-

nanted servant on the Bengal establishment, secured the adoption of a law known as Regulation VII of 1822. This laid down certain fundamental principles for the revenue settlement in Āgra. These included the execution of an exact field-to-field survey, and the preparation of registers showing all existing rights over the soil. Areas were only to be assessed after a local enquiry had been held, and tenant-right was to be recognised and protected. The standard rate at which the revenue was to be assessed was fixed at five-sixths of the rental. A good deal of difficulty was found in determining rental values. Money rents were most unusual, and rental values generally depended on estimates of crop-values. The system was therefore modified. Under Bird and Thomason rules were at last prepared by which the demand was reduced from five-sixths to two-thirds of the rental value, and the process was simplified by framing the aggregate demand on a tract of country and then distributing it in detail. The cadastral survey, as it proceeded, threw much light on the organisation of the village communities of the province. These were bodies much more closely knit than the villages of South India and the Deccan, where the village lands were commonly divided out into separate and individual holdings. The Āgra villages were mostly "joint" villages—owned in common by a family or group of families holding a superior position, but tilled by an inferior group. The latter, however, often claimed occupancy rights over the land they actually cultivated, and the extent to which such rights should be recognised was very difficult to determine. In a practical sense this matter was settled by adopting a rule originally proposed by Lord William Bentinck in 1832, recognising persons who could prove a continuous occupation for twelve years as possessed of heritable rights to cultivate the land in question at a rent which in case of dispute was to be determined by a court of law.

The prevalence of the "joint" village in the Panjab led naturally, when that province passed into the company's possession, to the application of the revenue system which had grown up in Āgra. Tenant-right was recognised in the Panjab from the first. The twelve-year rule was commonly applied. The settlements were made on special local enquiries, and moderation in assessment was urged from the first.

The mode of land settlement thus corresponded with the characteristic land tenures. In Bengal the existence of great zamindars

led to a zamindari settlement marred by a practical neglect of tenant-right; in Madras and Bombay the prevalence of small individual holdings produced a ryotwari system; while in Āgra and the Panjab the existence of a strong village system led to a method of village settlements. In Bengal the zamindari system made a detailed survey appear needless; in the other provinces a minute survey was found to be the indispensable basis of a settlement.

It followed that the executive officials at the head of the districts played a far larger part in the administration of the other provinces than was the case in Bengal. Not only was the collector elsewhere responsible for all the detail involved in village or ryotwari assessments, but he was in charge also of other administrative work that closely touched the ryot. He decided boundary disputes, disputes about the sharing of water, disputes about rents or customary payments. He directed the repair of water-channels and the clearing of irrigation tanks. Such matters necessitated constant relations, wholly unknown in Bengal, between the peasant on the one side and the collector and his revenue subordinates on the other.

In all the older provinces the administration of justice and the management of the police were more nearly assimilated to the system established in Bengal than was the case with the revenue administration, but even here remarkable differences long continued to exist, and here it was the Bengal system which came ultimately to be modified. In Bengal in 1818 civil justice was administered by district judges, with a considerable number of subordinate Indian judges under them. Reforms introduced by Bentinck improved the status of the latter by the creation of a new and superior grade entitled "principal sadar amīns", who could try cases involving values up to 5000 rupees. On the criminal side the district judges were also magistrates, who might deal with cases summarily or commit the accused for trial by courts of circuit presided over by members of the four provincial courts which heard appeals in civil causes from the decision of the district judges. For police purposes the districts were divided into fifteen or twenty circles called *thānas*, each under the control of a *daroga* who directed the activities of a number of paid police and who might call upon the services of the village-watchmen—*chaiki-dars*. The police-force was under the general control of four super-

intendents, stationed at Calcutta, Dacca, Patna and Murshidābād; but in each district responsibility lay with the civil judge in his capacity as magistrate. The underlying principle of these arrangements was the complete separation of revenue functions from those of justice and police.

Precisely the same organisation had at first been established in Madras, but there, as in Bengal, produced a host of evils. The district judges, oppressed with heavy judicial duties, could not even attempt to supervise the police. Judicial processes were elaborate and expensive. The regulations which they administered were unknown to the peasant, and in fact could not be made known to him in the existing state of communications and illiteracy. The great opponent of this system was Thomas Munro: "It has left the ryots in a worse state", he wrote, "than under any native government".¹ In consequence of his criticisms the control of the police was transferred from the civil judge to the collector, who became the collector and magistrate, with the tahsildar in charge of the police-force within the *taluk*. Similar arrangements were adopted in the Bombay presidency and later in the Āgra province. The change was an undoubted improvement. The union of revenue and police control in the hands of a collector who was accustomed to tour his district, see things for himself, and discuss local affairs with the villagers, meant that his means of information would be greatly increased, along with his powers of action, while he would also be better able to estimate the accuracy or falsehood of the reports which came to him from either department. The control of the police still remained very inadequate. The first steps to amend it were taken in Bombay in 1852, when the system of semi-military police established by Sir Charles Napier in Sind was extended to the rest of the province. In Madras a prolonged and exhaustive enquiry into the misconduct of the police—the Torric Commission of 1855—led to the reorganisation of the department under an inspector-general, with a special superintendent in every district. In the North-Western Provinces—as Āgra came to be called—no change was made till 1861.

But in spite of these defects the administrative superiority of the system operating outside Bengal was sufficiently marked to induce efforts to reform conditions in Bengal itself. In 1829 Bentinck

¹ Gleig, *Life of Munro*, I, 460.

attempted for a while to restore the vigour of the administration by creating commissioners, with general authority over both revenue and judicial functionaries in groups of districts. These commissioners replaced the provincial courts of appeal. They were to hold assizes for the punishment of serious crime, and to supervise the conduct of both the collectors and the judge-magistrates. In 1831, since these duties were found to be beyond the powers of a single person, the duty of holding assizes was transferred to the district judges. Soon afterwards experiments were made in the direction of creating separate magistrates in each district, so that for a while the normal district control was vested in a judge exercising both civil and criminal jurisdiction, a magistrate controlling the police, and a collector. But at last on the urgent recommendations of Halliday, the first lieutenant-governor of Bengal, of Dalhousie, and of Canning, it was decided in 1859 to invest the collector with the control of the police-establishment. This meant the adoption in Bengal of the district-organisation which had grown up, a generation earlier, in Madras, Bombay, and Agra, though the Bengal collector remained shackled by the zamindari settlement and bereft of the revenue subordinates who were the eyes and ears of the collectors in other provinces.

The history of district-administration from 1818 to 1858 thus displays the escape of the other provinces from the thralldom of the Cornwallis system, and the way in which the permanent zamindari settlement obstructed the attempts made in Bengal in the same direction. The stagnancy of the administration in Bengal as compared with the progress made in the other provinces illustrates the same truth. In 1810 Minto when governor-general had lamented the prevalence of dacoity, and complained that the dacoit leaders were known popularly as *hakim* or governor, and that the district authorities could not secure the least aid for their apprehension. In 1852, despite the passing of two special acts in 1843 and 1851, the magistrate at Hughli reported the existence of 35 gangs of dacoits operating round Calcutta. In 1856 the lieutenant-governor could still assert that the conduct of criminal justice was popularly regarded as a lottery, and that while the people thought a dacoity bad they regarded the subsequent police-enquiry as worse. Education only touched the inhabitants of Calcutta itself. The province was left virtually without roads.

Cultivation had undoubtedly expanded, but this had weakened the position of the tenant by depriving him of the power of migration which in the past had always limited the zamindar's power of extortion.

In contrast with this, the other provinces exhibit considerable efforts to improve the condition of the people. In Madras, for instance, ever-increasing attention was given to the maintenance of the irrigation-tanks. In 1819 a special department (the *maranāt* or repair department) was organised under the collectors. In 1825 it was placed under the superintendence of the Board of Revenue, under which civil engineers were placed in charge of groups of districts. In 1852 a committee of enquiry sat, in consequence of which the modern Public Works Department was set up in 1858. Much was also done to extend irrigation. Under the conduct of Arthur Cotton the repair and extension of the Kāveri works was begun in 1836, the same engineer began the Godāvarī dam in 1846; in 1850 the Krishnā delta system was begun. In Bombay the Bombay Education Society and the Bombay Native Education Society opened and maintained primary schools in various districts. In 1840 a Board of Education was formed, consisting of four European members nominated by government and three Indian members nominated by the Native Education Society; when in 1852 government increased its subsidy from one-and-a-half to two-and-a-half lakhs of rupees, the board undertook to open a school in any village where the inhabitants would provide a building and the necessary books, and agree to find half the schoolmaster's salary. In Āgra, where the population was specially exposed to famine, irrigation received much attention. Between 1815 and 1827 military officers restored the canal dug by Fīrūz Shāh, now known as the West Jumna Canal. Then a smaller canal—the East Jumna Canal—was restored. In 1836 a new project—the Upper Ganges Canal—was proposed, and completed by Cautley in 1854.

All these provinces were what were technically known as "Regulation" provinces. These were marked by being ruled under definite bodies of enactments—the regulations passed by the company's presidency governments up to 1833, and the legislation passed by the Government of India after that date. For the enforcement of these laws there was an elaborate chain of courts with strict and elaborate rules of procedure. The judges were

entirely separate from the revenue and executive officials; and by English statute both judges and revenue officials could be appointed only from the ranks of the company's covenanted service. At first this method formed the standard pattern of administration. Originating in Bengal, it was extended as a matter of course to Benares, to the Madras Presidency, to the Bombay Presidency, and to the territories which were to form the North-Western Provinces. But even in Bengal it soon became apparent that this was too elaborate and mechanical a system to be universally applicable. In Bengal for instance the districts fringing the north-east frontier—Rangpur, Assam, Arakan—were inhabited by or in close contact with primitive tribes for whom complicated forms and procedure were strange and incomprehensible. The same was the case with parts of Orissa. A striking illustration of the futility of hoping to provide justice by making law and setting up courts was afforded by the Santhāl rebellion in 1835. The Santhāls, a numerous group of primitive tribes, being oppressed by Bengali and Bihari landlords, never thought of appealing to the courts of law but broke into rebellion, torturing and exterminating all the Bengalis they could find. Regular troops had to be sent against them, and, when the rebellion had been reduced, the Santhāl country was made into a separate district in which, as in Rangpur and Assam, the Regulation system was declared not to apply. A similar course was found necessary in the Madras Presidency in the hill tracts of the Northern Circars, and in Bombay in the Bhil country, where a special agency was established in 1825 and furnished occupation to the young Outram.

The special features of these "non-regulation" areas were that ordinary law did not apply unless specially extended. The governor-general, or the governor, in his executive capacity would issue as orders such rules as he desired to be observed. He could, moreover, select to conduct the administration persons whom he judged to be particularly suitable, irrespective of their belonging to the covenanted service. The mode of government was personal and paternal, all authority, executive, revenue and judicial, being usually concentrated in the same official; and the general purpose was to disturb tribal or local custom as little as possible, and to make changes only with the greatest caution and on some evident necessity.

The earliest acquisition thus to be dealt with was the Delhi

territory. But the reason for this was political rather than administrative, for the government, though conducted by the authority of the governor-general, was carried on in the name of the Mughal emperor. Sind afforded the earliest illustration of the non-regulation system applied on a considerable scale. There the reasons were partly personal. The conqueror of Sind, Sir Charles Napier, had conceived a strong distaste for the civil government of the Bombay Presidency. The hot-headed Ellenborough distrusted his members of council, his foreign secretary, and many others of the covenanted servants with whom he came in contact. Both therefore preferred to staff the province with military officers, and consequently the form of government was inevitably non-regulation. Napier divided the province into three collectorates with a head-collector in each, and a number of deputies. All were magistrates as well as collectors, with limited powers of punishment. Ordinary civil disputes were referred to a *panchayat* constituted by the collector-magistrate, the members receiving a small payment to compensate their loss of time. The *kāndars*—or village headmen—were maintained in their former functions; and a body of police under military discipline was organised, directly commanded by their own officers but at the disposition of the collector-magistrates. This system at first provoked much criticism, but its successful working came gradually and reluctantly to be recognised, and when Dalhousie conquered and annexed the Panjab, he followed the precedent set by Napier and Ellenborough. The country was organised in eight divisions, each under a commissioner, and twenty-four districts, each under a deputy-commissioner, and placed under the management of a peculiarly able group of men. They included the two Lawrences, John Nicholson, Robert Montgomery, Herbert Edwards, Robert Napier, and Donald Macleod, and thus represented both the covenanted and the military services. There were no separate courts. The commissioners and deputy-commissioners exercised full criminal jurisdiction, and in civil causes made much use of *panchayats*. The law administered was at first customary law and a rough equity. But rules were gradually laid down by executive order. In 1855 a civil code was issued embodying a great amount of the customary law of the province. A Public Works Department was immediately organised, and set to work to make roads and improve the irrigation-canal, not only cleaning and extending

the " inundation " canals which filled only in the flood season, but also constructing the first perennial canal—the Upper Bāri doāb Canal—between 1851 and 1859.

III.

While the mechanism of district management was thus being elaborated, the spirit of the government was also being transformed, so that the new efficiency was being applied to new purposes. From 1818 until the close of the century British rule in India remained virtually unassailed except by the catastrophe of the Indian Mutiny, and that event being mainly military in its detail if not in its causes, one is apt to look back upon the period as one in which the government rested upon unassailable foundations. But that was not the view of contemporaries. So early as 1794 Shore doubted whether the English government in Bengal would last another fifty years. Wellesley within a month of overthrowing Tipu Sultān was demanding increased military forces lest his countrymen should "suffer the fate of those whose minds are unequal to the magnitude of their fortunes and who are afraid of their own strength".¹ Elphinstone was alarmed by "the great strides we are making towards universal dominion", and likened the empire to steel "which cuts through everything if you keep its edge even, but is very apt to snap short if it falls into unskilful hands".² Metcalfe was "ever anxiously alive to the instability of our Indian empire". The British provinces, he believed, held many internal enemies, "ready for change if not ripe for insurrection". John Shore's son declared that the constant presence of troops alone prevented disturbances.

The strength of the British dominion resided in positive and negative groups of factors. The positive group included such obvious things as British naval supremacy, uncontested since the battle of Trafalgar; British military skill and obstinacy, proved on battle-field after battle-field, and ultimately victorious in the hills of Nepāl, as in the jungles of Burma; and British solidarity, attested equally in parliamentary debate and in the obedience shown in India to the commands of the governor-general in council. The negative group consisted in the complete lack of union among Indians, Muslim and Hindu, Brāhman and out-caste,

¹ Wellesley, *Despatches*, II, 42.

² Colclbrooke, *Life of Elphinstone*, II, 167.

Rājput and Bābu, being wholly unable to find any common cause against the foreigner; in the weariness of everlasting war, pillage, and unsettlement, which had been the general lot outside the British provinces for half a century and more; and above all in the political apathy which for ages had characterised the bulk of the population. "They take no interest", wrote Thomas Munro with complete truth, "in political revolutions; they consider defeat and victory as no concern of their own, but merely as the good or bad fortune of their masters; and they only prefer one to another in proportion as he respects their religious prejudices or spares taxation".¹ But it could not be supposed that these negatives offered a permanent foundation. Political apathy might wear away; the terror of marauding armies would gradually be forgotten, religion might offer a cause which could unite, if not the general body of the people, at least great sections of them.

The company's government was at first deeply conscious of all this, and most reluctant to do or suffer to be done anything which could appear like an attack on social customs or religion. But gradually its attitude changed. Under the impulsion of liberal ideas in politics and evangelical ideas in religion, under the guidance of Whig governors-general like Bentinck, Auckland, and Dalhousie, missionary activities developed, an educational policy was adopted, humanitarian ideals were pursued, in a manner which would have shocked and alarmed an earlier generation. The *laissez-faire* of the Cornwallis régime gave way to the paternalism of the 'non-regulation' system in the moral as well as in the administrative sphere.

The change was demonstrated by the admission of new missionary bodies to India, and by a growing support of them by members of the company's services. Early in the eighteenth century the Danish missionaries, established at the Danish settlement of Tranquebar on the Coromandel Coast, had received considerable financial help from the English Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, and from time to time members of the mission had been employed as interpreters and chaplains by the Madras Government. But this was at a time when the company was not a great territorial power in southern India. In Bengal for many years after its acquisition missionary activity was strongly discouraged. A Bengal regulation passed in 1793 declared that

¹ Gleig, *op cit* I, 203.

Hindu and Muslim law should be upheld, that all religious rites and customs were to be allowed, and all religious endowments maintained. In the same year the company successfully resisted the efforts of Wilberforce and the Clapham Sect to impose upon it missionary responsibilities. In the same year again William Carey, the famous Baptist missionary, was compelled to sail to Bengal by a foreign ship and to establish himself under the Danish flag at Serampore, where he and his companions, Marshman and Ward, taught, preached, and laid the foundations of Bengali prose by their translations from the Bible. Though the Serampore missionaries were countenanced and encouraged by Wellesley, difficulties arose with his successors, and on various occasions missionaries were deported from British India or not allowed to land. In 1813 the act continuing the company's privileges not only authorised the appointment of a bishop and archdeacons in India but also gave the Board of Control the power of reversing any refusal by the company to allow individual missionaries to proceed to India. After 1833 no licence at all was required. As a result of these changes and the growth of the Evangelical Movement in England, a considerable number of missionaries, both Scotch and English, went to India, where they preached Christianity with great zeal and did much to promote the cause of western education.

In other respects too their presence in India produced important changes. The company's government had inherited from the past customs such as that of turning out troops and firing salutes on certain Hindu festivals, taxes such as the pilgrim tax levied for the maintenance of certain temples, duties such as the administration of endowments bestowed upon temples, mosques, and tombs. All these were capable of being represented as unworthy support accorded by a Christian government to heathen worship. The missionaries did so represent them, and received sufficient support in England to secure the writing of a despatch in 1833 requiring their abandonment. For some years nothing was done. But (again in consequence of missionary representations) another despatch was sent in 1838 demanding immediate compliance with the previous orders. These were at last put into effect, save that in some places no suitable trustees could be found to manage the endowments, which therefore continued under the control of the revenue authorities till 1863. The government was, and on the whole remained, decidedly averse from any encouragement of

proselytism. But it was scarcely possible to resist the rising tide of sentiment. Two of the most eminent of the Panjab school—John Lawrence and Herbert Edwardes—leaned strongly to the view that Providence had placed India in British hands in order that the people might be Christianised; more than one colonel of the Bengal Army preached the gospel zealously between parades, and even Lord Palmerston, at a banquet given to Canning on his appointment as governor-general, observed that “perhaps it might be our lot to confer on the countless millions of India a higher and nobler gift than any mere human knowledge”

Parallel with this movement went the development of an educational policy. Here, as elsewhere, Bengal followed a special, and, as might be expected, a faulty policy of its own. The men of the eighteenth century, such as Warren Hastings and Jonathan Duncan, and those who had inherited their tradition, had sought to revive and strengthen the classical cultures of the Hindu and the Muslim. Hastings had founded a school for the study of Persian and Arabic, Duncan one for the study of Sanskrit. With Hastings's support, Sir William Jones had founded the Bengal Asiatic Society. When in 1813 the British Parliament authorised expenditure on the promotion of useful learning in India, the money was mainly used in printing in Sanskrit, Persian and Arabic original works and some translations of English text-books, and in providing scholarships for promising students of Indian classical literatures. But already a strong contrary current of opinion had arisen. David Hare, the free-thinking watchmaker of Calcutta, planned a school where young Indians could be taught western literature and science. In this scheme he succeeded in interesting Europeans like Sir Hyde East, the chief justice, and Indians like Rām Mohun Roy, with the result that an institution called “The Abode of Learning”—*Vidyālaya*—was set up, known subsequently as the Hindu College and then the Presidency College. The Serampore missionaries established a college under the patronage of the king of Denmark and the governor-general to teach western knowledge. In 1820 missionary bodies founded the “Bishop's College” at Calcutta, in 1823 a college was founded and endowed at Agra by Pandit Gangadhar. These new institutions were designed to spread western knowledge and languages, not to promote oriental studies. Rām Mohun Roy and his friends indeed presented a petition to Lord Amherst, criticising the

orientalist policy of teaching "what was known two thousand years ago with the addition of vain and empty subtleties since produced by speculative men". Much anxiety was displayed by a wide circle of Indians to learn English, and Bishop Heber noticed a strong tendency to imitate English ways. It became increasingly evident that English studies were popular and that oriental studies were not. The Committee of Public Instruction, to which the administration of public funds had been entrusted, was rent in sunder between the two policies. Charles Trevelyan, a brilliant but erratic young covenanted servant, pointed out that while a private society had sold over 31,000 volumes of English text-books in two years, the committee had not sold enough of its Sanskrit and Arabic volumes in half as long again to meet its warehouse charges for two months, he added that the young men at the Sanskrit College had petitioned, representing that the knowledge they had acquired would not enable them to earn a living. The cause of western education was also strenuously advocated by a Scotch missionary, Alexander Duff, who had opened a secondary school at Calcutta with the assistance of Rām Mohun Roy. He argued that all save the literate castes were prohibited from learning Sanskrit. Even were modern works translated into that language (he added), every term in it was so saturated with Hindu philosophic ideas that the translation must fail altogether to convey the thought of the original.

In the autumn of 1834 Macaulay reached Calcutta as the first law member of the governor-general's council. He was at once appointed president of the education committee, and within a few months of his arrival was urging upon the governor-general, Bentinck, with all the force of his specious rhetoric, the wholesale adoption of the English policy. He recommended that the printing of Sanskrit and Arabic texts should cease, that the Muslim and Sanskrit colleges should be closed, that the scholarships to students of Islam and Hinduism should be discontinued, and that all the available state funds should be devoted to promoting the study of English and English literature. This, he supposed, would produce a class of persons "Indian in blood and colour, but English in tastes, in opinions, in morals, in intellect". Not many months later he had convinced himself that within a generation all the respectable classes of Bengal would have ceased to be Hindus.

These ideas were adopted and recommended by Bentinck, but

were strenuously opposed by H. T. Prinsep, who pointed out that the Muslims had as yet exhibited no inclination to study English, and that, even among the Hindus, only those who had had connections with the English through public or private service really regarded the study of their foreign tongue and alien literature as indispensable. But his opposition was unheeded. The proposal to abolish the government teaching of Sanskrit and Arabic was indeed dropped, but it was resolved to make English literature the main subject of instruction. The possibility of instruction in such subjects as science and agriculture was virtually ignored. The decision to make English the basis of Indian education was inevitable. It complied with a strong local demand; it was backed by missionary opinion, it fell in with the views of the government, both in Calcutta and in London, which desired to extend the range of appointments open to Indians; above all it was a necessary measure if British rule was to do more for India than establish internal peace and secure her from external invasion. But as a policy it was too limited. It left out of account the Muslims who believed no education of the least value unless based on Arabic, and women, who in the existing state of society never dreamed of attending schools and colleges. Essentially literary, it provided no corrective for the prevalent faults of classes whose education had always been of a literary nature. And the fact that it would be applied to boys and not to girls meant that it would be ineffective, the future mothers of the classes that embraced it would remain wedded to the old ideas; and what a boy learnt at school would therefore conflict with the atmosphere of the home.

Soon afterwards, in 1842, the Committee of Public Instruction vanished. In Calcutta it was replaced by a Council of Education, on which a number of Indians sat. Outside Calcutta the government undertook the direct responsibility. Hardinge announced in 1844 that candidates with a knowledge of English would be preferred for public appointments. This step was doubly unfortunate. Young men who had sat successfully for examinations held by the Council of Education were registered as eligible; but eligibility and appointment were different things; and great heart-burning was caused. What was even worse, it invested western education with adventitious attractions, leading men to seek it, not because they set any special value on western know-

ledge, but purely as a passport to government service. Little was done to promote the efficiency of indigenous schools, and about 1853 while government was assisting thirty schools and colleges in Bengal, where English was the chief medium of instruction, it was maintaining only thirty-three where the vernacular was in use. The Bengal educational policy was thus wedded to what was known as the "filtration" policy—of leaving elementary education to care for itself and concentrating on English and especially higher education in the hope that western culture would gradually permeate the whole population.

Authorities in the Āgra province had followed a wholly different course. James Thomason, the lieutenant-governor from 1843 to 1853, was above all anxious to promote rural education. A plan was at length formed to group villages in circles of five and set up a school wherever the land-owners were willing to pay an additional cess of one per cent. on the land-revenue. In 1852-3 the scheme was brought into force in eight districts, and was afterwards extended. Another development of great importance was the establishment of the Thomason College of Engineering at Rūrķī. In Bombay too the "filtration" theory of education had been set aside. Elphinstone, the first governor of the presidency in its modern form, had done much to promote classical and vernacular studies. He had continued the custom followed by the Pēshwā, of granting allowances to distinguished Sanskrit scholars; and after a time this had led to the foundation of a Sanskrit college at Poona. He had also attempted to encourage and increase the vernacular schools of the presidency. But he had as well set up in Bombay a school for English, an engineering school, and a medical school. Malcolm, his successor, reckoned a knowledge of English as a very trivial qualification for service under government. While missionary enterprise, as in Bengal, had been active in providing English education, the government had rather applied its funds to vernacular schools, of which in 1853 it was maintaining 233 against the thirty-three so maintained in Bengal. In Madras, Munro, like Elphinstone, had been anxious to improve vernacular teaching, and had framed a plan for setting up two high schools in each district, together with a normal school for the training of teachers. But these proposals had been abandoned at his death in 1827. A government high-school was founded at Madras, but a very large number of missionary

institutions grew up—more indeed than were to be found in all the rest of India.

Educational policy had thus exhibited great diversities of aim and method. To Dalhousie and Wood belong the credit of framing a general policy, which after long correspondence between the two was embodied in the educational despatch of July 19, 1854. It declared the need of "a properly articulated scheme of education from the primary school to the university". The vernacular schools were no longer to be neglected, and the method devised in the Agra province was proposed for adoption elsewhere. Secondary schools were to be encouraged, and in general the system of making grants-in-aid was to be employed to encourage institutions maintained by missionary and other voluntary bodies, irrespective of their religion. Universities were to be established at Calcutta and Bombay, and perhaps at Madras as well, not indeed to teach, but to conduct examinations and award degrees, and the whole system of primary schools, secondary schools, and colleges was to be linked up by a series of scholarships, to enable persons of special talent to pursue studies from which they would otherwise be debarred by poverty. These orders were carried into execution. The various governments organised departments of public instruction to give effect to a scheme (as Dalhousie described it) "far wider and more comprehensive than the supreme or any local government could have ventured to suggest". But in practice the new policy proved to have inherited more of the emphasis on English studies and on higher education than the despatch itself would suggest. It stood, alongside of missionary effort, as the outstanding challenge of British influence to that old world into which the British had intruded.

The educational ideals thus adopted were purely secular and were in no wise designed as a direct attack upon Hinduism or Islam. They were indeed, as experience has shown, ill-calculated to promote the spread of Christianity. But there were certain social customs much interwoven with Hinduism which a western government could not easily or even honestly tolerate. After a great struggle the British had resolved in 1807 to abolish the slave-trade and in 1833 to emancipate all slaves in British territory. In 1833 when the company's privileges came again before Parliament for renewal, the Indian government was required to take measures for the suppression of slavery in India. To some extent

this direction had already been anticipated. In 1789 Cornwallis had forbidden the purchase of slaves for transport to other parts of India or elsewhere. In 1811 the importation of slaves into India had been prohibited. But the institution of slavery was a more difficult thing to abolish. It was an ancient custom for men to sell themselves and their families into slavery in time of famine in order to escape from starvation; and in many parts of India there were whole classes of labourers bound to the soil and in many ways resembling the serfs of medieval Europe. In 1832 the sale of a slave brought from one district to another had become an offence. In 1843 an act was passed directing the courts no longer to recognise the status of slavery. Under the Penal Code of 1860 all keeping of or trafficking in slaves became punishable at law. In practice the status of slavery long survived; and it was not really brought to an end until the spread of education and the improved position of the labourer at the close of the century gave reality to the pious enactment of 1843. The fact illustrates the extreme difficulty with which a closely organised and most conservative society can be modified by law unsupported by economic or moral pressure.

Slavery in India had generally been so different a thing from the slavery of the West Indies that the British government had not felt any great need of rapidly sweeping it away. Other prevalent customs met with less tolerance. There was a practice of casting children into the sea at Sāgar Island in accomplishment of a vow. This was prohibited by Wellesley in 1802. An allied custom was female infanticide as practised by the Rājputs. Jonathan Duncan, when resident at Benares, had discovered its existence among the Rāj Kumārs and had induced them to forswear it. Custom, however, proved stronger than promises. Although the practice had been declared to be murder, the Rāj Kumārs were killing their infant daughters as freely in 1816 as they had been in 1795. Walker, political agent in Kāthiāwār, discovered the practice among the Rājputs of western India, and obtained from some of them a covenant such as the Rāj Kumārs had given to Duncan, but with little more success. The method followed—of refusing to suckle the child—was most difficult of proof. Constant pressure was put on the Rājput tribes both within and without British India by district officials and political agents. But no coercive measures were taken until 1870, when an act was passed permitting rules

for the registration of births and verification of the survival of girls to be applied to such districts as seemed to require it.

The practice of burning the widow on her husband's pyre was one which had shocked all foreigners in India. It had been forbidden by the Muslims and by the Portuguese, though the prohibition by Muslim rulers had not been very rigorous or effective, and that by the Portuguese had been too limited in territorial scope to have any effect. While always barbarous in essence—perhaps the last relic of the massacres with which the obsequies of the kings of Ur were celebrated—individual cases varied greatly. If on the one side we have the widow who importuned Colonel Sleeman till at last she wrung from him a most reluctant assent, on the other we must set Rām Mohun Roy's sister-in-law—"an hysterical and unhappy sacrifice"—and the latter case appears to have been the more frequent of the two. Though stated to have been enjoined by a passage in the *Rig-Veda*, it had never been an integral part of Hinduism; and the earliest text cited in support of it has been proved to be a perversion of the original. But it was so closely associated with Hindu practices and so loudly applauded by popular opinion that British administrators long hesitated to interfere with it. Cornwallis in Bengal, Elphinstone in Bombay, would not assent to positive official suppression. It was, indeed, hoped that with the spread of British influence the custom would disappear. Various company's servants and the Serampore missionaries drew the attention of the Bengal government to its prevalence. Wellesley directed the chief criminal court, the *nizāmat 'adālat*, to report on the religious basis of the custom and the possibility of prohibiting it. The judges reported that it was permitted but not enjoined by the *shāstras*, and that it might be abolished in the districts where it was unusual and checked or prevented elsewhere. This report, dated in 1805, long lay unanswered. At last in 1812 the government ordered that all compulsion, intoxication or drugging of the victim should be prevented, and that sati should be allowed only where the case fell within the rules laid down by the *shāstras*. Further rules, intended to prevent the rite except when clearly within the accepted religious limits and requiring relatives to give notice of intended sati to the police, were issued in 1815 and 1817. In the circumstances it would perhaps have been better to do nothing than to issue rules which were interpreted as conveying at least a partial

approval. The number of reported *sutis* rose considerably, especially in the neighbourhood of Calcutta, where English opinion might have been expected to exercise most influence, and it was believed by the chief judge of the *nizāmat* 'adālat that many women were burned without the knowledge of the police. In view of the unsatisfactory state of police organisation, it seems more likely that police subordinates were often bribed not to report cases that took place. Much criticism was directed against the government both by missionary bodies and by its own officials, who urged that the rules were authorising widows to be sacrificed by their husbands' families. It was a singular fact that more than half the reported cases occurred in five districts of Bengal. At last, in 1823, the court of directors was moved by the pressure of public opinion in England to suggest to Lord Amherst the desirability of further action. But nothing was done. Amherst himself was an irresolute man, and his councillors were averse from action which might raise the cry of "Religion in danger" and which in any case seemed inconsistent with Cornwallis's regulation declaring that Hindu and Muslim law should be upheld. But when Bentinck arrived as governor-general, he resolved to enquire into the question of total prohibition. He found official opinion sharply divided. Even Rām Mohun Roy, who had organised a counter-petition against one which had been presented complaining of the increased stringency of the rules, advised him to wait a while. But relying mainly on the unanimous opinion of the *nizāmat* 'adālat, Bentinck decided on immediate action, and in 1829 passed a regulation declaring the act to be illegal, abetment to be punishable as culpable homicide, and compulsion a capital offence. This was the most daring interference with religious and social customs undertaken by the company's government. A considerable group of Hindus appealed to the Privy Council in the hope of getting the regulation declared invalid. They claimed that it interfered with their most ancient and sacred rites, violated the conscientious beliefs of a whole nation, and infringed the promise to maintain the Hindu religion, laws and customs. But the appeal was emphatically rejected. In the Rājput states the practice continued for a while but vanished before the insistence of Dalhousie and the gradual spread of knowledge among Rājput ladies that it was no longer permitted in British India. In the Panjab it lasted till Dalhousie conquered and annexed the province.

Of much the same nature was the suppression of human sacrifices among the Khonds of the Ganyam and Orissa hills, since that also was a barbaric custom conducted under religious sanction. But in this case the religion was primitive, the custom followed by only a small group of tribes, and its suppression did not carry with it the possibilities of political danger which had made the government hesitate so long in the case of sati. In the course of suppressing a rebellion that had broken out among the disorderly hill zamundars of that area, British officers discovered that the primitive Khond tribes performed an annual sacrifice designed to ensure the fertility of their fields. They kept a class of victims termed *meriahs*, consisting either of unfortunate persons kidnapped from the plains and sold to the Khonds, or of the children of victims so acquired. A number of *meriahs* were chosen yearly and hacked to pieces, every cultivator seeking to obtain a shred of flesh to bury in his field. In 1841 a single tribe sacrificed 240 victims in this manner. The area concerned lay partly in the presidency of Bengal, partly in that of Madras. For some time difficulty was found in co-ordinating the efforts of the two governments, but in 1845 a special agency was constituted under the governor-general. A military officer, Colonel Campbell, who had already served in that part of the country, was appointed agent with special instructions to wean the Khonds from their unpleasant ways; and in the long run he induced the people to substitute buffaloes for human beings, and released a large number of *meriahs*.

In this same period the crime of thagi was suppressed. This offered perhaps the most remarkable example of organised crime on record. Every autumn at the *Dasara* festival, the auspicious time at which to commence a campaign, the thags would assemble in bands ranging from a dozen men to a large company, conduct their operations over a great tract of country, and return about the beginning of the next hot weather to their homes, where they usually followed some ostensible occupation. The gangs were elaborately organised. Some were chosen as spies to go ahead of the rest and find out travellers with property or goods of value. Others again were appointed to prepare graves for the selected victims near the place designed for their murder. The most expert were the men who strangled the victims with a handkerchief—only on the rarest occasions was any other instrument employed. The

thags plied their trade under the special protection of the Hindu goddess known variously as Bhowānni or Devi. At the commencement of each campaign propitiatory ceremonies were conducted and recruits initiated; and whenever a likely victim came under consideration the omens were carefully observed. If these were favourable, the traveller was regarded as delivered over by the goddess to death, and the thags believed that if he were not killed the goddess never again would be propitious. The customary process was for the band to fall in as it were by accident with parties of travellers selected by the spies, the place of murder would be chosen and grave-diggers sent on in advance, when nearing it the thags would distribute themselves so that a strangler would be posted beside each victim, and on the appointed signal all would be put to death. Within a few minutes the corpses would be buried. No witnesses would survive to tell the tale; no traces would remain on the road to betray to after-comers the tragedy that had occurred.

Such bands had existed in India for many centuries. As far as is known, no particular effort had ever been made to root them out, and they seem to have been regarded with resigned fatalism, like famine or cholera, to be feared, to be avoided, but not to be resisted. Their existence was well known to the company's governments years before any decided action was taken. The great difficulty was the question of evidence. Eye-witnesses were seldom to be found; and bankers who had lost money, and the relatives of victims, alike were reluctant to appear before distant courts which could restore to them neither their money nor their friends, but merely punish those popularly viewed as the instruments of God. Bentinck resolved to create a special agency for the suppression of thagi, to be placed under the management of Sleeman and other specially competent company's servants. Special courts were formed. Indian rulers like the Nizām and the king of Oudh were induced to waive their jurisdiction over men accused of thagi. Under promise of life a number of thags turned approvers. Their evidence was collated. Places where they said victims had been buried were examined. Thus a mass of evidence was collected, corroborated by statements taken locally from persons who had lost money or friends; and the bands were gradually broken up. Those against whom specific murders could be proved were hanged; the greater number, however, were

transported under a special act of 1836 which had made membership of a thag band a criminal offence.

The concluding part of the period exhibits no measures so striking as Bentinck's war upon sati and thagi, or his adoption of English as the basis of Indian education. But Dalhousie passed one act and introduced another which in principle went much further than the suppression of sati. Sati was not, and never had been more than a permissive rite. Strongly encouraged as it had been by vicious social influences, in itself it had ever been a work of supererogation. But the re-marriage of a widow was utterly prohibited by Hindu law. A bill declaring such re-marriages legal was introduced under Dalhousie in 1855 and passed into law by Canning in 1856. Hindu sentiment seems however to have been more deeply affected by an earlier piece of legislation. In 1832 a regulation had been passed by the Bengal legislature relieving persons who should change their religion from any consequent loss of property. This had been enacted under missionary influence. Missions had undoubtedly found their success impeded by the existence of the Hindu joint family system, under which ancestral property was owned in common by the family as a whole; and conversion to Christianity had entailed not only the social consequences of exclusion from the family circle but also the economic results of a forfeiture of all right to share in the family estate. In 1845 the Bishop of Bombay had complained that the Bengal regulation did not extend to Bombay; and in 1850 Dalhousie passed an act, valid for the whole of British India, directing the courts of law to cease to give effect to any laws or usages inflicting forfeiture of property or affecting rights of inheritance in the case of persons changing their religious faith or being deprived of their caste-rights. This act, like the regulation suppressing sati, produced considerable alarm among orthodox Hindus. Petitions were presented against it signed by 60,000 persons from Calcutta and its neighbourhood. Sixteen years earlier a retired covenanted servant, who had more than once occupied the chair of the Court of Directors, had lamented the rising enthusiasm for conversion which had "already done much to alienate the attachment of the people, to shake their confidence, and to produce uneasiness and alarm." Circumstances were to lend great support to his views. It is clear that the forty years following the overthrow of the Marāthas introduced many most disturbing influences. The

activity of missions, the evangelical spirit exhibited by many of the company's civil and military servants, educational activity, and the social reforms enforced with unexampled vigour, method and success upon an apathetic and reluctant people, of necessity carried with them a challenge to Hinduism none the less agitating because it was less direct than that which Aurangzib had given to the Hindu world. It was evident that the foreign government was no longer content, as it once had been, to leave affairs to follow their traditional course, that it was being driven forward by ideals and purposes unquestionable by the modern world but strange, dubious, and alarming in the eyes of a people belonging to the world of the past. Two things should be evident to us who can look back with the knowledge of what was to come. One is that the British government was by its nature, its ideas, its western outlook, bound to give a series of shocks to the world of Hinduism; the other, that the Hindu world was bound to react sharply and convulsively to these external impulses.

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CHAPTER XI

The Company's Armies and the Indian Mutiny

In one sense the mutiny of the company's Bengal Army was an inevitable consequence of previous developments; in another it was a mere unlucky accident. It was inevitable because the old Indian world was certain to react against the influence of a more efficient, more interfering, and more systematic government than the country had ever known before, inspired alike by views of social and legal obligation and by conceptions of economic and political progress utterly different from those current among Indians. Until 1818 India had felt little but the political effects of European dominion. She had changed masters with no more concerted opposition than she had offered to the establishment of Muslim domination. The ryot or the Brāhman cared little whether he tilled his fields or performed his rites under the rule of Mīr Kāsim or of Clive; the merchant and the banker definitely preferred the stronger, more efficient rule of the East India Company, though unprepared to risk anything to effect a change. The soldier was more ready to serve the English than any other employer, for their pay was regular and certain, they respected his caste and religious prejudices, and, though they would never suffer him to rise to high rank, their military superiority had been attested on a score of battle-fields and their ascendancy was accepted as a thing of course. So long as the company's government continued to be merely an Indian power, and even when Cornwallis introduced his administrative reforms, this situation persisted. Foreign dominion was nothing to peoples with no consciousness of nationality. But from 1818 the position began to change. This new and strong government proved to be associated with active missionaries who challenged the very foundations of Hinduism and Islam. It interfered to prevent sati, to permit the re-marriage of widows, to save converts from losing their interest in family property. It ceased to take that active and paternal interest that it once had shown in the celebration of

festivals and the management of temple funds. It promoted a new type of education which made light of ancient learning. It began to build railways, in the carriages of which the Brāhman might find himself polluted by the touch of Pariahs. It constructed telegraph-lines which carried messages by magic. In what manner could a respectable Hindu consider this impingement of a new world upon his own which had remained unchanged so long? The answer is provided by a great variety of sources. The idea spread abroad that the whole country would soon be westernised and Christianised. At Bombay Parsis and Hindus were made to study Butler's *Analogy of Religion*. At Madras over-zealous missionaries taught Hindu boys to answer questions relating to the Christian faith in language which might have become a Christian but which sounded even to good Christians revolting when put into the mouths of orthodox Hindus. In Bihar the educational inspector's office was popularly known as the "Devil's Office"—the *Shaitani Daftar*. When it was resolved that prisoners might no longer carry their own water-vessels with them to gaol, this was taken to be the opening act of a general scheme to break all caste and convert the whole population to Christianity. Canning believed that "heads of families, and men of wealth and good position, are generally persuaded that their grandsons, if not their sons, will renounce their religion for Christianity". The belief spread from the populace to the sepoy. Before the outbreak of the Mutiny, Henry Lawrence had a long conversation with a Brāhman jamadar of excellent character belonging to the Oudh Artillery, and was quite unable to dissuade the man from believing that the government had been seeking for the previous ten years to break down the system of caste. These ideas were manifestly false; but the importance of a belief has no relation whatever to its truth. Such notions, false as they were, spread alarm, anxiety and distrust through large masses of the population.

Political affairs added to the general disquietude. The Afghan war had doubtless ended with a triumphant vindication of British arms. But the success of Nott and Pollock was far from having obliterated memories of the disaster at Kābul, the massacre of sepoy and Briton alike, and the bondage into which the sepoys' wives and families had fallen. The great strength of the Indian government had lain in opinion—the opinion of its invincibility. That had been rudely shaken. The conduct of more than one

sepoys regiment in the Sikh wars suggests that it had not been restored. Then came the wars with Russia in 1854 and with Persia in 1856. The latter was unwelcome to the Muslims in India—even to the Sunnis, for the progressive decline of Islam was already inclining the Muslims to close their ranks and forget even the bitterest sectarian differences. The Russian war produced serious evidence of unrest. The general Indian belief, Dalhousie declared, was that Great Britain would be beaten. He found an uneasy feeling abroad, partly alarm, partly indefinite expectation. A rumour suddenly spread through Calcutta that a Russian fleet had reached the Sandheads; the bazaars closed; and men began to bury their money and jewels for safety.

All this was eagerly canvassed and exaggerated by certain sections of Muhammadans. The Wahhabis, who had their centre at Patna, had ever been an element of disquiet, in communication with fanatical groups on the North-West Frontier, at Swāt and Sitāna. Besides that they had sent preachers into many parts of India, especially the south, where they had provoked sedition at Hyderabad, inveigled the Nawab of Kurnool into the enterprise which cost him first his country and then his life, and preached rebellion at Vellore, the scene of a former bloody, though localised, mutiny in 1809. Even apart from them, the more zealous Muslims had marvelled how Shāh Shujā' could accept infidel help for the recovery of his kingdom of Afghanistan, and about 1852 a ballad had been secretly printed at Calcutta exhorting the faithful to rise and overthrow the infidel government. In 1855 the celebration of Muharram at Hyderabad had been marked by a disquieting incident, in which the resident had been attacked and wounded—it was thought, with the purpose of embroiling the Nizām with the British government. And while the Muslim population included these explosive elements, there were Muslim centres which might at any time serve as detonators. Of these Delhi was the principal. Its imperial traditions, though dimmed, were still unbroken, owing to the facility with which the company's government had suffered the forms of imperial authority to continue, while the recent decision of Canning's government to discontinue the recognition of the imperial family made Delhi abnormally sensitive. As Napier had written in 1850, "The Delhi king within the palace is a mere effigy; yet he forms a moral rallying point, round which gather the dreams of dis-

contented princes, feeding upon prophecies. Such prophecies and traditions as those about Delhi oftentimes work out their own fulfilment”

Besides the descendant of Tīmūr surviving in mock majesty within the Fort at Delhi, there was yet another discontented inheritor of fallen imperial traditions. The Chitpāvan Brāhmans who had borne the title of Pēshwā had in the middle of the eighteenth century almost laid their hands upon the empire of India. They had failed, partly by reason of the strength and vigour of Afghan invaders, partly because they could not retain the loyal obedience of their own lieutenants like Sindhia and Holkar, partly because they had sunk before the waxing power of the East India Company. When the last Pēshwā, Bāji Rāo II, had died a pensioner of the company, Dalhousie resolved that his pension should die with him. In this there was no great injustice. Bāji Rāo had died son-less. His adopted son, Nāna Sāhib, was suffered to inherit Bāji Rāo's savings and estates. He was wealthy, and gave no hint of his discontent, living in friendly intercourse with the British officials. But he was an active, ambitious man, who dreamed if occasion ever served of reviving Brāhman rule. We may suppose him keenly alive to the alarm produced among orthodox Brāhmans by the company's new social and educational policy, and he may well have played a part in propagating and spreading that alarm.

Lastly there was the newly annexed province of Oudh. Probably few cared much for the fate of the deposed king. He and his family had done little for fifty years and more to earn the respect or affection of either his countrymen or his co-religionists. Orthodox sympathy had been alienated by the imitation of foreign ways which had long prevailed in the palace of Lucknow, and his royal title was derided as a sham, made evident by the forms of respect still shown to the company's resident. But the annexation had been grievously mismanaged. Oudh had become a country of great talukdars who corresponded in theoretical position with the great zamundars of Bengal, but who were practically much stronger, for they could command the services of a warlike and turbulent peasantry. Under the king they had lived in a state of perennial rebellion. They had their mud forts and armed retainers, and had been accustomed to defy the government. Dalhousie had resolved that, like the Panjab, the

province should be disarmed and the forts rendered untenable. But Canning not only disregarded this decision but also gave the talukdars the most serious reasons for discontent. The first land-revenue settlement was made with the definite intention of restoring the old village communities, strong there as in the neighbouring province of Āgra, to a position of independence wherever there was reasonable ground for considering them entitled to it. The result was that many talukdari estates were materially cut down. The natural leaders of the people were thus provided with a good excuse for resentment and left in possession of the means to make their resentment felt.

Incidentally the annexation of Oudh affected the sepoy of the Bengal Army, largely recruited from that region. This was not because the sepoys felt special sympathy with the king or grievances against the revenue settlement. But annexation deprived them of the privileged position which till then they had enjoyed. In the past whenever the family of a sepoy had had a complaint to make against the king's government, the complaint had been laid by the sepoy before his commanding officer, who communicated it to the government of Calcutta, who instructed the resident at Lucknow to make enquiries, with the result that sepoys' families had found justice more easily than any other subjects of the king. But annexation reduced the sepoys and their families to the same level as other persons, and was therefore resented by them.

Thus in 1857 India was afflicted by a considerable number of causes all making for unrest and uncertainty: schools and mission-houses, the maintenance or disgrace of undesired widows, family bitterness over conversions followed by an enforced partition of the family property, Muslim discontent, the Oudh talukdars' bitterness—none of these by itself of great moment, none likely to produce more than a sporadic movement, but collectively making up a situation full of alarming possibilities. Yet any rebellion among the civil population was most unlikely, despite Muslim sermons, or the talk of Hindu agents, for there was no organisation, and no possibility of organisation in a land so seamed by age-old divisions of race and creed and caste. But the organised body lacking in civil life existed in the military sphere. In what circumstances was this body likely to catch the infection of popular feeling and turn against the government which had

created it? Thomas Munro a generation earlier had, with rare insight, pondered on this problem and had reached a conclusion which circumstances were to prove unhappily correct. "The spirit of independence", he wrote, "will spring up in this army long before it is ever thought of among the people." And again: "All that is necessary is that they [the sepoys] shall have lost their present high respect for their officers and the European character; and whenever this happens they will rise against us, not for the sake of asserting the liberty of their country, but of obtaining power and plunder".

The history of the company's sepoy forces was long and honourable. The earliest English forts had been garrisoned by small bodies of European troops. But the struggle which Dupleix had precipitated produced a swiftly growing need of men. European battalions were supplemented therefore by bodies of Indian troops. The credit of this has falsely been ascribed to Dupleix. But both Portuguese and Dutch had freely entertained large numbers of sepoys. Dupleix did no more than they had done. He enlisted companies of men under their own leaders. The English at Madras did the same. But they soon introduced a change which no one else had thought of making. They began to provide these auxiliaries with European drill-sergeants; they then went on to organise them into battalions on the European model; and completed their work by providing the battalions with English officers. Under this new discipline the sepoys in the English service acquired a facility and steadiness of manoeuvre which Indian troops had never before displayed. Under this new leadership they developed a new cohesion and confidence. French observers noted with dismay that the English sepoys would face French regiments while the French sepoys would not even face English sepoys. The latter thus became by far the most efficient body of Indian troops in the country, and, as war after war proved, in conjunction with the European troops were far more than a match for Mysorean, Marātha, or Sikh.

The company's forces were organised in three presidency armies, each under its separate commander-in-chief. In 1824, when they underwent re-organisation, the Bengal army included sixty-eight sepoy infantry regiments, the Madras army fifty-two, and the Bombay army twenty-four. Besides these, there were thirteen native cavalry regiments in Bengal, eight at Madras, and

six at Bombay, with considerable bodies of native artillery as well. In normal times these forces were balanced by European troops in the usual proportion of one to three. The latter consisted partly of company's troops, partly of queen's regiments. But the exigencies of the Crimean War had led to the reduction of the latter. Dalhousie was most indignant. Ministers justified the recall of troops from India by quoting his assertion that India was tranquil. "So it will be," he commented, "if we are left strong. But if we are weakened, India cannot be warranted to continue either tranquil or secure." Despite his protests three regiments were recalled in 1854, and in 1857 still had never been replaced, and the proportion of European troops had thus fallen to less than one in six. Owing to the concentration of over a quarter of these troops in and about the Panjab, the strength of the European element elsewhere was much less even than one in six. If therefore the sepoy forces were disposed to mutiny, the years 1854-7 presented to them an opportunity of exceptional advantage.

Moreover, sepoy discipline had been decaying for at least a generation, especially in the Bengal army. Several causes had been operating to produce this effect. The growing centralisation of control had deprived commanding officers of much power. They were no longer competent to redress grievances or reward merit, and their influence with their men therefore declined. But what was much worse than this was the decay in the average quality of the officers, European and sepoy alike. Promotion by seniority produced commanding officers of long experience but little talent, exhausted by a long term of service. "Commanding officers are inefficient", wrote Dalhousie in 1851; "brigadiers are no better, divisional officers are worse than either because older and more done, and at the top of all they send commanders-in-chief seventy years old." Lord Roberts's father was appointed to command a division on the frontier, the authorities prided themselves on the youth and activity of their choice; General Roberts was at that time a mere sixty-nine years of age. But this was not all. Long-standing regulations permitted an officer to spend long periods of time in staff-employment and then to rejoin his regiment with a rank determined by his total service, not by his regimental experience. A man might serve twenty years in the Pay or Staff Department, and then, when he was a lieutenant-colonel, be appointed to command a regiment. The demands of

the civil administration too had been severe and exhausting. In every government that Dalhousie organised, Nāgpur, Burma, the Panjab, he was bent on securing the finest personnel within his reach. Men were sought out who possessed special knowledge of Indian languages and customs, who cherished special sympathy with Indian peoples. Many such were found serving in the company's armies. Outram, Havelock, Henry Lawrence, John Nicholson, to name but a few, were withdrawn from military to political or administrative service. The result was that of a nominal establishment of twenty-five officers to a sepoy regiment, few units had more than a dozen actually serving. Nor were the consequences limited to a mere question of numbers. The system unhappily weeded out many of those best fitted to command the respect and affection of their men. This evil fell especially upon the Bengal Army, for its officers were in a special manner under the governor-general's eye and specially liable to selection.

The quality of sepoy officers in the Bengal Army was affected by the severity of the Bengal promotion rules. At Bombay and Madras selection by seniority was tempered by selection on merit. In Bengal the strict rule was regularly applied. The sepoy officers were automatically chosen, not from the gallantest, the most enterprising, the most intelligent, but from the longest-lived. In Bengal therefore the sepoy officers were not the natural leaders of the men; gallantry in action could hardly win for a private non-commissioned rank, the subadars of companies were usually aged, toothless, and incapable of keeping up with the troops on the march. As Outram declared before the outbreak of the Mutiny, they possessed no control over their men and owed gratitude for their promotion neither to their officers, nor to the government, but only to their own longevity. •

Another influence making for laxity of discipline in the Bengal Army in particular lay in its comparatively high-caste character. In Bombay and Madras recruits were drawn from a great diversity of castes and peoples. In Bengal the predominant element consisted of Brāhmins and Rājputs from Oudh. The regiments were honey-combed with family groups, and classes which in the eighteenth century had been willing to ignore caste-scruples had come to be pertinacious in putting forward caste as a reason for avoiding unpopular duty.

While the bonds of discipline had thus loosened, causes of

discontent, both just and unjust, were operating. The recent expansion of the empire had widened the sphere of garrison-duty, increased the distances to which the sepoy could be sent from home, and diminished the possible enemies against whom he might be sent to fight. While his service was becoming more irksome, his importance was diminishing. Small matters like the new post-office rules affected him. In the old days his letters had passed under the frank of his commanding officer, this privilege disappeared with the reorganisation of the post-office. More important still in the sepoy's eyes was the general enlistment oath. Until Canning's time sepoys on recruitment had been sworn to service anywhere within the presidency of their enlistment. This led to various difficulties and Canning decided that in future recruits should be sworn to serve wherever needed. This change was most distasteful. It not only kept many out of the service, and so created dissatisfaction among families accustomed to rely on the company's armies for the employment of their sons, but it also alarmed the whole body of sepoys already serving, for they feared that the new conditions would apply to themselves as well as to the men who had taken the new oath.

Thus it happened that while anxiety pervaded many most influential classes of the people, the Bengal Army had for years stood on the brink of mutiny. Neville Chamberlain, one of the ablest of the company's officers, declared that the sepoys were becoming worse than useless. Between 1844 and 1856 no less than four times had large bodies of Bengal sepoys refused to obey orders. These outbreaks were smoothed over rather than suppressed. The evil continued. The time had come which Munro had foretold, and Dalhousie had feared, when the professional Indian soldier was no longer dominated by the European element. Any spark might produce an explosion.

Chance produced the necessary combination of circumstances. Excited minds dwelt upon the old prophecy that the company's rule would end in bloodshed and tumult a hundred years after the battle of Plassey. A Hindu almanack for the *Samvat* year, of strangely ill-omened number, 1914, reproduced and emphasised it. Throughout northern India the prevalent agitation was indicated by the mysterious passing from village to village of flat, unleavened cakes known as *chupattis*. The village watchman would receive one from a neighbouring village with a message

directing him to prepare five more and send them on with like messages. No explanation of this has ever been discovered; but it both occasioned and displayed great alarm in the native mind. At the same time the sepoy were convulsed over the cartridge question.

The company's troops were being re-armed with the Enfield rifle in place of the old smooth-bore musket. The new weapon required a much closer fit of cartridge and ball to the barrel than the old one had done, and consequently the new cartridges needed to be heavily greased to permit their being rammed down the barrel; and sepoys were being sent in parties to camps of exercise where they were taught the new drill. The cartridges issued to the Bengal Army were prepared at the arsenal at Dum-Dum. One day in January, 1857, a low-caste lascar employed there demanded the use of his water-vessel from a high-caste sepoy. The latter refused with disgust. The lascar then taunted him with being already defiled by cartridges, which, he declared, were greased with the fat of the sacred cow. The incident has all the appearance of having been deliberately planned. The story ran through the army like wild-fire. A new version, that the grease contained pig's fat, was used to excite the Muslim sepoys, men began to refuse to touch the cartridges; and the wild belief spread abroad that government had laid a deep plot to destroy Islam and Hinduism at once. Disorder followed. Huts were fired. The adjutant of the 34th Native Infantry was cut down while the quarter-guard looked on. The mutinous sepoys and the officer commanding the quarter-guard were tried and hanged. At Meerut eighty-five men of the 3rd Native Infantry were condemned to a long term of imprisonment for refusing to accept the cartridges. A punishment parade was held on May 9. One by one the delinquents were stripped of their uniforms, fettered, and marched off to prison, where they lay under a sepoy guard. The next evening a regiment of native cavalry broke into open mutiny. It dashed off to the jail, released the prisoners, and was joined by two battalions of native infantry. European officers were cut down, houses fired, bazaars looted, and the sepoys in confusion and alarm marched off along the Delhi road. In the knowledge of what was to follow, critics have usually demanded why the general officer commanding at Meerut did not instantly gather together the European troops—a regiment of dragoons, the 60th Rifles, and a strong body of horse

and foot artillery—and pursue the mutineers. The general was undoubtedly unfit. He had in 1855 been transferred from Peshāwar as being too inactive. But no one knew whither the mutineers had gone or what might next happen. There were many scattered European women to be protected. The general therefore chose what seemed the safest course—he stood on the defensive and did nothing. It is but fair to add that Lord Roberts believed that pursuit could have secured no good effect.

The story of the cartridges that precipitated the general unrest into open mutiny is probably a fable with the slenderest possible foundation in fact. Animal fat had doubtless been used at Woolwich, where the earliest Enfield cartridges were made up. But those issued to the sepoy troops had all been prepared at Dum-dum, where Brāhman workmen had handled the fat without question. As soon as difficulties emerged, strict orders were given that nothing but mutton-fat and wax were to be used. At some stations in the hope of smoothing matters over the men were ordered to grease the cartridges themselves, so that they should have no possible pretext for suspecting the materials used. But in the excitement of the time these measures had small effect, and as often as not were interpreted as showing that the original story had been true. The more active minds behind the whole movement no doubt perceived that the new cartridges provided a good rallying cry on which to raise the whole sepoy army, and had not the Enfield rifle been introduced, some other incident would have been employed to give the necessary stimulus. As Dinkar Rāo observed later, the cartridges provided merely the occasion of the mutiny. The real cause lay in popular discontent, reflected in the army.

Munro had not been alone in anticipating that one day the sepoy forces would break into revolt. Some ten years earlier, in an article on the tragedy of Kābul, Henry Lawrence had asked whether any of the more important military stations in India was better prepared than Kābul had been against a sudden up-rising. The position at Delhi, he thought, was closely similar to that at the Afghan capital. Suppose, he wrote, three hundred men seized the Delhi magazine and treasury, that the troops in the cantonments merely strengthened the guard in the palace; that the palace commandant (like Colonel Skelton at Kābul) merely opened fire from the walls, and that this befell on June 2. In a day

the rebels would swell into thousands, plough-shares would be beaten into swords, and the leader of any force that could be sent against the enemy would have to strike for very existence, at the most inclement season of the year. But suppose too, he continued, that the commandants of the neighbouring stations hesitated to spare troops and that movements were hindered by a lack of transport, "should we not have to strike anew for our Indian empire?" But while men like Lawrence and Dalhousie were certainly alive to the general possibilities of danger, no one seems to have perceived the ferocity and extent of the coming storm, until it was close at hand. Even in March, 1856, Lawrence himself does not seem to have thought that within fifteen months his guesses were to be fulfilled to the letter. Both the government and the high command believed that they had time in which gradually to carry out the reform of distribution, the development of railways, the removal of abuses, with nothing worse to fear than such local troubles as had already been met and reduced.

Consequently government was ill-prepared to suppress the mutiny on its first outbreak. The withdrawal of European troops for the Crimean War had never been made good, for the home authorities had first ignored and then forgotten Dalhousie's remonstrances. Of the European troops attached to the Bengal Army, most were concentrated on the frontier or in the Panjab. The valley of the Ganges was almost bare of them. None were at Allāhābād, a magazine and strategic centre of great importance, for it commanded the route from Calcutta up the Ganges valley. None were at Delhi, another great magazine, which had been the base of the troops operating in the Sikh wars. The arsenal stood within the city walls, and had long been regarded as unsatisfactory. Lord Gough in particular had urged the importance of its removal. Dalhousie had hoped to be able to deal with this question. His agreement with the emperor's heir for the transfer of the royal family from the fortress-palace to a new building near the Kutb, would have placed the fort in British hands and permitted the transfer of the arsenal from the city to the fort. Military opinion was agreed on the soundness of this plan. But the death of the Mughal's heir endangered the proposal. As a temporary measure Dalhousie reduced the arsenal from a first-class to a second-class magazine, but it still contained some 300 pieces of ordnance and a vast amount of percussion-caps, while the chief powder-

magazine, though lying in the cantonments outside the city walls, remained under the guard of sepoy troops alone. At Allāhābād likewise the arsenal in the fort was protected only by a few European invalids. Outram, just before the Persian war, had urged on Canning the need of a British garrison; but nothing had been done. In fact the one precautionary measure of any value which had been taken was the recent treaty with Dost Muhammad of Kābul. So far as this was observed, no danger was to be feared on the north-west frontier. But, in the event of serious trouble arising in India itself, the troops in the Panjab could not be transferred elsewhere, until it was clear that the amir intended to abide by his agreement.

The difficulties of the position were for the moment enhanced by the character of the governor-general. Canning possessed many noble qualities. He was just, clear-minded, and resolute once he had adopted a course of action. But he was not the man to face a crisis, because he could not swiftly decide on any course of action. He saw all the sides of a complicated question, and could not without long delay determine what was, and what was not, essential. Dalhousie would have acted strongly and decisively the moment he judged a serious movement impending. Canning feared to precipitate a mutiny by preparing to crush it. He hoped to coax the sepoys back to discipline, at a time when coaxing was too late.

The morning after the outbreak at Meerut, the fugitive cavalry reached Delhi, and were admitted into the palace. Late the night before a messenger had arrived from Meerut with news of what had happened. The letter had been safely delivered to the commissioner, Simon Fraser. But, heavy with sleep, he had taken it from the servant's hand, mechanically put it into his pocket, and fallen asleep again. The mutinous cavalry were therefore their own heralds. They were soon followed by the infantry regiments. The sepoys in the cantonments joined the mutineers. The jail was thrown open. The arsenal in the city was attacked, and though the small magazine which it contained was blown up by its defenders the great magazine outside was plundered, part of its contents being carried off by marauders, the remainder being brought into the city. The troops declared allegiance to the emperor. His sons endeavoured to assume command of a movement which they hoped would lead to the restoration of Mughal

SKETCH MAP
ILLUSTRATING
THE MUTINY OF THE
BENGAL ARMY



government; and such Europeans as failed to escape at the outset were shot or cut to pieces in the streets, or else herded into the palace where they were speedily put to death. This massacre at Delhi gave the tone to the pitiless struggle which was to come. It meant that there could be no peace until one side or the other, the British in India or the mutineers and those who joined them, had been exterminated.

The news of the revolt at Delhi had been forwarded to Lahore by two telegraphists just before they had been forced to flee for their lives. But it was not until two days later, on May 13, that Canning learnt of the catastrophe. He at once empowered John Lawrence at Lahore and Henry Lawrence at Lucknow to take such measures as they thought best. But elsewhere nothing was done. No transport was ready, no stores collected, the English troops at Ambāla were detained by the presence of suspected sepoy regiments which the commander-in-chief hesitated to disarm. A force was at last assembled at Karnāl, the commander-in-chief died of cholera; on June 8, no less than four weeks after the outbreak, a force composed of the Karnāl troops, the Rifles from Meerut, and a Gurkha battalion, drove in the mutineers' outposts and camped on the Ridge looking down from the northward over Delhi.

The royal family had beyond doubt hoped for and encouraged the spirit of revolt. Before the end of April one of the princes had dismissed the European groom employed to exercise his horses, with a message that ere many days had passed every English infidel should be put to the sword. On the arrival of the mutineers various princes assumed command of the several regiments. But they spoke only the corrupt Persian used in their phantom court, and could not communicate with their men except through an interpreter. Their command, like the authority of the aged king, Bahādur Shāh, proved a mere thing of words. The day after the arrival of the Meerut mutineers, a high-sounding proclamation was issued in the king's name, directing his ever-victorious armies to advance and destroy his enemies. Bahādur was carried in triumphal procession through the city. But the same day witnessed a scene betraying the emptiness of all these solemn pretensions. The sepoys crowded on the king in his durbār, shouting at him, seizing his hand or touching his beard to attract his attention. At last he was permitted to withdraw,

shocked, alarmed, and lamenting the evil days which had come upon him. A week later the mutineers declared the king to be too old and infirm, and chose one of his sons in his stead. Presently they tired of the prince and recognised his father once more. But what authority existed lay with a *junta* of sepoy officers constantly split by jealousy and mistrust. Nor was the imperial city much happier than the imperial court under its new masters. The men were demanding pay. On May 21 the palace was crowded by a howling mob, whose attitude was so threatening that the bankers raised a lakh of rupees to satisfy them. Long before the siege was over, the wealthier citizens had gone into hiding to escape the contributions constantly demanded under threats of plunder. The Muslims hoisted the standard of the *jihād* on the Jama Masjid; the Hindus complained and insisted on its being pulled down. Communal feeling became so strained that, when Bakr'Id approached, the death-penalty was proclaimed against any man who should sacrifice a cow.

The appearance of the English force before Delhi produced wild confusion in the city. Fugitives came pouring in through the Kashnūr, Lahore, and Kābul gates, and, could the English troops have advanced at once, they would have found the gates open, and the mutineers in panic. But the men were exhausted and the risk appeared too great. The walls were no longer the thin, ruinous, mud-patched defences which the English had found in 1803, but had been repaired with stone by English engineers. On the following day an attack was proposed, but the plan was rejected as desperate, probably with good reason. The assailants therefore fortified themselves upon the Ridge and there remained for some three months. The mutineers then recovered their courage. The English were constantly harassed by attacks, a prey to cholera and sunstroke, incapable of doing more than hold their ground.

The delay in recovering Delhi was in all respects disastrous. Every day that passed increased the strain upon the sepoy troops that had not yet joined the mutiny. Messengers from the revolted regiments were constantly beseeching them to join their brethren or taunting them with cowardice for their delay. Knowledge of the distrust with which they were regarded by the British authorities set a keener edge on their uneasiness, while the position at Delhi suggested to wavering minds that the prophecy of the

company's fall was about to be fulfilled. So regiment after regiment broke, until the sepoy portion of the Bengal Army had almost wholly vanished. During the fatal four weeks that dragged so slowly out between the mutiny at Meerut and the occupation of the Delhi Ridge other mutinies occurred at Firūzpur, at Aligarh, at Nasirābād, at Āgra, at Lucknow, at Bareilly, at Allāhābād and Benares, at Nīmach, at Jhānsi, at Cawnpore. As June and July passed with Delhi still unsubdued, sepoys had to be disarmed at Multān and Barrackpore, Sindhia's and Holkar's contingents mutinied at Gwalior and Indore; and the troops at Fatchgarh, at Mhow, at Sāgar, at Sialkot, at Dinapur, broke from their allegiance. Preparations for a strong mobile force at the end of April, when the position was known to be full of danger, and swift action on the first outbreak, would have prevented many, if not all of these disasters. For there was no common and agreed plan throughout the army. Schemers had no doubt done all they could to produce a universal revolt, but the regiments broke piece-meal, and many might have been saved. Even as it was, some units were held fast by the resolute wisdom of their commanders, some by the unwavering spirit of the men themselves. The 47th Native Infantry, for instance, posted at Mirzāpur, was kept with its colours by Lieutenant-Colonel Pott, who warded off attempt after attempt and at last persuaded his men to volunteer in a body for service in China, while a large body of the 13th at Lucknow joined with a devotion far beyond all praise in the defence of the Residency, and, when their commander Major Bruce was killed, carried his body to the grave regardless of pollution. But such fidelity could be secured only by men of strong, commanding character. A striking contrast is afforded by other regiments whose steadiness was regarded by their officers with the fullest confidence. In some cases the men mutinied and killed their officers, in others they were only prevented by being disarmed, and in at least one instance the colonel shot himself for grief and shame. Such blind trust is the poorest possible substitute for discernment.

The only bright feature of the situation consisted in the fact that the mutinies were almost wholly limited to the Bengal Army and concentrated in northern and central India. The Madras population, less emotional than their northern brethren, remained quiet, and the discipline of the Madras Army held good. Muslim

agitators brought about a riot at Hyderabad, but the attack which the rioters made on the Residency was easily beaten off, and, under the influence of the rising statesman, Sālar Jang, the power of the Nizām's government was used vigorously to prevent any repetition of the event. The Madras Army was thus able to spare a considerable proportion of its European troops, who reached the valley of the Ganges under the command of Neill early in June. In Bombay the situation was more unsettled. Many land-owners in the Marātha country had been aggrieved by investigations into the validity of their exemption from the payment of land-revenue. Marātha sentiment was strong, and sympathised naturally with the efforts of Nāna Sāhib to revive Marātha power. His emissaries brought about a local rising, and a mutiny occurred at Kolhapur. But these movements were speedily suppressed. The Bombay sepoys, though restive, were kept under control. Sind, under the government which Napier had set up and at this time in the able hands of Baird Frere, remained notably quiet, and spared troops for service elsewhere. After a while the Bombay government was able to organise the column which under Sir Hugh Rose restored British supremacy in Central India.

In Bengal and Bihar the situation suffered from the ill-grounded optimism or unwise hesitation of Canning. He refused the offers of volunteers, made immediately on the outbreak at Meerut, because he fancied that the evil had been checked. He refused at first to disarm the sepoys at Barrackpore, although he distrusted them with good reason and kept to watch them two European regiments whose services were most urgently required elsewhere. At last on June 14 the Barrackpore sepoys were disarmed. But the spirit of unjustified confidence still prevailed. Though Patna was the headquarters of the Wahhābī sect, well known to have been active in intrigue in many parts of India, Halliday, the lieutenant-governor, objected to the precautions which Tayler, the commissioner, wished to take and ridiculed the possibility of a mutiny at the neighbouring station of Dinapur. Tayler on his own responsibility arrested three leading Wahhābī moulvis, and suppressed a riot which broke out on July 3. On the 25th half-hearted measures at Dinapur produced the expected mutiny, and the sepoys marched off to join a Rājput zamindar, Kunwair Singh, who had risen in rebellion. They attacked Arrah, the headquarters of the most troubled district in the Patna division; but were kept

at bay until Major Vincent Eyre scattered them on his way to Allāhābād, with the help of a small body of troops of which he assumed the command. Apart from this episode, the discredit of which must lie mainly on the lieutenant-governor, the province remained undisturbed.

At Āgra too the conduct of affairs was marked by unfortunate indecision. The lieutenant-governor, John Colvin, a sound administrator in untroubled times, was swayed alternately by hope and fear. First he proposed to take refuge in the fort. Then he persuaded himself that no real danger threatened, and would not disarm the sepoys at Āgra till May 31. The result of this inaction was the mutiny of every sepoy regiment in the Rohilkhand, where a Muslim pensioner, Khān Bahādūr, proclaimed himself viceroy of the king of Delhi.

The situation in the Panjab was at once more dangerous and better managed. The recent conquest of the country, the possibility that the Sikhs would use the crisis to recover their independence, the neighbourhood of Afghanistan and the uncertain attitude of the frontier tribes, demanded the utmost vigilance. Luckily the telegraph line was broken, for the provincial government was composed of Dalhousie's picked men. John Lawrence was at its head. Under him were Robert Montgomery as judicial commissioner, and Herbert Edwardes, commissioner at Peshāwar. At the moment when the news of the revolt at Delhi reached Lahore, Lawrence was absent on leave. But Montgomery instantly took action. On May 13 the four sepoy regiments at Miān-mūr were disarmed. At Firūzpūr the brigadier imitated the hesitation of the commander at Dinapur, with the result that a regiment mutinied the day before it was to have been disarmed. But even there the magazine was secured. At Peshāwar Herbert Edwardes, on John Nicholson's advice, had instantly ordered the formation of a movable column, to be ready to march wherever danger might appear. The sepoy troops outnumbered the British by almost three to one. The closest watch was kept. Intercepted letters proved communications with the Hindustani fanatics of Sitāna, and on the night of May 21/22 news came that the 55th Native Infantry at Nowshera had mutinied. Next morning four regiments at Peshāwar were paraded and disarmed. On the 23rd Nicholson led a party to disarm the remaining companies of the 55th at Mardān. They fled at his approach, were pursued into the hills,

wandered miserably and precariously there for a while, and at last those who had not surrendered themselves as slaves to the tribesmen surrendered to the British. Such vigorous action was reinforced by the enlistment of local levies. At first the Peshāwar chiefs had refused their aid, telling Edwardes bluntly that he must show them that he was the stronger. But after the events just noted, no further reluctance was shown. In the following month at Multān two sepoy regiments were disarmed by some Panjabī cavalry and infantry backed by a troop of Native Horse Artillery. It was clear that Panjabīs, whether Sikh or Muslim, felt not the least sympathy with the *Pindhīyas*, the Easterners, as they called the sepoys of the eastern provinces.

Thus in northern India, while the central government was unprepared and irresolute, and the provincial governments of Bengal and Āgra were hampered by the consequences of their own indecision, the Panjab alone could strengthen the scanty and inadequate force which was all the governor-general and commander-in-chief had been able to assemble for the recovery of Delhi. In this task Lawrence was greatly aided by the attitude of the Cis-Sutlej chiefs. From the very first, under the leadership of Patāla, they never hesitated but offered all their resources for the suppression of the mutiny. This did much to clear the road. The Guides who marched from Mardān under Daly as soon as the revolt at Delhi was announced, covered twenty-seven miles a day for three weeks, arrived on the Ridge only a day after the Karnāl troops, and engaged the mutineers within three hours of their arrival. As soon as the crisis in the Panjab began to ease, Lawrence prepared to follow them up with large bodies of additional troops—British and Panjabī. Thirteen battalions of infantry, four regiments of horse, 8000 auxiliaries supplied by local chiefs, stores of all kinds, and the siege-train that at last broke down the defences of the city, all came from the Panjab. At one moment Lawrence had judged the position so desperate that he had proposed to facilitate the despatch of reinforcements by abandoning Peshāwar to the Afghans. But this proposal, which Edwardes judged to be a disastrous confession of weakness, was rejected by Canning on Edwardes's vigorous remonstrance, and Lawrence was thus saved from the one serious error into which he had been in danger of falling.

Meanwhile at Delhi the British troops had maintained and

even strengthened their position on the Ridge, despite the constant attacks of the mutineers. The city formed a natural focus, and band after band of sepoys marched thither as the mutiny spread from unit to unit and from station to station. Their practice was to move out to engage the British immediately after their arrival. Within six weeks more than twenty assaults were delivered against the Ridge. These were steadily repulsed, but by the end of July the recovery of the city appeared as remote as ever, and even the Panjab was beginning to waver in its belief in the ultimate victory of the English. Early in September, however, the siege-train under the escort of Nicholson with the Panjab movable column arrived. The mutineers still outnumbered their assailants by about two to one, but an assault was planned. Breaching batteries were opened on the bastions and curtain of the northern wall. On September 14 the storming columns were assembled, a party of most gallant men blew in the Kashmīr Gate, and that day a lodgement was made in the city with the loss of about a quarter of the assailants. After some five days of bloody street-fighting, the mutineers were completely driven out, the fort captured, the emperor and four of his sons made prisoner at the Tomb of Humāyūn, and the latter shot by their captor, Major Hodson. The greatest British loss was the death of John Nicholson, who had commanded one of the columns of assault. Before the mutiny he had proved himself a most vigilant, fearless and successful frontier administrator. On its outbreak he had played a leading part among John Lawrence's lieutenants in maintaining order in the Panjab. As resolute and swift in action as Clive, he had, what Clive had not, the stern Hebraic piety of a seventeenth-century Puritan, and knew that to him the victory would be given. Men followed and obeyed him without question. He was beyond doubt the most heroic of a group of men all distinguished by their endurance, courage and resource.

The recovery of Delhi in September, 1857, was the turning-point of the mutiny. When the news reached Peshāwar, the townsmen thronged Edwardes's house with congratulations. The merchants apologised for their late reluctance to raise a loan of five lakhs, and government bonds which had been selling at 25 per cent discount rose rapidly. But the four months' delay in its recovery had been dearly paid for by the course of events at Lucknow, Benares and Cawnpore. At Lucknow Henry Law-

rence had done all in his power to conciliate the chief people of the province, but, since he could not undo the revenue settlement, the talukdars still had a material grievance to nurse. He had already decided to defend the Residency, should affairs compel him to stand on the defensive. On May 25 he warned the women and children to take refuge there. On the 30th mutiny broke out in the cantonments, followed by riots in the city. But over 500 sepoys refused to follow their comrades, and played a great part in the subsequent struggle. Besides these, Lawrence had one queen's regiment—the 32nd Foot. The mutiny at Lucknow was followed during the next few days by mutinies at every other station in the province, and the complete collapse of all civil administration in the districts, though most of the talukdars contented themselves with resuming their lands, and some even sent promises of help to the Residency. Within Lucknow itself Lawrence succeeded for a while in maintaining his authority, although the mutineers were assembling in the neighbourhood. All available hands were kept hard at work preparing the Residency for a defence which every day made more inevitable. On June 30 an attempt was made, against Lawrence's own inclinations, to disperse the sepoys who had gathered at Chinhath, four miles away. The troops, exhausted by continuous labour on the fortifications and by the heat of the season, were compelled hurriedly to retreat with a loss of one third of their number. The mutineers at once entered and plundered the city and the siege of the Residency began. On July 2 Lawrence was mortally wounded by a bursting shell. Two days later he died, leaving about a thousand English soldiers and civilians and seven hundred loyal sepoys to defend the Residency against about 10,000 mutineers.

At Cawnpore were stationed four sepoy regiments, with about four hundred British gunners and invalids. On the news from Meerut, the commander, Sir Hugh Wheeler, resolved, like Lawrence at Lucknow, to secure a defensible position. The magazine offered by far the best. But Wheeler hesitated to withdraw the sepoy guard posted there lest he should precipitate a rising, and contented himself with throwing up a breastwork near the north-east corner of the town. On June 4 the native cavalry and one infantry regiment mutinied. On the 5th a second infantry regiment went over, and the third broke when Wheeler hastily fired into them with his artillery. Eighty still clung to their

colours, but all the rest joined their revolted comrades. The mutineers gathered round Nāna Sāhib at his palace near Cawnpore. After some hesitation, he resolved to besiege Wheeler's feeble entrenchment. For three weeks the defenders held their ground, lacking food, lacking water, lacking shelter from the enemy's fire and from the heat of the day. On June 26 Wheeler surrendered, under promise of safe-conduct to Allāh-ābād. The survivors went aboard the boats provided for them early next morning. But as soon as they had got on board, the thatch-shelters of the boats were set on fire, while a hail of grape-shot and bullets was poured upon them by the sepoys who crowded round. Only one boat got away, and of those upon her only four men escaped with their lives. While this was going forward, orders came from Nāna Sāhib forbidding further massacre. The survivors were then imprisoned in a large building within the town. But the men were speedily taken out and killed. Later on the women and children were removed to a small house called the Bibigarh, and after some days of the utmost misery, on news of an English advance up the river, were cut to pieces by the Nāna's orders on July 15. This slaughter displayed in its extreme form the ferocity with which the struggle was being fought out. The murder of English women at Meerut and their wholesale massacre in the *Dīvān-i'-am* of the Delhi palace, had in the first place sharpened the determination of the English to punish the mutineers with a deterrent severity. Death was the accepted punishment for mutiny. A large number of mutineers had been hanged. This was the severest form in which death could be inflicted on high-caste men, for they were sent into the next world indelibly polluted by the touch of a low-caste or caste-less hangman. In some cases the authorities in the Panjab and elsewhere had adopted a mode of execution which had long been practised by Indian rulers, which had probably been introduced into India by the Mughals and which had certainly been employed by the Marāthas. It consisted in blowing the condemned men from guns. This more spectacular punishment has usually been regarded as indicating a peculiar ferocity on the part of the British. But unlike hanging it was instantaneous, unlike hanging it involved no inevitable pollution. The caste-sepoy would almost certainly have chosen it in preference to the rope. In any case every sepoy knew that he would be liable to death in one form or another if

he broke into mutiny. Wholesale execution is the appropriate punishment of wholesale mutiny, and we must regret that the sepoy risked his stake rather than that he lost it, for his success could only have restored in India that welter of unending war in which the country had lain miserably in the eighteenth century. The blot on British conduct does not lie in the military punishments which were exacted, but in the conduct of a number of officers who took a bloody revenge upon guilty and innocent alike. Indiscriminate executions had accompanied the suppression of the munnies at Benares and Allāhābād. They help to explain the pitiless slaughter of Cawnpore, and both miserably prove how cruel men are made by fear.

Weeks passed before any serious attempt could be made to recover Cawnpore and relieve the defenders of the Lucknow Residency. But Neill with the Madras Fusiliers reached Bengal from Madras; and the disarming of the sepoys at Barrackpore in the middle of June set other troops free. On June 3 Neill reached Benares on his way up the river with a detachment of his regiment. There an ill-managed disarming of sepoys led to mutiny which was immediately and severely repressed. Neill at once pushed on to Allāhābād, where he arrived on the 7th. Possession of that place was crucial, for, unless it was securely held, no attempt could be made from Bengal to maintain British authority at Cawnpore and Lucknow, known to be trembling in the balance. Mutiny had broken out at Allāhābād the day before Neill's arrival. But the fort was saved by Captain Brasyer and a company of the Ludhiāna Sikhs, though other companies of that regiment had mutinied at Benares. Neill had first to restore order among the volunteers who had seized the liquor in the fort, and he then swept the surrounding country of all elements of opposition. Many villages were burnt for harbouring sepoys who had mutinied, and many villagers were cut down at sight by the Sikh and volunteer parties which were sent out. Preparations were then made to relieve Wheeler at Cawnpore. Major Renaud, to whom the command was to be entrusted, received instructions for the extermination of every mutinous sepoy he could find.

When he was on the point of marching, Havelock reached Allāhābād to take over the command of the forces which had gradually assembled there. Havelock was another man of the type which emerged so prominently in this crisis. He was not

only a soldier of long experience and deep study, but also, like Edwardes and Nicholson, he was a devout evangelical, constant in prayer, convinced that his cause was the cause of God as well as of his country. In fact the qualities of the rulers which had done much to bring about the mutiny aided strongly and resolutely in its suppression.

Renaud had moved off on June 30. On July 3 the surrender and destruction of Wheeler's force was known at Allābābād. On the 7th Havelock advanced with about 1000 British troops, 130 Sikhs, twenty volunteer troopers and six guns. On the 12th he overtook Renaud. In the four following days he fought four actions, in the last defeating 5000 sepoys under the command of Nāna Sāhib in person. On the 17th he entered Cawnpore, two days after the slaughter of the women and children in the Bibigarh. The sight of its blood-stained walls and its floor littered with shreds of muslin and long tresses of hair produced a terrible reaction. The fury of vengeance flared up into an intense burst of passion. Neill, to whom the command of the city was entrusted, resolved to punish such sepoys as he deemed particularly guilty not only with the physical pains of death but also with the highest degree of spiritual torture which he could inflict. Each of these was to be forced, if necessary with the lash, to lick the bloodstains from an appointed space. 'After properly cleaning up his portion', the order concluded, "the culprit is to be immediately hanged".

After receiving reinforcements, Havelock advanced again with some 1500 men, leaving but three hundred to hold Cawnpore. He twice met and defeated the enemy; but his force was so wasted by cholera and by loss in action that he was obliged to fall back again, convinced that he could not yet accomplish the relief of the Lucknow Residency. Having been reinforced by a company of British infantry and half a battery of guns, he made another attempt, but once more, after meeting and driving back the sepoys at a point about half-way between Cawnpore and Lucknow, he was obliged to retire. Though he dispersed a body of 4000 sepoys who were threatening Neill in Cawnpore, the Oudh talukdars, encouraged by his inability to advance, began to comply with the demands of the mutineers for help.

Meanwhile the government had resolved to re-appoint Outram as chief commissioner of Oudh in the place of Henry Lawrence. The choice was questionable, for Outram seems to have owed his

reputation to timely measures of self-advertisement. With still more doubtful wisdom, he was given the command of the relieving force, though as a soldier he lacked the experience, knowledge, and resolute skill which marked out Havelock. With characteristic caution, however, which was meant to be and in fact was hailed as noble self-sacrifice, Outram refused to exercise the military command, preferring to serve as a somewhat indocile subordinate to the older and better soldier. With him came substantial reinforcements. On September 21, a few days after the recovery of Delhi had been completed, Havelock marched for the third time towards Lucknow, with something over 3000 men. At 'Ālambāgh, two miles from Lucknow, he learnt of the recovery of Delhi. On the 25th the attack was made on a scheme dictated by Outram. The resistance proved stubborn. Outram hesitated and would have halted. But in this he was overborne by Havelock, and, after severe losses, the relievers forced their way through into the Residency. But though the besieged garrison was thus saved, the available forces were still unable to evacuate the women and children, or recover control of the city, still less of the province, for the mutineers had been strengthened by numerous bands which had fled from Delhi. The completion of the task had therefore to await a new commander and the forces which were at last beginning to arrive from Singapore, whence troops destined for the China war had been diverted to Calcutta, and from England, whence reinforcements were tediously travelling by way of the Cape although the Khedive had offered facilities for the much more expeditious route by Alexandria and Suez.

Sir Colin Campbell had been appointed commander-in-chief by the home authorities. He had risen from the ranks, had fought when scarcely more than a boy in the Peninsular War, and had commanded a division in the Crimea. He was beyond the custom of the time careful of the lives and comfort of his men, and, though no great general, was a sound and practical soldier. After completing his preparations for transport and communications, he moved up the river and reached Cawnpore on November 3. The place was threatened by Sindhia's revolted contingent, which had joined Tantia Topi, the ablest of Nāna Sāhū's commanders. Sir Colin therefore left a detachment to hold Cawnpore, and himself pushed on towards Lucknow. On November 16 and 17 he fought

his way through the city and joined hands with the garrison. The Residency was evacuated, the women, children and wounded removed, and Outram was left with 4500 men to contain the mutineers in the city until Sir Colin could return to crush them. On November 27 the latter counter-marched towards Cawnpore, where Tantia Topi had scored two successes against the detachment defending it. He arrived in time to prevent any considerable mishap, and on December 6 engaged Tantia's forces. But, though he defeated them, his victory was far from decisive, for an opportunity of cutting off two-thirds of the mutineers was missed by his chief of staff.

However, from this point onward the ultimate issue was never in the smallest doubt, operations were no longer limited to the relief of small groups struggling against greatly superior numbers, but could be directed towards the re-establishment of British power over wide areas. The first object was the complete control of the Ganges-Jumna doāb. Converging columns were therefore directed on Fatchgarh, situated on the Ganges due east of Āgra. These drove large numbers of sepoy across the river into the Rohilkhand, and on their expulsion the villagers hastened to support the re-established civil administration. A force was then concentrated on the right bank of the Ganges to prevent the sepoy from re-entering the doāb, while Sir Colin himself proceeded to the re-conquest of Oudh.

At the end of February, 1858, he was able at last to march again on Lucknow, where 120,000 men had been attacking Outram at the 'Ālambāgh, which the British had occupied on the evacuation of the Residency. His attack succeeded after some days of severe fighting. But, as at Cawnpore, large bodies of the enemy, numbering at least 30,000, were suffered to escape, so that the recovery of Lucknow, on March 21, left the province still in the hands of the rebels, and their resistance was stiffened by the proclamation in which Canning announced the policy which he intended to follow. It declared all lands confiscate, save those of a few individuals who had aided the government. At Outram's pressing request, a clause was added to the effect that those who immediately submitted might expect a large measure of indulgence. But the vague terms of this promise, coupled with the nature of the original British land-revenue settlement, did not conciliate the talukdars. Accordingly a long struggle ensued, in

which the rebel parties were invariably scattered when encountered, only to re-assemble at some other place. In October, 1858, however, Sir Colin was induced to employ mounted infantry. Their mobility enabled them to take much more effective action, and before the end of the year the surviving rebels were driven into the Raipur hills, while the talukdars were reassured by Montgomery, who succeeded Outram as chief commissioner, regarding the government's intentions.

In the region to the south and west of the doāb and Oudh operations had been conducted by forces organised from Bombay. Sindhia's contingent at Gwalior had mutinied in the middle of June, 1857. The widow of the late raja of Jhānsi had already raised a revolt in the hope of recovering the state which had been annexed in the time of Dalhousie. On July 1 mutinies broke out among the company's sepoys at Mhow and Sāgar, and in Holkar's contingent at Indore. As soon as the local troubles had been suppressed, Sir Hugh Rose with a Bombay column took the field. He marched from Mhow on January 6, 1858, and moved on Jhānsi, reducing rebel forts on his way and driving before him parties of mutineers. On March 22 he laid siege to Jhānsi. Tantia Topi with the Gwalior contingent attempted to raise the siege but was defeated, and on April 3 the place was carried by assault after a desperate resistance. The rani escaped and joined Tantia Topi. After a pause to rest his men and gather supplies, Rose moved against Tantia and defeated him at Kunch and Golahi. The latter success gave Rose possession of Kālpi, and he hoped that his campaign was virtually completed. But Tantia and the rani suddenly marched on Gwalior. Sindhia's wavering army joined them. On June 1 they occupied the fortress and proclaimed Nāna Sāhib Pēshwā. Rose immediately took the field again. On the 17th and 18th he defeated Tantia outside Gwalior, and restored Sindhia's authority, while Tantia fled with some 4000 men into Rājputāna. For eight months he succeeded in evading his pursuers. But at last his followers wearied and dispersed, while he himself was captured early in 1859, tried by court martial on a charge of rebellion, and hanged at Sipri, in Sindhia's territories, on April 18.

Thus northern India was re-conquered. In this operation the great mass of the population, save in Oudh, looked on with the same apathy with which it had witnessed the gradual extension of

the company's authority. When civil government vanished, the villagers had plundered and sometimes murdered local money-lenders and grain-dealers, paying off old scores, and falling cheerfully into anarchy. But when the mutineers were beaten and the district officials reappeared, they were met with the old respect and obedience. The sole organised body of Indians had been the army. The army alone therefore responded to the atmosphere of alarm and anxiety which had prevailed early in 1857. The minor chiefs, too, had naturally provided a more turbulent factor. Especially in Central India and Oudh, they had been disposed to assist the mutineers rather than the government, which was lowering their dignity, their importance, and their wealth. But the princes had on the whole stood by the company, whatever grounds of complaint individuals among them might have had. Some had written messages of good-will to the old emperor in the first flush of the outbreak; but their words had not been followed up by action.

The Bengal sepoy had thus stood alone, and their mutiny of itself dissolved the organisation which had made them capable of common action. They did not trust their new leaders. In the early stages of the desperate struggle the Europeans, ever outnumbered, speedily recovered the prestige which for the moment they had lost. Soon the sepoys went into action expecting to be beaten. The individuals of a battalion might fight to the death, but the battalion had lost its military virtue. It speedily broke, and the sepoys perished in groups or fighting man by man. The mutiny was in fact foredoomed to failure, however overwhelming it appeared when station after station was bursting into revolt. Victory in the sepoy war, as in those which had preceded it, was determined by the greater vigour, the union, and the resolution of the victors. Caught in the early stages at a great disadvantage, they had done much to retrieve their position before reinforcements had even begun to arrive, and owed their success to a superiority of moral against a vast preponderance of material force. With the gradual recovery of power the vindictive indiscriminateness of punishment which had been shown in some (not in all) of the areas of conflict gave place to more measured action. Men remembered once more that co-operation had been and still must be the keynote of Indian government, and heeded Canning's wise resolve not to rule in anger. The net results of

those two years of dreadful turmoil were the reassertion of British power, and the complete defeat of a convulsive effort to throw off the growing influences of the west. Two events notably typified the issue. The last shadow of the Mughal court vanished. Bahādur Shāh was tried for rebellion, condemned, and removed a prisoner to Rangoon. And with the court of Delhi the East India Company vanished also. By an act of 1858 its powers were cancelled, and direct government over the territories which it had acquired was henceforward vested in the queen.

CHAPTER XII

Crown Government and the Government of India after the Mutiny

The constitutional result of the Indian Mutiny was the abolition of the Mughal Court at Delhi, the disappearance of the last vestiges of sovereignty other than British within British India, and the termination of the powers and privileges of the East India Company. For a century the company had exercised political authority, despite the arguments of theorists like Adam Smith and the efforts of intemperate politicians like Charles James Fox in the eighteenth and Lord Ellenborough in the nineteenth century. But when in 1853 Macaulay had succeeded in substituting competition for the patronage of the directors as the method of recruiting the company's covenanted service, the company's real safeguard had vanished. Direct crown government would no longer invest the executive in England with new and extensive sources of patronage. Whig support, which had kept the company alive for over a generation, vanished. The Mutiny produced a widespread but unjust opinion that the company was specifically to blame for that great misfortune. In 1858 therefore both political parties were agreed that the company should be abolished and that thenceforward the government of British India should be exercised in the name of the queen.

But though parliament therefore paid small attention to the company's petition that no change should be made in the mode of government "without a full previous enquiry into the operation of the present system", the arguments of the petition itself exerted considerable influence on the new form of government which was actually adopted. The company had urged that any crown minister charged with the government of India would himself be unacquainted with India, and incapable of judging the solicitation of men either equally ignorant with himself or knowing enough to impose on others less informed, and in any case liable to seek party objects rather than the good government of the country. Such a minister would therefore need a council

composed of men experienced in Indian affairs, and personally independent of the minister, in order that they might be able effectively to oppose proposals founded in ignorance or self-interest. Such a council could not be made up entirely of crown nominees, but must include a large proportion of men who owed their seats to no ministerial influence. Nor should any proposals seek to establish the executive government of India in London. The executive government must remain situated in India itself. The business of the home government was not to conduct the details of administration, but to revise past conduct, to lay down principles, to issue general instructions. Such functions demanded a deliberative rather than an executive body, and resembled those of parliament rather than those of the cabinet or of any administrative board.

The various schemes put forward, as well as that ultimately adopted, show how generally these conclusions were accepted. The bill introduced by Disraeli and inspired by Ellenborough, proposed to attach to the Indian minister a council partly nominated by the crown, partly elected by persons who had served in India, who had financial interests in that country, or who were parliamentary electors resident in the leading commercial cities of Great Britain and Ireland. This was speedily laughed down. But the bill which was substituted and which was passed into law in 1858 made careful provision for a council able to supervise the conduct of the minister. The new body was to be called the Council of India—a title till then borne by the executive council of the governor-general. It was to consist of fifteen members, a majority of whom must have served or at least resided in India for ten years at least. Eight members were to be nominated by the crown and the other seven were to be elected in the first instance by the members of the Court of Directors. Vacancies in the latter group were to be filled by co-option. All members were to hold office, like judges of the English bench, during good behaviour, and were removable only on an address of both houses of parliament. These provisions ensured that the new council would include a considerable element entirely independent of the minister, while the exceptional tenure of office enjoyed by every member permitted an expression of the frankest opinion on every question laid before him. The powers bestowed on the council illustrated similar views of the functions which it was designed to

discharge. It could not indeed take any business into consideration except under a reference from the minister, its decisions might be overruled by him, and he might despatch to India without its concurrence orders which he ruled to be either urgent or secret. But all other proposed orders had to be laid before it for its opinion; where the minister refused to accept the council's opinion, he had to record reasons for his refusal; and in a wide variety of matters, especially all financial questions, the concurrence of a majority of the council was indispensable. In all matters excepting those of high policy it was thus deliberately intended that the minister's proposals should be submitted to a critical and effectual review.

Such limitations on the Indian minister's powers were undoubtedly sound and proper, for a House of Commons elected primarily to control the conduct of British affairs could not be expected to develop either the active interest or the informed criticism which influenced the management of the other great departments of government. The degree in which parliament was expected to participate in the business of Indian government was indicated in the act itself. Every year the minister was to submit the accounts of India for parliamentary approval with a statement showing "the moral and material progress" of the country. Besides this, aspects of policy likely to escape the criticism of the Council of India by being dealt with as urgent or secret were also to be discussed in parliament. Any declaration of war was to be laid before parliament within a prescribed period, and any military operations beyond the Indian frontiers, save for the purpose of repelling invasion, could not be paid for out of the Indian revenues without the approval of parliament.

For the actual conduct of affairs a new secretary of state was created to take the place of the former president of the Board of Control. This involved no fresh expense, for the salary attached to the latter office had already been raised in 1853 from £3000 a year to £5000, in view of its growing importance. But the change carried with it a rise in status. Future ministers for India would be men of greater political weight than the long succession of mediocrities who had sat at the Board of Control.

The net effect of these clauses in the Government of India Act of 1858 was an extension of the changes already introduced in 1853. In 1853 the crown had received the right to nominate six

members out of the eighteen who formed the Court of Directors, it was now to nominate nine out of the sixteen members composing the new council. This new body was also much less powerful than the old one had been. The council could not initiate correspondence, it lacked the company's power of obstructing indefinitely administrative measures of which it disapproved; it could not recall a governor-general, and so lost a powerful lever for influencing the cabinet's policy. And while the successors of the directors were weaker, the successor of the Board of Control was stronger, holding higher rank in the cabinet and enjoying greater influence in the House of Commons. In fact the old system, under which the government of India had been managed by an independent body under the general control of a minister of the crown, had at last been replaced by a new system, under which a minister of the crown was to administer Indian affairs under the partial control of a semi-independent body.

On the formation of the new office the queen looked forward to participating as actively in its transactions as she was accustomed to do in those of the other departments of her government. She directed that its procedure should be based on that of the Foreign Office, that all important despatches should be submitted to her on their receipt, and that no important orders should be sent off without her previous approval. But this proved too much for even the tenacious industry of Queen Victoria. The volume of Indian business far exceeded her expectations, while its technical difficulties made much of it difficult to follow. Coupled with the fast-growing correspondence of the other public offices, these facts speedily led to a revision of her earlier intentions; and by the 'seventies the India Office was being required to communicate to her only outstanding information regarding Central Asia and the Indian states. She was, however, kept informed of the general situation by the regular correspondence which she maintained with the governor-general. This was a new feature, at all events in its regularity. Lord Ellenborough, when governor-general, had excited sharp jealousy in the minds of the directors by corresponding with the queen. Such objections now had disappeared. But constitutional considerations still demanded circumspection in the exercise of the privilege. On at least one occasion Lord Curzon greatly irritated the cabinet by appealing to King Edward VII in a dispute which had emerged between himself and the

secretary of state. The assumption by the queen in 1877 of the title of Empress of India was, so far as the home government went, a matter of form, without constitutional significance.

The main question which the act of 1858 left uncertain as regards the home government was that of the relations between the secretary of state and his council. For this there existed no precedent. None of the principal secretaries had ever been limited in the discharge of his duties by the existence of such a body, while the council itself was disposed to magnify its importance. In the very early days of its existence it had laid claim to the directors' old privilege of initiating correspondence, and had submitted to the first secretary of state, Lord Stanley, a draft despatch. This had been immediately checked. Stanley had torn up the draft, and substituted another of his own. But section 41 of the act, requiring the council's assent to financial proposals, offered more lasting difficulties. The council was at times disposed to use its power of vetoing expenditure in order to secure control of policy. This was a natural consequence of the wide powers which the act of 1858 had conferred. In 1858 parliament had certainly considered that the council should be invested with real and effective powers, in order, as Sir Charles Wood afterwards stated, "to give the secretary of state the support requisite for resisting party-pressure, a pressure not always applied in a manner beneficial to India." But the limit of these powers was not defined, and the different sections of the act were liable to conflicting interpretations. In 1869 it was decided to modify the council's position. A bill was introduced which struck at the root of its independence by modifying the tenure from that of good behaviour to a fixed term of ten years, with a possible extension for special reasons for another five years. Lord Salisbury, who as Lord Cranborne had had much difficulty with the council, proposed an amendment, which was accepted, abolishing co-option and giving to the crown—which would act on the advice of the secretary of state—the right of nominating to all vacancies that should arise. Another amendment took away from the council its voice in appointing persons to the executive councils in India. By these changes the independent position of the council was visibly weakened. It was becoming not so much a controlling as an advisory body.

The question of its financial powers still remained. This was not determined by any alteration of the law. But in 1869 and 1880

the position was discussed in parliamentary debates which had the practical effect of regulating usage if not of defining the constitutional position. The opinion which prevailed was that while parliament had certainly intended to impose checks on the financial powers of the secretary of state, it had never intended to enable the council by its financial control to hamper the execution of policy involving imperial interests. The secretary of state was a member of and represented the cabinet. As such he was supreme over the council, not the council over him. The fact was that difficulties of drafting or negligence in expression had seemed to invest the council with far greater power than a small body of Indian specialists could conceivably exercise. Maine justly observed that "any such power given to the council and exercised by it would produce before long a combination of both the great English parties to sweep away the council itself". When this had been recognised, causes of friction between the secretary of state and the council tended to disappear.

The subsequent developments of the home government down to 1918 were almost negligible, and at no point touched important constitutional principles. In 1878 the secretary of state was permitted to appoint a limited number of special experts on the old tenure of good behaviour; in 1889 he was allowed to leave vacancies unfilled till the council should be reduced to ten members; in 1907 he began the practice of nominating members of Indian birth, and about the same time the size of the council was increased to fourteen members while their tenure of office was cut down to seven years and their pay from £1200 to £1000. In 1913 and 1914 Lord Curzon, on the inspiration of Mr Edwin Montagu, attempted to remodel the council, but in this he met with such opposition in parliament that the proposal was abandoned.

The transference of government to the crown made no considerable alterations in the form of the Government of India. The governor-general in council retained "the superintendence, direction and control" of administration. The Government of India was still regarded as unquestionably the executive government of the country. It was indeed required to pay due obedience to all orders which it might receive from the secretary of state, but this was no more than had formerly been due to the orders of the Court of Directors. But although no changes were made in the form of government by the act of 1858, important changes

speedily followed in the substance. The governor-general, Canning, who continued to hold office, preferred the new title of viceroy, as the personal representative of the queen in India, although "governor-general" continued to be his sole statutory designation. He seems to have considered that he was needlessly hampered by his executive council, and at once made proposals for its abolition. Since he was personally responsible, he wrote, he should be relieved of the necessity of discussing matters with a council. He therefore urged that the council should be abolished, that the government should vest solely in the governor-general, and that the appointment of secretaries in the various departments would provide him with all the assistance he required. These proposals were discussed at the India Office in 1859 and 1860, and it was agreed that they should be carried into effect, in spite of the criticisms levelled at them by H. T. Prinsep. Once again, therefore, the abolition of the executive councils was sanctioned by the home authorities. But when the reports adopted by two committees of the Council of India reached Calcutta, Bartle Frere, the first Bombay covenanted servant ever appointed to sit on the governor-general's council, succeeded in persuading Canning of the unsoundness of his views. He put forward particularly cogent arguments. The governor-general would have much more to do, and have less assistance in doing it. Moreover, since a council had been established in London, the abolition of the council at Calcutta would make the governor-general more dependent than ever before on the home government, for unless the Council of India agreed with his proposals the secretary of state would hesitate to assent; he would therefore still have to reckon with a council, and that no longer one with which he could discuss matters in person and which he could in the last resort overrule, but one on the other side of the globe, not only remote from but also independent of his authority. India too was changing with extraordinary rapidity. It would be most unwise to enhance the influence of the Council of India, which knew only the India of the past, in order to get rid of a council which knew India as it actually was. The remedy, Frere urged, was not the reduction of councillors to secretaries, but the introduction of the portfolio system, which would make the individual councillors more responsible and hasten the despatch of public business. These remarks appealed the more to Canning since he had already begun

to experience the inclination of the new home government to interfere more actively in Indian administration than the old one had done, and had already experimented with introducing the portfolio system from the arrival of James Wilson, a financial expert nominated from London to reform Indian finance. Early in 1861 he withdrew the proposals which he had formerly sent home, and demanded instead that he should receive legal authority to establish rules for the conduct of business by his council. In consequence the bill prepared for the abolition of the executive council was abandoned, and clauses were introduced into another bill, primarily dealing with the legislative council, to define the composition of the executive body and to give the governor-general the powers he sought. By these clauses the executive council was fixed as before at five ordinary members, but now two instead of only one need not have been in the service of the crown or of the company in India for at least ten years. The service members consisted of a soldier of high rank as military member, and two covenanted civil servants. The other two ordinary members usually consisted of a financial expert and the law member. Besides them the commander-in-chief might be (and in practice always was) appointed an extraordinary member.

Under the clause which empowered the governor-general to make "rules and orders for the more convenient transaction of business in his council other than the business at legislative meetings", Canning proceeded to make permanent the distribution of business which he had already introduced. Until the Mutiny the council had dealt as a whole with all affairs laid before it. As administrative business grew, its meetings had lengthened out, its discussion of detail had become more unreal, its waste of time greater. Every paper that came in was circulated to all the members, who found each other's minutes provocative of further comments. But now a department or a group of departments was assigned to each. Papers in the first instance would be considered by one member only. Unimportant matters would be determined by him without reference to anyone else. Important matters would be discussed at the weekly meetings which each member held with the governor-general. In order to guard against the improper disposal of important questions without reference to the head of government, similar meetings were to be held weekly with the secretaries of the various departments. Questions of

sufficient moment and those on which the governor-general and the member in question could not agree, were considered and discussed at meetings of the whole board

The effect of these changes was two-fold. In the first place business was greatly expedited. A great mass of comparatively trivial detail was withdrawn from the consideration of the council as a whole and dealt with by men enjoying a special familiarity with the business of the department in which it arose. Much useless and often irritating writing of minutes was avoided. In the second place the responsibility and importance of the governor-general was enhanced. He himself in practice always took the portfolio of the Foreign Department. This was a continuance of the custom which had always closely identified him with foreign policy and had placed in his hands exclusively the duty of corresponding with the princes of India and of its borders. But in the past the methods of business had compelled him to pick out of a great and growing mass of correspondence the matters to which he would give special attention. Now all major affairs were automatically picked out, and discussed with him by individuals, each a master in his own sphere. The great majority of decisions was thus taken after discussion between a specialist in Indian administration and a man of wide and general political experience. The governor-general was, moreover, guarded from being misled by technical detail, for, if he were dissatisfied with the explanations of the member, he could discuss the matter further with the secretary. In this way he became the centre of all administration in a degree which had been altogether impossible for more than a generation. The power of making rules of business thus provided Canning with the advantages which he had expected from the abolition of the council while avoiding the evils which would have followed on his original proposals.

Few alterations were made in this system of government down to 1918. In 1874 an additional service member was appointed, who represented the Public Works Department till 1904 and thereafter the new department of commerce and industry. A more important change was made in 1905. Army affairs had been represented on the council by the military member as the head of the Military Department of the civil government and by the commander-in-chief as executive head of the army itself. The latter was responsible for the organisation of the army, discipline

and promotion, and preparation for war. In this capacity he required a considerable establishment, called Army Headquarters. The former was in special charge of military finance, preparing the military budget, entering into contracts for military supplies, such as victuals, clothing and medical stores, and maintaining transport, ordnance, and military works. Proposals for expenditure or reform were usually prepared in the commander-in-chief's office, and were presented to the governor-general by the military member with his comments. Thus in army matters the principle of providing the governor-general with two technical advisers was even more definitely established than was the case in the other departments of government, a position justified alike by the civilian's difficulty in forming a sound judgment on military questions and by the extreme importance of Indian defence. When Lord Kitchener became commander-in-chief during Curzon's term of office, the former attacked this dual organisation on two main grounds. He argued that the existence of the Military Department side by side with Army Headquarters involved a useless duplication of staffs and repetition of work, and should be abolished for the sake of economy. He further claimed that the commander-in-chief ought to be the governor-general's sole adviser in all military matters, declaring that the commander-in-chief's proposals could not properly be communicated and criticised by an officer junior to and less experienced than himself. Curzon and his council rejoined that this proposal was dangerous and unwise. It would leave the civil government with only a single military adviser, would invest the commander-in-chief with an undue preponderance, and would lay upon him a multiplicity of duties which he would be unable to discharge in time of war. But these weighty arguments were disregarded in England, where Kitchener's reputation stood high, and where Curzon's vigorous assertion of his rights as the head of the Indian executive had excited much opposition. Kitchener appears also to have made use of irregular and improper channels in order to procure the approval of his plans. The outcome was that Curzon was thrown over. The military member was replaced by a military supply member of inferior status and powers; and in 1909 the latter was abolished to make way for a new civil member for education and sanitation. No one can criticise the provision of a representative of those important departments, but the mode in which the

provision was made was unfortunate. The mismanagement of military affairs in 1914 and 1915 in Mesopotamia showed that Curzon's anticipations had been justified.

The council as reconstituted by Canning worked more constantly and regularly with the governor-general than had sometimes been the case in the immediate past. A weak governor-general, Auckland, had made a practice of betaking himself to the heights of Simla, then recently discovered, for long periods of the year, leaving his councillors to stew in the moist heat of Calcutta while he himself arranged his foreign policy to his liking without the trouble of discussing it with them. The relief of escaping from the plains in the hot weather had been too great for his successors not to follow his example. Fortunately they had been better able to manage the affairs of India than he had been; but the regular period of separation had been much resented by the council, which found itself excluded alike from the discussion of important public questions and from the amenities of the hills. Canning's re-arrangement of council work made such a divorce between the head of the government and his legitimate advisers inconvenient as well as undesirable. The governor-general need now bring nothing under the general discussion of the council which he did not choose to refer to it, while the portfolio system rendered the presence of all the individual members necessary for the prompt despatch of business. Consequently in the time of John Lawrence's government the existing practice was changed. Henceforth the councillors accompanied the governor-general to Simla when the hot weather drew near.

While Canning's rules of business, coupled with the mistaken policy of 1853 in reducing the status of councillors below that of lieutenant-governors, rendered the governor-general able the more easily to maintain his predominance in the Government of India, and to play a greater part than ever before in the general administration of the country, the governor-general came to perceive more clearly the advantages of the council form of government. Canning's projects of abolition vanished not to be revived; and complaints of opposition in the council almost wholly disappeared. John Lawrence indeed fancied that there was some secret, underhand resistance to his measures; but he set out as governor-general under the disadvantage of lacking the prestige conferred by the wide experience and high rank which nearly all

his predecessors and successors enjoyed Lord Minto complained that the members chosen by Lord Morley were worse than useless; but this criticism was levelled at individuals rather than at the system. In general we find a chorus of approbation. Northbrook seeks to defend the statutory rights of his councillors; Ripon observes that they are easily manageable when allowed "to blow off steam"; Curzon declares their value to a governor-general of action. Indeed, it appears likely that their fault has lain rather in over-pliancy to the wishes of their political head than in any inclination to resist his policy. So far as is publicly known, on two occasions only since 1858 have they compelled the governor-general to bring into action his powers of overruling the decisions of a majority of his council. Lytton was forced to overrule his council in order to remove the import dues on cotton piece goods; and Elgin had to do the same in 1894 in order to establish a counter-vailing excise duty on cotton goods manufactured in India. The latter case was marked by a notable ruling by the secretary of state, Sir Henry Fowler, as a member of Gladstone's last cabinet. He declared that once policy had been decided, the members of the governor-general's executive council must either assist in carrying that policy into operation or resign their seats, and that in the legislative council they must vote for all government measures.

At the same time as Canning was empowered to make rules of business for his executive council, alterations were made in the machinery of Indian legislation. As has been shown above, the changes of 1853 had provoked much dispute. Two judges had been added to the legislative council in order to strengthen the legal element in the council and improve the technical character of the laws passed by it. Other foreign elements also had been introduced in the form of representatives of the subordinate governments. These new members had proved unexpectedly intractable. The judges were members of the Calcutta Supreme Court—a bench hostile by training and tradition to the autocratic Government of India, which was exempt from customary English limitations and paid small heed to the elaborate technicalities of unreformed English law. The provincial representatives were mostly covenanted servants of high standing, who were either not able enough or not accommodating enough to be promoted to the local executive councils. They were thus at the end of their

service, with no further promotion in prospect, with their full pensions assured, and consequently without inclination to discuss matters except on their merits, irrespective of the desires of the Government of India or of the home authorities. Under Dalhousie's guidance the council had adopted a procedure and rules of discussion largely borrowed from those of the House of Lords. Its sittings were public. Its discussions were, if not lively, at all events extempore, for it had from the first prohibited the reading of those elaborately prepared essays in eloquence which made the proceedings of later councils so dreary and unprofitable. Nor was the governor-general invested with the power of overruling its decisions as in the executive council. He could refuse his assent to a bill, but he could not amend a bill or declare a rejected bill to be law. Disputes speedily arose, not with the Government of India but with the home authorities. Sir Charles Wood, who, as president of the Board, had formed the act of 1853, was surprised and shocked to find he had created a body with legislative independence, when he had meant to create merely a legislative adjunct to the executive government. Dalhousie, on the contrary, pointed out that the statute had undoubtedly conferred sole legislative authority in India on this body of men, and that no one could legally dictate what laws it was to pass. When it attempted to interfere with executive matters by calling for papers, he checked it sharply enough, but otherwise he would make no effort to coerce it. The climax was reached when the company disallowed part of an act fixing the allowances payable to the administrator-general from the estates of deceased persons. It was, however, argued that the company could only accept or disallow an act of the Indian legislature, that it could not amend an act, and that it could not dictate the terms of legislation. Under Canning the difficulties were accentuated. The governor-general who had proposed abolishing his executive advisers was not likely to sympathise with a legislature that claimed independence. It was therefore decided in 1861 to remodel the legislative council, and restore to the executive government the full power of controlling legislation, inadvertently abandoned in 1853.

It was, however, felt that it would not do to return to the old system by which executive and legislative power had been absolutely united in the same body. Frere strongly expressed this point of view, much as he disliked the composition and inde-

pendence of the existing body. It was of no use, he declared, to discuss whether external elements were useful or injurious. "The days are gone", he wrote to Sir Charles Wood, "when you could govern India without caring what the Europeans and the Europeanised community say or think of your measures, and unless you have some barometer or safety-valve in the shape of a deliberative council, I believe you will always be liable to very unlooked-for and dangerous explosions." These views were generally accepted. But it was decided that the new legislature should be a barometer and nothing else. Wood harked back to the old position of 1833. Then the legislature consisted in the executive council with an extraordinary member, now the additional element was to be more numerous, so as to provide for a wider expression of opinion, but the legislative power was in fact to be exercised by the executive body. The governor-general was to have but one council. When he wished to make laws he was to summon at least six but not more than twelve additional members, who would hold office for two years. But though half of these at least were not to be the servants of government, the latter would constitute a majority ranging up to two to one should all twelve additional members be appointed. There was thus to be no separate legislative council. "You have no legislative council", Wood wrote at a later time to the governor-general, meaning that the legislature had ceased to have any existence apart from the executive. Further precautions were also taken. The chief justice of Bengal had raised an awkward doubt regarding the validity of the rules and regulations in force in the newer provinces, since they had been established by order of the governor-general in council instead of being passed by the competent legislative authority. A clause declared the validity of such rules. Moreover, the governor-general in person was authorised in case of emergency to frame and issue ordinances which would remain in force for six months. When the enlarged council met, it could consider nothing but legislative business. It could not move or adopt resolutions. It could not ask questions. It could not touch finance. It was a body through which the public might make its voice heard on legislative proposals. But, as the liberal Duke of Argyll declared in 1870, it did not enjoy independent power, it could not refuse to pass a legislative project laid before it. Supreme control lay with the secretary of state, and his directions must be

obeyed no matter whether they related to legislative or executive action

While in this respect the statute of 1861 constituted a reaction from the position established in 1853, in two other respects it marked an appreciable advance. The secretary of state refused to introduce a clause making the nomination of Indian members obligatory, on the ground that statutory distinctions should not be made between different classes of Her Majesty's subjects, but it was well understood that Indians would be included among the additional members. The advisability of this had long been urged. Dalhousie had recommended it to Wood when the bill of 1853 was under discussion. After the Mutiny Frere advised it as necessary to prevent serious legislative mistakes. Sayyid Ahmad, a Muslim of good birth who had long served the government and had distinguished himself in the Mutiny, produced a pamphlet in which he argued that many unpopular measures might have been avoided had Indians sat in the legislative council. The change was at last adopted. The nominees of 1862 included the Mahārāja of Patiala, the Rāja of Benares and Sir Dinkar Rao. These were succeeded by three great zamindars. After a while representatives of this class were mingled with retired officials like Sayyid Ahmad, and later still with members of the English-educated professional classes gradually rising into prominence.

The other advance made in 1861 consisted in a beneficial reversion to conditions abolished in 1833. The legislative centralisation was relaxed, and provincial legislatures were set up in Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, and afterwards extended to other provinces. No attempt was made to draw the line between the functions of the central and the subordinate bodies; the central legislature retained its competence to pass acts relating to the whole of India, and in a number of important subjects, such as religious and social customs, no bill could be introduced into a provincial council without the previous consent of the governor-general, while all bills were subject to a triple veto—that of the head of the province, of the governor-general, and of the home authorities. The powers of the new provincial legislatures were thus confined within very narrow limits. They recovered nothing of the general competence which they had enjoyed before 1833, when a central legislature did not exist in India. But the change facilitated the adaptation of existing law to local needs while

preventing local acts from developing into antagonistic systems of law. Indian members were nominated on the new provincial bodies as on the central legislature.

One other important topic remains. While the changes described above were being introduced into the structure of the home and Indian governments, the law regarding the relations of these two bodies remained unchanged. The act of 1858, as has been already noted, merely substituted the secretary of state for the Court of Directors and enjoined the same general duty of obedience to the former as had been the legal right of the latter. The new minister of the crown possessed the same legal powers over the Government of India as had formerly been possessed by the East India Company. His commands carried no higher degree of legal authority than those of his predecessors. Both were entitled to implicit obedience. But new and changing circumstances were to produce great alterations in the degree in which the law actually operated. Some writers seem to have believed that no material change took place. Sir John Strachey, for instance, writing in 1888, rejected the view that the home government had come to engross a larger share of Indian administration. But the weight of evidence against this view is overwhelming.

The changes in the form of the home government itself made for a great and growing degree of interference. The directors might have been entitled to implicit obedience, but they had to reckon with the Board of Control, which might intervene to support its nominee, the governor-general, in the event of serious disputes, while the company's power of recall, though a formidable weapon, was ill-adapted for constant and regular use. In general administration the home authorities were indeed able to lay down and maintain general principles; but the Indian governments were left to settle the detail by which they should be carried into operation, while foreign policy was determined more by the governor-general than by anyone else. Down to 1858 the Government of India was undoubtedly the real executive government of the country. The statute of that year certainly contemplated the maintenance of this position. But the secretary of state enjoyed a freedom of action which the company had not possessed. Parliament left him alone. His council could be cajoled or overruled. His rank and weight in the political world ensured a preponderance of political support for the measures which he decided to

adopt. A member of the executive government of his own country, he was not unlikely to forget that in constitutional theory he was not the head of the executive government of India. He was almost invariably a more prominent man than the governor-general of the day, whereas in the past the governor-general had with rare exceptions been a man of much greater political consequence than any of the directors or even the president of the Board. While the home authorities before 1858 had been inclined to defer to the judgment and experience of the governor-general, after 1858 the governor-general was disposed to defer to the secretary of state, backed as he was by the authority of the cabinet.

The establishment of the Council of India made in the same direction. The councillors all enjoyed experience of Indian administration. They were tempted by the fallacy of age to look upon their successors in India as men of less experience and weaker judgment than themselves. They had nothing to do but to attend to their duties, and were not distracted, as many of the East India directors had been, by the need of conducting large private mercantile affairs. They could not sit in parliament, as numerous directors had done, and so were not absorbed in party strife. They formed, therefore, a more active, better informed, and more opinionated body of supervisors than the directors of the company. The private correspondence of the early years of the new régime, notably that of Bartle Frere, abounds in complaints of their undue activity, of their insistence on initiating measures, of the way in which they hampered the wonted liberty of the Government of India.

Political interests also were enabled to act with greater force on Indian policy. The president of the Board had always been able to shelter himself behind the Court of Directors against the pressure of political groups. The secretary of state was in a weaker position, for his possible shelter was less effectual, while he himself was more directly and personally concerned with questions of parliamentary tactics and political exigencies.

Within a few years these tendencies were most powerfully reinforced and stimulated by one of those changes in general circumstances which constitute the most formative agents of political change. Though several proposals for the opening of telegraphic communications between India and London had been

put forward before the Mutiny, none had been adopted when that cataclysm befell. However, it so sharply pointed the disastrous consequences of medieval communications that much further delay became impossible. India was first linked up with the European telegraph system by an overland line through Persia connecting with both the Russian and the Turkish lines. Though a great improvement, this route was in many ways unsatisfactory. Sections of the line were often broken by the unsettled tribes of southern Persia who found copper wire useful for a thousand domestic purposes. Again the changes of jurisdiction and administration, from Persian to Turkish or to Russian, were found to occasion manifold delays, while the expediency of depending upon foreign states for the security of communications with India was more than doubtful. A project was therefore brought forward to lay a submarine cable by way of Bombay, Aden and Suez, this would be entirely under British control and afford a swifter and more regular service than the overland telegraph. Initial difficulties were met with. The sharp rocks of the Red Sea bottom frayed and broke the early cables that were laid. But at last the work was successfully completed. From 1870 the Government of India was in effective telegraphic contact with the India Office.

This achievement at once modified the actual position of the Government of India. A wide discretion had always been exercised by the governor-general, especially in matters of foreign policy. But the appearance of the telegraph at once reduced his discretionary freedom. He could, and therefore he was obliged to, take the secretary of state's orders even in matters where formerly he would have acted on his own opinion. With this change in practice went a change in constitutional theory. In 1858 the received view had been that the executive government resided in India. Frere could tell Sir Charles Wood bluntly that his business as secretary of state was to represent the governor-general in the cabinet and in parliament. But later secretaries of state like Lord Salisbury held that the governor-general occupied a position similar to that of an ambassador under the Foreign Office. When the governor-general, Lord Northbrook, contested this view and opposed the foreign policy which Salisbury wished him to carry into operation, the latter drove him from office and secured the appointment of a successor more in harmony with his

ideas When Lord Ripon became governor-general, he was astonished at the change which had occurred since the time a few years earlier when he had been under-secretary of state for India. He did not enjoy nearly that degree of freedom which he had expected, and doubted whether he would have accepted the governor-generalship had he known the actual state of affairs.

Thus the telegraph brought an ever-growing control of the Government of India by the secretary of state. This was often accentuated by the personal equation. Lord Elgin in the late 'nineties seems to have been reluctant to do anything without seeking the permission of Whitehall, and the only governor-general who succeeded in making even a temporary stand against these encroachments was Lord Curzon. His strong personality, his range of knowledge, his vigour of opinion, for a while succeeded in checking, if not reversing, the tendency, and, could he have ruled India before the days of the telegraph he would have left a reputation which might have been set beside those of Wellesley or Dalhousie. He claimed as the expert on the spot the right of taking decisions; where he could not secure the secretary of state's approval, he claimed a right of appeal to the cabinet; and where he could not persuade the cabinet, he might even invoke the influence of the crown. Mr Balfour's cabinet humoured him for a long time and to a remarkable degree. The secretary of state, Mr St John Brodrick, asserted in words which oddly recall Barle Frere's exhortation to Sir Charles Wood, that he was acting as Curzon's ambassador in England. But this triumph was too contrary to the broad trend of events to be durable. The forces making for increased control from London were too strong permanently to be diverted from their normal action. Personal friendships, which had made Curzon's domination possible, were strained and weakened. In the end, as has been seen, the cabinet threw over Curzon in a controversy where he seems to have been entirely in the right, and he soon resigned his office. The next governor-general found himself confronted by a minister as domineering as Brodrick had been complaisant. With Morley the India Office resumed its earlier attitude, and the governor-general was regarded as the secretary of state's agent. Though Morley did not himself use the term in public, and even half-apologised when it dropped from the lips of his under-secretary, his language showed that he approved the sentiment even when he disowned the expression.

This tendency was natural and inevitable so long as the Government of India remained a bureaucracy. But it is clear that every step taken to invest the latter with a constitutional character brought into action forces which would weaken and ultimately arrest the prevailing current. Every expansion of the governor-general's council, every measure to associate non-official Indians more closely with the administration, made the governor-general the mouthpiece of opinions with which the home authorities could not be in touch but to which they were more and more disposed to defer. Such were the influences which were to reverse the tendencies introduced by the change of government in 1858 and the laying of the Red Sea cable

CHAPTER XIII

Provincial and District Administration after the Mutiny

The general scheme of provincial government was even less affected by the act of 1858 than the Government of India itself. The executive councils of the two presidencies were modified in 1861 in the same way as the executive council of the governor-general, and in that year, as has been already shown, some degree of legislative power was restored to the chief provinces. Apart from these changes the structure of the provincial governments remained unaltered. However, a good deal of re-distribution of territory took place. The over-grown province of Bengal, for example, was reduced in 1874 by the creation of Assam as a separate province under a chief commissioner. Thirty-one years later two provinces—one Western Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, and the other Eastern Bengal and Assam—were formed, each under a lieutenant-governor. In 1911 this arrangement was abandoned. Assam reverted to the separate charge of a chief commissioner. Bihar and Orissa were placed under a lieutenant-governor. Bengal was re-united and entrusted to a governor and council, thus recovering its former status as a presidency. In 1877 the North-Western or Āgra Provinces were united with Oudh, and in 1902 received their modern name of the United Provinces. In 1861 the Central Provinces were formed by the union of the Nāgpur with the Sāgar and Nerbudda territories, and to these Berar was added in 1902 when it was leased in perpetuity to the Government of India by the Nizām. In 1902 the North-West Frontier Province was formed out of the Panjab territories beyond the Indus, and in 1912 the city of Delhi, on becoming the capital of British India, was formed into an "administrative enclave" under a separate chief commissioner.

The legal relations between these provincial administrations and the central government remained unchanged. The two presidencies in some respects enjoyed special privileges, derived from their original independence of the presidency of Fort William in

Bengal. They could correspond direct with the home government on matters not involving finance; they could appeal to it against the orders of the Government of India; they enjoyed the right of appointment to important provincial posts. But from 1833 complete financial control over all the provincial administrations had been vested in the Government of India. No attempt had ever been made to define the powers which should be exercised by the provincial governments, which had in law become the local agents of the central power.

This excessive centralisation had been tempered by two influences. The great extent of the country, the diverse social and economic conditions prevailing in the various provinces, linguistic differences which produced distinct technical vocabularies in the different provinces, first in the important matter of trade, then in the yet more important matter of land revenue, made it as difficult to rule India from Calcutta as it would be to rule Europe from Constantinople. The governor-general in his short term of office could not be expected to master such an array of disconcerting detail. His council, drawn exclusively from the Bengal services down to 1858, knew nothing of the southern and western provinces, into which their duties never led them, and little even of their own province where they were hampered by the consequences of the permanent settlement. Ignorance, therefore, went some way towards limiting the legal control of the governor-general in council. The other influence was the limitation of time. When all business was laid indiscriminately before the council as a whole, many points of detail had of necessity to be passed over with small consideration.

In these respects the system introduced by Canning brought about a considerable change. It not merely strengthened the control of the governor-general over the general conduct of the Government of India, but also strengthened the control of the Government of India over the provincial governments. The portfolio system multiplied the capacity of the central government for transacting business, and thus sharpened the scrutiny which could be given to provincial proposals. Then too the financial reorganisation begun by James Wilson, the first finance member, produced a closer and more systematic inspection of provincial finance. Stringent rules were adopted, requiring a preliminary sanction for all expenditure, involving a multitude of references

on details much too minute for the consideration of the Government of India, and producing great friction with the subordinate governments, which felt themselves aggrieved at the limitation of their powers.

Some relaxation thus became necessary, in the interest of smooth working as well as efficiency, and from 1872 onwards a process of financial decentralisation was begun, the object of which was to free the provinces from needless control and to classify the revenues of the country into central and provincial. In the earlier days no distinction had been recognised. All taxation was collected on behalf of the Government of India, which annually assigned specific sums for the requirements, real or supposed, of the several provinces. No attempt had even been made to limit provincial expenditure to a certain proportion of the revenues raised within each province. The result had been an unfair allocation of funds as between the several provinces. The most clamant governments received more than their fair share, those which sought to practise economy suffered by this exercise of virtue. Funds were allotted in proportion rather to demands than to needs. The different systems of land revenue increased the inequality. The permanent settlement of the Bengal land revenue precluded the rising costs of administration from being met by increasing collections from this, the most prolific source of taxation within the province itself. The other provinces were therefore required to pay more in order that the land-owners of Bengal might continue to enjoy the benefits of a fixed assessment.

Lord Mayo began by assigning to the provincial authorities certain services, such as education and roads, for which they were to be responsible, providing additional money that might be needed beyond the fixed budget grants by savings or by local taxation. Under Lytton and Ripon, the work was carried on. Provincial governments were allowed to transfer savings in one section of their budget for expenditure under another. Certain small sources of income were transferred to their management, and they were to keep part of any net increase they could obtain from them. The vicious system of annual settlements with each province was abolished. Under this method of control all unexpended grants lapsed to the Government of India at the close of the financial year, so that in the last quarter of the year much needless expenditure was often incurred merely in order that

grants might not lapse and that the Government of India might have no excuse for cutting down the ensuing annual budget on the ground that the scale of the former grants had been evidently excessive. In place of this was established a quinquennial settlement, under which balances could be carried forward and provincial governments could plan their expenditure over a period of years, instead of confining their outlook to twelve months only. Finally under Lord Curzon a great advance was made by the establishment of what were called "quasi-permanent settlements". These were based on a real attempt to classify revenues as central and provincial. It was imperfect, in that it was still found necessary for the provinces to assign a proportion of their land revenue and excise collections to the central treasury; but it was declared that the distribution of revenues between central and provincial needs would not be altered save in the event of some great calamity such as war or famine, which would imperatively require a temporary readjustment. These changes were accompanied by a progressive relaxation of control over financial detail. The limits of expenditure which might be sanctioned by provincial governments were raised, and appointments might be made and posts created by them which at an earlier time would have required the formal approval of the Government of India. The thirty years which closed in 1904 thus materially increased the authority of the provincial governments in matters of detail. Their formal power unquestionably rose.

But at the same time their degree of influence over the general course of policy tended to weaken. The growth of communications, which subjected the Government of India to the secretary of state, subjected the provincial governments to the Government of India. The centralisation of the period before 1858 had been a matter of law rather than one of practice. Provincial governors, lieutenant-governors, and high commissioners had all enjoyed large though varying powers of discretion. Varying systems of district administration and land-revenue collection had developed in the various provinces, usually justified by special local conditions. But now the influence of the telegraph, the spread of education, the growth of the press, the development of political interests, all tended to produce a growing uniformity of policy. Local differences were not indeed obliterated but they were reduced. The new period was one of constant reports, statistics,

office work. Supervision was incomparably closer. Organisation came to be moulded rather on the theoretical perfection begotten of files in the pigeon-holes of Calcutta than on what the individual administrator thought to be indispensable. So that while the Government of India was surrendering its right to say whether a collector in Bombay or Madras should add a new clerk to his office establishment, it was laying down principles for universal application and earnestly pressing the provincial governments to put them into practice. This pressure, like that of the secretary of state, increased as the century waned. It reached its climax with the appointment of inspectors-general by the Government of India, designed to visit the provinces, to "advise" provincial officials, and to inform the Government of India of the extent to which its views were being carried into effect. Matters went so far that Bombay could not set up a university course of studies in agriculture because other provinces were not sufficiently advanced for such a step, and Burma had to stand perpetually on guard lest one of the revenue systems of northern India should be thrust upon the province. Curzon might complain that he knew less of what was going on in Madras than what was going on in Egypt. But the complaints of a tired man must not be taken too seriously; and if his language corresponded with the fact, that was because he lacked time or inclination to read the inexhaustible stream of papers which the central government exacted from every province.

A like tendency was illustrated by the reform of the law courts and the development of Indian law. A reform in this direction was long overdue, and had constituted one of the main purposes which were to have been secured by the reforms of 1833, although unexpected difficulties had prevented action for another generation. In 1858 the old evils still persisted. At the three presidency towns sat the three Supreme Courts, mainly administering English law and having no relation with the company's courts which operated everywhere else in British India. These latter administered strange and diverse mixtures of English, Muslim and Hindu law, more or less amplified and modified by the regulations and acts passed by the company's governments. The result was that the presidency towns had different systems of law from those of the countries of which they were the capitals. The first essential step to get rid of these anomalies was the amalgamation of the two sets of courts. This was much facilitated by the

establishment of direct crown government, for it was manifestly absurd to replace two groups depending one upon the crown and the other upon the company, by two groups each depending upon the crown. In 1861 therefore the Indian High Courts Act was passed to fuse the two groups into one. The Supreme Courts were united with the company's courts of appeal—the *sadr 'adālat*s—at each presidency town, the new courts receiving the new title of High Courts. These inherited the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Courts within the presidency towns and the appellate authority of the *sadr* courts over the territory dependent on each. Thus proposals for which Hastings and Impey had been violently assailed were at last, eighty years later, effected with the approval of all. The judges of the new courts, like those of the Supreme Courts, were to be appointed by the crown and hold office during pleasure. A third of each bench was to consist of members of the English, Irish, or Scotch bars, one third of covenanted servants, and the remainder of persons who had held judicial office or practised in the High Courts. An opening was thus made by which eminent Indian lawyers without European qualifications could be promoted to the bench. The constitution of these High Courts has remained unchanged, but a fourth was set up at Allāhābād in 1866, and a fifth at Patna in 1912.

The jurisdiction of the new High Courts was limited to the older or "regulation" provinces in which alone Supreme Courts had been created, and where no change could be made but by the legislature. In the other, more recently acquired provinces, a similar organisation was gradually established by the authority of the governor-general in council. Chief Courts, as these new bodies were called, were introduced in the Panjab in 1866, and later on in the Central Provinces, Sind, and Burma. Judges of the Chief Courts were appointed by the governor-general and held office during his pleasure.

The main cause which had delayed this judicial reorganisation had been the need of simplifying the law and determining the mode of procedure which was to be adopted, it being agreed by all except practising lawyers that some way out of the existing confusion must be found. It had been declared by a judge of the Calcutta Supreme Court in 1829 that "no one could then pronounce an opinion or form a judgment, however sound, upon any disputed right, regarding which doubt and confusion might not

be raised by those who might choose to call it in question." In 1835 a law commission had been constituted with Macaulay as its president, to attempt a codification of the existing law. It had prepared the first draft of the Penal Code. In 1853 another law commission had been formed. This had sat in London instead of Calcutta, and had first produced the Code of Civil Procedure, passed into law in 1859. In 1860 the Penal Code as revised by later lawyers was passed. In 1861 a Criminal Procedure Code, prepared by the second law commission, was adopted. The way had thus been opened for the reform of the law courts by providing common procedures to be followed in civil and criminal causes throughout British India, although several revisions of each were afterwards found to be necessary, and other branches of law were codified at a later date. No doubt can be felt that the new laws were a great improvement on the incoherent mass of rules which they displaced. At the same time codification has not been found entirely free from disadvantage. The augmented certainty of the law has not diminished the frequency of appeal, and it has been acutely remarked that under the codes cases have come to be argued on over-subtle interpretation of the wording of the statutes or on points of perhaps minute procedure rather than on broad principle and the merits of the individual case.

Under British administration Muslim criminal law has ceased to operate. In the time of Warren Hastings the reform of Muslim criminal law began. It involved many points which were repugnant to western legal ideas. The rule that a murdered man's next-of-kin might choose the death of the murderer or a sum of money, the rule that the murderer could only be put to death by the murdered man's next-of-kin, the rule that an accused could be convicted only on the evidence of two eye-witnesses, or the rule that infidels could not be admitted as witnesses against Muslims, were easily evaded by orders to the courts. In 1793 the punishment of an eye for an eye was prohibited. In 1825 women were exempted from flogging. From 1849 the perjurer was no longer branded. At last in 1860 the Penal Code wholly replaced the criminal law which had been introduced into India by the Turks of Ghūr.

Family law, however, whether Muslim or Hindu, was scarcely touched. The Muslim law of divorce and successions remained substantially unaltered, while there was no sharp conflict between

Muslim and English conceptions of landed rights such as distinguished Hindu law from English. English knowledge of Hindu law had grown up slowly. Warren Hastings had led the way by causing a group of pundits to compile a digest of the recognised texts, which was translated into Persian and thence into English under the title of the *Gentoo Code*. A generation later this had been superseded by the *Digest* of Colebrooke, who was at once a sound lawyer and a Sanskrit scholar. The influence of such works, however, was to invest ancient Sanskrit texts with an authority which perhaps they had never before enjoyed, for the changes made by customary and local use were wholly ignored. The pundits who were attached to each court as expounders of Hindu law were also inclined to stand upon their texts and to dispute the validity of custom where the latter differed from the former. In northern India this tendency was in part counteracted by the growing practice of taking evidence of prevalent usage; but in the south the text locally recognised—the commentary on Yajñavalkya known as the *Mitakshara* compiled in the eleventh century A.D.—long continued to enjoy absolute authority.

These texts confronted English lawyers with principles of ownership wholly strange to them. In England ownership was "simple, independent, and unrestricted". But in the Hindu world this was an exceptional condition. Property of all kinds normally vested, not in the individual, but in the joint family; and though each male member could at any time demand his share, which would become his sole property, it would almost at once become the joint property of a new family composed of the owner and his descendants. Thus individual rights were in a perpetual state of flux, and, although they could be determined for the instant by a division, such temporary settlement would be at once upset by the birth of children. The individual was thus seldom entitled to alienate on his own behalf any specific piece of property. This system, while in general recognised and maintained by English courts, has in modern times been modified in two respects. The individual has been invested with rights to sell or charge his share in joint property and to dispose by will of property which he has acquired independently, and with which under Hindu law he could deal by gift.

The growth of commerce rendered the first of these changes almost indispensable. Economic activity would be greatly stimu-

lated by allowing a man to deal with his share in family property. Between 1855 and 1872 the courts came to hold that a creditor might recover a judgment debt by bringing to sale a debtor's share in family property, the purchaser becoming entitled to the items representing that share when ascertained by a division. In the west and south it then came to be held that the individual himself might sell what might be sold under a decree against him. In the north and east, however, this logical development was not followed. In the matter of wills the pundits, following their texts, considered such a right as an innovation which should not be permitted. But as against this was the fact that from 1758 Hindus began in increasing numbers to make wills. In Bengal the right was formally acknowledged in 1792 in regard to property of which a man could dispose by gift in his lifetime. In Bombay an anomalous position developed. In the presidency town, under the influence of English legal ideas, such wills received effect, but elsewhere in the province they did not. In Madras the sader court had at first been inclined to follow the precedents established in Bengal. But a regulation of 1829, declaring that wills of Hindus should have no force save in so far as they might be valid under Hindu law, produced an entire change of attitude. Such wills, therefore, remained wholly inoperative till 1862, when the High Court at last recognised their validity, following a decision of the Privy Council in 1856. Later legislation of 1870 and 1881 applied to such wills certain general conditions regarding the exercise of testamentary power.

In certain other directions the enactment of the codes and the reorganisation of the superior courts produced important consequences. They led for instance to the disappearance of the main differences between the regulation and non-regulation provinces. Those had consisted in the methods of legislation and the modes of district organisation. Law in the non-regulation provinces had been provided by executive order; and the district officer had united in his own hands executive and judicial functions. In a province like the Panjab a large body of law was in force, but, unlike the enactments prevalent in the older provinces, it had not been the work of the legislative council, and was not distinguished by special legislative form. It consisted in the orders of the governor-general, under whose personal direction the new provinces had been administered, and the orders of the principal

authorities whom he had set up. One disadvantage was that the lack of legislative form gave rise to uncertainty, since, as Maine noted, it was not always easy to discern which orders were, and which were not designed to have legislative effect. Another was the dubious legality of the system. It had been called in question by Sir Barnes Peacock, chief justice of the Supreme Court at Calcutta. The Councils Act of 1861 therefore included a section declaring valid the rules actually in force, although they had not been made in the manner laid down by the statutes. This necessitated an enquiry as to what rules actually were in force in Oudh or in the Panjab, and thenceforward legislative methods followed the statutory processes. The union also of executive and judicial power was modified, and district administration, in part at least, was assimilated to the typical organisation elsewhere. The deputy-commissioner, as the head of a district was called in the non-regulation provinces, had originally exercised the combined authority of revenue collector, head of the police, and chief civil and criminal judge within his district, while the commissioner in charge of a division or group of districts supervised his executive and revenue work and heard appeals from his judicial decisions. Gradually these judicial functions were transferred to separate officials. The deputy-commissioner retained as magistrate a limited criminal jurisdiction, but he was gradually relieved of the task of hearing civil suits save those arising between landlord and tenant; the commissioner's jurisdiction in like manner was transferred to divisional judges, who came in course of time to correspond closely with the district and sessions judges of the regulation provinces. Thus the personal administration which had been the mark of the non-regulation provinces came to an end and was replaced by much the same rule of law as had been established elsewhere. The principal surviving distinction was that the higher administrative posts long continued to be open to men who were not members of the covenanted civil service.

However, though personal rule vanished from wide areas as a whole, it was neither practicable nor desirable for it to disappear altogether. There were numerous tracts in the various provinces, consisting of hilly or jungly regions, inhabited by primitive tribes wholly unaccustomed to regular administration. Earlier governments had ignored their existence except when raids of the hill-men upon the plains had called for punishment. The Santhāl

parganas in Bengal, the Mahi Kanta in Bombay, the hill tracts of the Northern Circars, and many other areas, were all unsuited for the elaborate system of government which had been established in the older provinces, with their separation of functions, complicated laws, and endless series of appeals from court to court. Where primitive tribesmen, as in the Santhāl *parganas*, had been subjected to the general plan of government, the plain dwellers had taken advantage of this to exploit the hill tribes, with injustice and rebellion as the consequence. A statute of 1870 and an Indian act of 1874 permitted a certain elasticity in the system. The first permitted the secretary of state to "schedule" tracts within which the governor-general in council should have authority to make binding regulations. The second enabled the government to declare in cases of doubt the law in force in such "scheduled tracts." In these restricted areas the system of personal rule and united powers which had characterised the non-regulation provinces persisted in all its force, despite its disappearance as a mode of provincial government.

In its main principles the mode of district administration had been already settled, and, except for the modification in the newer non-regulation provinces already noted, the formal changes made in the period after the Mutiny were not great. The collector or deputy-commissioner continued to be the chief agent of government in his district; he continued to be responsible for its general order and well-being. But as time passed, those objects came to be pursued in a different manner and by changed methods, which, in the restricted area of the district, corresponded with the assimilation of non-regulation to regulation provinces. Government was becoming more a matter of method, of statistics, of general rules pressed into force over ever-widening areas, than of personal judgment and influence. The district officer gradually came to pass more of his time at headquarters, less on tour. Tours themselves became more hurried, as the motor car superseded horse and ox-cart and elephant. The telegraph cut down the collector's discretionary powers, just as it cut down the local governor's and even the governor-general's.

The elaboration of public business led to the division of administration among a number of new departments, usually of a highly specialised nature, tending to absorb part of the duties for which the district officer had been exclusively responsible. Public works,

for instance, acquired a new importance. Before the Mutiny, except for the building and repair of public offices and the maintenance of the few public roads, little had been done. But the new period was one of great expansion. Especially in the Panjab, new irrigation works on a large scale were planned and carried out, bringing under the plough wide areas which till then had lain barren and uninhabited. New roads were cut, new bridges made; railways were built. These new activities demanded a technical knowledge which could be acquired only by special training, and so the control which the collector had formerly exercised over the public works of his district was in part replaced by that of a Public Works Department, composed of engineers, military and civil, and represented in each district by an official called the executive engineer, who was responsible to the provincial head of the department. The collector was still consulted about operations in his district, for they would certainly affect the important question of revenue, and his opinion continued to carry great weight on all questions of general policy within the district; but there had come into existence an organised department owing obedience to another authority.

Much the same happened with the forests. Till the time of Dalhousie hardly anything had been attempted in the way of conservation, and great areas had been damaged or destroyed by indiscriminate cutting and grazing. In 1856 Brandis was invited from Germany to advise on the policy to be followed in the Burmese forests, and he with two other German experts organised the Forest Department, formed in 1869. A conservator of forests was appointed in each province, with deputies in charge of the "circles" into which the forest lands were divided. Under acts passed in 1865 and 1878 the forest lands were classified as "reserved", "protected" and "unclassed". The first are maintained under strict rules of scientific forestry; the second are subject only to rules designed to increase their value to the neighbouring inhabitants or to permit their subsequent reservation if that should become desirable; the third are virtually open. The chief difficulties which arose in this branch of administration resulted from the uncertain and ill-defined rights of user which the neighbouring inhabitants, whether settled villagers or primitive tribes, claimed to possess. The extension of cultivation in the course of the nineteenth century absorbed in certain provinces

lands which had lain waste and had been employed for pasture. This led to a growing pressure upon forest areas, threatening widespread destruction, with the accompaniment of a diminished rainfall and extensive denudation. The act of 1878 therefore laid down methods by which public and private rights in forest lands were to be determined, and provided for the extinction of private rights by compensation or exchange where they endangered areas which it was judged necessary to "reserve". As was the case with public works, these forest operations also closely affected the interests of the agricultural population, while, then, the technical operations of the forest conservators were withdrawn from the collector's management, rules for the control of grazing or the levy of fees required his approval.

A further development intimately touching the welfare of the rural population was the appearance of an agricultural department. From the early days of the company's rule sporadic efforts had been made to improve agriculture and introduce new and profitable crops. At the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries attempts were made to introduce cinnamon from Ceylon and cloves from Amboyna. Cotton seed was imported from Bourbon. Prickly pear was planted to feed the insect which produces cochineal. At Madras an experimental farm was instituted in 1865, developing later into an agricultural school, and in 1886 into an agricultural college. In 1882 an agricultural expert was appointed to advise the officers concerned with the land-revenue settlements. At Bombay and elsewhere departments of land records and agriculture were formed between 1880 and 1884. But these attempts led to little, mainly because such experts as there were lay under the control of the non-expert revenue department. Cuizon, however, inaugurated a most fruitful change. In 1901 he appointed an inspector-general of agriculture with a small staff of experts. This was followed in 1905 and 1906 by the organisation of provincial departments. Agricultural colleges were opened, research was undertaken; methods of exterminating pests were discovered and recommended; the improvement of crops was zealously sought after. Here as elsewhere development required the supersession of non-expert by expert control.

The organisation of the provincial departments of education worked in the same direction. The collector in early days had

exercised a paternal if vaguely informed supervision over the schools maintained within his district, occasionally visiting them and questioning teachers and pupils. When the educational departments were formed in 1856, this work was taken over by the inspectors of schools and their subordinates. But beyond the appearance in the districts of a new official responsible not to the collector but to the head of the department, the change scarcely affected the collector's position because the rural population took and continued to take no interest in education, since it was, even in its simplest and most elementary forms, in no wise connected with the daily business and vital concerns of agriculturists.

For a different reason the reorganisation of the police departments also affected but little the collector's position. An act of 1861 introduced extensive reforms in the provincial police, which had been entirely controlled by the collectors and deputy-commissioners in their capacity as district magistrates acting under the orders of the provincial governments. The district officers had in fact insufficient leisure to maintain an adequate control over the police of their district, and investigation had brought to light cases in which Indian police officials had employed the methods familiar to earlier Indian governments but inconsistent with western ideas. No one under the rule of the nawab of Arcot had been astonished or shocked when a prisoner was stood in the sun with a heavy stone on his head to make him confess to a crime which he was thought to have committed. But such practices assumed a different complexion under the Presidency of Madras. The police of each province were therefore placed under an inspector-general, with deputy-inspectors-general in charge of areas corresponding with the revenue divisions. In each district a superintendent was placed in charge of the local police establishments. But the maintenance of public order was too important a matter to be withdrawn from the head of the district. The district superintendents were therefore placed under a dual control. They were responsible to their departmental authorities for the internal management and discipline of their police-force; but in regard to its distribution, the preservation of peace and the suppression of crime, they followed the directions of the district magistrates, so that the authority of the collector was little affected. The change certainly produced improvement. But the pay and qualifications, especially of the lower Indian ranks, remained poor; and the

police commission appointed by Curzon recommended numerous reforms which were gradually introduced as financial conditions permitted.

The net result of all these changes was to set up within the district agents of numerous departments owing but a limited obedience to the collector, whereas in the past he had been the channel by which all government orders had been carried into operation. This did not greatly affect his pre-eminence within the area of his authority, but it enormously increased his office-work. Matters which would previously have been settled by the drafting of an order to the appropriate official became the subjects of voluminous correspondence, not merely with the district representatives of the various new departments, but also, in consequence of proposals submitted by the heads of these new departments, with the provincial government itself. This certainly reduced the capacity of the collector to deal directly and personally with the affairs of his district. Government was becoming a matter of memoranda, minutes, letters and statistics instead of personal inspection and decision. The change involved greater method, greater regularity, a tighter control by the central bodies, a more efficient administration. But it also carried with it the loss of that close personal touch between the head of the district and the villagers in which had lain the real strength of the company's government in every province but Bengal.

In some respects this more systematic government carried with it great advantages. General measures adapted to the special needs of various provinces, were taken to protect the interests and rights of the cultivators. In Bengal they had been most grievously neglected. The zamindars and their agents had succeeded in hiding the agrarian position. Cornwallis had hoped that the operation of his new courts would disentangle a problem which he thought too intricate for executive solution; but the advantage which his elaborate judicial procedure and its freedom of appeal from court to court bestowed on the rich land-holder as against the poor cultivator, had completely falsified his expectations. The zamindars claimed under the permanent settlement to be entitled to the fee simple of their estate except where tenants could prove customary rights; and the large class of customary tenants had undergone grievous diminution. In 1859 the first act was passed to remedy this injustice. This declared that certain classes of

tenants were entitled to occupy their holdings at fixed rentals, and that occupancy rights should be presumed where tenants had held the same lands for twelve years or more, while it also limited the zamindars' powers of distraint upon the ryot. But the burden of proof still lay upon the latter, and no provision was made to ascertain and record existing rights. In 1872 agrarian trouble arose out of the additional demands made upon the cultivators in certain districts. After long discussions a new tenancy act was passed in 1885. This checked the practice, introduced after 1859, of moving tenants from holding to holding in order to prevent their securing occupancy rights, and enabled a survey and a record of rights to be prepared in any area by direction of the Government of India, or in any estate where either the zamindar or the ryots petitioned the provincial government for such action. In this way after the lapse of three generations part of the injustice of the permanent settlement was undone.

The problem of occupancy rights had been far more acute in Bengal than in any of the other provinces, because there alone a system of large estates coincided with a permanent zamindari settlement. But questions of tenant-right emerged in the Agra or North-Western Provinces, in Oudh, and in the Panjab. In the first the Bengal act of 1859 applied until it was replaced by special acts of 1873 and 1881, which maintained the same general principles but also gave to the collectors and subordinate revenue officials the power of settling disputes between tenants and their landlords. In Oudh, where the talukdari settlement had recognised subordinate rights, by acts of 1868 and 1886 such occupancy rights were admitted as had been enjoyed within thirty years of the annexation, and non-occupancy tenants were protected against any increase of rent at intervals of less than seven years. In the Panjab, where the prevalent land-tenures were different, an act of 1868, passed after much controversy, defined the classes of tenant entitled to occupancy rights but abolished future acquisition by mere lapse of time.

Economic development led to evils of a different kind. One of the major consequences of the stability of British rule and the growing precision of rights over the soil was a great rise in the marketability of land. A buyer could rely, in a degree which had never before existed, on knowing what rights he was purchasing and on finding full legal support for the rights he had acquired.

At the same time the development of the world-markets for Indian produce, the expansion of the legal profession, the rise of a middle class possessed of great wealth, produced a large number of individuals ready to lend money on landed security or to buy land outright as the safest of all possible investments. What had happened in England in the half-century following on the confusion of the Wars of the Roses happened in India in the second half of the nineteenth century. The mortgage and sale of land increased with extraordinary rapidity. In so far as this affected the landlord class, it mattered comparatively little. But over great tracts the land was divided out into the tiny holdings of peasant proprietors. Their extrusion from their holdings and their reduction from the position of land-holders to that of agricultural labourers was a matter which could not be viewed with unconcern. In 1875 considerable agrarian trouble broke out in the Bombay Deccan; riots took place, the village money-lenders and grain-dealers were attacked, their houses burnt, their accounts destroyed. In Madras a large amount of land gradually passed out of the possession of the non-Brāhman peasant into that of the Brāhman professional class. In the Panjab the cultivating class was being ousted by traders and money-lenders. In order to meet this social evil two remedies, direct and indirect, were gradually applied. The direct remedy lay in legislation. In consequence of the Bombay troubles, and the recommendations of a commission appointed to investigate their causes, an act was passed to prevent money-lenders from acquiring land by fraudulent claims. But, as this failed to attain its object, a different principle was adopted in the Panjab, where an act of 1900 placed under severe restrictions all transfers of land from the ownership of the agricultural into that of the non-agricultural classes of the province. The indirect method consisted in the establishment and development of a system of co-operative credit. The value of this, both moral and economic, would be hard to exaggerate.

India has suffered for untold generations from two economic vices. One has been the reluctance of all but the banking and commercial castes to employ savings in any productive way. They have been either hidden in the ground or spent upon the purchase of personal ornaments of gold or silver. The consequence has been that a great proportion of the wealth of the country has increased only in arithmetical instead of geometrical progression.

This medieval characteristic has been accompanied by another even more injurious. Social custom has been allowed to dictate the expenditure of relatively huge sums on the ceremonial occasions of marriage and death. Expenses amounting to two or three years' entire income have been virtually inevitable at such times, because individuals feared lest their fellow-villagers or caste-men would despise them if they kept their outlay below the customary standard. But since their actual savings often would not cover such extravagance, the aid of the money-lender was sought. Indian capital being scarce and ill-organised (another condition which assimilates India to medieval Europe), the rate of interest was usurious, and would run from 18 to 24 per cent per annum. These peculiarities explain why the Indian cultivator was remarkable among all the peasant proprietors of the world for the extent of his indebtedness.

A real remedy for this evil demanded not only the provision of cheaper credit but also a measure of practical economic education. Cheaper credit by itself would be a mere palliative. Men needed to learn the practical disadvantages of borrowing for even the most solemn of religious rites, the practical advantages of borrowing and lending for productive purposes. In 1904 Curzon resolved to apply to India methods which had produced most fruitful results in not dissimilar conditions in Germany and Italy—the methods of co-operative credit. An act of that year provided for the establishment of co-operative credit societies under due supervision. In 1912 the law was revised in the light of Indian experience and widened so as to include societies for co-operative purchase and marketing. The local societies are managed by committees of the villagers themselves; their funds are in part provided by the subscriptions and deposits of the villagers. Under due supervision and control the movement, which has spread steadily, carries with it the most valuable educative influences; and the act of 1904 will perhaps rank with the organisation of the agricultural department as the most enduring and valuable monument of Curzon's rule in India.

The definition of landed rights and the provision of co-operative credit formed two developments of great importance to the peasantry of India. A third was the formation of regular and systematised methods of dealing with famine. The failure of the periodic rains in India had much the same effect within the area

concerned as a prolonged general strike would have in the industrial countries of the West. The ryot could not till his land or feed his cattle. The cities ceased to receive their accustomed supplies of food. The industries lacked their raw materials. Everyone was thrown out of work. Inland transport ceased, for pack-oxen could not be fed and watered. At intervals of a generation or so this terrific calamity had fallen upon wide tracts of India, leaving them wasted, impoverished, dispeopled. The traditional methods of relieving famine had consisted in forbidding the export of grain, in suspension of the revenue demand, in making advances to distressed cultivators, and (in extreme cases) in the bestowal of charity by the ruler and his chief officials. Similar methods were adopted by the company's government. But they were obviously inadequate. When in 1837 the upper provinces were smitten with famine, the Āgīa government laid down the principle that the state should find work for the able-bodied, but that charity must provide for those incapable of working. The result was the same in 1837 as it had always been. Many perished.

The change in general conditions, however, permitted the development of more effectual methods of dealing with famines, while the extension of humanitarian ideas made such a development a matter of urgency. The areas liable to famine were contracted by the new irrigation works, begun by the company's government and continued with ever-growing vigour and more liberal finance by its successor. The building of railways aided the solution of the problem with even greater power, though in another manner, for it solved the problem of transporting food-stuffs into the afflicted regions. The Orissa famine of 1866-67 laid a sharp emphasis on this aspect of the matter. The Orissa districts were notably lacking in means of land transport, and the coast was inaccessible after the breaking of the south-west monsoon. The consequences were exaggerated by the ignorance in which the Bengal system of administration had involved the local government. The magistrate of Cuttack was almost starved within a few days of reporting that no need for anxiety existed. In the ensuing famine a quarter of the population was believed to have perished; and though, as is usual in such cases, the estimate probably exceeded the fact, the suffering was great. However, a committee was appointed to enquire into the causes of the failure to anticipate

and remedy the evil. Under the acute and vigorous guidance of George Campbell, its report led to a great development of policy. When famine appeared again in 1868 Lawrence, then governor-general, declared that the district officers would be held responsible for seeing to it that no preventable deaths occurred. In 1873 the Bihar famine exhibited the opposite extreme. Relief was extravagant. Famine was acute in two districts only; but 6½ millions was spent on relief and 800,000 tons of unneeded grain were carried into the affected area. After the lack of preparation for the Orissa famine and the excessive relief of the Bihar famine, policy took on a more exact and foreseeing character. A severe famine raged in 1876-8, caused by the failure of two successive monsoons, and covering an area stretching from Madras northwards as far as the North-Western Provinces and Oudh. The governor-general, Lytton, toured through the famine-stricken districts, closely observing the methods of relief in force. He found great divergencies. In Bombay, for instance, a greater saving of life had been secured than in Madras, though Madras had spent ten millions as against Bombay's four. He therefore appointed a commission, under Sir Richard Strachey as chairman, to examine into the whole question. Its report, which appeared in 1880, laid the basis of a new and efficient famine policy.

The main points of the report dealt with the need of properly compiled statistical information on the condition of agriculture, with the preparation of local schemes of relief-works which would absorb such proportion of the population as would probably be thrown out of employment, and with the financial measures necessary as a regular annual provision against the possibility of famine. This led to the preparation of a Famine Code issued in 1883 and to the appearance in the Indian Budget of a head called "Famine Relief and Insurance". Under the famine code schemes were to be prepared for relief-works, the larger ones by the Public Works Departments, the smaller ones by the district officials, so that, whenever famine appeared, there should be a maturely considered programme of suitable projects ready to be put into immediate operation. As regards finance, it was reckoned that famine had cost in recent years an average of a crore and a half of rupees. It was therefore resolved to budget for this sum as part of the regular expenditure. In normal times it was to be employed either on schemes of irrigation designed to protect

areas specially liable to famine against its occurrence, or on the construction of railways and canals which would otherwise have been financed by loans.

This new system was bitterly tested by two great famines in 1896-7 and 1899-1900, in which devoted efforts were made by the whole power of the administration to minimise suffering. Each was followed by a commission of enquiry; and while both generally endorsed the findings of Lytton's former commission, the second suggested a number of points in which the methods of combating famine might be improved, laying particular emphasis on the importance of a more careful preparation of district schemes and on the early announcement of suspensions of the land revenue and of the grant of advances. The changes then introduced by Curzon were put to the test of experience in 1907-8 when famine again visited the United Provinces. The failure of the autumn and spring harvests was as great as it had been in 1896-7. But its effects were far smaller. Railway extensions, canal extensions, a higher range of prices and wages, a growing variety of employment, a more mobile population, had at last enabled the efforts of policy successfully to cope with the strain of famine, and in this most important respect medieval conditions had disappeared in India.

The organisation of the civil servants of the government still remains to be described. In 1854 they were classified into two groups—the covenanted and the uncovenanted servants. The first formed the administrative aristocracy. They and they alone could legally fill any civil office in the regulation provinces that carried a salary of £800 a year and upwards. They had been the personal nominees of the directors of the company. But in 1853 Macaulay succeeded in carrying into effect the plan, which seems to have been first proposed by Lord Grenville in 1813, to provide for their future appointment by open literary competition. Macaulay's skilful pleading persuaded almost everyone that the change was a great and unassailable reform. It had many advantages, especially in that it prevented dull or vicious lads being thrust into the covenanted service by family interest. It also ensured that future entrants would be quick-brained, well-read, good pen-and-ink men, like Macaulay himself. After a little while the same system of recruitment was applied to the civil services in England, and its undeniable success in the public offices of London was

thought to confirm the suitability of such selections for the public offices of Calcutta, and the head-quarters of every district in British India. But in fact the principal duties of the higher civil service in England and of the covenanted service, or Indian civil service as it came to be called, were fundamentally different. In England the civil servant is the servant of the political head of his department, in whose name and by whose orders alone he communicates with the general public. His responsibility is limited, his discretionary powers small. The English administration is, and has always been, controlled in part by the politicians of Westminster, in part by prominent local men, justices of the peace, county councillors, borough and district councillors, and the like. Such amateurs have benefited incalculably by the clever and trustworthy assistants provided for them by competitive methods. But, although the civil servants have always believed it, it is not at all certain that the country would have been better governed had they been entrusted with the whole power and responsibility of administration. For centuries a like method of recruitment had been in force in China, where men who had competed successfully in difficult literary examinations were entrusted with the principal offices of the state.

The defects of this system as applied to India were three-fold. Engrafted on a bureaucratic government, it ensured a supply of clever men, while bureaucracy ensured that the cleverest should rise speedily and constantly into the secretariats and thence into the councils. But the qualities which India required of her foreign rulers were not mere cleverness. Her own people were not lacking in quickness and subtlety of mind. On that side Britain had nothing to contribute. What was wanted was honesty of purpose, independence of judgment, freedom from the disturbing influence of caste and creed, absence of self-seeking. But the men possessed of these were not those whom the system raised most readily into high places. The best men remained long in the districts and only rose with difficulty or by good fortune to high office. On the whole the system probably improved the district administration, improved the secretariats, but did not improve the general control.

The second defect of the new system lay in its weakening family connections with the Indian administration. It was all to the good that when a young man arrived in India he should find

friends, both English and Indian, ready-made, that he should carry out with him the intimate tradition of family service and be inspired by obligation not only to the people of the country but also to his father and grandfather. He came to India not as a stranger to a strange land, but as one fulfilling an ancestral destiny. The competitive system weakened this beneficent influence and often replaced it by feelings of mere personal advantage.

The third defect was that pointed out by Lord Stanley, though quite fruitlessly, in the debates of 1853. The competitive examination was based on western knowledge. Though Indians might be eligible to compete, they could not compete on anything like equal terms. Their schools, their traditions, their family life, all forbade their acquiring such a knowledge of Latin and Greek as would allow them to rival English competitors. The examinations were held in London; and Indian candidates were thus required to undertake a long and expensive voyage, to live among people of utterly different habits, and to endure the quick changes of a different and most volatile climate. They could not but break solemn rules of caste if they came to England. They might fall sick amid the fogs of London. And even when they had run all these social and personal risks, they would still have hardly the faintest chances of success. It is true that the rules of the examination were later on modified so as to include Sanskrit, Persian and Arabic, and to permit Indian candidates to offer them instead of the classical languages of the West. Other oriental languages were introduced. But the fact remained that, unless an Indian boy spent several years in an English school and college, far from home, and incurring what in India was considered an enormous expense, his chances of success were very poor. The system ensured that the higher posts of the British-Indian government should be filled by Englishmen or Indians of English training, so as to preserve the English character of the administration. But this object, valuable as it was, was secured by a side-wind. It was secured by a system which professed to offer an equal opportunity to all. Indians therefore resented it with a bitterness which would not have been provoked by the creation of a *corps d'élite* publicly declared to consist of Englishmen alone. In 1914 only twenty-six Indians competed out of 183 candidates. The remedy demanded by Indian political bodies such as the National Congress was that simultaneous examinations should be held in India and England.

But to this there was a great obstacle. In the existing state of education it was certain that Hindus alone would succeed among the Indian competitors, and that large and powerful sections of the population, such as the Muslims and the Sikhs, would remain completely excluded; the proposal was therefore rejected, until the reorganisation of recruitment following on the reforms of 1919, and even then it was still apparent that the principle of open competition could not be applied without restriction.

In view of the practical working of the competitive system, a number of experiments had been made in order to modify the virtual exclusion of Indians from the posts open to members of the Indian civil service. The first was a proposal by Lawrence to establish a number of state-scholarships, in order to enable Indians to pursue their studies in England. But almost as soon as this scheme began to work, it was suspended by the Duke of Argyll, then secretary of state. He desired a completer plan, and in 1870 passed an act through parliament enabling the Government of India with the secretary of state's approval to make rules under which Indians might be appointed to posts usually reserved for covenanted civilians. The subject was then actively discussed, but nothing was done till Lytton framed a scheme for the nomination of Indians to one-sixth of the reserved posts. His hope was that the nominees would consist mainly of young Indians of distinguished family, and that the "Statutory Civil Service" (as the new group was to be called) would bring the old Indian aristocracy into closer and more effective relations with the administrative machine. These expectations were not realised. The provincial governments, in recommending persons for the governor-general's nomination, found themselves obliged to choose between young men of good family but of meagre educational attainments, and older men of the professional groups qualified by administrative experience. Their recommendations came to be more and more limited to persons of the latter class.

Below the covenanted service was a large subordinate service recruited in India and known as the "Uncovenanted Service". In the regulation provinces its members could not rise to superior posts, and in the non-regulation provinces they were seldom suffered to do so. They included men of pure and mixed English blood, and Indians; and they provided most of the persons nominated to the Statutory Civil Service. In consequence of the

report of the Public Services Commission appointed in 1886, it was resolved to abolish this long-standing classification. For it was substituted an imperial service, recruited in England, and two others, one provincial and the other subordinate, recruited in India. No more appointments were to be made to the Statutory Civil Service, but specially recommended members of the provincial civil services were to be eligible for appointment to a fixed proportion of the posts reserved for the Indian civilians.

A similar organisation was adopted for the services employed under the specialised departments which had come into existence. Here too, as in general civil employment, the chief posts had been usually reserved for persons recruited in England, while the remainder were filled in India. However, special circumstances had demanded special treatment. The Public Works Department, for instance, had been staffed partly by officers of the Royal Engineers, partly by civil engineers selected in London, and partly by men who had qualified at the Indian engineering colleges—Rūrki, Poona, and Madras. In 1871, however, the Royal Engineering College at Cooper's Hill was established to provide civil engineers, and a fixed proportion was adopted, Cooper's Hill providing half, the Indian colleges three-tenths, and the Royal Engineers one-fifth of the recruits to the department. For a while too Cooper's Hill provided a training for the candidates selected as probationers in the Forest Department.

The general system adopted all through the administration was thus Indian agency under English supervision. This persisted in spite of a slow infiltration of Indians into offices of superior rank, and undoubtedly produced a government more honest and efficient than had previously existed in India. The price paid for this development was discontent, growing with the spread of education in India, at the exclusion of Indians from the higher grades.

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CHAPTER XIV

Central Asia and the Routes to India

In a previous chapter some attempt has been made to sketch the growing importance of Central Asia and the Mediterranean avenues of approach to India. The other ways to India were securely held by the British navy, with its outposts at the Cape of Good Hope to the west, and at Singapore to the east. But the eastern ends of the Mediterranean routes were less completely held, Gibraltar closed the western entrance to the Mediterranean itself, and Malta lay full in the path of French fleets aimed, as Napoleon had aimed them, at Alexandria. But French influence was strong in Egypt; and Russian predominance at Constantinople had been avoided only at the cost of the Crimean War. If the long-discussed project of cutting through the isthmus of Suez were ever realised, then both France and Russia might find entrance through the Red Sea into Indian waters; and though Aden had been occupied in 1839, it could not seal up the southern exit. If the Suez Canal were cut, the duties of the British navy would be greatly increased, and a more effective control over Egypt would become indispensable to the security of India. And besides these considerations the Crimean War had brought the understanding between England and Russia about Central Asia to an end. Unless some influence could be found to make abstention worth Russia's while, she would almost certainly renew the policy which had alarmed Great Britain in the 'thirties, either extending her influence in Persia or advancing her frontier towards Afghanistan, or following both lines of development. In the middle of the nineteenth century these were the problems dominating the external policy of the Government of India. From the British point of view, was British foreign policy to become liable to deflection by Russian pressure on India? From the Indian point of view, was India to remain secure from external attack or were the conditions of the past to be revived? These considerations had already led to one ill-calculated and mismanaged war. They were now to produce fierce controversy and violent alternations of policy. Moreover, in this more than in any other aspect of policy

was the growing control of the home government to receive its fullest effect. Auckland had entered on the First Afghan War in the belief that he was pursuing the desires of the English ministry, and Hobhouse boasted that he had dictated the conduct of the governor-general. This boast had not been wholly true; but within forty years it was to be realised, and a governor-general was to resign because he disliked the foreign policy of the secretary of state. The world was in fact shrinking, and action which in the past would have produced a mere local disturbance was now liable to bring about important reactions in all the capitals of Europe. India could no longer have a foreign policy of its own.

The annexation of the Panjab had at least simplified the position, for it had brought British India into direct contact with the area from which invaders had ever been wont to set out for the conquest of the country. In 1855 a treaty of friendship had been made with Dost Muhammad, the amir of Kābul, who had been driven into alliance with his former enemy, the Government of India, by the renewed ambitions of the shah of Persia. In 1852 the latter had seized Herat and had relinquished it only under British threats. In 1856 he again attacked Herat and boasted that he would conquer Kandahār as well. This led at once to war. An expedition was despatched from Bombay under the command of Outram; and aid in arms and money was sent to Dost Muhammad. These vigorous measures soon brought the Persians to terms. In the course of the next six years Dost Muhammad was busy consolidating his position in eastern and southern Afghanistan. In 1862 he resolved to add Herat, then under an independent Sadozai prince, to his dominions. Elgin, the governor-general, protested against this action, and recalled the Muslim agent whom the Government of India had maintained at Kābul since 1857. But Dost Muhammad persisted, and in the next year captured the place, but died shortly after at the age of eighty. His death involved the country in a long and confused war of succession. It lasted from 1864 to 1868. First one son and then another gained the upper hand; and each party applied to the Government of India for assistance. But John Lawrence, who was then governor-general, refused to take any part in the matter. He belonged to the generation which had drawn natural but mistaken conclusions from the lamentable war of 1839. He held strongly that Britain

had no interests beyond the line which the Sikhs had formerly held, and that the defence of India should be based on the Indus. He had tried to prevent the conclusion of the treaty with Dost Muhammad; he had, in the crisis of the Mutiny, proposed to give away Peshāwar to the Afghans; and now when he had attained to power, he persisted in his former views. He assured each applicant that if he could establish himself as the ruler of Afghanistan, he should be recognised by the Government of India. This attitude, which its friends described unwisely as "the policy of masterly inactivity", was well calculated to induce the rival claimants to seek aid elsewhere. They approached Persia and Russia. This brought the policy of Lawrence to a hasty end. He at once gave a subsidy to Shīr 'Alī, whom Dost Muhammad had formerly designated as his heir, and with this help Shīr 'Alī soon succeeded in establishing himself as the ruler of Kābul, Kandahār, and Herat. But great harm had been done. Shīr 'Alī believed that "the English look to nothing but their interests and bide their time". Everyone had come to regard the English as unreliable friends and impotent enemies.

While Lawrence had been looking on at the Afghan situation, the Russians had been advancing swiftly in Central Asia. Their expansion had begun soon after the Crimean War. In 1864 they touched on the borders of Khokand, Bukhāra, and Khiva. In 1865 they occupied Tashkent. In 1867 they formed the new province of Russian Turkestan and reduced Bukhāra to the position of a vassal state. In 1873 the same fate befell Khiva. The ostensible motives for this advance were the difficulties which were always arising with the Turkman tribes, the need of suppressing the slave-trade, and the encouragement of commerce. English opinion was divided between the acceptance and the rejection of these explanations. But we now know from undeniable Russian authority that the real motive was political. The imperial Russian government argued that since Britain could attack Russia through continental alliances, as had happened in the Crimean War, Russia should secure in Turkestan "a military position strong enough to keep England in check by the threat of intervention in India". Against this action England had two possible remedies. One was to occupy advanced stations in Central Asia and secure a commanding influence in Afghanistan, in order to convince Russia of the futility of advance in that direction. The

other, which Lawrence recommended, was to reach a diplomatic agreement. If that could have been attained, it might have proved to be the cheaper way. But it was liable to one disadvantage. Russia clearly would not assent to any such proposals unless they were beneficial to herself; and the only bribe which Great Britain could offer would have been British support for Russian interests on the continent. But neither of the great English political parties would have dreamed of pursuing such a policy. What in fact happened was that diplomatic discussions were conducted without ever bringing the matter near a real settlement. The utmost that emerged from the conversations between Clarendon and Gortchakoff were Russian assurances of pacific intentions.

Meanwhile in India endeavours were made to form a closer union between Britain and Afghanistan, in order to preclude the establishment of Russian influence there. In accordance with the later policy of Lawrence, his successor, Lord Mayo, had a conference with Shīr 'Alī at Ambāla in 1869. But the net result was small. The amir only received a letter couched in encouraging but non-committal terms. In 1873, after the absorption of the khanates on the Oxus by Russia, Shīr 'Alī made an endeavour to secure a real alliance with Great Britain. He sent an agent to Simla, and proposed to Lord Northbrook that the British government should promise him help in case of any unprovoked aggression on the part of his northern neighbour. Northbrook was willing to accede to this request. But the Duke of Argyll, then secretary of state for India in Mr Gladstone's first cabinet, would allow him to go no further than to declare that "we shall maintain our settled policy in Afghanistan". To Shīr 'Alī this could mean nothing but a continuation of the Lawrence policy of helping those who no longer needed assistance. Argyll's decision marks a turning point in the development of the Central Asia question. Its ill effects were accentuated by two other events. The British government had agreed to arbitrate on the long-standing disputes between Afghanistan and Persia on their boundaries in Seistān. The decision in some points went against the amir, who complained bitterly of its injustice. In the circumstances it would have been wiser to allow the Persians and Afghans to settle the matter as best they could than to indispose both parties by a decision which if just would displease both. The second was the request of Shīr 'Alī for British recognition of 'Abdullāh Jān, whom

he had installed as his heir. The answer which was sent to this proposal was intentionally phrased in the same terms as had been used in 1858 when Dost Muhammad had sent a similar request on behalf of Shīr 'Alī himself. From this Shīr 'Alī must have drawn the conclusion that his son would be recognised as amir only when he had destroyed or exiled every possible rival.

In these circumstances Shīr 'Alī seems to have concluded that for his own security he must make terms with Russia. General Kaufmann, the governor-general of Turkestan, was delighted at this development, which fitted in admirably with the purposes of the Russian Foreign Office. In 1870 he had opened a correspondence by assuring Shīr 'Alī that 'Abdur Rahmān, his nephew who had taken refuge at Tashkent, would receive no help to wage war against his uncle. This letter had been forwarded by Shīr 'Alī to the Government of India for advice regarding the answer which he should return. The latter merely informed him that "such letters should be looked on as an additional ground of confidence." When Shīr 'Alī asked for the recognition of 'Abdullāh Jān by the British, he made the same request to the Russians, who, instead of reminding him of his own struggles to secure his succession, blandly stated that "such nominations tend to the comfort and tranquillity of the kingdom." From 1875 the exchange of letters between Kābil and Tashkent became frequent. Such as transpired were mere letters of compliment, but no one in India knew what the others might contain. London suggested to St Petersburg that the correspondence might be brought to an end, but St Petersburg ignored the request. Yet, as the Government of India asked, what would have been thought at St Petersburg had the British entered into similar relations with the khans of Khiva or Bukhārā?

While affairs were thus developing in Central Asia, the position in the Mediterranean had been transformed. After long delays, and in defiance of all the obstacles which the British Foreign Office under Lord Palmerston could put forward, de Lesseps had obtained support and approval for his plan to cut the Suez Canal. That great work had been carried through, and was at last opened in 1869. Almost immediately afterwards the telegraph line which had been erected by way of Persia and Asia Minor was replaced by a submarine cable running from Bombay to Aden, thence up the Red Sea, and so to England through the Mediterranean. This cut

out the long delays which the despatch of messages through several foreign jurisdictions had involved, and placed India in direct communication with London. For the first time the India Office could telegraph its orders to Calcutta or Simla in the certainty that they would arrive in time to be acted upon. From that moment the home government's control of foreign policy became unquestioned, and the discretionary authority which the governor-general of India had long enjoyed began to disappear.

In 1874 also the Gladstone government was replaced by the first Disraeli ministry, with Lord Salisbury at the India Office. The new government was eager to redeem what it regarded as the great errors committed by its predecessor in the matter of foreign policy. In particular it thought that Gladstone's government had acquiesced far too easily in the explanations of Central Asia policy which had been offered by the imperial Russian government. Salisbury feared that unless something were done, Great Britain might suddenly find herself in a position of great strategic and political disadvantage. At Kābul the Government of India was represented only by a Muslim agent, who wrote (Salisbury thought) just what the amir chose to tell him, and whose reports did not tally with other reports received. The India Office therefore proposed that the amir should be invited to receive a British agent who should be stationed at Herat, in order that full and accurate information should be available regarding developments on the Russo-Afghan frontier. The governor-general, Lord Northbrook, disliked this proposal, and virtually refused to give effect to it. Soon afterwards he resigned his office and was succeeded by Lord Lytton, who was specially charged to carry out Salisbury's policy.

The new plan was not so unreasonable as has been supposed. It was based upon the terms which Shīr 'Alī had been willing to concede in 1873 in return for a conditional guarantee. It was asserted that Shīr 'Alī had never given any formal promise to receive a British agent at Herat. That was true, but it was not the whole truth. Northbrook himself was driven to admit that the amir "had appeared to consent", in return for the agreement which Argyll had compelled Northbrook to refuse but which Salisbury was now prepared to give, together with the acknowledgement of his son 'Abdullāh Jān as his heir. The real trouble was not that the proposals were bad but that they came too late.

What Shīr 'Alī would have given in 1873 he would not give in 1876, when his relations with Kaufmann had become closer and more intimate. At the same time Salisbury authorised a movement of great importance, the occupation of Quetta. This step had long been advocated by men like Jacob, Rawlinson, and Frere, who argued that the defence of India could not be conducted adequately without a strong post on the farther side of the hills separating Afghanistan from India. The line of the Indus was impossible partly from the defects of a river as a line of defence, partly from the political consequences which would follow immediately on the invasion of India by a foreign enemy. The administrative line, which roughly followed the boundary which the British had inherited from the Sikhs, possessed no military value whatever, and was, like most Indian frontiers, more likely to provide subjects of dispute than to secure a clear-cut division of interests between two neighbouring states. The advocates of an advance therefore claimed that the proper course was to occupy Quetta, under the existing treaty with the khan of Kalāt. This step would open the road to Kandahār, and permit the out-flanking of any enemy seeking to advance against India by way of the northern passes. So long as Lawrence's influence had been supreme, this course had been reprobated as improper. But the advance of Russia and the growing correspondence between Shīr 'Alī and Kaufmann had led many to change their views. In 1876, therefore, a new treaty was made with the khan of Kalāt, and shortly afterwards Quetta was occupied. In a military sense the step had everything to recommend it. For the first time since the days of Aurangzib the Indian frontier was no longer liable to attack with all the advantages on the side of the assailant. In a political sense also it was sound, although at the time it was regarded with much misgiving. It was said that it would alarm Shīr 'Alī and drive him into the arms of Russia. But that judgment ignored the fact that Shīr 'Alī had already been alienated by the policy of Argyll, and was already in communication with Russia. The occupation of Quetta was undoubtedly regarded by him as a threat. But it was the sort of threat which, had he not been deceived by the attitude of Mr Gladstone's government, should have made him think twice before committing himself to the friendship of Russia. Unless Great Britain was willing to allow the establishment of Russian predominance in Afghanistan,

and concede to Russia the power of intervening in India at moments of European crisis, she was obliged to take action, and the conduct of Salisbury and Lytton, while certainly aggressive, compelled Shīr 'Alī either to give up his relations with Kaufmann or to embark on war in a position of relative disadvantage.

Therefore for the first time Shīr 'Alī found himself confronted by a British government which recognised that its own political interests were involved in Central Asia. He did not, however, understand the position in which he stood. He was probably much misled both by the past conduct of the Government of India and by the attitude of the Russian authorities. He seems to have hoped that he could balance between the two rivals, committing himself to neither, and protecting himself from inconvenient entanglements by their common fears. Long negotiations, lasting from October, 1876, to March, 1877, regarding Salisbury's proposed mission led to no conclusion. The chief argument against agreeing to this proposal was that if a British mission were accepted, the amir would be unable to avoid receiving a Russian mission, were one despatched. This argument was most unlucky, for almost at once a crisis arose in Europe. Rebellions broke out in European Turkey. Russian and British policies were antagonistic, and when Russia went to war with the sultan, the British attitude became definitely hostile to Russia. Both parties sought to employ every possible means of limiting and controlling the action of the other. Indian troops were sent to Malta. The Russians demanded of Shīr 'Alī a specific treaty of alliance. In these circumstances Shīr 'Alī's hopes of being able to follow a policy of balance were doomed to disappointment.

In June, 1878, Kaufmann wrote to the amir informing him that his external relations required "deep consideration" and that he was sending a Russian officer "to inform you of all that is hidden in my mind". He calculated wisely that Shīr 'Alī was unlikely to turn his mission back at the frontier. His envoy, Stolietoff, bore with him a draft treaty, offering much the same terms as Lytton had just offered, the recognition of 'Abdullāh Jān as heir and assistance against any foreign aggression. At the same time three columns of troops marched from Tashkent towards points on the Afghan frontier, and, in case by chance Shīr 'Alī refused the offer, Kaufmann entered into discussions with 'Abdur Rahmān, the amir's fugitive nephew, with a view to a possible revolution at

Kābul. On the border Stolietoff met half-hearted orders forbidding his admission into Afghan territory. These he of course ignored, and moved on to Kābul, where he arrived on July 22. In the course of the next four weeks he negotiated a treaty with the amir ready for signature and ratification.

Lytton was well informed of these events. He had learnt of Stolietoff's mission before that officer had actually left Tashkent. It seemed to him that the time had come to recall to the amir's mind the arguments which he had so lately used against accepting a British mission. Having received a Russian envoy, he could hardly refuse to receive a British one without displaying a marked hostility which no one could mistake. With the English cabinet's approval, therefore, Lytton wrote demanding that an English mission should be received. His letter reached Kābul on August 17. No answer was returned, on the score of the death of 'Abdullāh Jān, who died that same day, but the letter was read in durbar and Stolietoff's advice taken. He urged that the answer should be delayed, that if any British mission were sent it should be stopped by force, while he would hasten to Tashkent to communicate with the Russian authorities, who would compel the English to withdraw their demands. The amir followed this advice to the letter. He delayed giving any answer, and when Neville Chamberlain was sent as envoy from Peshāwar, he was met with threats of being fired on if he attempted to pass 'Alī Masjid.

Shīr 'Alī would hardly have done this but for the trust which he placed in the promises of the Russians. But the latter had shown more zeal than discretion. Kaufmann, perhaps on the orders of the Russian War Office, had acted as though war were certain between Great Britain and his own country. But the expected war did not come to pass. Instead of that the Congress of Berlin reached a peaceful settlement. Kaufmann had received this news while Stolietoff was still on his way to Kābul, and seems to have written warning him to give the amir no specific promises of help against the English, at the same time he recalled the columns which had set out from Tashkent. But the mischief had been done. Lytton had been given the best possible excuse for demanding the reception of an English mission, and Shīr 'Alī had been encouraged to defy the English. The Russians had thus fallen into the trap which they had set for others. All Kaufmann could say in reply to the amir's urgent demands for help was to advise him

to come to terms with the English as best he could. One is reminded of the fate of the Indian princes who in the previous century had been encouraged by French intrigues to give overt proofs of their hostility to the East India Company.

The cabinet in London viewed the swift development of the Afghan crisis with some alarm. Salisbury, who had been moved to the Foreign Office, feared lest the Russians might find in it an excuse for not withdrawing their troops from Turkish territory in accordance with the Treaty of Berlin. He and the prime minister, Lord Beaconsfield, blamed Lytton for sending his envoy by the Khaibar Pass, where he was not unlikely to be stopped, instead of by the Bolān Pass, where such an event was more improbable. Attempts were made to smooth over matters for a while. But these plans failed through the strong defence which Lord Cranbrook, the new secretary of state for India, made on behalf of Lytton. On November 2, therefore, with the cabinet's reluctant assent, an ultimatum, expiring on the 20th, was sent to Kābul. No answer being received before that date, British forces invaded Afghan territory. Lytton had succeeded in taking full advantage of the Russian blunder.

The Second Afghan War opened by an advance through the Kurram and the Khaibar Passes. A month later Shīr 'Alī issued a *farmān* in which he recounted the innumerable victories which he had achieved over the invaders and announced his retirement into Russian territory. Negotiations were opened with his son Ya'kūb, with whom in May, 1879, the British signed the Treaty of Gandamak. Ya'kūb assigned the districts of Kurram, Pishān, and Sibi to the British; he agreed to conduct his foreign relations in accordance with the governor-general's advice; and he accepted a permanent English agent who was to be established at Kābul. The Second Afghan War was as successful in its first stage as the first had been. But inevitable difficulties loomed ahead. The new amir was believed to be fickle and weak. Not was the establishment of the agent at Kābul entirely in accordance with English desires. Herat had been the place where they thought an agent would be most useful. But Ya'kūb had urged Kābul so strongly that it had been felt undesirable to insist on the other course. Cavagnari was therefore selected as envoy. He was an active, energetic man, who had conducted the Gandamak negotiations to a successful conclusion; but he was scarcely tactful enough for

a post demanding great delicacy. He reached Kābul in July, 1879, and though well received, was regarded from the first with great suspicion. He found himself isolated. No nobles were allowed to visit him. He tried to counter this restriction by setting up a dispensary to serve as a cover for persons who wished to communicate with him. But this device was of doubtful advantage. Early in September a real or pretended mutiny broke out among the troops at Kābul. The residency was attacked, and its inhabitants massacred. Ya'kūb's complicity was and still remains uncertain. Roberts believed, probably with reason, that he knew of and favoured the projects of a mutiny, in the hope that it would allow him to represent to the Government of India the difficulties which the presence of a British resident involved and would enable him to request the agent's withdrawal. Indeed some such ideas may well have underlain the proposal to station the envoy at Kābul instead of at Herat. But it is not likely that Ya'kūb either expected or desired the death of Cavagnari. His Afghan advisers, however, probably did.

This event led to a re-opening of the war. Once more a brilliant opening had been followed by the murder of the unfortunate man chosen to represent British policy at a ferocious capital. But now the sequence of events was to diverge sharply from the earlier example. Roberts promptly occupied Kābul, where he established himself securely, and throughout the following winter resisted with ease the attempts of the tribesmen to expel him. Ya'kūb himself had abandoned his precarious position and joined the English camp, declaring that he would rather be a grass-cutter with them than attempt to rule the ungovernable Afghans. He was sent down into British India, where he lived on a government pension till his death in 1923. But his disappearance left for a while no satisfactory candidate for the government of the country. In these circumstances the British authorities turned naturally towards partition. The Foreign Office even began to discuss with Teherān the terms on which Persia might be allowed to occupy Herat, and a member of the old ruling Sadozai family was recognised as ruler of Kandahār. Such arrangements would, it was thought, make it a small matter what became of Kābul.

At this moment, however, a new candidate stood forward. 'Abdur Rahmān, who had been living under Russian protection, thought the time had come to claim the succession of his uncle

Shīr 'Alī, who had died soon after his flight into Russian territory. 'Abdur Rahmān was now a man of forty, and had inherited much of the vigour and ferocity of his grandfather, Dost Muhammad. In 1880, after long discussions with the Russian governor-general, he was allowed to return to his native country. The Russians undoubtedly hoped by this to embarrass the English and to secure a friend at Kābul to replace the dead amir. But in this they miscalculated. 'Abdur Rahmān had seen much of them, and had meditated long on the causes of his uncle's fate. He had come to the conclusion that friendship with the English was worth having, thus reversing the sentiments with which he had fled to Tashkent sixteen years earlier. As soon as Lytton heard of his appearance, he sent orders to the English agent to enter into discussions with him. But at that moment negotiations were interrupted by the arrival of a new governor-general, Lord Ripon.

In the spring of 1880 a general election had taken place in which the foreign policy of the Beaconsfield government both in Turkey and Afghanistan had become the object of violent and indeed dishonest attack. Mr Gladstone's success led at once to the resignation of Lytton and the appointment of Ripon, pledged to carry out a policy of withdrawing altogether from beyond the hills. With this policy Ripon had been in the fullest possible agreement. But after his arrival in India, he found that much more was to be said for the late Conservative policy than he had imagined. Indeed he came speedily to the conclusion that the execution of the policy of withdrawal which had been promised in the queen's speech at the opening of the new parliament would infallibly lead to a new war, and insisted with a covert threat of resignation that Pishīn and Sibi should be retained. Meanwhile he took up the discussions with 'Abdur Rahmān at the point at which Lytton had left them. 'Abdur Rahmān had already given proof of his desire to be friends with the English. When Ayūb Khān, Shīr 'Alī's son, inflicted a sharp defeat on the English at Maiwand, 'Abdur Rahmān had materially assisted Roberts in the great march which the latter made on Kandahār, leading to the complete overthrow of Ayūb Khān's forces. Ripon therefore reached an understanding with him, by which he was to be allowed to establish his authority over the whole of Afghanistan, Pishīn and Sibi being retained by the British, and soon afterwards 'Abdur Rahmān agreed in return for an annual subsidy to place the conduct of his foreign relations

under British control. Thus the settlement at which Lytton had aimed was largely secured. The hostile amir had been replaced by one friendly to Great Britain, the fear of having an ally of Russia on the immediate frontier of India was removed, the control of the amir's external relations was secured, and above all a position was obtained on the further side of the hills from which any hostile advance towards India might be met and checked before the Indian territories were reached. The main point which still awaited settlement was the delimitation of the new amir's dominions. Except towards Persia they were as yet undefined. Between them and Russian Turkestan on the north, and British India on the east, lay belts of territory under no settled government. This was a not uncommon feature of political Asia. It carried with it what had long been regarded as a distinct advantage, a standing pretext for a declaration of war. Until that question had been cleared up, Central Asia was still likely to give ground for international dispute.

The matter became the more urgent because the Russian government speedily began to take advantage of the numerous difficulties in which Mr Gladstone was involved by his conduct of foreign policy. Russian documents (for instance the correspondence of the Baron de Staal who was the Russian ambassador at London at this period) prove how greatly Russia valued his tenure of office as providing a favourable opportunity of extending its power in Central Asia. The Merv oasis formed the first step. It was a region the importance of which had been exaggerated. It was, however, not far from Herat, and the Russians had repeatedly disclaimed all intentions of advancing thither. But while the Russian foreign minister was seeking to reassure the British ambassador on this point, Russian agents were urging and bribing the chiefs of Merv to submit themselves to the emperor. At last in 1884, when Mr Gladstone was embarrassed by the Sudan question, the allegiance of the chiefs was formally accepted and the Russian War Office prepared a map showing the new Russian boundary stretching south to touch the Hari-rūd near Herat. Fresh remonstrances led to a proposal that the Russo-Afghan boundary should be defined and laid down. The British ministry eagerly took up the idea, and at once appointed a commission to act with the Russians in the matter. It was suggested that the two missions should meet at Sarakhs on October 1, 1884. But the

Russian advance had not yet been sufficiently developed to make so early a meeting convenient. A general was therefore named head of the Russian mission, but he was at the same instant smitten with sickness, and it was evident that his diplomatic recovery would be followed by a lengthy period during which he would be diligently studying the problem and the Russian forces would be occupying the posts on which the Russians desired their frontier to rest. The chief point at which they aimed was Panjdeh, which the English had always regarded as lying well within the amir's territories. The Afghans sought to defend the place. Early in 1885 the respective forces were face to face. The English boundary commission was also present. On March 30, when the only line of telegraph by Mashhad was conveniently interrupted, the Russians took advantage of an incautious movement of the Afghan troops to attack and expel them from Panjdeh.

This news did not reach London till April 9. The Irish question was acute. The ministry's policy in the Sudan and the death of Gordon had involved it in deep unpopularity. The Afghan question also had excited much attention, and acceptance of the Russian action would be deemed a new humiliation. In these trying circumstances Mr Gladstone found it necessary to make a show of spirit. He called up the reserves and moved a vote of credit for special military preparations. De Giers, the Russian foreign minister, had reckoned on carrying his point by bluff. He had even ordered the ambassador to inform the English cabinet that the Afghan commandant admitted that he would have retired but for the pressure of the English boundary commission. But the vote of credit looked too like business and he at once cancelled his instructions to de Staal. The Russians wanted two things. They wished to avoid war; and they wished Mr Gladstone to retain office. A suggestion was put about that the matter might be referred to arbitration. The cabinet eagerly snatched at the idea, hoping that the German emperor might be named arbitrator. The Russians refused emphatically to submit the conduct of their general to discussion; but were willing to arbitrate on the question whether they had kept their engagements with Great Britain, provided that the arbitrator was the king of Denmark. These points were conceded, and the Russians, having obtained their main point, permitted the delimitation of the frontier, which took place in the course of the following year. The arbitration lapsed,

indeed it had never been more than a pretext under cover of which Mr Gladstone might retire from his bellicose position. After somewhat similar though less provocative events, the boundary through the Pāmirs was formally laid down.

In Afghanistan itself, the amir had been gradually building up his position. He was excellently fitted for the difficult office which he held. He ruled the Afghans with a rod of iron. Rebellions were crushed with traditional vigour and commemorated by the erection of great pyramids of skulls. 'Abdur Rahmān's administration of justice was personal, and marked by the fantastic but striking methods of Jahāngīr in Mughal India. He was perhaps the most absolute ruler of his day. His rigid orthodoxy carried with it the support and sympathy of the mullahs; and he enjoyed a great and deserved reputation in the world of Islam. With the English he maintained generally good relations. But the later part of his reign was marked by periods of coolness, of distrust, and frontier intrigue. Indeed the incident of Panjdeh seems to have given him a lesson. Misled by the experience of Shīr 'Alī and the assurances of the boundary commission, he seems to have believed that the Russians would never dare to attack his territory so long as he was sheltered by British arms. At the moment at which the incident occurred, he was paying a visit to Lord Dufferin at Rawalpindi. The governor-general had at once assured him of arms, ammunition, and possibly money should war with Russia follow. But Great Britain evidently had thought Afghanistan not worth going to war over. 'Abdur Rahmān probably concluded with wisdom that just as Russia had not been willing to fight for Shīr 'Alī, so, too, England would not fight for him. He could hardly be expected to relish the position of his country as the region in which the security of India from invasion was to be defended.

However, the chief difficulties arose not out of any leanings towards Russia but out of questions of frontier policy. The frontier problem was exceedingly complicated. It involved political, military, and administrative questions. The political question was to define the proper division of rule between India and Afghanistan, the military to find the line from which India might best be defended, and the administrative to determine the point to which control of the frontier tribesmen should be assumed. The military question had already been determined by the Second Afghan

War Quetta was occupied and developed, it was linked up with the Indian railways, it was designed to permit the speedy occupation of Kandahār, in order to meet and repel any attack, whether Russian or Afghan, coming from the north-west. The political question still had to be answered. Along what line was the authority of the amir on the one side and of the governor-general on the other to terminate? The British had inherited from the Sikhs an undefined border beyond which lay a tangle of great hills, cut by deep winding valleys, and occupied by a great number of tribes. Further to the south, where the conquest of Sind had carried British authority on to the edge of Balūchistan, the political position was much the same. But the whole frontier had fallen under two provincial authorities. The Sind frontier was under Bombay, the Pathān frontier under the Panjab. This fact had led to the development of two distinct methods of administering the frontier and conducting relations with the trans-border tribes. On the Sind frontier, where the valleys were broader and less tortuous than in the Panjab and where the cultivated land pressed less closely on the tribal areas, the "closed frontier system" was in force. Under this, the frontier was patrolled, and no tribesman from beyond was allowed to enter British territory without a pass. The Panjab frontier was an "open frontier." Its protection was based upon forts and garrisons. In the fruitless hope of winning the tribesmen to forsake their immemorial habits of plunder, they were encouraged to trade within British territory. Raids, however, were frequent, and the only practicable punishment consisted in punitive expeditions. The frontier officials were strongly discouraged from visiting the tribal region. Down to about 1890 the Sind system was working incomparably better than that of the Panjab.

This result, however, was due to local circumstances rather than to anything else. The physical differences of the two frontiers have already been noted. But there existed political differences as well. Major Sandeman, who was appointed to the Balūchistan agency in 1877, was able to enter into comparatively close and friendly relations with the principal Balūch chiefs, and Lytton withdrew the prohibition which had limited the activities of English agents to British India.* But Sandeman's success was only possible in a region such as the Balūch region, where the chiefs possessed a high degree of influence over their fellow tribesmen.

The Pathān tribes were real democracies. The *jirga*, or tribal council, in the Balūch country was a small group of leaders, in the Pathān country it might consist of the whole tribe. Agreements with the Pathān chiefs therefore did not and could not possess the value which agreements with the Balūch chiefs carried. All attempts to extend Sandeman's methods to the Pathān tribes were foredoomed to failure. While then Sandeman could establish a vastly improved order in the south by agreeing with chiefs for the guarding of the passes and the execution of the decisions of the *jingas*, in return for the grant of allowances, Bruce's attempt to introduce the same plan into British relations with the Mahsud tribesmen proved useless.

The early history of the Panjab frontier was thus a series of raids interspersed with expeditions into tribal territory intended to bring the tribesmen to reason and teach them that raids were disadvantageous. At the same time a tendency existed towards the extension of British authority. After difficult negotiations in 1893, Durand induced the amir to accept a formal boundary, known as the Durand line, intended to mark out the political jurisdiction of the amir on the one side and of the British on the other. The British government was disposed to take its new responsibilities seriously. The Chitral campaign of 1895, the extensive frontier risings of 1897, were the result, assisted by the intrigues of the amir, who might have agreed to renounce his authority over certain tribes but who was not willing to honour his pledges. Lord Curzon did more than any other individual to bring order into the confusion of frontier politics. In the first place, despite the protests of the Panjab government, he created the North-West Frontier Province, reaching from one end of the frontier to the other, and replacing the divided authority which had till then existed by the power of a single group of individuals. In the second place he withdrew the British troops whom he had found established in forward positions, where they were not only exposed to tribal attacks but also were a constant source of irritation to the tribes. Instead of regulars, he set up groups of *khas-sidars*, or militiamen, drawn from the tribes themselves, and supported by regular troops who were concentrated in positions in the rear, and enabled by new roads and railways to move laterally with a speed till then impossible. These changes greatly improved the situation; but the temper of the tribes still remained uncertain,

owing partly to their fanatical religious ideas, partly to the efforts of the amir, who hoped that if he induced the tribes to give sufficient trouble the English sooner or later would cease to dominate them and leave them to his management.

Meanwhile troubles had arisen with the scarcely known and seldom-visited state of Tibet. This country was nominally a dependency of China, Chinese troops having been invited in to save it from Gurkha occupation. But by the close of the nineteenth century this dependence was scarcely more than nominal. The Chinese maintained a resident, the *amban*, at Lhasa, and demanded that all Indo-Tibetan relations should be conducted through him. But he had become virtually powerless, and was most unwilling to do anything which would reveal his impotency to the external world. The country was really controlled by a council of regency, acting in the name of the Dalai Lama, one of the two religious heads of Buddhism in Tibet. The Dalai Lama was regarded as an incarnation of the Buddha, an emanation of whose spirit was thought, immediately on the lama's death, to be reincarnate in some child born at the same moment. But throughout the greater part of the century successive lamas had perished on approaching maturity, and the iniquity of man had thus limited the abode of the divinity to a person incapable of exercising government. Towards the close of the century, however, the existing Dalai Lama had come of age instead of being quietly put to death. This change of policy was probably due to the influence of a Russian Buriat named Dorjioff. This man seems to have persuaded the council that Russia was a Buddhist country, and that, if matters were rightly handled, the Dalai Lama might become head of a consolidated Buddhist church under the military protection of the Russian emperor.

The relations of this region with British India had been scanty. The roads leading into it were difficult and unfrequented, and, although in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries British agents had been received at Lhasa, the Chinese spread distrust of the motives and policy of the rulers of British India. In 1886 a commercial mission had been dispatched, but recalled in deference to Chinese protests, and its withdrawal had been at once followed by a Tibetan invasion of the protected state of Sikkim. Two years later, after numerous efforts to induce the Chinese government to compel the invaders to withdraw, the Tibetans were expelled

by force, and in 1893 a trade agreement was adopted. But every article of it was ignored by the Tibetans. It had been negotiated with the Chinese alone, and their dependents destroyed the Indian boundary-pillars, and again invaded Sikkim. These causes of offence were emphasised by reports of Tibetan missions to Russia. These were sent in 1898, 1900, and again in 1901, when Dorjief was received in audience by the emperor. Rumours spread that China had been induced to cede to the emperor her rights over Tibet; and, although the Russians emphatically denied that the Tibetan missions had any political significance or that they had negotiated with China about Tibet, none but the simplest-minded Briton could give full credit to such assertions. Lord Curzon, then governor-general, resolved that the position could be cleared up only by the dispatch of a mission to Lhasa. After prolonged discussions with the home government, and a most provocative complaint from Russia against British intervention in Tibet, Colonel Younghusband was sent at the head of a mission. The Tibetans attempted to prevent his advancing into the country, but their efforts were brushed aside with considerable loss to them, and the mission advanced, first to Gyantse, and then to Lhasa; the Dalai Lama fled, and at last an agreement was negotiated with the Tibetans themselves, who agreed to open trading-posts and to pay an indemnity, much reduced by the decision of the home government. Thus in Tibet, as in Afghanistan, British-Indian interests had been protected at the cost of military action.

In the early years of the present century the various branches of policy here reviewed underwent considerable changes. German policy was becoming particularly active, seeking to set up definite communications with the near and middle east. Of the German projects the most notable was the construction of a railway to link up Constantinople with the Persian Gulf. This was regarded with the greatest suspicion by the Russians, who thought it designed to dispute with them access to India. The English attitude was less hostile, at all events in official circles, but none the less agreement on joint action proved to be impossible, and the whole plan was found to involve too much international jealousy to be executed. With this should be set the attempts of various powers, Russia, France, and Germany, to secure bases on the Persian Gulf. These attempts were sharply resisted by Great Britain, and Lord Lansdowne, when foreign minister, declared that any such

acquisition, in the light of special British interests in the Persian Gulf, would be considered an unfriendly action. It was fortunate for India that neither the Berlin-Baghdad railway, nor the desired German base on the Persian Gulf, had come into existence when war broke out in 1914, for they would have greatly complicated the problems of the defence of the country.

The development of these German views, coupled with the disappearance of the understanding between that country and Russia which had enabled the latter to play so large a part in Central Asia at an earlier time, greatly modified Anglo-Indian policy. The home government, finding Britain menaced by the expansion of the German navy, set to work to clear away ancient misunderstandings with France and Russia. With the first, agreement was reached on the subject of the Burma frontier; with the second, a convention was signed dealing with the Asiatic interests of the two empires. This was exclusively the work of the government in London. Any agreement with Russia was regarded by Lord Minto, who was then governor-general, as likely to produce danger rather than security. But despite his protests, the convention was signed in 1907, without giving him any opportunity to secure the assent of the amir of Afghanistan. By this convention Russia recognised for the first time in any formal document that Afghanistan lay beyond her sphere of interests. At this time the ruler of Kābul was Habibullāh, who had succeeded his father, 'Abdur Rahmān, in 1901. He himself was inclined to friendly relations with Great Britain; but he found difficulties in the activity and influence of his very orthodox brother, Nasrullāh. He refused therefore to recognise the convention, which was unpopular in the world of Islam owing to the division of Persia into spheres of influence, generally but mistakenly thought to portend a real partition of that country. But, so long as the entente between Great Britain and Russia lasted, no ruler of Afghanistan could venture to break with British India. The effects of the convention were therefore less than Minto had expected. Even the outbreak of the war with Germany in 1914, and the attempts which were made to use Kābul as the starting point of an attack on British India, proved failures. But the revolution which broke out in Russia in 1917, and the consequent disappearance of the friendliness which had marked Anglo-Russian relations since 1907, transformed the position. In 1919 the amir was murdered,

and his successor, Amānullāh, thought he might strengthen his position by an attack on British India. Thus the Third Afghan War came about. This attempt to invade Indian territory showed at once the need of strong defences on the frontier, and the difficulty of controlling Afghan policy so long as Russia and Great Britain remained enemies. The peace which concluded the war in 1921 restored to Afghanistan freedom of conducting its foreign relations, and it still remains precariously perched between two great states, much as was the case in the days of Shāh 'Alī.

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CHAPTER XV

Burma, 1852-1918

The kingdom of Burma offered a notable instance of the difficulty of maintaining friendly relations (in the European sense of the term) with an Asiatic state. The diplomatic traditions of the kingdom had been formed by its relations with the empire of China and its age-long rivalry with the neighbouring Siam. The decay of Chinese imperial pretensions in practice if not in theory, coupled with the successes which the rulers of Burma had obtained against the Siamese, had firmly established the belief that Burma was great and powerful. Nor had that belief been much shaken by the first, badly managed, war between Burma and the East India Company. When a new king, Tharrawaddy, ascended the throne in 1837, he had refused to recognise the Treaty of Yandabo as binding, since in accordance with general Asiatic tradition he regarded treaties as mere personal agreements between sovereigns which lapsed with the death of either signatory. Nor would he even receive the English resident in his representative character, since the latter was commissioned by a dependent government instead of the sovereign of Great Britain. In consequence the resident had been withdrawn in 1840.

No local means remained to smooth away the difficulties which arose from time to time at the port of Rangoon. The Burmese governor there in 1850 was a man given to liquor, who in his cups would threaten to behead the whole population of the city. According to Burmese custom, he regarded his government as his estate, to be made the most of while he continued to hold it. He extorted 1005 rupees from the commander of one British-owned barque on a false charge of throwing his pilot overboard, and 700 from another with threats of flogging and beheading on an equally false charge of murdering a lascar. Dalhousie therefore sent a queen's frigate, *Fox*, under Commodore Lambert, to seek reparation—the removal of the governor and the payment of compensation. Pagān, who had become king in 1845, was quite willing to accommodate matters. He despatched a new governor to Rangoon with orders to arrange a settlement. Lambert, who

knew little of eastern uses, quarrelled with the new governor on a point of etiquette. He blockaded Rangoon and seized one of the king's vessels. In return the Burmese batteries opened fire on the *Fox*. Dalhousie very reluctantly sent an ultimatum. The Burmese court ignored it, and the Second Burmese War began on April 1, 1852, when Dalhousie's forces under Admiral Austen and General Godwin reached Rangoon.

Their organisation was good. Dalhousie had paid special attention to matters of transport, commissariat and medical supplies, taking prudent warning by the difficulties of the former war. Rangoon and Mārtabān were taken in a fortnight. Bassein followed. Then Promé was captured and Pegu occupied. The Burmese had gathered together 30,000 men to oppose the 8000 British troops, but they only succeeded in killing and wounding 377. Pagān was not in fact vigorously supported by his people. The Shāns refused to send levies, the delta population welcomed the English, the Talangs rebelled against their Burmese king. As the Burmese court refused to come to terms, and Dalhousie had occupied as much territory as he thought prudent, Pegu was declared by proclamation on December 20, 1852, to be British territory and a letter was written to Pagān warning him that if he provoked another war it would end "in the ruin and exile of yourself and your race".

Almost immediately afterwards Pagān was deposed and imprisoned by his brother Mindōn, who ruled the remaining Burmese territories from 1853 to 1878. Like Tharrawaddy, in 1837, he refused to accept the consequences of his predecessor's foolish management. But he made no attempt to disturb the new frontier. In 1854 he sent agents to request of Dalhousie the rendition of Pegu. Despite Dalhousie's emphatic answer that the new province should never be restored, Mindōn next endeavoured, though in vain, to induce the missionaries to intervene, but when the Mutiny broke out, he would not listen to the advice of his court, that the time had come when Pegu might be recovered by force. His political conduct was thus notably peaceful and conciliatory. His great interests in life were trade and religion. He summoned a Buddhist council to his new capital at Mandalay in 1871, and presented a new spire, plated with gold and set with precious stones, to the Shwēdagōn Pagoda at Rangoon in the same year. As a trader he not only enforced the customary royal

monopolies, but was the largest dealer in all kinds of produce in his kingdom. He encouraged English merchants, partly in the hope that they would succeed in developing the trade with the neighbouring Chinese province of Yunnan. He sent envoys to Europe in order to open direct relations with the west, and though disappointed by the refusal of the English ministry to deal with him except through the Government of India, he welcomed the governor-general's agents when the residency was re-established in 1862. The Burmese court had always insisted that the residents should comply with local etiquette, and appear before the king kneeling and unshod. But in 1876 the governor-general forbade the continuance of this practice, on the ground that Burmese had gone to Europe, had witnessed the ceremonies of European courts, and knew that it was not customary to exact humiliating ceremonial. This attitude might be supported by much argument, but it involved many regrettable results. Mindōn refused to give way. The resident was no longer admitted to the king's presence; he transacted business merely with the ministers, and the English influence at once began to decline.

Among other political defects the Burmese kingdom suffered from ill-regulated customs of succession. The king was entitled to nominate his successor from among his sons or brothers. Mindōn had forty-eight sons, and shrank from nominating any for fear that the favoured one would be immediately poisoned. At last, on his death-bed, he nominated three who were to divide the kingdom between them. The ministers disliked this decision, and rightly, because it would have meant civil war. They therefore supported a project of the queen dowager, to set up a younger son, Thibaw, who was married to her daughter, Supayālat. All the other sons and daughters were imprisoned, and for the traditional act of allegiance was substituted a new oath promising obedience, no longer to the king alone, but to the king acting with the *Hlutdaw*—the council of ministers.

However, this attempt to borrow western political ideas speedily collapsed. The custom of ministerial obedience was too strong to be abandoned. Thibaw was a feeble creature, much given to strong liquor; but he was ruled, not by the wisdom of the *Hlutdaw* but by the wiles of Supayālat. Under her influence the new king refused to marry the numerous queens regarded as the necessary appendages of royal state; and then, fearing a movement

in favour of one of the other princes, Thibaw ordered seventy members of the royal family to be put to death. In the middle of February, 1879, these unfortunate persons were strangled or beaten to death, and their bodies flung into a trench within the palace enclosure. Although this practice had not been followed in the previous four reigns, there were numerous good precedents for the massacre from the thirteenth century onwards, nor did it shock Burmese sentiment. The ministerial view was that it was better for the princes to perish than that the country should be laid waste by rebellion and dacoity. After much indecision, it was resolved to withdraw the British resident, lest he too should be murdered. In any case he exercised no influence and could do little good.

British policy in the years immediately following was markedly unsteady. Four of Thibaw's brothers had escaped from Burma, and sought to raise rebellions. One or other would have succeeded in overthrowing the king but for the action of the Government of India in internment them whenever it could lay hands on them. Commercial and especially missionary opinion ran strongly in favour of annexation. In 1884 English and Chinese merchants in Rangoon joined in subscribing funds to assist one of the princes, Myingun, to invade Burma by way of Siam, while the English chief commissioner considered that in view of Thibaw's misrule another prince, Nyaungyan, should be assisted to set himself up as king. But the Calcutta government, torn between moral disapproval of Thibaw and moral disapproval of intervention, would do nothing.

The French were less squeamish. They had in recent years established an empire in Indo-China and desired to extend their influence into Upper Burma. From the time of Mindon the Burmese court had been seeking an alliance with a first-class European power. In 1885 Ferry, who was pursuing an aggressive policy, signed a commercial treaty with the envoys whom Thibaw had sent to Europe, and at the same time gave them a letter agreeing, though reluctantly, to permit the import of arms through Tonkin as soon as order was regularly established there. He had assured the British ambassador that he would never allow the import of arms, and had insisted that his discussions merely related to trade. Six months later, in July, the British chief commissioner at Rangoon procured a copy of Ferry's letter. The

falsity of Ferry's assurances led the Government of India to regard French policy in Upper Burma with much suspicion, and it was further alarmed by the activity of French finance in that country. The French government had established a consul at Mandalay. Through him and a Burmese envoy at Paris a number of important concessions were negotiated. The French were to establish a bank at Mandalay, to build railways, to place a fleet of steamers on the Irawadi, to manage the royal monopolies of teak and petroleum. These projects, however, overran the policy of the state. Great Britain had repeatedly and publicly claimed special interests in Upper Burma. On her remonstrances the French disavowed their consul's acts, while reverses in Tonkin at once restricted the French power, and cooled their desire, to interfere in Burma. As had happened in the previous century, the unconsidered policy of the French had encouraged an eastern prince in hostility to England, had persuaded him that French help would be forthcoming in the event of trouble, and so had nourished a policy which they were unable or unwilling to support by force of arms.

Thibaw undoubtedly fancied that French friendship would relieve him of all need to conciliate the English, and he unwisely proceeded to give them an opportunity of action. His finances were shamelessly mismanaged. The revenues were misappropriated. The royal jewels were pledged. State lotteries were tried and failed. Loans were raised from all willing to advance money. At this time the Bombay-Burma Trading Corporation was the largest English firm established in Burma. It drove a great trade in teak which it cut and sold under a royal concession. It had already advanced Thibaw £100,000. He demanded a further advance of twice that amount. The company refused. It was then accused before the *Hlutdaw* of not paying its employees and of cheating Thibaw of his royalties. The *Hlutdaw* condemned the company to pay a fine exceeding the amount originally demanded as a loan, cancelled its leases, and prepared to grant new ones to French merchants. On this the governor-general, Lord Dufferin, demanded that the case should be submitted to his arbitration. The Burmese court refused. On October 19, 1885, an ultimatum reached Rangoon to be forwarded to Mandalay. It required the reception of a permanent resident, with free access to the king without humiliating ceremonies, the submission of the Bombay-

Burma Corporation's case to the viceroy's arbitration, the management of Burmese foreign relations through the Government of India, and assistance in developing the trade with Yunnan. On November 9 Thibaw's rejection was received. Three weeks later he was a prisoner.

Annexation was the only practicable course. Thibaw's massacres had destroyed most of the possible claimants to the throne, and the only survivor thought to possess the necessary character was under French influence. But annexation involved, as had been expected, great and prolonged difficulties. The country was disorganised and demoralised. Dacoity had long been prevalent. The troops whom Thibaw assembled to repel the English scarcely fired a shot, but disbanded and joined the dacoits. They could hardly ever be brought to action, and spent their time evading the British troops and plundering their own countrymen. Their reduction took five years, and at one time 32,000 men were employed against them.

The annexation of Upper Burma was the last example, in the expansion of British India, of the misfortunes which have commonly followed on a refusal to intervene at the appropriate moment. It was generally agreed that a small amount of countenance and help would have permitted one of the rival princes to overthrow Thibaw early in his ill-starred reign. There would then have possibly arisen a friendly Burmese state under acknowledged British protection, and that would have offered the best solution of the Burmese problem, for the country would have been spared the consequences of unskilful endeavours to treat it as an Indian province. The refusal in 1887 to accept the assistance voluntarily offered by the heads of the Buddhist priesthood was perhaps the greatest blunder that was committed, for it not only threw away a most valuable link between the people and the government but also led to the disintegration of the ecclesiastical organisation.

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CHAPTER XVI

The Crown and the Indian States

The change in the form of government in 1858, although leaving the relations of the British government with the Indian states seemingly untouched, laid the foundation of the considerable developments which were to follow in the latter half of the nineteenth century. The act transferring the functions of the East India Company to the crown expressly confirmed all the treaties which the company had made; and the proclamation in which the queen announced her assumption of control declared that she held herself bound by those obsolescent documents. These announcements seem to have been made without due consideration. Taken literally, they appeared to mean that the treaties were to possess a force which they had long lost, and that the princes were to enjoy the status of equal allies of the British crown. But it was not the intention of either the home authorities or the Government of India to introduce any such revolutionary change into Indian political relations. The queen and the ministry meant that the princes should be treated fairly; the governor-general meant that the government should, as he expressly declared, continue to exercise the power of interference when needed to prevent abuses. Moreover, the government of the crown was not averse, as the company's government had been, from recognising its responsibility for India as a whole. In that respect a marked change took place. Responsibility was asserted firmly and consistently. The queen was regarded as the sovereign, not merely of the possessions formerly held by the East India Company, but of the whole country. The princes were expected to show her not friendship alone but also allegiance. The change was indicated by new phrases which appear in the documents relating to the states. They were expected to show "loyalty to the British crown", which the *sanads* of adoption lay down as a condition of the privilege which they conferred, and "allegiance to Her Majesty" which was an express condition of the rendition of Mysore. The princes were thus deemed to have become members of an empire, whose boundaries were no longer limited to the provinces directly

administered from Calcutta. The assumption of the new title of Empress of India, announced at the great durbar of 1876, was an outward sign of the change which had taken place. So was the assumption of the power of bestowing orders and titles upon the princes. In 1861 a new order, the Star of India, was created specially to provide a means by which the crown could reward the princes for their services during the Indian Mutiny. As Canning, the governor-general, said, "There is a reality in the suzerainty of the sovereign of England which has never existed before, and which is not only felt but is eagerly acknowledged by the chiefs".

Nor were the latter without good reason for acknowledging and acquiescing in this change, despite the effects which it was to have upon the theory, and the practice, of the predominant power in India. Under the company the states had been threatened with extinction. A failure of heirs, a decadent administration, a quarrelsome resident, might involve any of them in annexation. But such a fate was now formally, explicitly, and effectually ruled out. The queen's proclamation of 1858 declared, in striking contrast to the declaration of the East India Company in 1832, that "we desire no extension of our present territorial possessions". These were mere words. But they were speedily followed by a measure which set the hearts of many princes at rest. In 1860 a number of special grants were issued under the name of "*sanads* of adoption." The chiefs to whom they were addressed were informed that "the doctrine of lapse" had been brought to an end. The *sanads* ran in two forms, one for the Hindus, the other for the Muslims. The first were assured that adoptions on a failure of natural heirs would be recognised and confirmed, the second that successions in accordance with Muslim law would be upheld. If then the princes had in fact lost their status as separate and individual sovereigns, if they had become subordinate members of an empire, they had also been recognised, not as transitory, but as permanent members of that empire.

But annexation was the only point in which the crown receded from the position of the company. In all other matters it accepted and developed the position to which it succeeded. Though annexation on a failure of natural heirs had been abjured, successions remained subject to the confirmation of the Government of India. "No succession is valid until recognition has been given." The military strength of the states was still closely watched. For

this the company had had two motives. One was the fear, needless in fact, of any prince becoming inconveniently powerful; the other was the desire to prevent princes from wasting on unnecessary military display money which was more urgently required for administrative improvements. Under the crown this second motive certainly became much more powerful than the first, yet perhaps it was not the dominant factor when in the 'sixties Jayaji Rāo Sindhua was required to reduce his forces to the limits laid down by treaty, and even Lord Kitchener's re-organisation of the Indian Army took into account the possibility of troubles from the Indian states as well as external invasion or internal disturbance. No relaxation in the control of political relations was made, nor was the isolation of the individual states modified until the formation of the Chamber of Princes in 1921.

While in these respects the crown maintained the practice established by the company, in the matter of internal interference usages grew up far exceeding those of the former régime. The company had refrained from accepting a general responsibility for the whole of India. The government of the crown did not. On the contrary it emphasised its responsibility. In the face of the administrative disorder of the Nizām's dominions Dalhousie had formally disclaimed all concern for the administrative well-being of Hyderabad. But the later governors-general assumed a different attitude. Elgin, for example, in 1862, observed, "If we lay down the rule that we will scrupulously respect the right of the chiefs to do wrong, . . . we may find that it may carry us somewhat far—possibly to annexion, the very bug-bear from which we are seeking to escape". Accordingly, from the first, the former hesitation to interfere vanished. The rule of the mahārāja of Alwar was replaced by a council of regency after he had provoked his nobles into rebellion. The nawab of Tānk was deposed for being concerned in an affair in which the family of one of his dependent chiefs was almost exterminated. The nawab of Kalār was deposed for inflicting barbarous punishments. But the leading example was afforded by the case of the Gackwar of Baroda. Malhar Rāo, who had succeeded in 1870, was a man of low character and mean intellect. He had on his accession imprisoned and destroyed the chief agents of the late ruler. He had provoked great discontent among the subjects of his state, and within three years the Government of India appointed a commission of enquiry to

examine into his administration. Malhar Rāo was required to introduce a number of reforms. He did nothing, but instead quarrelled with the resident, a man of small judgment and little tact. Finally he was accused of attempting to poison the resident. A new commission was then appointed. On this occasion the political department was represented by only one member. The others were the chief justice of Bengal, another judge, two ruling princes, and Sir Dinkar Rāo, who had shown great ability in re-organising the administration of Indore. The Gaekwar was arrested and placed on his trial before this body. After hearing voluminous evidence and the prolonged addresses of counsel, all the members agreed that an attempt had been made to poison the resident by two members of his household, and that the guilty men had been in communication with the Gaekwar, but the Indian members found the charge against the Gaekwar himself unproven, while the two judges and the political official considered that it had been established. On this report, the Government of India concluded that, although the commission had not found the Gaekwar guilty of attempted murder, yet the presumptive evidence was so strong, coupled with his previous misconduct, as to render him impossible as a ruling prince. It decided therefore to depose him, and to recognise as his successor a young member of the family, not directly descended from the accused man. During his minority the state was placed under the management of a council of regency over which a distinguished Indian administrator, Sir Madhava Rāo, presided. Some such decision had been a foregone conclusion. But the procedure adopted had been unprecedented. Till then the decisions of the Government of India had been taken in the secrecy of the political department; and this was the first attempt to constitute anything like a judicial tribunal to decide on an accusation against a ruling chief. This action was possibly due to the views which Queen Victoria had formerly expressed in regard to cases concerning the princes of India, and it is closely similar to the procedure laid down for future guidance in 1921. It clearly marked a great advance on previous practice. But it was an advance in more directions than one. It promised to the princes the advantage of not having the Government of India acting as judge and party in the same suit; but it also manifested in an unmistakable manner the suzerainty claimed on behalf of the crown. But for the policy of the crown

in refraining from annexation, such a step would perhaps have provoked great discontent on the part of the princes as a whole. Holkar, who had been invited to serve on the commission of enquiry but had declined, probably expressed the general view of his fellows when he said, "The person for the time being is little; the state with its rights is the point for consideration". Under the company Malhar Rāo would not have been brought to public trial; but none the less he would have been deposed, and in all probability his state would have been added to the British dominions.

The rendition of Mysore furnished another striking illustration of the new policy of the crown. The state had fallen under British administration in 1831. The mahārāja, who had then been removed from the exercise of authority, had survived till 1868. He had repeatedly sought permission to adopt a son, but this had been consistently refused; and at one time it had been generally expected that on his death the state would pass formally under British sovereignty. So in fact it did, but not in the expected manner. After the mahārāja's death, it was resolved that after all the son whom he had adopted to carry on the religious rites of the family and to inherit his private estate should be recognised as his political heir and be invested with the government of the state, provided that on coming of age the boy gave promise of becoming a satisfactory ruler. In accordance with this decision the state was made over to him in 1881. But it was not made over absolutely. The instrument of transfer did not confer sovereignty. That word, where used, refers to the sovereignty of Queen Victoria. The prince is given "possession" of the territories. He is to "administer" them. He is to "remain faithful in allegiance and subordination to Her Majesty". The state coinage is not to be revived. Its military forces are not to exceed the limits fixed by the Government of India. The law in force in 1881 is not to be changed without the approval of the governor-general in council. Lands needed for railway development are to be made over free of charge, and the Government of India is to enjoy full jurisdiction over them. Thus the state of Mysore is clearly not an independent state, even in regard to internal administration. It is a province of the empire of India. The administrative policy of its ruler must correspond with the policy of the country as a whole. Its prince exercises a trust on behalf of the British crown; and although his


rights depend on an agreement between himself and the crown, instead of on statutes passed by the British parliament, his position is not dissimilar from that formerly enjoyed by the East India Company. He exercises sovereign powers, but his exercise of them is liable to control, and he is politically dependent on a superior authority.

The differences between this settlement of 1881 and the treaty by which the state was constituted by Wellesley in 1799 are most instructive. Under Wellesley's treaty Mysore was undoubtedly dependent. The company could garrison at its pleasure any fortress within its borders; any advice which it offered the prince was under an obligation to observe, it maintained a large force within his territory; it entirely regulated his foreign relations; and it had the right of re-entering on the territory and assuming the administration if the payments to which the prince was bound fell into arrear. The prince was thus a dependent ally of the East India Company. But the duties which he owed to it could hardly be brought under the term of allegiance. Wellesley's treaty in fact was mainly designed to secure two purposes. One was the adequate protection of the state from attack; the second was the maintenance of a stable financial system. Those had ceased to be the main purposes to be secured by the instrument of transfer. External danger was no longer to be feared. Financial stability had merged in the wider question of the maintenance of a sound system of administration. The suzerainty of the crown had to be placed beyond doubt or question.

The cases of the Gaekwar and of Mysore thus exhibited in a strong light the policy inaugurated in 1858. In both opportunities of annexation were deliberately passed by, in both the suzerainty of the crown was asserted in a striking manner. The terms on which the Mysore state was given back to princely rule offer a clear example of what the government of the crown considered should be the relations between itself and the princes of India. Moreover at this time a tendency prevailed for similar ideas to be applied in some degree to all the other states. The main cause lay in the higher consciousness of responsibility in the imperial as opposed to the company's government. But many other causes concurred. The development of communications within the country, the spread of railways and the swiftly-growing use of the telegraph, coupled with the growth of educa-

tion and of the public press, brought news to the Government of India much more rapidly than had formerly been the case, and increased the amount of news which it received. Under the company a chief might cut off a delinquent's hand or foot, but such an episode might never come to the ears of the government, or only reach them weeks after the punishment had been inflicted. Interference would then either be impossible or appear useless. When, however, the government might be informed of the chief's intention before it had been carried out, interference was not only possible but beneficial. Then, too, the standpoint of government in regard to administrative misconduct changed greatly. Standards of judgment rose. Uses which had been tolerated in the old days were now rigorously prohibited. The custom of the country, which had once been a universal excuse for misconduct, was now no longer admitted. Princes whose private conduct had been regarded as exclusively a matter of their own concern were now liable to paternal advice. At the close of the century the ruling chiefs were circumscribed with an expression of the governor-general's opinion of the inexpediency of their making prolonged and repeated visits to Europe. The same governor-general, Lord Curzon, claimed them as his partners and colleagues, adding that they could not be at once loyal subjects of Her Majesty and frivolous or irresponsible despots. The prince "must be the servant as well as the master of his people".

Under the pressure of these moral considerations, the Government of India began to formulate a series of precedents which would normally be followed in certain cases with the Indian states. Some provisions in certain treaties were stressed, others were suffered to fall into oblivion. A body of rules was emerging for the coherent management of the relations with Indian India. Despite the variations in the terms of the treaties, a uniformity of treatment was beginning to emerge. The practice of "reading the treaties together" was coming into vogue. The result was that at the end of the century Lord Curzon could speak of the relations with the states as having "grown up under widely differing historical conditions", but having in process of time "gradually conformed to a single type". The objections to such a practice are clear. It tends to invalidate individual treaties; and if the states are regarded as really possessing an international status, the impropriety is unquestionable. But states which have surrendered either



THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER

———— Durand and Outer Boundary of India
 - - - - - Russo-Afghan and Russo-Persian Frontier
 - - - - - Other Boundaries
 - - - - - Sandeman Line
 - - - - - Scientific Frontier
 - - - - - Railway

by formal grant or acquiescence all power of control over their external relations, which have submitted for a long period of years to a constant supervision of their internal administration, and which have constantly acknowledged the supremacy of the king-emperor, do not in fact enjoy any international status, and international rules of conduct do not therefore apply to them. They are provinces of a united India; and from that point of view general rules, however cautiously applied, are indispensable. Even the late advocate of the rights of the princes before the Butler Committee found it impossible to avoid admitting that certain uniform rights were vested in the British crown; yet, it seems, the validity of those rights must rest upon cessions made by the greater states. But if the rights of small states can be modified by cessions made by larger ones, it is difficult to argue that a cession on the part of one large state cannot affect the rights of another large one. The fact is that a position has gradually developed which finds no place in treaties framed a century or more ago in circumstances differing completely from those of the present day. Nothing can be more idle than to attempt to restore the conditions of 1818. What is really needed is a new definition of the relations which shall exist between the states and the Government of India.

As a matter of fact the importance of this question has only emerged in comparatively recent times. Until about the close of the century the princes were on the whole disposed to acquiesce in the action of the Government of India, wisely perceiving that they were on the whole benefiting far more than suffering by the policy of the crown. But with the development of a policy of constitutional reform the position began to change. The princes began to ask themselves what would be their position when a new government might come into being responsible to the people of British India. They could see no reason why they should acquiesce in subordination to any Indian cabinet. It was Britain, not India, who had deprived them of their former sovereignty. Left to themselves they might well have established their own rule over the regions which had become British India. Thus democratic possibilities began to raise hostility against a body which might one day be radically transformed, just as within British India itself like hopes and fears excited an antagonism such as had not been known for generations between the Muslim and the Hindu.

It is noteworthy that the same period brought a reversal, in part

at least, of the policy of uniformity which had been actively pursued until the close of Lord Curzon's administration. Lord Minto deliberately changed the emphasis of British policy when he declared that he would avoid the issue of general instructions. But even he recognised that the treaties had to be interpreted in the light of actual fact and established usage, and did nothing to detract from that paramountcy of the crown which had gradually grown up.

Thus the course of policy since 1858 has been marked by two great changes, the first being the maintenance of the states and abstention from annexation, the second the extension of the practice of interference in matters of internal administration. But two other important changes have to be noted as well. One was in regard to the military forces of the states. The suspicion with which the princes were regarded by the company's government gradually gave place to a well-founded confidence. They had been looked on as allies who had been driven reluctantly into an alliance by the force of circumstances. But in times of external danger, when for instance the Panjdeh crisis threatened a war with Russia and when war broke out with Germany in 1914, the princes gave striking evidence of their desire to stand side by side with their suzerain. No observer could doubt that their alliance had ceased to be a galling bond which they desired to break at the first favourable opportunity. Sir Mortimer Durand, who was secretary of the Foreign Department in 1885, strongly urged the expediency of finding employment and recognition for the state troops. He discussed the question with the commander-in-chief, Sir Frederick Roberts, with the lieutenant-governor of the Panjab, with Lord Dufferin, the governor-general. The result of his persuasive advocacy was the formation of the Imperial Service Troops. Certain bodies of the state forces were to be placed for training under British officers, but were to remain entirely under the control of the states which raised them and were only to fall under the orders of the commander-in-chief when they were employed on active service. The maintenance of such bodies was a matter entirely at the discretion of the princes themselves, the chief condition being that they should always be kept effective and ready to serve whenever called for. They were first employed in the Hunza campaign in 1893. In 1914 they numbered 22,000; in 1923 they had risen to 27,000 men. This new policy offers a

most remarkable contrast to that of Wellesley, who sought to hold the states in check by imposing on them bodies of foreign troops paid for by the princes but controlled by the company. It indicates a clear departure even from the policy of 1867 when Sindhia had been required to reduce his forces.

The other great change was the relaxation of the policy of keeping the states in strict isolation. Every treaty had placed the management of foreign affairs in the hands of the governor-general. No two states could communicate except through the Foreign Department. No two princes could converse on matters of common interest save through the agency of that department. The object of this had been to prevent as far as possible the formation of any league hostile to British supremacy in India. This practice persisted until a surprisingly late date. Lytton was the first governor-general to propose any relaxation. His general policy was directed towards securing a more active co-operation of the Indian aristocracy with the British government. That was the purpose underlying the formation of his Statutory Civil Service; that was the purpose of his proposed Indian Privy Council. He was eager to announce at the great durbai at which Queen Victoria was to be proclaimed Empress of India the creation of a council to be composed of a certain number of the greater chiefs, to consult with the governor-general on matters of common interest. Had this proposal been accepted, it would have led necessarily to the disappearance of the old isolation to which the princes had been politically condemned. But the project was viewed in England as dangerous, and the only step taken was to bestow the empty title of "councillors of the empress" on some of the princes. Curzon and Minto were the next to revive the idea. The latter desired the reforms of 1908 to be accompanied by the formation of a council on which the princes were to be represented. But the opposition of the home government and other influences defeated the proposal. Nevertheless, the same governor-general did begin a new practice, that of collective consultation. Lord Hardinge followed the practice and widened it. At last the Montagu-Chelmsford Report of 1918 recommended the formation of machinery for a regular collective consultation between the Government of India and the states, and this led to the establishment of the Chamber of Princes inaugurated in 1921. This brought to a close a stage in the

development of the relations between the princes and the central government of British India. For the first time the princes were linked up with the central government by something more definite than a series of treaties which had in some respects lapsed into disuse almost as soon as they had been signed. It was a constitutional, not a diplomatic, link. It was a sign-post pointing to a united India as the goal of British policy, and thus formed a natural sequence to the course of events which has made the paramountcy of the king-emperor the outstanding feature of the last sixty years.

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CHAPTER XVII

Educational and Political Development, 1858-92

Although the financial disorder brought about by the Mutiny had of necessity cut down the resources of the government, the development of educational policy continued unchecked. With a constancy of spirit as noble as that with which the defenders of the Delhi Ridge were holding their own against the mutineers' ceaseless attacks, Canning in the latter part of 1857 introduced and passed through his legislative council a bill establishing universities at Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras. Regular educational departments were organised in each province under a director of public instruction, who on the one hand corresponded direct with the provincial government and on the other controlled a swiftly growing establishment. This comprised inspecting and teaching officials, who were soon classified into superior or "graded" and subordinate or "ungraded". The first were normally Englishmen, the second Indians and Eurasians. At first the superior posts had been filled by covenanted servants, chaplains, military officers, or any other officials thought likely to prove competent. But in 1859 the secretary of state had laid it down that educational appointments should usually be filled by persons not members of the covenanted or military services. Although the rates of pay were much lower than those of covenanted servants, a number of distinguished men, such as Edwin Arnold, were attracted to the new service.

The universities which had been set up in 1857 had been intended to supervise and control higher education by means of examinations and courses of study conducted and laid down by the universities themselves. The faith thus placed in examinations as a method of testing ability and educational progress proved the dominion still exercised by the ideas which in 1834 had replaced Sanskrit and Arabic by English and twenty years later had established open competition as the sole method of admission to the covenanted service. The university bodies consisted of vice-chancellors and senates, mainly filled by government servants, which drew up regulations subject to the approval of government.

The three universities divided the whole of India between them. The university of Calcutta was supposed to be responsible for northern India, the Central Provinces, and British Burma, as well as for the Presidency of Bengal. Those of Bombay and Madras were limited to their own presidencies. To these bodies were affiliated a growing number of colleges, maintained by government itself, by missionary societies, and by private bodies; all these were devoted to literary or legal studies except a couple of engineering and three medical colleges. Many of the colleges were really schools which had formed classes for instruction in the subjects required for the lower university examination; and admission to a university class was limited to students who had passed the matriculation examination conducted by the universities. This unfortunate system took too much for granted. In 1854 it had been suggested that a number of university chairs should be established. Dalhousie had opposed this on the ground that the universities would be ill-qualified to supervise actual teaching. Yet functions of a far wider kind—the supervision of widespread groups of colleges—were actually confided to them. No steps were taken to secure adequate staffs, a sufficient rate of pay, classes of not more than manageable size, class-rooms well-lit and ventilated, libraries well equipped for the study of the subjects taught. Colleges dignified their chief lecturers with the title of professor, with small regard to attainments or salary, so that there came into being a multitude of professors whose work was judged solely by the percentage of students whom they managed to squeeze through the university examinations. This evil was accentuated by two others. Only through the matriculation examination could the universities influence the high schools from which all candidates for university learning were drawn, so that here the universities were as educationally noxious as the colleges. And only through university examinations could aspirants for government service secure success. This involved extraordinary pressure on the schools and colleges teaching for university examinations. Ill-qualified students besieged these institutions for admission and crowded the university examination-halls. When they were rejected, loud outcries arose against the authorities. Against the ceaseless pressure for a lowering of standards never high, no existing authority was able to oppose a firm enough resistance.

The colleges and high schools, forming a closely connected group and exposed to similar influences, had been designed to spread a knowledge of the English language and of western culture. But the students whom they attracted were drawn from narrowly defined classes of society. The castes with literary traditions—Brāhmins and Kayāsths in Bengal and northern India, Brāhmins elsewhere—showed the same eagerness to learn English as under Mughal rule they had already shown to learn Persian. In great part this zeal was due to the fact that English formed an indispensable qualification not only for government employment but also for professional work—the law, medicine, the press, education itself. In part, especially in Bengal, this interested motive was reinforced by a real and lively interest in western knowledge. In Bengal too, where the literary castes were interwoven with the class of landowners to a far greater degree than elsewhere, English education came to be widely diffused. But the structure of Indian society opposed an obstacle, which should have been foreseen but had in fact been ignored, in the way of “filtration.” It had been hoped that western knowledge would gradually but surely penetrate downwards by way of the middle classes. It threatened, however, to become the monopoly of certain castes, just as Sanskrit had done. The castes without literary traditions, the castes whose *dharma* did not include study, took small interest in the movement. Very few girls were educated. Muhammadan boys were seldom to be found in schools or colleges.

The cause of this lay very largely in the literary and non-practical form which this education assumed. English language and literature, philosophy, history, politics, economics, mathematics, were the subjects mainly taught and studied. Science was almost entirely ignored, technical education was neglected. What nine-tenths of the educated classes learned was in fact useless for all the practical purposes of life except conducting public business in English and pleading in the courts of law. How partial the effects of the educational system were is shown by the fact that at the close of the century among the castes ranked as clean Sudras, who formed about half the Hindu population, only one in fifty could read and write, while of the polluting castes, who formed a quarter of the Hindu population, hardly one in a thousand was literate.

While higher and secondary education had made rapid pro-

gress, elementary education had languished. At first the officials of the education departments had been expected to induce villagers to promise the contributions without which elementary schools were not to be opened; but this task had been difficult and invidious. The villagers were poor and set small store by school-learning. If one of them wished to write a letter he would hire a scribe, if he wished to prosecute a law-suit he could retain a pleader. In 1883 an inspector in the United Provinces claimed with reason that the elementary education provided was useless to such a man. Most of the pupils, he said, in less than ten years after leaving school could neither read, write, nor cipher. "Having nothing to read, having no occasion to write, and no accounts to keep, they gradually forget whatever they learn." Nor did it offer any real avenue of escape from the degraded position marked out by ancient social custom for the polluting castes. An inspector found a boy of the "sweeper" caste, in an essay on the comparative advantages of trade and service as an occupation, preferring trade. "Yet", he asks, "who would enter into mercantile relations with a sweeper, even if a man of that caste could be started in such a calling? Everything that he touches would be considered as polluted." Moreover, the greatest difficulties were raised by the higher-caste Hindus against the admission of the lower castes to the schools at all.

In 1882 a commission was appointed to enquire into the means by which elementary education could be extended and improved. This body, which consisted of both Indian and European members under the presidency of Sir William Hunter, recommended that in future elementary education should possess "an almost exclusive claim" upon provincial and local revenues, and that, while in future secondary schools should be opened only where local co-operation could be found, elementary schools should be established wherever they were judged necessary without requiring private co-operation as a preliminary. Secondary schools ought, it was thought, to be made over wherever possible to private control. The commission also recommended the introduction of a text-book embodying "the fundamental principles of natural religion" and the delivery of lectures upon civic duties. The last eccentric proposal was rejected by the government, the others were in the main adopted. But the results were bad. The withdrawal of control from secondary schools led to the multipli-

cation, especially in Bengal, of private schools conducted in the hope of profit, thus increasing the pressure upon the existing frail defences of sound education; and the increase in the number of elementary schools was idle, so long as they continued to teach nothing which the villagers valued.

Meanwhile under the wise inspiration of Sayyid Ahmad Khān some provision had been tardily made for Muslim education. He induced a number of prominent Muslims of the United Provinces to join with him in a campaign to break down Muslim antipathy to western knowledge. Mayo, the governor-general, sympathised with and promoted the projects. Funds for a Muslim college were collected; in 1875 a high school for Muslims was founded at Aligarh, and in 1878 the high school was developed into a college teaching up to the university intermediate examination. The college was divided into two departments, English and Oriental. In the former English was the language of instruction with Arabic or Persian as a second language; in the latter Urdu was the language of instruction, with Arabic or Persian literature as the chief subject, and English as a second language. But here as elsewhere the popular branch was that most likely to be of practical use, and the Oriental branch attracted few students as compared with the English branch.

Desultory beginnings were also made with female education. In Bengal a member of council, Bethune, had established a girls' school with funds privately subscribed. In Madras missionary societies had led the way. In Bombay the same had been done, and there the missionaries had found a greater response than elsewhere, the cause being taken up by the Parsis and the Gujarātis. But even in Bombay not one girl in fifty of those of a school-going age was being educated in 1882, and elsewhere the proportion was even lower. The purdah system, the marriage system, the lack of economic motive in a country where prostitution offered women the only means of independent livelihood, were the principal obstacles. But there was also the difficulty of gathering together a sufficient staff of female teachers. An unmarried woman was in the opinion of orthodox Hindu society suspect and almost certainly disreputable.

Little had thus been done to counteract the unbalanced tendencies of the system set up in 1854. New universities, but of the old pattern, were established in the Panjab in 1882 and at Allāhā-

bad in 1887. But the University of Calcutta, in spite of this relief, was still overburdened with a multitude of students. In the last fifteen years of the century the number of students in colleges rose from 11,000 to 23,000, and of pupils in secondary schools from 429,000 to 633,000. But while numbers were rising, the quality of the education was tending to fall. English, for instance, was being taught by an ever-increasing proportion of men to whom it was a foreign tongue. Students were relapsing into the ancient Hindu mode of study, memorising their text-books as pandits of old had memorised the Vedas. Elementary education was not progressing, and, instead of carrying useful knowledge to the masses, was only enabling a few of the more intelligent boys of the villages to earn a scanty living by clerical drudgery in the cities.

In 1901, nearly three years after his arrival as governor-general, Curzon resolved on introducing reforms, and convened a conference of the principal educational officials, to whom he pointed out the chief defects as he saw them—the predominance of examinations, the lack of university organisation, the unpopularity of primary schools, the neglect of technical and vocational instruction. He also called deserved attention to an important social aspect of the matter. A large number of students in the great cities lived in miserable lodgings, amid unsanitary and undesirable surroundings, and untouched by the corporate influences which form a large and most important element in school and university education. As regards general policy he suggested that central control had been inadequate, that the provincial governments had been left too much to their own devices, that expert direction was needed, that the subject had been approached with too little consideration. It must be remembered, he said, that they were “handling the life-blood of future generations.” After this conference reforms began. Enlarged grants were made to the provincial governments for educational purposes. An agricultural college was opened at Pusa. An inspector-general of education was appointed, to tour the provinces and advise the Government of India on matters of policy. A universities commission was appointed to inspect the working of both universities and colleges, and on its recommendations was framed the Universities Act of 1904.

The aim of the new act was to strengthen the control over and

raise the standards of university education. The senates were to include majorities of educationalists, and to be responsible for courses of studies, text-books, and standards of examination. Colleges were to be inspected and certified as competently housed, equipped, and staffed, before they were affiliated. Vice-chancellors would in future be appointed by government. Moreover, the universities themselves should provide post-graduate instruction, and to that extent at least become teaching bodies, setting up new and higher standards of attainment and thus exercising a new and most necessary influence upon higher education as a whole. As regards secondary schools the senates were to recommend to government the conditions under which high schools should be allowed to prepare boys for admission to colleges.

These reforms were in themselves most desirable. The tightening of control and the raising of educational standards were long over-due. The development of scientific and technical instruction was urgently needed to promote the search for occupations other than an over-crowded bar and press. Higher literary education had far out-run the economic development of the country, and there were no means of absorbing the numerous arts graduates who poured annually from the colleges. Bengal had as many university students as England, without a tenth of the posts to offer them. Nor had Indian public opinion proved itself capable of wisely influencing educational policy. That public opinion was the opinion of the literary castes, apparently eager that every boy born in them should secure the dubious advantages of a university degree. Curzon had even been urged to commemorate Queen Victoria's reign by a general lowering of examination standards. If matters were to be mended, government must of necessity exercise more direction and control. But unfortunately the proposals came at least a generation too late. Could the clear, incisive mind of Curzon have replaced the cloudy and confused ideas of Ripon, and had the commission in 1882 been set on its way with an allocution as direct, poignant, and unmistakable as that which Curzon delivered twenty years later, a real turn for the better might then have been taken. As it was, his proposals met a most bitter opposition. It was feared that his underlying purpose was to curb the political activity of the educated classes, to lessen their numbers, to diminish their importance. The owners

of private schools and colleges in Bengal felt that their interests were threatened, which was indeed the fact. The partition of Bengal created an angry atmosphere in which the real interests of education vanished.

The result was that in spite of the desperate efforts of individuals, both Indian and English, to give reality to Curzon's educational proposals, they produced comparatively small results. Education continued to expand and to deteriorate. Expenditure from public and private funds was more than doubled, while the numbers of students went on rising. Persevering efforts were made to broaden the educational basis by establishing new agricultural colleges, and by opening technical schools for weaving, for carpentry, for commerce. But these efforts were frustrated by the lack of sound training in the primary and secondary schools.

It is not difficult to find the fundamental defects from which modern Indian education has suffered. Government has almost always pursued the idle hope of producing a good system with cheap and often inefficient instruments. For decade after decade swelling numbers have been hailed as proof of progress. Yet the multiplication of pupils meant that the demand for efficient teachers was out-running the supply. In founding a new educational system the provision of teachers should have been the first consideration. Normal schools should have engaged the closest attention of government. Suitable men should have been attracted by good prospects of pay and promotion, and the schools recognised and supported by government should have been kept down to the level at which it was possible to staff and equip them adequately. This would have placed secondary education on a sound basis, and have permitted the gradual development of universities above them and of elementary schools below. But instead of this government complied with the public demand for English education, irrespective of quality. Educational salaries were kept low in order to make education cheap. Secondary schools multiplied and worsened. They sent up ill-prepared students to the colleges. College standards fell as numbers rose. So the vicious circle was completed. The ablest students naturally preferred well-paid administrative to ill-paid teaching work. The schools could not be improved owing to the lack of a sufficient number of able teachers, the colleges could not be improved because of the overwhelming numbers of ill-taught students.

pressing up to them. Nor did the influence of the educational departments counteract this unfortunate tendency. Everyone soon came to be over-worked, while the failure to divide the departments into distinct teaching and administrative sections emphasised the consequences. The ideal recruit, from the departmental point of view, was not the specialist but the man of all work, who could be sent to inspect schools, or to teach English in a college, or at a pinch to teach science or mathematics. The result was that the outstanding personalities in the world of Indian education were missionaries rather than government servants, and the Europeans who rose to prominence from the ranks of the educational service, like the talented Indians who emerged from the system of education itself, could only achieve this after overcoming grave and needless disadvantages.

The general position was well summed up by the recent Interim (Education) Report of the Statutory Commission. The difficulties of developing elementary education still persisted. It was easy to increase the number of pupils in primary schools, but few remained long enough to attain any certain and well-established literacy. The majority either never attained literacy, or else, under the conditions of rural life and owing to the lack of suitable vernacular literature, speedily relapsed. The secondary schools and colleges were still overcrowded with students not naturally gifted for literary education, as was shown by "the immense numbers of failures at matriculation and in the other university examinations". In spite of the recent movement to make the universities real teaching bodies, the theory was still generally held that they existed mainly to pass students through examinations, instead of training men to become "broad-minded, tolerant, and self-reliant citizens". But, as Curzon himself pointed out, the severest critics must recognise the important results that followed from the working of this imperfect educational system. It brought a large number of persons into pregnant contact with western ideas. Of late years it has been asserted by the extremist nationalists that it produced (and was intended to produce) a "slave-mentality". But in so far as a slave-mentality is discernible among the educated classes of India, it would seem to be inherited from the past rather than inspired by modern conditions and methods. Under favourable conditions western education emancipated rather than enslaved. It inspired a habit

of questioning that the ancient culture had lost, and it set up assimilation as the purpose of study instead of the traditional memorisation. It also gave to the social classes peculiarly associated with it a common language and a common stock of ideas.

From this certain social and political tendencies inevitably flowed. The broad basis on which Hindu society had rested for many centuries was silent, undoubting acquiescence in the customary. The whole influence of religion, the idea of transmigration, the system of caste, all made in the same direction. It was the business of one group of castes to fight, of another to propitiate the gods, of a third to till the fields. He who held the sword not only ruled, but was entitled to rule so long as he upheld ancient custom. The prudent Indian ruler might have grievous cause to dread his neighbours, but not to fear his subjects. But it was certain that if a neighbouring prince invaded his territory and overthrew his army, the people would submit and accept the new dominion as submissively as the peasants of Aquitaine accepted the dominion of Edward III. But western education rudely disturbed these medieval conditions. The activity of missionaries in early educational enterprise led naturally to the earliest movements occurring in the closely related social and religious spheres. In Bengal Rām Mohun Roy founded the *Brāhmo Samāj*. This was a deist sect inspired largely by the free-thought of the eighteenth century, which had been propagated in Calcutta by David Hare. The *Brāhmo Samāj* exhibited its social tendencies by supporting the abolition of sati. At a later time it was sharply divided over the question of tolerating other Hindu usages and customs vigorously attacked by Keshub Chandra Sen. Finally the latter was expelled from the society, and established a new body which championed the reform of the marriage-system, and advocated female education.

The spirit of criticism spread inevitably from social to political questions about the middle of the nineteenth century. The writings of Burke, overloaded with image and simile, for that very reason appealed to a people whose literature had been almost exclusively poetic, who were still in the process of developing a prose style, and who in general preferred a striking metaphor to a sound argument. English history, especially as represented by Whig theorists, and the political writings of the younger Mill abounded in suggestions that the natural development of political

societies was from despotism to liberty. The career and writings of Mazzini, equally widely studied, offered an example of a nationalist movement directed to the overthrow of foreign dominion. Under these western influences small groups of educated Indians began to set before themselves as an ideal the transformation of the basis of government and the gradual extrusion of foreign control.

This was far from having been entirely unforeseen. Munro, Elphinstone, Malcolm, Lord Hastings, and others who had thoughtfully surveyed the prospects of the Indian empire which their generation had consolidated, had all looked forward to the day when it would be expedient for Great Britain to withdraw from the task of administering that great and perplexing dependency. But their anticipations had not taken all the factors into account. They had expected their successors to be called upon to deliver Indian rule back to the princes, the nobles, the warriors, whom they regarded as the natural leaders of the country. But the nationalist spirit was developing, not among these but among castes which, with a few notable exceptions, had always held a subordinate place in Indian governments, and among races which had been notably unwelcome. Could these new claimants impose themselves on grounds of intellectual superiority alone upon classes which in the past had relied upon the judgment of the sword and the shrewd manipulation of purely material factors?

The distrust thus inspired by the new movement was emphasised naturally if irrationally by the eccentricities of style in which the claims of the educated class were being advocated. Just as true Persians had mocked the phraseology and pronunciation which had passed for Persian in India, just as in medieval Europe the French of London had been a marked and inferior variety of the language spoken at Paris, so now Indian English had developed peculiarities of its own. The misuse of subtle English idiom, the appearance in English dress of idiom borrowed from Indian vernaculars, the use of grandiloquence on quite ordinary occasions, the laborious research for the poetic and the resonant, afforded easy subjects of ridicule. Englishmen doubted whether western ideas had been any better apprehended than the usages of English speech, and whether the democratic ideals of universal equality could be sincerely adopted by a society founded on the principles of caste. The administration considered that it was

being invited to deliver over its functions to a minority scarcely more considerable than the civil services, and incapable of maintaining itself in power except by the constant support of British troops.

The political movement had originated in Bengal, where the literary castes were stronger, wealthier, and more widely affected by English teaching than elsewhere. The zamindars for instance set up the British Indian Association to support their interests, menaced by what they regarded as infractions of the Permanent Settlement, such as the levy of additional cesses for local purposes and the protection of tenants by the Bengal Tenancy Act. Then Surendranāth Banerji, who had taken up educational work, set out (as he says) "to kindle in the young the beginnings of public spirit and to inspire them with a patriotic ardour, fruitful of good to them and to the Motherland". In 1876 he founded the Indian Association, intended to spread the same spirit through the middle classes as a whole. When the age of admission to the Indian Civil Service examination was lowered from 22 to 19, delegates were sent to northern India, to Bombay and to Madras, to obtain signatures for a memorial declaring the change to be hurtful to Indian competitors and praying for the restoration of the former age-limit and for simultaneous examinations to be held in England and in India. The delegates were also to establish branch-associations wherever this could be done. These endeavours to introduce changes by argument and persuasion were accompanied (as is usually the case) by attempts of the more angry and hasty to spread hatred of the government by charging it with injustice and tyranny. The vernacular press, which had sprung up in the third quarter of the century, consisted of a large number of very ephemeral periodicals, often edited by college students who found in their columns an opportunity of practising their talents for invective. In 1878 the Vernacular Press Act was passed in order to restrain these activities. It empowered the government to demand securities from such vernacular journals as were thought to calumniate the administration. About the same time, in connection it would appear with alarms concerning the revival of Wahhabī activity among the Muslims, an Arms Act was passed to limit the possession of fire-arms. These measures provided the occasion for further criticisms of government policy.

In 1880 Lytton was succeeded by Ripon and policy was

sharply reversed. He repealed the Vernacular Press Act, announced his intention of developing the system of local self-government, and thus secured great personal popularity. Towards the close of his government this was enormously increased by his unintentionally becoming involved in the Ilbert Bill controversy. The Indians who had competed successfully for the Indian Civil Service had generally been posted to the judicial branch of the administration, and the more senior had reached the stage where they were eligible for appointment as district and sessions judges. But as the law stood, such Indians would not be capable, in their magisterial capacity, of hearing charges against Europeans residing in their districts. The anomaly of the position was emphasised by the fact that an Indian already held the office of presidency magistrate at Calcutta, where he could hear charges against Europeans, a power which he would lose on promotion elsewhere. A bill, drafted by the law member, Ilbert, was therefore introduced to confer on Indian district judges the same powers as were enjoyed by their British colleagues. Against this measure a strong agitation arose among the indigo and tea-planters, who feared that the change would expose them to unfounded or exaggerated charges; and after prolonged discussion the bill was amended by government so as to give Europeans, accused of criminal offences in the mofassal, the right of demanding trial by jury. But while thus partially successful, the agitation proved to have been singularly ill-judged. It provoked strong resentment among the Indian middle-classes, who regarded it as casting a slur on their integrity, and it therefore gave a most powerful impetus to the attempts which Surendranāth Banerji and his friends were making to establish an effective political organisation.

Already in 1883 a conference had been held at Calcutta attended by delegates from other parts of India. In the next year a group of men, brought together at Madras by the annual convention of the Theosophical Society, resolved to set up a body which should embrace all the provinces of India. In 1885 the first Indian National Congress met at Poona. The goal which these early organisers proposed was the establishment of representative government, and they hoped that the congress would develop into an Indian parliament. Their early demands included the enlargement of the legislative councils, the inclusion in them of elected members, the grant of the power to discuss the budget

and to ask questions on all administrative matters, the abolition of the secretary of state's council, and the formation of a standing committee of the House of Commons to consider protests made by the legislative councils in matters in which their recommendations had been over-ruled by the executive governments.

From 1885 the National Congress held annual meetings. At first it was not easy to gather together any considerable number of delegates, and the rules were correspondingly loose. For some years delegates could be chosen by any kind of association and indeed at any public meeting convened by any person. Gradually these easy conditions were tightened up, and a general organisation came into being, supported by a considerable proportion of the middle classes in the larger cities. But the movement which it represented remained predominantly Hindu. Few Muslims had at first joined it; and although efforts were made to attract Muslim co-operation, although a Muslim was chosen president at the third meeting, and a resolution adopted at the fourth banning all proposals peculiarly unacceptable to either community, the Muslims continued to hold aloof. In this they were strongly influenced by the criticisms of Sayyid Ahmad, the founder of Aligarh. He disliked the proposals aimed at extending the selection of officials by competitive examination, which would unduly favour the Bengali Kayāsth at the expense of the Rājput and the Muslim. He disliked the proposals for the introduction of elected members, since this would be likely to exclude Muslims. He doubted too whether elected bodies would be willing to impose taxation even if they had the power.

While the leaders of the Hindu middle-classes were thus seeking the reconstruction of the government, and the Muslim leaders were resolving that such a change threatened many disadvantages, the government itself had been seeking to provide a school of political training by the extension of local self-government. Under past empires the villages of India had always been left to do, or leave undone, many things for themselves. Muslim and Hindu emperors alike had been sternly bent upon gathering in the land revenue, but had troubled the villages little otherwise. Local police, local education, local roads, had been supplied by the villagers' own efforts where such things were desired; and the only spur to their activity had been the responsibility of making good losses of travellers by robbery. In most provinces the villages had

head-men, who were at once the local representatives of the government and the mouthpieces of village opinion. These head-men had associated with them a group of village servants, to help them in carrying out their duties, and could always convene meetings of the village notables, who would discuss at extraordinary length matters laid before them until unanimity was reached or at all events until opposition was silenced. In such regions as in Bengal where large land-holders had come into existence, the village organisation had tended to decay, for their functions generally had devolved upon the great man of the neighbourhood. But elsewhere the villages had remained largely self-dependent. The establishment of the British government had, however, affected this village-system deeply. It was far more completely organised than any of its predecessors. Nothing like its regular chain of law-courts, for example, had ever before been seen in India. Then too the conception of law which it brought with it was at once more definite and more comprehensive than either the Hindu law, which had been largely a matter of fluctuating and variable custom, or the Muslim law which, though definite in character, had been narrowly limited in scope. Furthermore, its conception of the functions of government embraced many things which its predecessors had been content to ignore—education, for example, and roads. Under the pressure of these new influences the old village-system, weakened by a century of political chaos, had collapsed. The new courts absorbed the judicial functions which the village panchayats had exercised. The new precision of the law forced the villager to employ the professional aid of pleaders and attorneys. The new activity of the district officials confronted him with new proposals which at best were but half-understood.

The tendencies thus brought into play were scarcely affected by early and imperfect efforts to preserve village institutions. Munro at Madras, Elphinstone in Bombay, attempted to preserve the judicial panchayats. But their endeavours were not followed up, and the origins of the British system of local self-government in India are to be found in the districts and in the larger towns rather than in any development of village-organisation. The earliest specific instance of this policy is found in the action taken in Bengal under regulations of 1816 and 1819. It was then decided that public ferries should be managed by the officers of the govern-

ment, and that the surplus proceeds should be spent on roads, bridges, and other conveniences for travellers. Local committees were appointed in each district, with the district magistrate as secretary, to advise the government on the needs of the locality. This association of the district officials with the local gentry not only showed the former what works were considered most needful, but also led the latter to subscribe the funds needed for local roads which could not be constructed out of the inconsiderable surpluses available from the local tolls. In other provinces the district officials often levied a cess on the land revenue, to be expended on local purposes with the advice of local committees, and, though these cesses had no legal basis beyond the sanction of custom, they were paid readily. This was, however, a mere temporary phase. In Madras such cesses were legalised by an act of 1865; and in Bombay four years later an act authorised the appointment of district and taluk committees, to advise the district officials on the expenditure of local funds. The form of local self-government thus coming into existence differed from that long established in England. In England powerful officials of the central government had vanished with the decay of the sheriff's authority, and local self-government had thus come to be the business of local magnates working through a staff of their own. In India the collector, with his large executive staff, was the natural and most efficient agent by which local as well as provincial work could be executed; and his prominence and importance in the district necessarily meant that he would dominate the local committees instead of being their servant.

In 1870 Mayo had issued a resolution designed to place the existing incoherent and irregular state of affairs on a definite footing. The policy of the Government of India was two-fold. It hoped to provide for growing expenditure (especially on roads and education) by legalising the development of local taxation which would be better understood and more willingly borne if devised and voted by local men for local objects. It also hoped thus to associate more closely Indians and Europeans in the administration of affairs. Under this resolution a large number of provincial acts were passed, legalising, and in Bengal establishing for the first time, the collection of local cesses. But in the latter province much opposition was offered by the land-owners, on the ground that cesses were a violation of the permanent settlement.

In the legislative council Indian members declared that no more roads were wanted, although the recent famine in Orissa had just demonstrated the terrible insufficiency of land transport.

In the country towns affairs had followed a similar but easier course. As in the districts of many provinces, the magistrate had associated himself in early days with the principal merchants and householders; such informal committees had resolved by what means money for local purposes should be raised, and on what objects it should be spent; and the inhabitants were willing enough to contribute small sums by way of octroi-duties or house-rates to maintain night-watchmen and to keep the streets clean. This voluntary municipal system flourished especially in the Panjab, where in 1855 drainage had been provided in all the larger cities and quite elaborate projects formed for Lahore, Amritsar and Ambāla. In 1850 a municipal act had been passed, permitting the formal establishment of municipalities where the inhabitants petitioned for their introduction. This operated in a curiously uneven way. In Bombay the district officers had small difficulty in securing the necessary petitions from many towns and large villages. By 1856 as many as 292 municipalities had been created in the Satāra district alone, though many of them proved to be short-lived. But in Madras and the Panjab the people showed great reluctance to introduce the act. Between 1864 and 1868 municipal legislation—commonly of a vague form—was adopted by the provincial councils of Bengal, Madras, and the Panjab. In Oudh the Panjab act was followed. In Bombay a municipal act was adopted in 1873. In Madras municipal taxation was limited to an amount approved by the government for each municipality, which was increased by a government grant of 25 per cent. on the amount of the local rates. But in most places no legal limits were set to municipal taxation. The favourite mode of raising money was by the establishment of octroi-duties, in accordance with long-standing practice. Almost everywhere except in Lucknow (where a special act of 1864 had sanctioned the election of nineteen out of twenty-five municipal commissioners) the committees were appointed by the provincial government on the recommendation of the district officers. There was thus little "responsible" government, although there was much association of the principal local people with the officials in the administration of the towns. At the time there was small demand for election and

popular control, and rich merchants and land-owners preferred to seek government nomination rather than the people's suffrage.

The three presidency cities stood in a class by themselves, owing to their numerous European population, their relative size, and their superior wealth. At the close of the eighteenth century a British statute, passed in consequence of the disagreeable discovery that taxation by executive order was illegal within these little domains of English law, empowered the governor-general in council to appoint in each a number of justices of the peace, and enabled the latter to appoint watchmen and scavengers and to levy rates for their payment. But, although this enactment was based on English precedent, it failed to include provision for the punishment of malversation. In early days the justices' finances were assisted by the promotion of lotteries, the profits of which were laid out on public buildings, roads, and drains. But the assessments never sufficed for the due maintenance of roads and conservancy, at Bombay alone was any additional taxation imposed; and the justices as a body took small interest in their duties. Attempts were made to set up an elective body at Calcutta, but produced such gross abuses as to discredit the system of direct election for years. At Bombay in 1845 administration was entrusted to a committee—the Conservancy Board—consisting of two European and three Indian members elected by the justices, with the senior magistrate of police as chairman. In 1856 acts were passed vesting the administration of each city in three commissioners. But this plan too was unsatisfactory. The commissioners had no power to raise the necessary funds, they were not subject to due audit control, and they were in no way associated with the inhabitants. Between 1863 and 1867 therefore further changes were made. From this point local methods began to diverge, but the immediate general tendency was to concentrate executive power in the hands of a single man. At Calcutta, while general control was restored to the justices, 120 in number, their chairman, appointed by the provincial government, alone possessed executive authority. At Bombay, where the justices formed a body of 500, much the same was done, the executive official being designated the Municipal Commissioner. At Madras a municipal council of 32 members was created, but it could act only through its president. On the whole this new plan proved much more efficient than the former ones. Hogg at Calcutta and

Crawford at Bombay introduced great improvements in drainage, water-supply, and general sanitation. But it was felt that a dictatorship could not be more than a temporary expedient. The next move was in the direction of elective councils, less unwieldy in number than the justices had become, and invested with financial control over the executive official. This was first done at Bombay. In 1872 a council of sixty-four replaced the five hundred justices, one-quarter nominated by government, one-quarter chosen by the justices, and a half elected directly by the rate-payers. The commissioner's accounts were to be audited weekly by a standing committee of the council, and monthly by paid auditors. At Calcutta in 1876 and 1882 the municipal body was reduced from one hundred and twenty to seventy-two, with a majority elected by the rate-payers and audit provision imitated from that adopted at Bombay. But, while the Bombay scheme worked well, at Calcutta large committees were formed which sought to exercise a minutely detailed control over the executive until definite limits to such interference were laid down by an act of 1899. At Madras, where the municipal body had already been cut down, first half and then two-thirds of the members became elective.

In 1882 experiments over three-quarters of a century had thus been conducted with a view to the development of local self-governing bodies. But these had by no means conformed to the English pattern. Direct election had been generally unsuccessful outside the presidency towns; local bodies had been overshadowed by the power, knowledge, and energy of the executive officials; little had been achieved in the nature of political education, or in the actual transference of control in local matters from official into unofficial hands. In 1882, however, Ripon, the governor-general, issued a resolution defining a new policy. This aimed at avoiding the defects of past attempts. The English machinery of the ballot-box was to be introduced; and with the English machinery it was hoped that the English spirit of real local self-government would come. By learning to manage local affairs men would qualify themselves for wider political action. Local organisation would form a solid foundation for constitutional reform. It did not greatly matter if at first local affairs were mismanaged. People would learn from their mistakes. The great object should be to teach the use of the vote, to build up

electorates, to form a class accustomed not merely to discuss but to manage public affairs in a spirit of public responsibility.

In consequence of this resolution it was decided to establish under the existing district committees a series of boards, chosen wherever possible by election, with private persons instead of officials in executive charge. Some attempts were made to connect the new boards with the villages. In the Central Provinces village head-men grouped together were to choose members of the subordinate boards, while the latter were to choose members of the district boards. A somewhat similar plan was adopted in Bombay. In Madras village panchayats were recognised as electors for the taluk boards. But the district officials continued to provide the executive agency for both taluk and district boards, so that control was still exercised from within. In Bengal a most interesting experiment was proposed. A bill was introduced in 1883 to set up boards in each revenue sub-division, with a central board of supervision for the whole of the province, the members of the subordinate boards being chosen by village committees. When the bill had passed the provincial legislature and was awaiting the sanction of the home government, experimental elections of village committees were conducted. There was no secret ballot. The villagers were assembled and chose their representatives after open discussion. But this most hopeful plan was vetoed by the secretary of state, who insisted on setting up district boards, with the magistrate and collector at their head, to control and conduct local work within each district. Thus a measure, which would have gone far to put into practice the ideas of Ripon, was negatived, not by the hostility of the official world, but by the secretary of state's lack of comprehension. The net result in the districts was a very limited introduction of the ballot-box, elections in which no one took real interest, and the establishment of boards dependent upon the executive for the performance of their duties. Their apathy was shown by their neglect of means to increase the funds at their disposal. Their normal income was derived from cesses assessed and collected by the district officials. The district was far too large an area to be entrusted to elected members, who knew their own villages and the immediate neighbourhood but were ignorant of all the rest save perhaps the district headquarters. Even the revenue sub-division, the *taluk* or *tahsil*, was too large to permit local patriotism and a sense of common interests to develop in an effective degree.

Municipal developments were similarly disappointing in character. In every province acts were passed requiring a large proportion—a half or three-quarters—of the municipal boards to be elected, permitting an elective member to be appointed chairman, and sometimes allowing boards to choose a chairman for themselves. But elective members were not often appointed by government, or chosen by the boards, to the chairman's office. The fact was that the district officer could promote the interests and defend the rights of the municipality far better than any private person. Little interest was taken in the elections. Seats were often uncontested, and voters did not trouble to exercise their powers. Except in some of the larger towns where individuals of strong personality emerged, the municipal executives remained under official control. In 1915 in the Panjab only ten out of eighty-three municipalities entitled to elect their chairmen chose non-officials. In Bombay and the United Provinces the number of non-official chairmen was increased only by constant official pressure. Finance offered perpetual difficulties. Octroi-dues formed the traditional and popular means by which money could be raised for municipal purposes. But since this obstructed the general movement of trade, strong efforts were made from 1868 onwards to induce municipalities to replace the octroi by direct taxation. This was exceedingly unwelcome. Even where assessments were imposed, the elected members were most reluctant to insist on their regular collection and prompt payment. In Bengal at the close of the period a quarter of the municipalities collected less than a rupee per head. Insanitary conditions were preferred to strict administration, and progress in water-supply and drainage was largely dependent on occasional doles from the provincial governments.

On the whole the local self-government policy must be adjudged a failure. It did not train an electorate, it elicited the services of only a few active and patriotic men, it increased instead of diminishing the duties of the district officials. The popular reasons which have been usually adduced to explain this failure are the closeness of official control, the small extent of powers accorded to the municipal and rural boards, and the inadequate funds provided out of provincial revenues for the development of local self-government. These reasons undoubtedly explain why the leaders of the Indian political movement preferred to exhibit

their eloquence at the Congress meetings, in public assemblies, and in the columns of the press, rather than in the humble and labourious sphere of local administration. With certain notable exceptions, such as Gokhale, they shirked the exacting political school out of which the English system of self-government had been painfully elaborated, judging that quick minds and ready argument could make good the lack of practical political experience. But although the limitation of powers and the demand that local finance should be provided mainly out of local funds explain why many prominent Indians refused to co-operate actively in the field of local self-government, this is far from providing any complete explanation of the failure. Other more important factors were at work. Sufficient allowance was perhaps never made for the difference of conditions in England and India—the difference between a system of responsible government in a small and homogeneous country, and a system of highly centralised autocracy in a sub-continent fissured by every kind of religious and social division. The strong, well-organised administrative machine of the latter would be bound to dominate local institutions even more completely in India than it did under the centralised governments of Europe. In another way the experiment had been incomplete. The mechanism of ballot-box and voting-paper had been borrowed from England, but not the vital, educative basis of the English system. In India control was exercised through official supervision; in England it was exercised through financial responsibility. In the latter a local board which improperly expended public money, or neglected to gather in at the due time the rates which it had imposed, would find itself surcharged and the members would be collectively and individually liable to make good the public loss out of their private estates. But neither in the corporations established in the presidency towns, nor in the rural and municipal boards, was this most salutary provision applied. The men who accepted nomination or sought election to these bodies accepted no personal financial responsibility with their seats, and consequently membership was neither so selective nor so formative as it might have been. Herein certainly lies one of the fundamental reasons why local self-government worked so disappointingly. Lastly, in the rural areas, the system was never properly connected with the villages, where alone effective local life was to be found. The nearest

approach was made by the vetoed Bengal scheme of 1881. Experiments along those lines might have produced a really active spirit, a true electorate uncursed by voting-papers, and boards filled with men who were looked up to as the natural leaders of their neighbourhood and who would not have been diverted from local duties by the thought that the sphere was incommensurate with their dignity and importance.

While these attempts were being made to provide elementary schools of political education by means of local self-government, the demands of the National Congress and of the Indian press led to certain changes in the structure of the legislative councils. Lord Dufferin, who succeeded Ripon as governor-general in 1884, possessed not only great personal charm but also a large measure of political sagacity. In 1883 he had prepared a plan for the gradual introduction of popular influence into the despotic government of Egypt, where fundamental conditions were similar to those of India though the political situation was less complicated. In 1886 he wrote a very important minute on the question of political development. In this he dwelt on the importance of giving quickly without the appearance of coercion whatever concessions it might be judged right to make. The particular measures which he had in view were the enlargement of the legislative councils, and the introduction of some method of electing part of the non-official members. These changes would provide the Government of India and the provincial governments with independent Indian advice; but, since he proposed to maintain official majorities in the councils, the responsibility to the home government would be in no way impaired. These proposals, however, went much farther than the home government would go. In 1890 a bill was introduced into parliament to enlarge the councils, but Dufferin's elective proposals were completely suppressed, and the Irish crisis led to the abandonment of the bill, after debates in the House of Lords on the practicability of establishing the elective principle, which was supported by both Ripon and Northbrook. Not until 1892 was a measure enlarging the Indian councils passed into law. This contained a clause designedly wide enough to permit the application of the elective principle, but not prescribing it. "It would be a great evil", said Lord Salisbury in debate, "if, in any system of government which we gradually develop, the really strong portions of Indian society did not obtain that share in the

government to which their natural position among their own people traditionally entitled them." It was, however, clearly understood that the new rules which the Government of India were to frame would recognise the elective principle.

The result of the act was to increase materially the provincial councils, and to provide that a number of members should be nominated on the recommendation of the municipalities and rural boards; while four new members were to be recommended for the imperial council by the non-official members of the existing provincial councils and a fifth by the Bengal Chamber of Commerce. In future too the budgets were to be laid before the councils for discussion, and the right of interpellation was granted to the members. Although it was solemnly declared that the changes were not intended to represent any movement towards responsible government, they evidently involved important principles and were not mere matters of form. The councils established in 1861 had been exclusively legislative in character. No business save changes in the law could be laid before them. But now members could ask questions touching administrative and executive business, and they were given the first elements of that financial power on which responsible government has always rested. These concessions, linked with the introduction of free choice into the selection of members, naturally appeared to the Congress leaders as definite steps towards the liberalisation of Indian institutions. They began indeed to hope that they would succeed in securing for themselves in the name of the people the supreme control of the machine, regardless of the development of political experience among the populace. In political reform, as in education, the results of British policy were to raise the superstructure before the foundations had been laid.

CHAPTER XVIII

The Morley-Minto Reforms

While the Congress was planning the capture of the government machine by constitutional agitation, and while the government was seeking to lay the foundations of a broad political advance by developing local institutions, an extremist party was growing up among Indians advocating the use of violence. In this respect matters were following a normal course. The Italian *risorgimento*, the Russian movement, the Irish Home Rule movement, had likewise developed an external propaganda, professing more or less moderate aims by more or less moderate methods, and these too had been accompanied by the formation of subterranean societies, with revolutionary objects, for the perpetration of political crime. In India as elsewhere the precise relation between the secret and the avowed branches was obscure. But moderate leaders almost always hope to be carried towards success by the efforts of the extremists, almost always hope to make political capital out of crimes the preparation of which they prefer to ignore, and almost always forget that he who rides a tiger cannot dismount. In India, however, an ill-judged policy enabled the extremists to appear more openly and exert more control over the moderate organisation than was the normal case elsewhere. The Austrians in Italy, the imperial government in Russia, did not permit the extremists openly to spread their propaganda among the people at large. The British government in India did. This resulted from the fundamental conflict between the British position in India and British political ideas. In Great Britain the press was free, and political life based upon open discussion. But India presented the political monstrosity of a free press and an autocratic government. The position had been created by Metcalfe in 1835, when he withdrew all press restrictions on the ground that this was necessary to promote western knowledge in India. The measure probably reflects the influence of Bentinck and Macaulay; it was certainly opposed to the views of the best and ablest company's servants of the period. Neither Mountstuart Elphinstone nor Thomas Munro can justly be called men of illiberal views; both

looked forward to the time when the British, in the interests of both Indians and themselves, would withdraw from the control of the Indian government; but both were emphatic in declaring that the immediate liberty of the press would weaken the existing government before any other was ready to replace it. Their expectations were fulfilled. As the Indian press developed, a section of it devoted its energies to attacking the British government. In 1857 Canning had found it necessary to limit for a year its freedom of comment and perversion. In 1878 Lytton had laid restrictions on the vernacular press. In 1882 Ripon had repealed this act. Press attacks seem to have been regarded as a safety-valve. This curious example of argument by analogy seems to have missed the point that press attacks were more likely to increase than reduce the political pressure. In any case Ripon's policy was inconsistent with itself. He strove, as has been shown, to establish schools of political education in his rural boards and municipalities. But he judged the time far indeed from ripe for any fundamental political reform. He would not have dreamed of setting up responsible government, yet he restored freedom to the press as though he considered the days of autocracy almost run. The error was the more considerable since the British government in India was ill-constructed to resist the constant fret of newspaper criticism and attack. It rested, and had always rested, upon nothing firmer than popular acquiescence and the respect which the east has always paid to successful force. The people cherished a traditional respect for the commands of government, not because they were good but because they were thought to be backed by irresistible power. The religious basis on which a despotism may long rest as upon a rock had never existed. The popular basis on which self-government rests had never existed. The economic basis on which a well-organised oligarchy has often rested had never existed. Anything which lowered the readiness with which the government was obeyed, which taught the people to question the orders which might be issued, struck at the very roots of government in India. Full freedom of the press should therefore have been deferred until the autocrat was ready to abdicate. Ripon's measure might suitably have accompanied the reforms of 1919. But to couple it with the local self-government resolution of 1882 was to condemn the one or the other as an anachronism.

After this release the section of the Indian press devoted to invective became the more extreme; while the section which had inclined to argument rather than to abuse became the more abusive. The Ilbert Bill agitation provided matter for a multitude of leading articles. The early Congress meetings also served to stimulate press campaigns in favour of the changes advocated by the Congress leaders. But the appearance of a real extremist group of newspapers may be dated from the passing of the Age of Consent Act in 1891. The death of a Hindu child-wife at Calcutta had led to the prosecution of her husband for culpable homicide. The case excited considerable and unfavourable comment, and the legislature decided to prohibit cohabitation until the wife should be at least twelve years of age. As in the case of sati, many Hindus of Calcutta professed to see an attack on their religion in this beneficent if modest piece of social reform. One Calcutta newspaper was prosecuted for sedition on account of its comments on the new act. But the chief opposition came from the other side of India. At Bombay a considerable number of educated Indians coupled their demands for an increasing share in the government of the country with a strong advocacy of reforms within the structure of Indian society itself. But on the latter there was small agreement. The orthodox Hindus, who had hitherto held aloof from the congress-men as tainted with the falsities of western education, would clearly become more than ever hostile to the political movement if it were identified with social reform; and this would demonstrate to every foreign observer that the Congress could not claim to speak for Hinduism as a whole. None saw this so clearly as Bāl Gangadhar Tilak. He was a Chūpāvan Brāhman, the caste that had produced the family of the great Pēshwās. He was a man of outstanding personality—decided, eloquent, learned; and soon became a man of note at the Congress. He seems to have conceived the plan of bringing the orthodox Hindu under the banner of the National Congress, in order to reinforce the political discontent of himself and his fellows by any religious discontent that could be promoted. His Marāṭhi journal, the *Kēsari*, therefore denounced the Age of Consent bill as violating religious duties and bitterly attacked every Hindu supporter of it as a traitor to his faith. Rightly regarding youth as the most impressionable age, he took special pains to bring school-boys and college-students under his influence. He organ-

ised gymnastic societies, and developed a cult of Sivaji as the national hero of the Marātha people. All the evils of India, he taught, had been brought upon her by foreigners—first the Muslims and then the British. In this he was but echoing the ideas which theosophical lecturers had been spreading for years. But, while Colonel Olcott and his companions had lectured in English, Tilak's vigorous Marāthi carried his words among the populace of a region where historical events had created more of a true national feeling than existed anywhere else in India.

Moreover, fortune favoured Tilak in his campaign, or, rather, he was on the alert to seize every opportunity. In 1896 famine disposed men to murmur. Then bubonic plague appeared in Bombay. There was no special reason why this in itself should have led to trouble. From time to time it had swept men away by whole families in every eastern port. It had ever been accepted as a decree of an inscrutable providence. But western men, obsessed with the hope of mastering some at least of the more unpleasant manifestations of nature, deemed it their duty to attempt to stay its ravages. No one yet knew the method by which bubonic plague was propagated. It was generally thought that stricken men communicated it directly to their fellows. Every effort was therefore made to segregate the victims. Houses were searched. At Poona British troops were employed as search-parties. Measures of so extraordinary a nature did much to transform the prevailing panic into popular resentment. They were very easily misrepresented. The Marāthi press abounded in complaint. Tilak's journal accused the government of deliberate oppression. In one article he described the horror with which Sivaji, the national hero, must regard the condition of his people—impoverished, famine-stricken, diseased, and persecuted, the sacred Brāhman polluted with imprisonment among low castes, and veiled women insulted and dragged into the public view. In another he defended the conduct of Sivaji in killing Afzal Khān by treachery. Great men, he said, were above the common rules of conduct. There was no sin in killing for the benefit of others, and his readers were exhorted to consider how unrightful was the position of the foreigner in India and to ponder the actions of the great. The hint was quickly taken. Two young Chitpāvans murdered a military officer and the India civilian in charge of plague-prevention at Poona. They were duly tried and executed.

Tilak himself was tried for sedition and imprisoned for eighteen months.

This experiment in instigating political crime was imitated in Bengal. There too religious motives were brought into play. There too school-boys were organised into gymnastic societies for political agitation. There too was worshipped the national hero whose successors had laid waste the province with fire and sword. In 1902 a small band of revolutionary conspirators had already been formed. Their efforts were aided by the Japanese victories over Russia, by the unpopularity of Curzon's educational reforms, but above all by the resentment against the partition of Bengal. That measure excited alarm among influential sections of the educated class. The Calcutta lawyers feared that the creation of a new province would mean the establishment of a court of appeal at Dacca and diminish the business of their own High Court. Journalists feared the appearance of new provincial newspapers which would restrict the circulation of the Calcutta press. The change seemed thus to endanger existing interests and was assured of powerful opposition. But this was intensified to an extraordinary degree by sentimental and political considerations. In Bengal the worship of Kālī, wife of Siva, had always been very popular. She there possessed a two-fold character. She delighted in bloody sacrifices, but she was also venerated as the Great Mother. This mingling of attributes, destructive and generative, recalls the deities of ancient civilisations of whom she is perhaps the last representative. Associated with her worship was yet another conception—Bengal as the mother-land. This conception, vague and cloudy as it was, offered a far better basis for the support of political desires by religious excitement than the cult of Sivaji or the indefensible hostility to the Age of Consent Act. A great revival of Kālī-worship took place. At her temple in Calcutta thousands of goats were slaughtered, while the partition was described as the rending in pieces of the revered mother by unpius foreign hands. On the political side the partition meant the creation of a province in which the Muslims would form a clear majority of the population. It was therefore represented as the designed subjection of Hindus to Muslim interests. In support of the excitement thus called up was organised the *swadeshi* movement. This was designed to secure a boycott of foreign goods and their replacement by native—*swadeshi*—articles.

Students and school-boys were employed to picket shops; would-be purchasers of English cloth were abused and intimidated; shop-keepers who stocked it were threatened; and when in the new province Muslims resisted these endeavours to make them buy what they did not want, communal riots became frequent.

Under cover of this violent agitation, the revolutionary group formed secret societies, collected arms, prepared bombs, and scattered abroad newspapers and leaflets designed to vilify the government and inflame the people. It was a religious duty to get rid of the foreigner. The man who was executed for murdering an Englishman should be regarded as a martyr to his motherland. Miserly and luxurious men who refused to contribute subscriptions to the cause should be made to give by force. The doctrine fell on ready ears. Prices were rising, and with them the cost of living was increasing. But large numbers of the educated class lived on fixed salaries as clerks and school-masters. Their discontent rose as the purchasing power of their monthly pay fell. Then, too, the province was full of men who had failed in the various university examinations and who blamed the examiners and the government for the blight that had descended on their exaggerated hopes. Many even of those who had passed found themselves without the government posts which they had sought, or starving at the over-crowded bar, or teaching at miserably low pay in schools. These, and especially the last, became the eager disciples of the revolutionary movement, which through its adherents among teachers found a ready way into the classes of both schools and colleges. The result was a long series of political crimes. The terrorist associations attacked both the officials of government and their own countrymen. Within four months, in the cold weather of 1907-8, the lieutenant-governor's train was derailed, a former district magistrate of Dacca was shot at and wounded, and two Englishwomen were killed by a bomb thrown into their carriage. About the same time began a series of political dacoities. Dacoity had always been the characteristic crime of Bengal, but whereas in the past it had been the work of specific criminal castes, it was now conducted by groups of young *badralog*—middle-class people. Their methods were the same. Evidence was silenced by intimidation and murder. Sometimes the money and valuables stolen were devoted to the personal use of the

robbers. But the ostensible purpose always was to provide funds for the revolutionary movement.

These two movements, centring respectively at Poona and Calcutta, formed the most active branches, both characterised by the union of political and religious excitement. In the Panjab the latter was lacking. There advantage was taken of agrarian discontent arising out of legislation affecting the canal colonies. The leaders, Lājput Rai and Ajit Singh, sought to revive memories of Sikh rule, bitterly attacking as traitors those who served the government in the police or the army.

It has often been asserted that this unrest was basically due to the growing misery of the population under the depressing influences of British rule. Such statements lack both the support of evidence and any degree of inherent probability. So far as evidence goes, the population of India was more prosperous at the close of the nineteenth century than it had been at the beginning. Nor do men ponder rebellion when ground down by misery. A wholly wretched population is docile. When all the energies of a man are needed to save himself and his family from starvation, he has no time left for politics. Political discontent emerges, not among men who have always been destitute, but among men who find themselves worse off than they formerly were. This was predominantly the case with the professional and educated classes. Their growing numbers having exceeded the public demand for their services, and the rise in prices having reduced the value of the salaries they could command, they were all ready for political activity.

Blame also has been laid on the personality and policy of the governor-general who retired in 1905, Lord Curzon. In such matters contemporary judgment often lays too heavy a responsibility on individuals, and neglects the relentless pressure of general conditions. In like manner Dalhousie was blamed for bringing about the Indian Mutiny. But while the consequences of Dalhousie's and of Curzon's policy may be observed clearly in the developments which followed on their rule, the responsibility of both lay in failing to see what indirect and unexpected tendencies their conduct would call into action, and in the fact that their measures were timed unluckily, rather than in themselves ill-considered. Curzon's reforming zeal, his partition of Bengal, his educational reforms, the douches of cold common-sense which he

poured from time to time on political enthusiasm, his strong and well-founded admiration of the change which a century of British government had produced in India, intensely annoyed the educated classes who claimed that this tutelage was out-of-date, and who were eager to grasp authority in their own hands. To this extent he certainly exasperated the Congress and facilitated the extension of extremist influence. But though a more conciliatory attitude might have smoothed away some part of the moderates' hostility, nothing short of complete abdication could have satisfied the irreconcilable elements.

This was exhibited clearly by the course of events under Curzon's successor, Lord Minto. Minto's aim was twofold. He desired to rally to the government the moderate group which had been antagonised by his predecessor, and to bring forward into active political life the large land-owners of the country. In this respect Minto's attitude was much more realistic than either that of his predecessor or that of the secretary of state with whom he found himself yoked to the plough of government. Minto's appointment as governor-general had been made in 1905, when the Balfour ministry was approaching its termination. In January 1906 a Liberal cabinet came into office, with Campbell-Bannerman as prime minister and John Morley as secretary of state for India. Morley's selection had been one of those accidents which characterise the working of responsible government. He possessed no special fitness for the office. He had never studied Indian affairs. But he was a convinced and obstinate defender of the party-creed, who had held subordinate offices in past administrations, with a deserved reputation for incisive speech and a character of greater honesty than is usual among politicians. His intellect was, however, narrowly doctrinaire. All his life had been passed among writers and speakers; outside the sphere of party-management his practical experience was small; he suffered therefore from all the disabilities which afflict the *intelligentsia* in every age and every region. He exaggerated the importance of the political arena. He exaggerated the importance of the spoken and written word. He was essentially a critic, and a better critic of books and speeches than of action and policy. Minto presented a strong contrast. He was a Conservative in politics, but had never been a violent party-man. He had seen active service in the army. He had managed landed estates. He loved fair play with all the

earnestness of the true sportsman, and would no more have done a dirty thing than he would have shot a bird sitting or pulled his horse in a steeple-chase. He had little of Morley's width of reading, or vigour of phrase, but he had learnt to read men if not books, and to manage men if not to manage periods. He had never been guilty of a calculated ambiguity. He had just served a term of office as governor-general of Canada with remarkable success, and had been reckoned the very man to handle with tactful skill the difficult situation which Curzon had left behind. In accordance with well-established custom he continued in office under the new Liberal ministry.

The problem which confronted him and the secretary of state was two-fold. To maintain ordered government the efforts of the revolutionary societies had to be met and checked; but it was equally essential to restrict the sources of discontent by associating with the government influential Indians drawn not only from among the urban middle-classes but also from among the land-owners in close touch with the rural districts. Action against the revolutionaries and the newspapers which favoured their designs was made difficult by the reluctance of Morley to associate himself and the ministry with a policy of repression. The Radicals persistently denied the serious character of the situation, claiming that the newspaper reports were exaggerated and that the bureaucratic government was attempting to evade reform under cover of the revolutionary bogey. But after long delay Morley was induced publicly to confess that "You may put picric acid in the ink and pen, just as much as in any steel bomb." Meetings held to promote hatred against the government were prohibited first by a temporary ordinance and then by a permanent act. An act was passed limiting the conditions under which persons might possess explosive substances. In June, 1908, the Newspapers (Incitement to Offences) Act was passed. Under this the most inflammatory of the Calcutta newspapers—the *Jugantar* or *New Era*—was suppressed. In 1910 a further act was passed. Prosecutions and other repressive measures followed. Tilak for instance had seized the occasion of the murder of the two Englishwomen in Bengal to assert that their death was due to the unbearable oppression of the government. He was tried and sentenced by an Indian judge to six years' transportation. Other leaders who were believed to be deeply concerned in promoting the revolutionary movement were deported under an old regulation of 1818.

In all these matters the policy clearly originated with Minto; Morley's view was that such measures would do more to discourage the moderates than to check the extremists. But here practical wisdom lay rather with the man of affairs than with the politician. The moderates were bound to express loud public disapproval of repression. They could not without endangering their position declare open war upon the party of violence. But they were in fact alarmed at the extent to which the revolutionary movement was spreading. The cleavage had already produced notable effects in the National Congress. In 1905 under the presidency of Gokhale, the Congress had supported the Bengal boycott. Gokhale had complained of the repression of the educated classes, and compared Curzon's policy with that of Aurangzib, as if the partition of Bengal and the Universities Act had been akin in spirit to the emperor's calling out his elephants to crush a path for him from the Delhi palace to the Jama Masjid through the Hindu throng appealing against the re-establishment of the infidel poll-tax. But in 1906 difficulties within the Congress were evaded only by one of those devices favoured by embarrassed politicians. A formula was found vague enough to conceal the widening gap between moderate and extremist. *Svatantrij* was declared to be the goal of Indian progress, and that convenient catchword was accepted by all—by moderates in the sense of responsible parliamentary government, by extremists in the sense of absolute independence. In 1907 violence emerged. A preliminary meeting of the organising committee at Nagpur, where the Congress was to have met, was forcibly broken up by a body of extremists. At Surat, where the Congress finally sat, the two parties came to blows again, the extremists were driven out, and then the Congress purged itself of irreconcilables like Tilak from Poona and Arabindo Ghose from Bengal. This was mainly due to the influence of two men, Gokhale and Surendranāth Banerji. Gokhale, the ablest and probably the most far-seeing of the moderates, had been and still remained an earnest advocate of social reform. He was therefore fundamentally separated from his fellow-casteman, Tilak, by his conceptions of both political method and political objects. Moreover, he was honest as well as courageous. A free and often severe critic of the existing administration, he would also declare unpalatable truths to his own people, reminding them that Indian troubles sprang less from foreign

dominion than from internal defects, that British rule had been a great instrument of progress, that the average degree of knowledge, energy, and self-sacrifice among Indians remained far below that of the western self-governing nations, and that real political progress depended far less on political concessions than on a raising of the average Indian capacity.

Surendranāth Banerji had long been in the forefront of agitation in Bengal. He had led the anti-partition movement. He had followed Tilak in seeking to reinforce the political agitation by religious zeal, and to enlist the young enthusiasm of students and school-boys in spreading his views among the people. At one time he had verged closely upon the irreconcilable extremist attitude. But he had been alarmed by the anarchical developments which had arisen in Bengal, and in 1908 swung back decisively into the moderate camp.

Meanwhile proposals for political reform, which Minto deemed the natural correlative to the repression of violence, had been under serious debate. Here again the views of the governor-general and the secretary of state differed profoundly. Morley's ideas were based upon the proposals which had been put forward by the National Congress, designed in the main to secure a large measure of the political machinery existing in England. To Minto, on the contrary, the enlargement of the legislative councils, the extension of elective methods, and the widening of the powers of the councils, seemed of far less moment than certain other considerations which did not necessarily affect the actual political structure. The numberless and deep divisions of the population seemed to him completely to rule out the establishment of real representative government. "We cannot move far in that direction", he wrote on May 16, 1907, "and any move we make is merely a sop to impossible ambitions." But these words were far from indicating any reluctance to undertake important reforms. The essence of the matter, as he saw it, was to bridge over the gulf between Indian and Englishman, which had been at once concealed and widened by the spreading use of the English language in India. "I cannot admit", he wrote at the close of 1906, "that we have only the aspirations of the so-called advanced party to deal with.... I believe that we have something much bigger in front of us—the desire of a largely increasing class of well-educated and loyal men to possess a greater share in the govern-

ment of India. Since I have been in India I have talked with many such men, chiefs, land-owners and others, and I have found them almost universally.. opposed to an increase of representative government, but strongly pressing the claims and capabilities of their countrymen to share in the highest executive councils of their country."

This thought perpetually recurred in his letters. "The more I see, the more convinced I am", he wrote in the following year, "that we cannot continue to govern India with any hopes of tranquillity till we give her educated classes a chance of a greater share in the government of the country." But this was to be sought not by a mere mechanical widening of the elective elements in the legislative councils, but by rendering them more truly representative, and above all by a considerable increase in the high executive offices open, in practice as well as in theory, to men of Indian birth. "The only way we can save India from a tremendous convulsion", he declared, "... is in recognising the right of the Indian gentleman, loyal at the present moment, to a greater share in the government of the country."

While therefore he was quite willing to accept such changes in the direction of parliamentary government as Morley desired, he was far from regarding them as the essential part of the plans which he was elaborating. While Morley, despite disclaimers alike in his correspondence with Minto and in his speeches in parliament, considered the enlargement of the legislative councils and the establishment of elective methods as leading directly towards the establishment of western institutions, Minto busied himself with bringing into the scheme of reforms changes which would demonstrate his principles of associating Indians with the business of administration and of providing large but unorganised masses with the means of self-expression. His share in the formation of the changes introduced by the act of 1909 was therefore far more personal than that of the secretary of state, who hardly did more than adopt current ideas. The statement may surprise those conversant only with the published documents. With studied egotism Morley's *Recollections* tacitly claim a wholly disproportionate share of credit for the measure with which his name and Minto's are connected, and his private correspondence more than once suggested that the official communications of the Government of India should be so drafted as to make its depend-

ence on the home government appear more evident. In fact his autocratic temperament and his doctrinaire ideas led him to consider the governor-general as his agent rather than as his colleague. Minto, however, succeeded to a great extent in defending the government over which he presided. He was particularly anxious that the Indian public should have no reason to think that reform was being forced on him from London, and refused altogether to allow "the Government of India to give a blank cheque, so to speak, to be filled in for us at home".

Minto's special contributions to the reform scheme of 1909 were three in number—the proposed advisory council, the provision of special representation for certain classes, and the inclusion of Indians in the executive councils. The first of these came to nothing, but is interesting as illustrating the ideas by which he was inspired. The proposals sprang out of a suggestion of Curzon's that a council of princes should be set up. Minto thought this by itself inadvisable, but turned his attention to the possibility of forming a council of land-owners, ruling chiefs, and men of influence outside the legislative council, to be summoned from time to time and consulted regarding projected changes in law or policy. The special advantage which he hoped thus to secure was to ascertain the views of rural India, scarcely represented by congresses or elected members of an exclusively urban character. As the discussions progressed, this proposal was developed—it appears, by the secretary of state's council—into a scheme for an advisory council consisting of both ruling princes and territorial magnates. This was designed to represent the views "of the hereditary leaders of the people, both in British India and in the principal native states". But in this form the proposal proved impracticable. Ruling chiefs refused to sit as equals beside the zamundars of British India; and Minto himself concluded that his purpose could be better achieved by other methods. The proposal was therefore abandoned.

The provision for an improved representative system in the legislative councils, though a difficult matter, was however, developed. The scheme adopted under the act of 1892 had worked very much in one direction. The members recommended for appointment by the local boards had consisted in the main of lawyers. The district municipalities had recommended forty lawyers out of a total of forty-three members; and even the

district boards, which might have been expected to possess a more rural complexion, had nominated nearly four times as many lawyers as land-owners. Direct nomination had done something to set this right, but lawyers had succeeded in obtaining over a third of the seats on the provincial councils, while lawyers and school-masters between them had formed 40 per cent of the imperial council. Minto and his council did not deny "that the professional classes are entitled to a share of representation proportioned not merely to their numbers, which are small, but to their influence, which is large and tends continually to increase. But they are not prepared to allow them a virtual monopoly of the power exercised by the councils, and they believe that the soundest solution of the problem is to be found in supplying the requisite counterpoise by creating an additional electorate recruited from the landed and moneyed classes".

The over-representation of urban interests was not the only problem to be considered. The Muslims demanded a larger proportion of seats than they had been able to secure in the past. They formed about a quarter of the population of British India, but had not secured an eighth of the seats filled by recommendation in the imperial council. These results were necessarily displeasing to the leaders of the community, who feared that further advances in the direction of self-government would result in an increasing political predominance of the Hindu professional classes. The fact was, as Sir Valentine Chirol pointed out at the time, that "the more we delegate of our authority in India to the natives of India, the more we must necessarily in practice delegate it to the Hindus who form the majority". The whole question of constitutional change was therefore viewed by Muslims with great apprehension. They had besides been exasperated by the Hindu opposition to the creation of a predominantly Muslim province in Eastern Bengal. Thus the long-standing social and religious division of India into Hindu and Muslim was sharpened into bitter hostility by political fears and projects. Hindu politicians have usually sought to represent this revival of a deep-seated and long existing jealousy as the work of government, seeking to ease the burden of rule by division, and encouraging Muslim hopes in order to set one community against the other. But Muslim anxiety was in part the product of circumstances, in part the product of Hindu policy. Any movement towards self-govern-

ment suggested to a great minority the growing need of fortifying its position; and the conduct of the Hindu politicians had shown no sympathy whatever with the Muslim position. When the Hindus could not bear Muslim influence to be predominant in a single province, when journalists like Tilak classed the Muslims with the British as the tyrants and despoilers of India, what might not be expected if ever political power really fell into Hindu hands? Muslim distrust of a possible Hindu rule was a source of great annoyance to the Hindu leaders, for it showed too plainly that they could not claim to speak for the country as a whole. Naturally therefore they sought to minimise the importance and sincerity of Muslim demands by accusing the government of inspiring a fictitious movement. But, however well Hindu and Muslim had dwelt together under a common subjection, the idea of self-government was more than enough to revive irreconcilable bitterness between groups whose social and religious practices were mutually repugnant.

As soon therefore as it was known that the Government of India had a reform scheme under consideration, a Muslim deputation, headed by the Aga Khān, waited upon Minto to urge the necessity of special provision to safeguard Muslim interests. The governor-general, whose great aim was to secure an improved degree of representation, was in natural sympathy with the demand that the existing lack of electoral provision for minorities should be amended. He agreed that their position should be estimated not merely by their numerical strength but also by their political importance and the services they had rendered to the empire.

In the circular despatch issued in August, 1907, for the purpose of eliciting both public opinion and official views, considerable emphasis was laid upon the need of giving the widest possible representation to the various classes, races and interests of the country. The creation of special electorates for the landed class and Muslims was suggested; and a scheme (which was in fact over-elaborated) was published, proposing to assign specific numbers of seats to each race, caste, and religion, with special electorates in each case. This detailed proposal was abandoned. But the Government of India, like the Decentralisation Commission which was sitting at this time, concluded "that representation by classes and interests is the only practicable method of embodying

the elective principle in the constitution of the Indian legislative councils". Special provision was therefore proposed; landed and Muslim constituencies should be established, and means taken to secure for each important class in the country at least one member well acquainted with its views.

While Morley was induced to agree that general territorial constituencies on the English pattern could not be trusted to reflect adequately the numberless cross-divisions by which India was seamed, he attempted to overcome the difficulties raised by special electorates by putting forward an alternative plan. This had been mainly prepared by MacDonnell, a retired Indian civilian who had had an unusually distinguished career alike in India and after his retirement in London. This contemplated a system of indirect elections. The primary electors might choose electoral colleges, which should include minority representatives in numbers proportioned to the strength of the various minorities; and this, it was hoped, might obviate the need of securing representation by nomination. This plan, however, met with much criticism, especially among the Muslims, and was judged unworkable. The statute which was finally passed by parliament directed the Government of India to prepare rules for the constitution of the legislative councils; and the rules which were at last issued with the secretary of state's approval provided for the creation of special land-holders' and Muslim constituencies in the principal provinces.

Minto's other individual contribution to the reforms of 1909 was the inclusion of Indian members in the executive councils. The idea of such appointments was far from new, but difficulties of various kinds had always prevented their serious consideration. It had been suggested that a ruling prince should be included in the governor-general's council; but this would have had the disadvantage of giving mortal offence to all the others; nor was it easy to find among the great land-owners, whom Minto and more than one of his predecessors had wished to bring forward, men who possessed at once sufficient knowledge of affairs and a sufficient grasp of English. This had indeed been the chief practical obstacle to the inclusion of some of the distinguished men who had emerged in the Indian states. Knowledge of English had, however, spread rapidly in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, and at the opening of the twentieth Minto

was convinced that the time was ripe for a convincing demonstration of good-will. The appointment of Indian members had had a place in his earliest projects of reform, and seemed to him of the utmost importance both from their probable effect on Indian opinion and from their expected influence on government policy. As the law stood, such action was only possible within certain narrow limitations. Indian members of the Indian Civil Service were eligible to all the seats in the governors' councils at Bombay and Madras, and to most of the seats in the governor-general's council. But the Indians of the service had mostly chosen the judicial rather than the executive line of employment, and, what was of more importance, had been debarred by their occupation from taking a part in Indian politics or securing a following in the Congress world. While their appointment to council might then have flattered Indian sentiment, the advantage would for the most part have been sentimental only. Their judicial experience would have been of small use, and their appointment would have conciliated few but the members of their own families. Prominent Indians outside the service were not eligible at all for seats in the subordinate councils or for most of the seats in the governor-general's council.

While this was the legal and practical position, Minto busied himself in 1906-7 in raising the question in his own executive council. Though he met with small encouragement, he resolved at last to recommend on his own responsibility the appointment of an Indian to his council. One cynical adviser suggested the creation of a special educational portfolio, on the ground that the educational departments had few friends. But the office of the law member was the most suitable for such a departure, both because it required no change in the existing law and because it opened the field to a very active and influential class. Serious opposition emerged against this proposal in England. It had only been supported in the governor-general's council by a single member besides Minto himself. Morley was unable to induce the Council of India to agree to the measure. He then laid it before the cabinet, where the opposition of Lord Ripon was decisive. For the moment therefore the project dropped, and all that immediately followed was the nomination of two Indians to the Council of India, appointments to which lay within the statutory powers of the secretary of state. Morley himself admitted that this step

would hardly have been taken but for the firm stand which Minto had made in favour of including Indians in the executive council.

Though foiled for the moment, Minto persisted in his advocacy of appointing Indian members to council. "The best reply", he thought, "that can be made to the unrest that is in the air would be the appointment of a native member to the viceroy's council." In consequence of his persistence, it was at last resolved to adopt his advice, to appoint an Indian member to his council, to enlarge the two presidency councils by one member each so as to permit the same being done at Bombay and Madras, and to take powers to create executive councils in the other provinces.

These reforms, so far as was necessary, were embodied in the Government of India Act, 1909, and the regulations made under it by the Government of India. The legislative councils were enlarged, their powers were increased, and they were authorised to adopt resolutions on matters of administrative and financial policy, elective methods of choice were at last formally introduced; the higher governments lost that exclusive character which had marked them from the inception of British rule; and special provision was made to secure in the enlarged legislatures representation of numerous and important classes without reducing the representation of those classes specially associated with the National Congress. "Regarding the scheme as a whole," the Government of India wrote, "we consider ourselves justified in claiming for it that it will really and effectively associate the people of India with the government in the work, not only of occasional legislation, but of actual every-day administration."

This claim was well substantiated. The existing councils were enlarged from a total of 124 to a total of 331 members; elected members increased from 39 to 136; and though the official majority was retained in the imperial council, it disappeared from the provincial legislatures. The original proposals had included the retention of the official majority—*i.e.* the retention of full executive control over legislation—in all the councils. This was regarded as a legitimate and necessary consequence of the nature of the Indian government, nor was it seriously attacked except by men of extremist leanings. However, as a result of discussions with the provincial governments, and, on consideration of the views expressed in the Indian journals and elsewhere, the Government of India finally proposed not to create an official majority in the

various councils but only to retain the power of calling one into existence if necessary. "We propose to work normally with a minority but to reserve power in the last resort to transform it into a majority." It was in this connection that Morley made his particular and individual contribution to the reform scheme as finally adopted. The limited powers of the provincial legislatures and the effective powers of veto exercised by the executive authorities seemed to him to render the retention in them of official majorities unnecessary. Moreover, the Bombay government had for some years worked without an official majority, and did not desire one. He therefore decided that the official majority should be discontinued in these bodies. But in respect of the imperial council he was not prepared to go as far as Minto. The essential condition of "liberalising" the provincial councils was "that the imperial supremacy shall be in no degree compromised". The Government of India, he held, must always be so constituted as to be able to carry out the orders, executive or legislative, which it might receive from Whitehall. In no circumstances must its dependence be impaired. "I am convinced", he wrote, "that a permanent official majority... is absolutely necessary."

The Morley-Minto reforms, enacted in 1909, and brought into force in the following year, did not bring political crime to an end, as Morley seems to have expected. As soon as his bill was brought into the House of Commons, he began to demand the release of the deportees. But Minto was resolved to move more cautiously, holding the view that the political purpose of the reforms was to rally the moderates to the government, not to conciliate the irreconcilables. In this he proved to have judged aright. The moderates under Gokhale's leadership, while sharply criticising the provisions to secure the representation of classes other than those composing the *intelligentsia*, wisely accepted the reforms as a substantial move towards associating Indians with the government of their country. Pandit Moti Lal Nehru, for example, in a presidential address to a social congress held at Agra in 1909, reminded his audience that even self-government on the colonial model could not convert Indians into a united nation until they purged themselves of "the many social diseases that your body politic suffers from". In 1910, when a new regulation was introduced to control newspaper incitement to political crime by requiring presses to deposit security which might be forfeited,

Gokhale supported the measure, which was passed by the imperial council without a division, and with only two members rising to speak against it. This notable success, which indicated in how great a degree Minto had secured the confidence of the moderate congress-men, was followed at once by the release of the persons who had been deported under the regulation of 1818. Minto had in fact succeeded by mingled tact and firmness in turning a nasty political corner. It may justly be said that the unanimity with which the leading Indian politicians supported the government on the outbreak of war in 1914 was due in no small degree to the conciliating effects of his reforms, coupled as they were with the firm repression of political crime and of those who instigated it.


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CHAPTER XIX

Political Developments, 1910-19

The new press act of 1910 has been already mentioned. The earlier act had proved ineffective in preventing incitement to political crime, and sober minds were beginning to question the universal expedience of an unrestricted press. Further legislation had been recommended by the Indian princes. In the House of Lords in 1908 Lord Cromer recanted his former defence of Ripon's repeal of the Vernacular Press Act and admitted that the policy of complete freedom had failed alike in Egypt and in India. The earlier act too had led to the ostensible conduct of journals by mere nominees who went to prison for illegal publications one after another while the persons really responsible kept securely in the background. The new act was designed to make incitement to crime expensive as well as illegal. New presses were required to deposit security which might be forfeited if the press published illegal matter; forfeiture entailed the closing of the press which might be required to double the security if its owners desired to reopen it; and a second offence might entail not only forfeiture of the increased deposit but also confiscation of the press itself. Similar powers were granted over newspapers. An appeal against an order of forfeiture was allowed to the High Courts. The principles of this measure were approved by Gokhale, were accepted by the imperial council without a division, and indeed were attacked by only two of its members.

This act did much to check the open dissemination of revolutionary doctrines. But secret societies, especially in Bengal, continued their activity. Murders and dacoities continued. In the latter part of 1910 six occurred round Dacca, and sixteen more in 1911, although after a prolonged trial a number of men were convicted of conspiring to wage war against the king. The secret societies concerned in these and similar outbreaks found great advantage in the political immunities of French territory at Chandernagore. Pondichery also served as a refuge for political agitators in southern India. A newspaper which had been closed down at Madras was republished in the French settlement and



the district-magistrate of Tinnevely was shot by a man connected with the political refugees there. At this time revolutionary effort was intimately associated with a group of agitators in Europe, originally established at the "India House" in London, but who had migrated to Paris after the murders of Curzon Wylie and Dr Lalkaka in 1909.

At the end of 1911 King George held a great *darbar* at Delhi to celebrate his accession to the throne. This was marked not only by the traditional splendour, but also by scenes of extraordinary popular enthusiasm. The classes which had exhibited the fiercest antagonism to the British rule exhibited also a mystical devotion to the person of the king, displaying the degree in which their behaviour was governed by sentiment. The king's accession was commemorated by a number of boons. The princes were relieved from all future payments of *nazarāna* or succession-dues. Special grants were made for the extension of elementary education. The lower grades of military and civil servants received bonuses of pay. Members of the Indian Army were declared eligible for the Victoria Cross. The king's visit was also made the occasion of announcing a change of great importance but dubious advantage. The capital was to be removed from Calcutta to Delhi, the partition of Bengal was to be undone, the new province of Eastern Bengal with its Muslim majority was to vanish as a separate entity, and instead Assam was to be administered by a chief commissioner, while Bihar, Orissa, and Chota Nāgpur were to be made into a separate province under a lieutenant-governor with an executive council.

These measures were at once subjected to sharp criticism. Their intrinsic wisdom and the method of their announcement were perhaps equally open to question. The reversal of the partition had indeed been pressed several times by Indian leaders on the secretary of state. Morley, however, had consistently refused to reopen the matter. It had occasioned keen resentment among the Hindu leaders in Bengal, but even the Hindu politicians of other provinces had not taken the matter very seriously, while in Bengal itself the agitation was fast dying away. Morley, therefore, thought that little could be gained by reopening a settled matter, while he himself regarded the division of the Bengalis into two groups as expedient rather than otherwise. In 1910 he retired from office and was succeeded by Lord Crewe, while

Edwin Montagu retained his former position as under-secretary. The change probably invested Montagu with a greater degree of influence than he had previously enjoyed. He had always been disposed to emphasise the predominance of the India Office in Indian affairs. He had ventured in defiance of the facts to describe the reforms of 1909 as entirely the work of the secretary of state and publicly to refer to the governor-general as the secretary of state's agent. He was a man of high ideals, sharp perceptions, but uncertain judgment; and preferred the spectacular to the cautious in the way of political action. He probably had much to do with the adoption of this policy by Lord Crewe and with the method chosen for its promulgation. The objections to the reversal of the partition were numerous. Eastern Bengal had always been a much neglected area so long as it had been administered from Calcutta, and its separation therefore seemed expedient. Again, if the transference of authority into Indian hands was to continue, it was well that there should be provinces predominantly Muslim, since in most the Muslims would form a minority. Thirdly the reversal of an administrative measure in the face of objections which were mainly sentimental in character, for which no solid reasons could be adduced, which had been made the pretext for an outburst of political crime, was politically unwise. It suggested that clamour alone, irrespective of reason, could secure concessions. Besides this, to cancel the partition when the opposition to it was sinking involved government in all the odium of an unpopular measure without securing the advantages of a timely acceptance of popular opinion. Lastly, while the Hindus of Bengal felt they had gained a victory for which they owed thanks to the efforts of none but themselves, the Muslims felt they had been deserted and must make the best terms they could with the rival party. The transference of the capital to the city renowned throughout the world as the centre of Mughal rule had been intended to off-set this Muslim reaction. It certainly carried with it an appeal to Muslim sentiment. But it was unlikely that any good Muslim would respond deeply. Why should Muslims be moved by the establishment of the infidel capital in a centre of Muslim glory? It was quite as likely to wound as to conciliate. The building of a new city would be enormously expensive, even though this might be partly concealed by the

modesty of initial estimates. It was widely felt that Calcutta, created, as it had been, by English enterprise and Indian co-operation, still remained the most appropriate capital for British India, and that little would be gained by removal to a city whose traditions were essentially those of oriental despotism. The main advantage which could be claimed for the move was that it would shift the seat of government from the agitated atmosphere of Bengal. The whole project appears to have been formulated in London without any formal consultation with the Government of India, while official discussion or protest seems to have been designedly avoided by the method of announcement. The arguments which might have been sent in reply to an official despatch could not be urged against a measure announced by the king in person. The procedure illustrates in a striking way the degree in which the authorities at the India Office had come to regard themselves as the real executive government of India. This tendency, which had come into being in 1858, and had been greatly strengthened by the character and ideas of Morley, was destined to reach its peak under the influence of Montagu.

The futility of this endeavour to conciliate revolutionary leaders was displayed by the events of the next few years. Lord Hardinge, who had succeeded Minto in 1910, narrowly escaped being killed by a bomb thrown at him in Delhi in 1912. In Bengal murder and dacoity continued unchecked. Bengali influence extended to Benares, where revolutionary societies were formed. In the Panjab a movement arose that was to develop under Russian, American and Bengali guidance, into the *Ghadr* (Mutiny) Movement.

More ominous, however, than this continuance of political crime was the change in the Muslim attitude. Attempts were made to reduce the antagonism of the Hindu and Muslim leaders by holding a conference. Any results that might have followed from this were cast away by a Hindu member of the imperial legislative council who insisted on moving a resolution demanding the abolition of the special Muslim electorates. But although an alliance between Hindu and Muslim leaders proved impossible, the Muslim attitude to the government lost the friendliness which had marked it in recent years. Sayyid Ahmad had died in 1898, and no one of his school of thought could exercise the same degree of influence over the Muslim community. It was

much excited by the development of foreign affairs. The Italian seizure of Tripoli, the Anglo-Russian agreement in Persia, and the Balkan War all made it fear that soon no independent Muslim state would survive. The question too of the caliphate began more and more to exercise the minds of Indian Muslims. When the Turkish sultan assumed the title of caliph in 1517, his spiritual authority was not recognised in India. The Mughal emperors themselves assumed the same rank and style, and down to the Indian Mutiny and the final disappearance of the forms of empire from Delhi, no Indian Muslim seems to have looked to Constantinople for leadership or regarded the sultan with any special respect. With the disappearance of the shadowy Indian caliph, however, a new position emerged. For a time Indian Muslims were much perplexed. Whose name was to replace that of Bahādur Shāh in the Friday prayers? In the Panjab some are stated to have followed the extraordinary course of substituting the name of Queen Victoria. But after a period of considerable confusion, it was generally agreed that the sultan's name should be used in the *khutba*. To the more vehement followers of Islam this meant a formal transference of allegiance; but the majority continued in the passive obedience which they had generally shown to the British power in India, while some, under the leadership of Sayyid Ahmad, held that the caliphate had lapsed with the Mongol destruction of the 'Abbāsids in 1258 and had never truly been revived. Early in the present century, however, when the sultan found himself pressed on the one hand by the European powers and on the other by the agnostic, cosmopolitan group known as the Young Turks, he hoped to strengthen his position by emphasising his claim to the spiritual leadership of Islam. His agents spread to India, and Indian interest deepened considerably. When the Balkan War broke out in 1912, Indian Muslims equipped a medical mission, subscribed to the Red Crescent Fund, and formed the society called "The Servants of the Ka'aba", the object of which was the maintenance of Turkish integrity. The excitement aroused by this propaganda was illustrated by events at Cawnpore. In the course of street improvements it had been decided to demolish a Hindu temple and a room and platform which had been added to a small mosque. When it was found possible to spare the temple, the Muslims at once demanded that these additions should also be spared. A wild

agitation arose, fostered from without; the police were attacked; lives were lost, and the matter gained importance enough for Lord Hardinge to visit the place and personally arrange a settlement. In the past whole mosques had been removed without the least complaint being raised.

In two respects the reforms of 1909 had produced unexpected results in actual working. It was found necessary to prevent attacks on government measures by official members of the new councils, and to prevent provincial governments from evading obedience to the orders of the secretary of state on the score of opposition by the non-official majority. The latter also began to influence the course of policy and legislation much more directly than had till then been the case. Down to 1917 not quite half the resolutions moved in the imperial council had been followed by official action in the sense desired, but the power of putting questions was too often used to demand information which was already published or of small public value. Important changes were often made in government bills in the course of discussions in select committee, which proved more useful than the formal debates, where non-official members aimed less at persuading the government than at addressing the outside public.

The act of 1909 had given powers to extend the council form of executive government from Bombay and Madras to the other major provinces. In 1910 this was carried into effect in Bengal, where the lieutenant-governor was replaced by a governor with a council of four members. When in the next year the province of Bihar was formed, the new lieutenant-governor was provided with an executive council, on the ground that the province, when part of Bengal, had already been under council-government. But this was the only instance in which an executive council was set up in a lieutenant-governor's province, although proposals were made to establish one in the United Provinces by resolutions moved in the imperial legislative council in 1911 and in the provincial council in 1913. Indian opinion favoured such changes partly because government by council was reckoned a form of government superior to the individual government of a lieutenant-governor, partly because council-government would favour the appointment of heads of provinces from among public men in England, and partly because they would increase the number of high offices available for Indian politicians. On the first occasion

the lieutenant-governor, Sir John Hewitt, opposed the change on the ground that the volume of work to be done would not justify the creation of such a body, and that it would be difficult to select Indians with a sufficient knowledge of public work. On the second occasion, Sir James (now Lord) Meston was lieutenant-governor. He held much the same views as his predecessor as regards the need of a council, but on the whole advised compliance as the demand would certainly grow and have to be conceded sooner or later. After a prolonged discussion, this recommendation was accepted by the Government of India and the secretary of state. But when in 1915 a draft proclamation was laid before parliament in accordance with the act of 1909, the House of Lords voted an address to the crown opposing it, and the matter therefore dropped.

The most embarrassing question, however, of the years immediately preceding the outbreak of war in 1914 was that raised by the status of Indians in the South African colonies. Indians had gone to South Africa in considerable numbers as indentured coolies, to work on the semi-tropical plantations. On the expiry of their term of service many had settled down as small shopkeepers and pedlars. The growth of their numbers led to the appearance of a much smaller group of Indian professional men, lawyers and doctors. The same neglect of sanitation as characterises Indian villages made the poorer and much larger section of the immigrants unwelcome neighbours; and their unpopularity was strengthened by the strong colour-sense of the South African colonists, especially among the large Dutch element, which was disposed to class the Indians with the native inhabitants. In the two Dutch republics special regulations were directed against them. From the Orange Free State they were completely excluded. In the Transvaal they could not acquire land or reside outside certain defined areas. This produced many complaints in India and formed indeed one of the grievances alleged against the Dutch republics before the outbreak of the South African War. But the absorption of the republics at the end of the war produced no improvement. The new authorities were primarily anxious so far as possible to conciliate Dutch sentiment; while the formation of the Union of South Africa in 1909 deprived the home government of all powers of direct interference. At the same time restrictions tended to increase. Indians were best

off in the Cape Colony. In Natal they had to pay a licence tax if they remained beyond the term of their indentures. They lost their franchise for the state legislature, and they were threatened with the loss of the municipal franchise. Mr M. R. Gāndhī first came into prominence in connection with these restrictions. He was a Gujarātī lawyer who had gone to South Africa in 1893 and had remained with the object of obtaining some improvement in the status of his countrymen. Inspired by the nonconformist resistance to payment of the educational rates under the Education Act of 1902, he organised a passive resistance movement. The Government of India supported the demands, but could not deal direct with the South African governments, while the home government, though favouring the Indian claims, was hampered by its long-standing and deliberate acceptance of the rights of self-governing colonies. However, milder legislation was introduced in 1911 and passive resistance ceased. But long delays occurred in the passing of the bills. The governor-general spoke publicly and severely of Indian grievances in the Union. Passive resistance revived and this time led to acts of violence; riots were followed by vigorous prosecutions; and at last a commission of enquiry followed which produced a temporary settlement of the question.

Although the crisis of 1907 had on the whole eased considerably in the following years, there remained many points of difficulty, when, in August, 1914, war broke out in Europe and at once involved all the major powers. The effect in India was remarkable. German propagandists had claimed that war in Europe would be followed by a general Indian revolt, comparable only with the Mutiny. Instead, all the great princes offered their personal services and all the resources of their states. In British India private individuals and political associations wrote and telegraphed declaring their support of the British cause. When the imperial legislative council met in September, the non-official members agreed unasked that India should contribute to the heavy financial burden of the war. Often before had Great Britain been involved in desperate struggles, but the only deep feeling which Indians had exhibited had been a general apprehension, tempered by a cautious calculation of probabilities.

This unexpected enthusiasm permitted the Government of India to make a far larger contribution to the struggle in men, services

and munitions than had ever been dreamt of. Only a year earlier it had been resolved, in accordance with the findings of the Indian Army Committee, that the duties of the Indian Army were limited to meeting local aggression and resisting any attack by a great power until reinforcements could arrive from England. India, it was laid down, "is not called upon to maintain troops for the specific purpose of placing them at the disposal of the home government for wars outside the Indian sphere". It had been computed that in favourable circumstances the Indian Army could spare for service outside the Indian frontiers two divisions. But at once four divisions, two infantry and two cavalry, with four artillery brigades in excess of establishment, were sent to France to take part in the bitter fighting of the autumn of 1914. Troops were sent to East Africa. Two divisions of Indian infantry and a brigade of cavalry were sent to Egypt. When no less than eight divisions had either been sent abroad or were posted on guard on the north-west frontier, it was resolved to embark on a campaign in Mesopotamia, whither by January, 1915, two whole divisions had been sent. As the war went on, the area of operations constantly expanded; and before peace was made, Indian soldiers had fought all over the near and middle east, besides many parts of Africa, North China, and France. Whereas in normal times the rate of combatant recruitment had been about 15,000 men a year, during the war-years it was raised to 200,000, of whom about a quarter came from the Panjab. Whereas in 1914 the total establishment of British officers with the Indian Army was only 2500, more than 23,000 were sent overseas in the course of the war.

This tremendous effort was achieved at a great, and indeed disproportionate, cost. The Indian Army had been called quite without preparation to undertake tasks which its organisation had never anticipated. Its leaders had contemplated wars, perhaps even a great and serious struggle, upon the frontier; but they had never guessed that the pick of the Indian troops would be sent to France, and that then the remainder, with the aid of newly raised battalions from England, would be required to conduct campaigns in Africa, in Iraq, in Palestine. The effects of this situation were exaggerated by the early exhaustion of munitions, and by the excessive burden placed upon the commander-in-chief. The magazines had been emptied in order to

equip the divisions sent to France, and existing conditions of manufacture and supply prevented their being restocked with the quantities needed for the further conduct of the war, until a new system had been built up from the foundation. The commander-in-chief found himself, as Kitchener had insisted he should be, sole head of the Indian Army, and responsible alike for the training and discipline of the forces and for the technical departments without which a modern army is helpless. Kitchener had never supposed that the commander-in-chief would be called upon to bear so heavy a strain. But the system which he had set up was clearly over-centralised. The results appeared most clearly and disastrously in the early campaign in Mesopotamia. Failure of supplies, failure of medical attentions, failure of staff-organisation, failure of superior control were all revealed by the enquiries of a commission which public uneasiness had made necessary. But the blame seems due, far less to individual shortcomings than to the inevitable failure of an organisation required in a time of sudden crisis to carry out duties far more extensive than ever had been anticipated.

The task of government was rendered the more difficult during the period 1914-18 by the aid which external events lent to the revolutionary movements within India itself. German propaganda, Muslim anxiety produced by the entrance of Turkey into the war as an ally of Germany, Bolshevik propaganda following on the downfall of the imperial Russian government in 1917, the uncertain position on the north-west frontier where peace or war all along depended on whether the amir Habibullāh could or could not hold his people in check, encouraged the revolutionaries to redoubled efforts. Shortly after the outbreak of the war there arrived at Calcutta a ship-load of Sikhs who had been recruited and carried to Vancouver for the express purpose (as it would seem) of being refused admission into British Columbia and then sent back to India to excite discontent. On arrival they refused to enter the special train designed to convey them back to their native province; a riot ensued; the returned emigrants proved to have been provided with revolvers; men were shot on both sides; and those Sikhs who escaped capture joined groups of dacoits and committed a series of violent crimes. In December, 1914, a Bombay Brāhman was employed to concert a joint-rebellion in Bengal and the Panjab. A general rising was planned

for the following February, but was frustrated by the betrayal of the plan. In consequence of these efforts, the Defence of India Act was passed, under which revolutionists could be tried by a bench of judges with no preliminary commitment and no power of appeal, and suspects against whom actual crime could not be juridically proved might be interned.

In 1915 came the unfortunate *Khilāfat* movement. Muslim uneasiness at the war with Turkey was exploited in order, if possible, to produce rebellion. The cry raised was that the Holy Places of Islam were in danger. Many unfortunate peasants were persuaded to sell their land and emigrate into Afghanistan. Muslim students from the Lahore colleges were induced to join fanatical groups in the tribal territory. A Turco-German mission at Kābul busied itself in seeking to promote open rebellion and in nominating a government to replace the British government on its overthrow. Other attempts were made by the *Gladi* party in America to raise trouble in Burma, where Muslim agents were employed to instigate an Indian regiment to mutiny.

As the event showed, these attempts were adequately watched and forestalled by the secret intelligence of the government. Probably greater anxiety was occasioned by the changed attitude of many Indian leaders as the war drew on. The early enthusiasm of August and September, 1914, did not hold. This should have surprised nobody. The fickleness of popular feeling is the tritest of political commonplaces. Nor was much done to keep enthusiasm alive. It needed constant tending. Associations for voluntary work might have done much to keep it alive with the stimulus of emulation. But, except by Lord and Lady Willingdon at Bombay, little was done in this direction. As the first warmth of feeling cooled, as the burdens of war grew heavier, and the issue became less certain, the politicians began to change their tone. Something of this must be ascribed to the unbalanced praise and strong exaggeration of the part which India had played. English newspapers and politicians alike wrote and spoke as though India had saved the empire, and as though her effort, great as it was, had been really comparable with the efforts of the allied states, involved in as desperate a struggle as any that stands upon record. The effect of such language was unfortunate. It was naturally argued in Indian circles that Indian services would be acknowledged in the only way that could be acceptable to

Indian leaders, by the concession of substantial political changes; and when the cabinet, immersed in the overwhelming business of the hour, gave no sign of having considered the expected reorganisation of the empire, the early enthusiasm of political circles gave way to growing disappointment and suspicion. The calamitous mismanagement of Irish affairs seemed to indicate that the British government could be squeezed. New relations between Great Britain and the self-governing dominions too seemed to be in process of development; President Wilson, with headlong ineptitude, proposed "self-determination" as the goal to be attained on the conclusion of the war, while other leaders held out hopes that the war then raging was destined to be the last and that the dominion of armed force was drawing to its end. The new world thus foreshadowed, when the western powers should have attained to victory, the pathetic and delusive hopes spread abroad to encourage disheartened and weary combatants, seemed to promise the advent of an age when power and interests would be subordinated to argument and ideals. In these circumstances the Home Rule Movement was launched by Tilak and Mrs Besant. It was well calculated to attract wide support. Even the Muslims were for a while drawn into alliance with the extremest Hindu leaders. Forgetting the manifest dangers of their position in the excitement aroused by the Khilāfat movement, a considerable section of them agreed to accept a scheme hurriedly prepared as the basis of demands which were to be made in the name of a united India. In order to facilitate propaganda, Indian leaders in 1917 demanded the repeal of the Press Act of 1910. It was stigmatised as being at once ineffectual and oppressive. In fact while 143 newspapers had been formally warned under its provisions, in only three cases had the security been declared forfeit; while fifty-five presses had been warned, thirteen had forfeited their first security and only one its second. No forfeiture had been set aside by the High Courts, and the number of newspapers and presses had increased greatly, despite the existence of the act. The demand was therefore refused. Meanwhile Tilak and Mrs Besant succeeded in arousing a vigorous agitation. The government viewed this as undesirable and untimely, at a moment when the need of recruits, combatant and non-combatant alike, was great and growing. But unfortunately the views of the government were divided, its policy irresolute, its

action half-hearted. Mrs Besant was first restrained from entering Bombay and the Central Provinces, and then interned in the pleasant seclusion of the Nilgiris. But the agitation only redoubled under acts sharp enough to sting but not severe enough to hurt. The same ideas which in Indian minds were fostering agitation were in British minds shaking the strong confidence which had prevailed ever since the Mutiny in the British mission to the Indian peoples.

At last the war-worn British cabinet decided on making a pronouncement on the goal of British policy in India. The subject had long been under discussion. When Lord Chelmsford became governor-general in 1916, he had immediately invited his executive council to consider two questions. The first was, "What is the goal of British rule in India?" The conclusion reached was that the goal was "the endowment of British India as an integral part of the British Empire with self-government." The second question was, "What are the steps on the road to that goal?" But here greater difficulties of definition were found. The lines of advance which had been urged from time to time by the National Congress were provincial autonomy, further expansion and reform of the legislative and executive councils, the development of local self-government, and the abolition or at least the reform of the Council of India, which, it was claimed, had long laid the dead hand of obsolete experience on the constitutional development of India.

The gradual release of provincial administrations from the detailed control of the Government of India and of the secretary of state certainly formed an obvious line of advance. So early as 1911 it had been commended by the Government of India to the secretary of state. Sound policy, it wrote, appeared to lie in giving gradually to the provinces "a larger measure of self-government, until at last India would consist of a number of administrations, autonomous in all provincial affairs, with the Government of India above them all, and possessing power to interfere in cases of misgovernment, but ordinarily restricting their functions to matters of imperial concern". But the secretary of state refused to take any decision on this important proposal.

When Lord Chelmsford again raised the question, the government's conclusions were more specific than they had been in 1911. It was felt that self-government within the empire could not be

well attained by any blind imitation of dominion models. The social structure of India was too different to admit the adoption of colonial constitutions. But (as Lord Zetland has stated) a larger measure of control by Indians was desirable. This "would ultimately result in a form of self-government . . . differing possibly in many ways from that enjoyed by other parts of the empire, but evolved on lines which had taken into account India's past history and the special circumstances and traditions of her component peoples". It was therefore proposed to develop the existing local self-governing bodies, to increase the number of Indians appointed to high administrative posts, and to enlarge the elective element in the provincial legislatures so as to prepare for an extension of their constitutional powers. Sir Austen Chamberlain, then secretary of state, did not wish to go further at the moment than declare "an intention to foster the gradual development of free institutions". Montagu, who succeeded him in 1917, proposed a similar formula, which was finally recast by Curzon as the result of cabinet discussions into the words read by Montagu in the House of Commons on August 20, 1917. It ran, "The policy of His Majesty's government, with which the Government of India are in complete accord, is that of the increasing association of Indians with every branch of the administration, and the gradual development of self-governing institutions, with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire." Such progress, it was added, could be achieved only by successive stages, to be determined by the British Government and the Government of India in accordance with the degree of success secured.

Meanwhile Indians had been busily devising constitutions. A body known as the "Madras Parliament", connected with Mrs Besant's Home Rule League, drew up one. Nineteen of the elected members of the imperial legislative council prepared another. A third was produced, in November, 1916, by representatives of the Hindu National Congress and of the Muslim League, and this was formally adopted by both bodies at meetings held in Lucknow in the following month. This proposed the direct election of four-fifths of all the members of the provincial legislatures, and a similar proportion of elected members in the imperial council, though the elective members of the latter were

to be chosen in part by the elective members of the provincial councils, and only in part by a direct vote. Apart from certain items of receipt and expenditure which were to be reserved as imperial, the provincial authorities were to become financially independent, subject to a vague general supervision. At the head of each province was to be a governor who in general was not to be a member of any service, with an executive council, half of which was to be chosen by the elective members of the legislative council. Resolutions of the latter were to be binding unless vetoed by the governor-in-council, and in the latter case, when repeated after a fixed interval, were to become absolute. Muslims were to have separate electorates, with a proportion of numbers considerably in excess of their numerical claims, but were no longer to be free to contest other seats; and any bill or resolution opposed by three-quarters of either the Hindu or the Muslim members as injurious to their community was not to be further proceeded with.

Another scheme was propounded by Mr Lionel Curtis and a group of his associates, who included Anglo-Indian officials of high rank. Mr Curtis was a leading member of the Round Table group, which had played a not inconsiderable part in bringing about the union of South Africa in 1909. They were convinced believers in the sobering effects of frank and informal discussion. In South Africa they believed that the formation of study-circles to discuss the conflicting outlooks of Briton and Dutchman had done much to moderate antagonism, and hoped that a like procedure might be followed by like results in India. Mr Curtis reached India in the latter half of 1916 and attempted to set this plan in operation. But advanced Indian opinion was from the first hostile to him, perhaps owing to his South African associations, perhaps also because it was reluctant to defend itself in an arena where rhetoric and invective would be idle weapons. A chance phrase in a private letter of his which was stolen, and published, was deliberately distorted in order to wreck his plan. But he persisted in his study of the Indian problem with the aid of such as were willing to work with him, seeking especially to test the possibility of a plan of devolution suggested by Sir William Duke early in 1916 when a member of the Council of India. The essence of this proposal lay in a projected division of the functions of government. Granted that a step was to be taken towards the

establishment of responsible government without abandoning the essential matters for which the paramount power felt itself peculiarly responsible, why should it not be possible to transfer to responsible ministers the other duties of government? Mr Curzon persuaded himself that this conception might really solve the difficulty of a gradual transference of power from English into Indian hands. Early in 1917, in his *Letter to the People of India*, he advocated the development of responsible government (in the dominion sense of the term) by this evolutionary method. He urged the formation of smaller provinces with a much higher degree of homogeneity than existed in the old ones, which had grown up largely by chance and often embraced peoples of diverse languages. In each province should be established elective assemblies, with a ministry in each dependent on commanding a majority of votes. These ministries and executive councils of the old pattern would form two parallel executives under the common control of a governor, who would deal with certain departments of business in consultation with the responsible ministers, and with the other departments in consultation with the non-responsible councillors. It was suggested that public works, local self-government, and primary education might be transferred to the management of the proposed ministers, leaving the remaining functions of government under official control as before. Gradually, and by degrees varying in different provinces in proportion as the transferred departments were worked successfully, the whole of the duties of the provincial governments might thus pass under the control of popular assemblies.

This ingenious plan was much discussed. A number of Europeans and Indians presented an address to government commending it in its general outline. The National Congress, however, rejected it in favour of the plan of reform which it had already put forward, it thought that this should be introduced at once, and that a definite time should be laid down within which full responsible government was to be established.

Meanwhile Montagu resolved to visit India, ostensibly to consult with the Government of India and Indian leaders, actually in order to press the adoption of the scheme for dividing government into two parts—responsible and non-responsible. He was accompanied by a small committee, in which the original inventor of the scheme, Sir William Duke, had a place. He

rapidly toured India, interviewed a large number of politicians, exhibited great impatience with persons whose views differed from his own, and within six months of his arrival he and Lord Chelmsford signed the joint report in which dyarchy (as Sir William Duke's scheme had come to be called) was formally recommended for adoption. The report was drawn with great skill and persuasiveness. The first part of it was devoted to an historical exposition of the various endeavours which had been already made to modify the inherited autocracy of government in India. The second part discussed the methods by which the process might best be continued. The authors held that the sole practical solution lay in the development of responsible parliamentary government. The process, it was admitted, must be gradual, and the Congress proposals for the immediate establishment of full provincial autonomy were premature. It was also objected that such a legislative control over finance as Congress desired was impossible until the executives should become wholly responsible to the legislatures. Mr Curtis's plan to place certain departments of government under the legislatures, with executives responsible to the latter, was also rejected as likely to produce friction. The report agreed that the duties of provincial government should be divided into two groups, conducted respectively by an executive council and by a group of ministers chosen by the governor from the elected members of the legislature; but it recommended that the two halves should act as far as possible in union, that they should cultivate a habit of joint deliberation, and that the governor should remain free to reject the advice of his ministers in regard to their departments where he judged acceptance of it would produce serious disadvantages. It recommended a great increase in the number of non-official members in the legislatures, chosen wherever possible by direct election. It condemned the principle of communal representation as inconsistent with democracy; but reluctantly recognised the necessity of continuing it in the case of the Muslims.

All these schemes, whether produced by Indian politicians, by the Round Table group, or by the secretary of state and the governor-general, attached primary importance to the development of parliamentary government, and relegated "the increasing association of Indians with every branch of the administration" to a secondary place. It was evident that the establishment of the

former would at once secure the concession of the latter. Indian politicians very naturally, therefore, set the former in the foreground and devoted every effort to securing it. It was natural too that English politicians should consider the reorganisation of political institutions as more important than a mere matter of personnel. "Englishmen", once said Thomas Munro, "are as great fanatics in politics as Moslems in religion." He was thinking of the manner in which Cornwallis had forced English administrative and legal ideas upon Bengal. But in like manner Metcalfe had given India a free press; and so in the twentieth century Moiley and Montagu had been seeking to prepare for a free parliament. This was in notable contrast with Minto's view, in which greater importance was attached to the administrative co-operation of Indian and Englishman. Montagu was disposed to assume that co-operation would automatically follow upon constitutional reform. Seldom has political dogmatism been more evident in the formulation of a scheme of government.

The Montagu-Chelmsford report was published in the middle of 1918. The more moderate politicians were inclined to approve, and so were the land-owners, provided they might retain the special rights of representation which they enjoyed. But the advanced party began at once to denounce the new proposals, declaring that they would accept nothing short of full provincial autonomy. The official world also was strongly critical, on the ground that the transferred departments would be ill-managed and that the new oligarchy which would be set in power would not work harmoniously with their official colleagues. The heads of provinces were summoned to Delhi to discuss possible alternatives. The principal criticism put forward was that as yet the men who on political grounds would have the best claims to selection as ministers lacked sufficient administrative experience; and that the best course would be to increase the association of Indians with the administration before making any move towards parliamentary government. Lord Ronaldsday and Sir Edward Gait considered that any delay in introducing constitutional reform would be regarded as a breach of faith. Others, however, recommended an alternative scheme in line with their objections to dyarchy. They proposed that in the first instance executive councils should be appointed containing an equal number of officials and non-officials. The governor would be free to distribute

the charge of departments as he thought best, and the official and non-official members would act together as a single government. The line of development which these proposals were designed to assist lay in the gradual increase in the number of non-official members, the extension of the functions entrusted to them, and the disuse of the governor's powers of overruling his council. The advantage which was claimed for this scheme was that it did not threaten to impair the efficiency of the administrative machine, and that it manifested equally with Minto's most characteristic measure a sincere desire no longer to engross, but to share power. Although it would involve no immediate constitutional change, it would provide an ever-growing number of men practised in administration in the highest fields, and thus prepare and train the responsible ministers of the future if constitutional changes, at a later time and in a less heated atmosphere, should still appear to be desirable.

In at least one respect this alternative proposal promised some advantage over the dyarchy scheme adopted by the secretary of state and the governor-general. The successful working of dyarchy presupposed conditions which it was in fact unwise to take for granted. For the two halves of the provincial governments to work smoothly together, compromise and tolerance would be needed. These commonplace virtues of English political life could not be assumed in a country where representative government was in its infancy. Again if ministers were to fulfil their functions properly, they would have not only to display ability in the conduct of business unfamiliar to them, but also to command a stable majority in the legislative councils. But whence was such a majority to be drawn? There were no political parties. These would have to be built up from the foundations. Communal groups would doubtless form themselves, divided by narrow communal interests, but these would tend either to hamper or pervert ministerial action. Ministers would have for a long time to rely upon a personal following; they would probably be driven to employ their ministerial power to keep that following together; in proportion as they succeeded in favouring their own group they would exasperate the rest; so that their careers were likely to be short and fitful. Above all their acceptance of office would mark them out as targets of attack by the extreme party whose complete hostility was in any

case assured. Neither among the ministers nor in the legislative councils was there any guarantee of the cordial co-operation without which the scheme must inevitably fail. The proposals of the heads of provinces, on the contrary, pronounced a much more workable system. The unity of the government would check eccentricity on the part of non-official members. They would be chosen from among the men who were disposed to work with government, and the unextended powers of the legislatures would not permit an embarrassing interference with the conduct of administration. As against the advantage of not weakening the mechanism of government had to be set the disadvantage of alienating those who insisted on the need of constitutional change. But the latter would perhaps have been a lesser evil than was thought, for appointments on the councils would have conciliated moderate leaders, while extremist leaders were resolved in no circumstances to be conciliated.

The secretary of state and the governor-general had, however, already decided in favour of the scheme to which they had set their hands, and the proposals of the heads of provinces were rejected. A committee, over which Lord Southborough presided, was then sent to India to frame proposals for the regulation of the franchise and the formation of constituencies. In the middle of 1919 a bill was introduced. It was referred to a joint-committee of both Houses, and passed into law on December 23. The new system established governors and executive councils in five provinces in the place of lieutenant-governors. The branches of government were divided into central and provincial, and the latter head again into "transferred" and "reserved" subjects. To deal with transferred subjects the governor was empowered to appoint ministers from the elected members of his legislative council. In accordance with a preponderance of Indian political opinion, the funds available for the transferred and for the reserved subjects were to be drawn from a joint purse, instead of being (as the Government of India had desired) definitely allocated between the two halves of government. This proved an unfortunate decision, and the more so by reason of the financial stringency which affected the Indian governments just at the critical time when the new arrangements were coming into operation. Budgets were to be passed by the legislative councils, but the governors were authorised to restore grants for reserved

subjects, where these were reduced or rejected by the legislatures. The councils were doubled in size, and were not to include more than 20 per cent of officials, while 70 per cent. was to consist of elected members. The franchise and arrangement of constituencies varied greatly from province to province. The demand for separate, communal electorates, the principle of which had been condemned by the Montagu-Chelmsford report, proved widespread and vehement. Not only did the Muslims insist on retaining the special protection which they enjoyed, but numerous other bodies brought forward similar claims. In the Panjab, for example, the Sikhs claimed it with success; and in southern India the non-Brahmans, though forming a large numerical majority, insisted that they required special seats to be reserved for them, owing to the superior education and organisation of the Brahmins.

Although the Government of India was not split in two after the manner of the provincial governments, large changes were made in it also. The legislature was made bi-cameral, a new body, the Council of State, being established with a membership of sixty, of whom not more than twenty might be officials. The imperial legislative council, thenceforth to be known as the Legislative Assembly, was enlarged to one hundred and forty members, of whom one hundred were to be elective and only twenty-six officials. The official majority, which had vanished from the provincial councils in 1909, was thus withdrawn from the central legislature as well. Presidents were to be appointed in each chamber, in place of the executive head who had presided till then, and the legislature was entrusted with the obligation of adopting as well as discussing the budget. Executive control over the legislature thus disappeared from the central government. But it was still thought necessary to reserve means by which in the last resort the executive could ensure such legislation and grants of supply as it judged imperative. A bill rejected by the assembly might be "certified" by the governor-general as essential to the peace, order, or good government of the country; it could then be introduced into the council of state and when passed there need not be referred back to the assembly. In like manner, a grant of supplies which was refused or proposed new taxation which was rejected, might be made operative by certification.

Such fundamental changes in the structure of the Indian governments involved a necessary reduction in the influence of

the secretary of state. Till 1919 the legal authority of the home government had always been supreme in so far as supreme authority could at any given moment be exercised from so great a distance. But the extension of the powers and influence of the Indian legislatures and their release from executive control, would evidently diminish the moral authority which Whitehall had claimed over a purely bureaucratic administration. This had been recognised by the select committee. The legal position, it held, could not as yet be modified, but it hoped that the secretary of state would interfere only in exceptional circumstances in matters "of purely Indian interest, where the government and the legislature of India are in agreement". The recommendation applied with special force to provincial subjects classified as "transferred" and placed under the management of ministers. Henceforth too the secretary of state was to be paid from British, and no longer from Indian revenues, while the functions which he discharged were reduced by the creation of a high commissioner, with duties akin to those of the dominion high commissioners, under the orders of the Government of India.

The passing of the act was signalled by the issue of a proclamation which may well challenge comparison with Queen Victoria's proclamation of 1858. It dwelt on the greatness of the changes and the demands which they would make upon all concerned in their operation. "There will be need of perseverance and mutual forbearance between all sections and races of my people in India. I rely on the new popular assemblies to interpret wisely the wishes of those whom they represent. . . . I rely on the leaders of the people. . . to face responsibility and endure misrepresentations, to sacrifice much for the common interest of the state. . . . Equally do I rely upon my officers to respect their new colleagues, and to work with them in harmony and kindness, to assist the people and their representatives in an orderly advance towards free institutions; and to find in these new tasks a fresh opportunity to fulfil, as in the past, their highest purpose of service to my people."

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